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The September 11 events received extensive coverage in the British and Greek media. 
This thesis employs a post-positivist, discursive analytic framework drawing largely from 
Laclau and Mouffe, Foucault and Derrida to explore the press representations of major 
Greek and British newspapers six months before September 11 and during the ensuing 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Specifically, the analysis focuses on these two culturally 
distinct, European countries' constructions of the events, the role of the U. S. in the 
international system, their role as E. U. members, as well as their perception of emerging 
threats. Some of the key representations analyzed are the Kyoto protocol, globalization 
and the anti-globalization movement, terrorism, Islam and Saddarn Hussein. The thesis 
explores the way events are understood and represented in different cultural contexts. 
One of the primary aims of the project is to discover the differences and similarities in the 
representations of the two countries, as well as whether and in what respects events such 
as those of September 11, the war in Afghanistan and the subsequent Iraq war can affect 
existing articulations and existing state identity constructions. Finally, drawing from the 
belief that discursive practices are political practices, the thesis studies the ways in which 
these discourses may have enabled, necessitated or disabled particular responses and 
courses of action and the ways in which they may have marginalized other discourses. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis compares British and Greek press representations after September II and 
during the ensuing Afghanistan and Iraq wars. It aims at determining what this 
comparison reveals about the ways these two culturally distinct, European countries 
understood. the events, the role of the U. S. in the international system, their role as E. U. 
members, as well as their perceptions of emerging threats. As a Greek person studying in 
Britain in 2001-2002,1 was intrigued by the substantially different Greek and British 
media responses to the September II events. I was also fascinated by the uniformity 
within each country's media in their interpretation of the events. This uniformity within 
and divergence between the two counties' media discourses aroused my curiosity as to, 
firstly, what accounted for such uniformity. Was this the usual state of affairs, or could 
the September II events have triggered this otherwise unusual convergence? Moreover, 
I was intrigued as to what accounted for such divergence. Greece and the U. K. may be 
two culturally different countries, but they are both members of the E. U. and share 
similar economic and political values, operating within a liberal, capitalist system. 
Precisely because these discourses were prevalent within each country's media I was also 
interested in finding out what they were reflective of and what their political 
consequences were. 
I found that a post-positivist, discursive analytic framework can provide a deeper 
understanding of the above issues. Based on thi's frimework, the thesis asks the 
following questions: 
What were the prevailing articulations in the Greek and British press during the 
proposed period of study? Were there multiple discourses or was there a 
hegemonic discourse? 
4 
9 What were the similarities and differences in the press discourse of each country 
and between the two countries? 
9 Was there continuity in the representations or were there abrupt and sudden 
changes during the proposed period of study? 
* In what ways were identities and subject positions constructed, reconstructed and 
subverted in the texts? By means of what mechanisms and strategies were 
specific discourses rendered dominant while others were marginalized? 
What were the consequences of adopting one mode of representation over 
another? 
In what ways did the discourses enable, necessitate or disable particular responses 
and courses of action? 
By asking the above questions I hope to draw some general conclusions about how and 
under what conditions "discourses are constructed, contested and change" (Howarth 
2000: 131). 1 also hope to gain an understanding of the way events are understood in 
different cultural contexts; Moreover, I aim at exploring whether, the extent to which and, 
in what respects events such as those of September 11, the war in Afghanistan and the 
subsequent Iraq war can affect existing discursive articulations. Finally, drawing on the 
belief that discursive practices are political practices, I am interested in the ways in which 
these discourses affected policies and courses of action. The remainder of this 
introductory chapter elaborates on issues raised above by covering the research question 
and the theory, as well as providing explanations for the data and its use (King, Keohane 
and Verba, 1994: 13). 
Why- post-structuralism? Why discourse analysis? 
Traditional IR theories can provide useful insight into interstate relations and issues of 
security and war. However, they also make certain assumptions that render some issues 
much more relevant than others and adopt a state-centric approach, whereby the world is 
an anarchical arena in which the states, as unitary and rational actors with stable 
identities, interact according to objectively observable laws. Essentially, all social 
5 
identities are seen "as rooted in pre-given essences" (Torfing, 1999: 93). Moreover, 
power is centered around the states (see for example, Hobbes, 2002; Morgenthau, 1985; 
Waltz, 1979) and is conceived as essentially synonymous with military capabilities or 
economic supremacy. Furthermore, it is also assumed that an objective social reality 
with natural laws determines political and social events. This social reality can, in turn, 
be objectively analyzed and falsified by an empirical study-, natural and social science can 
thus follow the same rules to observe and analyze the world objectively. Similarly, "a 
realist approach to language assesses speech on its ability to accurately represent some 
independent reality outside it", while "the critical social project will require being able to 
differentiate distorted from true accounts of reality" (Miller, 2000: 320). 
Based on the above assumptions, a study of the Greek and British press would compare 
the institutions and explore the relationships between institutional and state power (see 
for example Chomsky, 2002; Chomsky and Herman, 1995; Norris, 2003) in order to 
determine the extent to which the government is involved in propaganda and the 
manufacturing of false accounts. Moreover, the newspaper language would be viewed 
as a direct consequence of institutional and state interests. The primary reason for 
studying newspaper language would thus be to understand what those interests are and 
unmask domination and distortions of the truth (Van Dijk, 1985,1988) in order to arrive 
at an accurate assessment of reality. Newspaper language would also be analyzed over a 
period of time in order to understand any changes in those power interests. Even though 
this is a worthwhile endeavour, it limits the study of discourse, in this case media 
discourse, to the study of discourse as language employed by rational actors interested in 
promoting their own interests. 
It is my contention that discourse should be understood as not merely reflecting but as 
constituting reality. Discourses' are essentially structures of meaning which, at least 
temporarily, fix meaning and construct "our" reality in that they enable us to understand 
the world around us (see for example Doty 1996; Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000; Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985; Milliken, 1999). Such a conceptualization of discourse results in "the 
1 Discourse theory and discourse analysis will be thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 2. 
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breakdown of once central political narratives and ideologies, the dissolution of stable 
political identities and institutions, and the decline of utopian projects and discourses" 
(Newman, 2004: 145). In this respect, discourse analysis is compatible with post- 
structuralism and postmodernism 2 (see for example, Campbell, 1998a and 1998b; 
Derrida, 1976; Doty, 1993a and 1996; Weldes, 1996 and 1999), which dismiss the 
possibility of any true knowledge of the world outside of discourse. Post-structuralism 
and postmodernism are essentially a reaction to the assumed belief that reality can be 
objectively analyzed and explained and that "truth" can be reached by means of 
objective, scientific methods. They reject the existence of an ultimate truth and of any 
ultimate principles, whilst also refuting the notion of fixed social identities and of 
fixedness of meaning. They argue against universality, closure, unity, uniformity, 
homogeneity, totality and stability, while celebrating particularity, open-endedness, 
multiplicity, diversity, heterogeneity, partiality and change. Moreover, unlike 
mainstream IR theories, power in postmodern and post-structuralist thought is broadened 
and permeates all levels of society, rather than being centered around the states, 
institutions and elites. It is not agency-centered, in the sense that agency is seen as 
located within the political process. 
In turn, such conceptions of the political result in analysis which aims at showing that 
what seems to be real and true is merely a contingent construction. Thus, post- 
modernists and po. st-structuralists are not interested in discovering the real causes and the 
hidden interests behind an issue or event, since "there is no such thing as a real interest 
independent from the discursive context in which interests emerge" (Diez, 1999: 599); 
they instead show the ways identities are constituted and reconstituted and the political 
consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another, thus uncovering the 
constructedness and contingency of meaning as well as the contestedness of certain 
notions. As a result, social science "becomes a more subjective and humble enterprise, as 
truth gives way to tentativeness" (Rosenau, 1992: 8), while politics loses its 
straightforwardness and universality, and becomes an indeterminable venture. 
21 do not equate post-structuralism with postmodernism and I believe that there arc very important differences between 
the two, but I do not discuss them separately because they have many similarities which inform my study 
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Postmodernists' refusal to privilege scientific reason and their commitment to analyze 
and deconstruct the different constructed realities, as well as their problematization of 
agency and their emphasis on exclusionary practices by means of which dominant 
knowledge is produced, are essential to an understanding of the workings of international 
politics. Postmodernism is also very important in that it can account for change, since it 
recognizes the non-static character of politics and points out issues of exclusion and 
silencing. Judith Squires (1993: 3) refers to postinodernism as "a post Enlightenment 
defence of principled positions, without the essentialist or transcendental illusions of 
Enlighterunent thought". 
Why media discourse? 
The mass media is beyond doubt central for the production and reproduction of 
individual and state identity and the transformation of social phenomena (see Beck 1999; 
Castells 1998; Hall 1990: 11; Hardt and Negri 2000; Kellner 1995; Torfing 1999), since 
media representations "help constitute an individual's view of the world, sense of 
personal identity and gender, playing about of style and lifestyle, and socio-political 
thought and action" (Kellner, 1995: 5). News is very important in people's daily lives, 
and it is news in the press and on television that people are exposed to and mostly rely on 
for their information (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 135; 
Semetko 2000: 343; Traugot and Brader 2003: 194). Especially regarding foreign policy 
issues, which "lie outside the orbit in which most of us habitually move", we are to a 
great extent dependent on the information provided by the media (Lang and Lang, 1994: 
58). Moreover, the media's power to some extent also lies in that many people nowadays 
readily accept media discourses as "objective" and "truthful" (see Ekecrantz and Olsson, 
1998: 83), or, at least, as less biased than, for example, the state officials' discourses. 
Moreover, not only do the media construct national public spheres, but they also reflect 
and are constituted by these spheres; that is, they are shaped by national cultures and 
identities (Moores, 2000: 94-96), since they "do not exist outside the political and social 
world they describe" (Allen and Seaton, 1999: 4). This means that studying media 
discourses can also provide insight on national discourses. As Kellner (1995: 5) points 
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out, "since media culture is both constituted by and constitutive of larger social and 
political dynamics, it is an excellent optic to illuminate the nature of contemporary 
society, politics and everyday life". 
Since power permeates all levels of society, it is important to study it on many different 
levels in order to more comprehensively understand the political process. Even though 
governmental elites are very significant actors, and the study of elite discourses is 
essential for an understanding of the political process (see for example Weldes 1996; 
Campbell 1998; Doty 1996), it should be complemented by the analysis of discourses in 
the public sphere, such as media discourses, since collective identities largely influence 
how elites come to see their interests (Risse, 2000). Thus, in turn, the study of media 
discourses, which reflect and construct collective identities, can account for the success 
or failure of certain policies, and can help explain certain issues that intergovernmental 
approaches cannot fully explain. For example, purely intergovernmental approaches can 
only partially capture the multi-level governmental structure of the E. U. (Chryssochoou, 
2001: 56-8; Rosamond, 2000); an approach is therefore also needed which explores the 
media's role in the constitution of public political debates (Hodess, 1997; 
Tsagarousianou, 1998). 
This thesis compares British and Greek press representations. One of the reasons for this 
choice is limited access to a wide range of television news programmes; however, the 
main reason is the partisan nature of the press (Semetko, 2000: 343), which enables a 
study of a wider range of political spectrums. As far as the choice of newspapers is 
concerned, I analyze newspapers from different political spectrums in order to find out 
whether, and to what extent, the discourses differed depending on the papers' ideological 
orientation and whether the press discourses of the two countries were similar or different 
depending on their political affiliations, rather than, for example, their cultural 
specificity. Moreover, such a comparison can provide insight into the predominance of a 
discourse within the press of each country and its future development. Thus, for 
example, a discourse which is hegemonic in all newspapers within the same country 
iegardless of their political affiliation is generally less likely to change swiftly or be 
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replaced by an alternative discourse which is only prevalent in one newspaper. Three 
Greek and three British newspapers are thus studied, chosen mostly because of their 
popularity and high circulation as well as their different political stances, which means 
that they cover a wide spectrum of opinions. The British newspapers analyzed are two 
broadsheets, Ae Times and The Independent, the first being right wing and the second 
more towards the center. Furthen-nore, since tabloids are very popular in the U. K. and 
since they deal with political issues, a left wing tabloid, 7he Mirror, is looked at. 
Kathimerini is a right-wing Greek broadsheet, Ta Nea is center oriented, and 
Eleutherotipia is a left-wing newspaper. Since tabloids are a recent phenomenon in 
Greece, and since they mainly deal with entertainment or local issues, no Greek tabloid is 
looked at. 3 
Finally, it is worth noting that the project conducts a qualitative analysis. Even though I 
examined all available material in the proposed period of study, I focused mostly, but not 
exclusively, on the editorials, opinion and comment articles in the daily newspapers, 
since they more clearly convey the existing discursive structures in the British and Greek 
press. Furthermore, elements such as cartoons, photos and captions are all very important 
features which are also analyzed, since they work together with texts to construct 
meaning and thus enable a deeper understanding of discursive practices and hegemonic 
articulations (see for example Burgin 1983; Gamson 1992; Hall 1973; Gunther and 
Leeuwen 1998; Kuhn 2000; Lutz and Collins 1993). 
Why comparative anal-vsis and what is being compared? 
A comparative study identifies similarities and differences in articulations and 
representations in different cultural and political contexts. Comparing the British and 
Greek press is important because it can provide an understanding of the ways the "same" 
event can be understood in different ways and the similarities and differences in identity 
31 have translated the Greek newspapers in such a way, that they are as close to the Greek original as possible. I didn't 
try to provide a smoother English translation, because my aim was to expose the understanding of events in different 
cultural contexts; thus, an "English" translation of the Greek text would hinder the understanding of the cultural 
specificity of the discourses. 
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constructions. As Howarth points out, "the point of comparison is to further our 
understanding and explanation of different logics of identity formation and hegernonic 
practice in different historical conjuctures [it should also be stressed in different cultural 
contexts]" (Howarth 2000: 138-139). Identifying the similarities and differences is, in 
turn, very useful in that it leads to the questioning of dominant forms of knowledge and 
the refuting of absolute truisms. 
The comparison in this thesis is conducted on two levels. The press discourses are 
compared over time and across countries. Thus, the first time period examined extends 
from March to September 10,200 1, that is 6 months prior to the September II events, 
while the second period from September 12 until the end of December, thus covering 
both the September II events and the Afghanistan war. The third period extends from 
October 2002, shortly before the U. N. Security Council resolution 144 14 and up until 
April 2003, thus covering the build-up to the war in Iraq and the beginning of the war. 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to compare the press representations after 
September II in order to understand the extent to which the September II events affected 
existing articulations. It is therefore essential to examine the representations before 
September II in order to locate the existing discourses before the attacks and thus 
determine any changes in the representational practices. Moreover, it is also important to 
analyze the discourses during the Afghanistan war and in the months leading to the Iraq 
war in order to appreciate whether any occurring changes were only temporary or carried 
a lasting effect. 
This, in turn, raises the question: Why do the September II events form a good case 
study? It has been argued that these events marked a turning point _- politically, 
economically, culturally and in our perception of the world and the international system, 
while the day when the events took place has often been referred to as "the day that 
changed the world" (Campbell, 2002: 12; Martin and Phelan, 2002: 104). of course, this 
view can be contested, but it is the case that the September II events caused a ripple 
4 Resolution 1441 was passed unanimously by the U. N. security council on November 8,2002, offering Iraq "a final 
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations". 
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effect, initiating a series of actions on the part of the U. S. Whether or not, therefore, 
these events are system transforming or not, they have certainly attracted a lot of 
attention, have caused heated debates and were crucial in the development of world 
events, in the sense that two wars, in Afghanistan and in Iraq, were justified in their 
name, as part of the "war on Terrorism", which was recently also referred to as "the long 
war" by the Bush administration. As Bush (2003) pointed out, the war in Iraq was "one 
victory in a war on terror that began on September I Ith, 2001". 
Precisely because the September II events marked a period of turmoil, such a moment is 
a good starting point for any study which seeks to look into issues of hegemony and 
identity formation since such events may disrupt and affect identities through discursive 
dislocations. 5 Such dislocations occur "when discourses begin to disintegrate during 
periods of social or economic tunnoil, and when such dislocations are experienced by 
subjects as an identity crisis" (Howarth, 1995: 123). Dislocations, according to Laclau 
and Mouffe, "disrupt identities and discourses, but also create a lack at the level of 
meaning that stimulates new discursive constructions, which attempt to suture the 
dislocated structure" (cited in Howarth 2000: 13). It is therefore possible that the 
September II events affected the Greek and British press discourses, and as a result their 
states' identities, to such an extent that new discursive constructions may have arisen, at 
least temporarily. Studying the press representations after September 11 therefore 
enables one to detennine the extent to which, and the ways in which, the events affected 
these states' identities as well as the ways in which the identities accommodated and 
conditioned the events. 
It is also noteworthy, that after these events there was a revival of somewhat forgotten 
themes on the "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1998) and the battle between 'the 
west' and 'the rest', 'Christianity' and 'Islam'. Therefore, it is very interesting to look at 
the constructions of these themes in two countries that not only belong to the so called 
west, but are also members of the same western bloc, namely the E. U. 
5 These terms and notions are comprehensively analyzed in the following chapter (chapter 2). 
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The choice of countries is quite important and is to some extent related to the fact that I 
am a Greek person studying and residing in the U. K., whose interest in analyzing these 
two countries' discourses has developed as a result. It is also related to my interest, as an 
E. U. citizen and a researcher, to gain an understanding of issues relating to the E. U., 
especially since there have recently been extensive debates on and a renewed interest in 
the future of the E. U., its expansion and its role in the international sphere as well as in 
relation to the U. S. in the face of the perceived terrorist threat (see for example, Kagan, 
2003; Patten, 2006; Peterson and Pollack, 2003; Shapiro, 2004). Greece and the U. K. are 
also good case studies because they are "comparable", which means that they are "similar 
in a large number of important characteristics" but "dissimilar as far as those variables 
are concerned which one wants to relate to each other" (Lijphart, 1971: 688). 
Indeed, Greece and the U. K. are "comparable" countries in that both belong to a 
particular geographic region of the world and are members of the E. U., operating within a 
liberal democratic, capitalist system and, as a result, sharing similar foreign policy 
decision making systems. Moreover, both countries share similar concerns and perceived 
"security threats", ranging from terrorism, to ethnic conflicts and environmental issues. 
However, the two countries are different in other ways. Firstly, they may both be E. U. 
members, but they are not equally powerful. The U. K., as a major global actor, has a 
more independent role in world politics. Not only has it got a very strong economy, 
compared to Greece, but it is also one of the founding NATO members and a G8 
member. In contrast, Greece is a smaller and "weaker" E. U. member, in a rather volatile 
area, the Balkans, with a long history of disputes and rivalry with neighbouring Turkey. 
History and geography also mean that these two European countries are culturally 
distinct; specifically, Greece is located in southeastern Europe and is seen as having both 
"Eastern" and "Western" cultural influences, in contrast to the U. K., a northwestern 
European country with close ties to the U. S. Linking the U. K. and Greece to the 
September II events, it is also worth comparing these two countries, since they adopted 
different policy stances and political positions before and during the Iraq war. 6 
6 It needs to be pointed out at this stage that the above "facts" about the U. K. and Greece are not used as points of 
departure in order tojustify discourses. It is thus not assumed, for "ample, that the U. K. press discourses on the U. S. 
are more favourable towards the U. S. than the Greek ones, because the U. K. has historically more in common with the 
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The final issue that needs to be addressed in this section pertains to the choice of the 
specific representations to be analyzed. In the following chapters I look at the press 
representations of the U. S., the E. U. and the perceived threats before and after September 
11. Even though I analyze representations of many different issues, such as the Kyoto 
protocol and the anti-globalization movement, they are all somewhat related to either of 
the above actors or perceived threats and all together enable an understanding of the 
overall discourses on these actors and "threats". I focus on the above actors/issues 
because they were central in the Greek and British press constructions of the "self' and 
because they were intrinsically linked -in the press constructions - to the September II 
events. 
Concluding remarks and chapter outline 
This thesis fits into the literature on comparative media discourse, identity and IR. Using 
a post-modernist, discourse analytic framework, I hope to identify the multiple and 
hegemonic discourses in the British and Greek press. Moreover, I wish to explore what 
difference, if any, the September II events have made for the British and Greek media 
discourses, and thus for the British and Greek identity constructions. Such an analysis is 
very important, since our understanding of who we are and, hence, the ways in which we 
should or shouldn't act is to a great extent dependent on such discursive representations. 
Thus, by analyzing the dominant discourses in the press, I hope to provide insight on 
state identity constructions and thus add to the growing literature that shows that IR can 
benefit from a post-positivist discourse analytic framework. By comparing the discourses 
of two European countries it is not only possible to explain and understand the 
construction and reconstruction of those states' identities, but also to account for their 
rather different policy responses in the months following September 11. Moreover, by 
exposing the contingency of certain constructed "truths" and the instability and volatility 
U. S. than Greece does. In contrast, ties with the U. S. are discursively constructed and are thus the outcome of these 
discursive constructions. In turn, the purpose of this thesis is to highlight and analyze the social construction of these 
"facts" rather than presuppose inherent similarities and differences between the two countries which result in different 
representations of the same event. 
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of knowledge regimes, which result in the legitimization of some and the delegitimization 
of other actions, I address the possibility of change by deconstructing the myth of 
absolute truths and well-established binaries, such as self/other, west/east, 
Christianity/Islam and good/evil. In addition, this thesis hopes to contribute to the area of 
European studies by exposing the complexity of foreign and security policies in the E. U. 
In the next chapter, I introduce my theoretical and methodological framework, which 
informs the rest of the thesis. Specifically, I explain my understanding of discourse, 
drawing largely from Laclau, Mouffe and Foucault, and explain notions such as 
hegemony and play of practice, which are vital for the understanding of discourse. I then 
move on to an explanation of the methodology I employ in conducting discourse analysis 
and make the connection between theory and methodology. 
Chapters 3,4 and 5 analyze the discourses in the Greek and British press in each of the 
three periods that inform my study. Chapter 3 focuses on the pre- September II period, 
from March to September 2001. Thus, I analyze representations of the most "heated" 
issues in the British and Greek press during that period, namely the Kyoto protocol, the 
spy plane incident with China, the U. S. missile defense system, globalization and the 
anti-globalization movement, as well as the role of the E. U. in the international system. 
All these issues and actors were discussed in relation to the U. S., eliciting very different 
responses both within the British press, and between the newspapers of the two countries. 
In contrast, Chapter 4 reveals uniformity both in the British and Greek press discourses in 
the aftermath of September 11. Even though there was significant divergence between 
the Greek and British press representations of the U. S., terrorism, Islam and the events of 
September 11, there was much less divergence within the press discourses in each 
country. Chapter 5 analyzes the discourses in the months leading to the Iraq war, 
focusing on representations of the Iraq war, the U. S. and the role of the U. K. and Greece 
in relation to both the U. S. and the E. U. Finally, Chapter 6 compares the Greek and 
British press discourses both over time and across countries. It draws some general 
conclusions on the importance of a discursive analytic approach in understanding state 
identity constructions and accounting for change. It also elaborates on the virtue of a 
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comparative analytic approach in explaining national variation and exposing the 
contingency of established "truths". 
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CHAPTER 2: THE CENTRALITY OF 
DISCOURSE: THE CASE FOR A DISCURSIVE 
ANALYTIC APPROACH 
As has already been pointed out, discourse analysis is vital to this study since it facilitates 
a deeper understanding and interpretation of the empirical world around us by being 
"critically self-aware of the closure imposed by research programmes and the modes of 
analysis which scholars routinely use in their work and treat as unproblematic" (Milliken, 
1999: 227). The chapter will justify the use of a post-positivist, discourse analytic 
framework to gain an understanding of the Greek and British press representations in the 
proposed period of study. This discourse analytic approach draws from the writing of 
Michel Foucault (1971,1978), Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) and the 
'Essex' school, which has implemented and systematized Laclau and Mouffe's work (see 
Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, Howarth, 2000), while for its methodological framework 
it also draws from the work of Jacques Derrida (1967), Jutta Weldes (1996,1999) and 
Roxanne Doty (1993,1996). 1 chose this type of discourse analysis, rather than, for 
example, content analysis 7 or critical discourse analysis (Coulthard 1994; Fairclough 
1992,1999), 8 most commonly used by analysts of media discourse, because I don't see 
discourse/s as equivalent to language. Rather, they are concrete "systems of meaningful 
practices that form the identities of subjects and objects", which are "intrinsically 
political" (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 4) and closely tied to relations of power. 
Moreover, this type of discourse analysis is particularly relevant to this study, since it 
sees politics as "essentially concerned with the formation of an 'us' as opposed to a 
6 them"' (Norval 2000: 224), and is therefore concerned with identity constructions and 
social formations. The central role of identity is very important to this study, which 
explores the press representations of two culturally distinct members of the E. U. and is 
interested in the construction and reconstruction of identities. Finally, this type of 
7 Ole Holsti (1969: 14) refers to content analysis as "any technique for making inferences by objectively and 
systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages". Content analysis is thus a quantitative technique 
mainly aiming at making links between causes and effects and assuming the "objectivity" of the social. a CDA views language as a type of social practice and endeavors to uncover ideologies and power relations that are 
hidden in discourse. CDA distinguishes between the discursive and the "real", and thus "doesn't problematize the 
process through which 'reality' is constructed and the 'material' given meanings as a 'reality"' (Shepherd, 2006: 20). 
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discourse analysis is essential to this study because it embraces the post-structural, while 
also addressing methodological and epistemological issues (Milliken, 1999: 228). In this 
chapter I initially point out the main theoretical premises of discourse analysis. In the 
second section I analyze the different methodological techniques that I use in the analysis 
of the Greek and British press representations. I then discuss the specifics of media 
discourse by highlighting the importance of captions and images. I conclude by summing 
up the main workings of a discourse analytic approach 
The role of discourses 
Discourses as productive systems of signification 
The first point to be made about discourses is that they don't merely define an 
unproblematical and uncontested 'reality', an objective world which is out there to be 
discovered; rather they construct social realities. Discourses are not what positivists 
would describe as language used to express or describe the 'truth' or what structuralists 
would characterize as language used to mask a hidden ideology and an underlying deeper 
meaning. Meaning is not simply there waiting to be discovered. Instead, "meaning is 
discourse dependent" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 157) since all objects and actions derive 
their meaning from discourses, from "historically specific systems of rules", and 
therefore "all objects are objects of discourse, in that a condition of their meaning 
depends upon a socially constructed system of rules and significant differences" (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985: 157). Thus, knowledge is located within discourse and "nothing has 
any meaning outside -of discourse! -' (Foucault, in Hall 1997: 44). As-Howarth also points 
out, this doesn't mean that objects don't have a 'real existence' outside discourse; rather, 
objects don't have an extra-discursive meaning (Howarth, 2000: 104). So, for example, 
the occurrence of the September II events is not being disputed. It is beyond doubt that 
two airplanes crashed onto the twin towers in New York City. However, we cannot 
understand these events 'objectively' outside of discourse. Thus, in the Greek press the 
events were mostly seen as the punishment of the 'evil American superpower', while in 
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the British press they were to a great extent conceived as an attack on 'the West' and an 
attack on liberal values. 
However, discourses don't only function as structures of signification. They are also 
64 productive or reproductive of things defined by the discourse" (Milliken 1999: 228). 
This essentially means that discourses favour and privilege certain ways of living in, 
conceiving and acting towards the world, while excluding other ways. They don't just 
give a language for speaking about phenomena, but introduce and define specific regimes 
of truth with which people identify. "A discourse delineates the terms of intelligibility 
whereby a particular 'reality' can be known and acted upon" (Doty, 1996: 6). Thus, 
"when we review the set of constructs relating to conduct that exists in a language, we are 
reviewing not only the horizons of possible speech, but also the horizons of possible 
actions" (Shapiro, 1981: 130). So, for example, the constant articulation of the 
September 11 events as world changing reconstitutes the world we live in. It doesn't 
matter that this is mainly an unsupported argument, because its constant articulation 
constructs the world we live in and serves to bring the changes it ostensibly describes. 
The fluidity of discourses and the play of practice 
Even though discourses fix meaning and construct particular social realities, this fixity is 
not constant and everlasting. Specifically, one of the defining characteristics of 
discourses is their instability and openness, which makes them changeable and 
historically contingent. Hard work is therefore needed to articulate and rearticulate their 
knowledge and identities (Milliken 1999: 230). This inevitably means that the social 
world itself is not a fixed, stable entity and that all identities are open to change and 
transformation. There is always the possibility of change even in those discourses that 
seem extremely predominant. Discourses are "contingent and historical constructions 
which are always vulnerable to those political forces excluded in their production, as well 
as the dislocatory effects of events beyond their control" (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 
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2000: 4). Laclau and Mouffe borrow the ten-n 'overdetermination9 from Althusser to 
describe this "field of identities which never manage to be fully fixed" (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985: 11). 
While discourses are not constant and there is always the potential for change, it would 
also be inaccurate to say that they are always in flux and that the transition from one 
discourse to another can happen at any time, or even suddenly. Thomas Diez 
conceptualizes discourses as glaciers: "in a snapshot, it is the structures that allow for a 
very limited range of concrete articulations. But with each of these articulations the 
structures are themselves transformed a bit, and after a longer timespan, the 
glacier/discourse is no longer what it used to be" (2001: 31). Thus, for example, the 
discourses on the E. U. in the Greek press substantially differed in the months prior to the 
September II events and in the months leading to the Iraq war. However, the change 
wasn't sudden but gradual and there were elements of the former discourses in the latter. 
Specifically, even though the E. U. was seen as not having fulfilled its potential and as an 
anti-democratic organization governed by the powerful members in the months before 
September 11, this discourse gradually changed, leading to a discourse about a 
democratic union capable of opposing U. S. unilateralism in the months leading to the 
Iraq war. Even though the two discourses seem opposing, they are not; in fact, the E. U. 
was seen as having great potential even before September 11, though it was not 
constructed as having fulfilled it yet. It was still seen as the only hope against a 
unilateralist and imperialist U. S., even though it was only after the Afghanistan war that 
it was represented as having fulfilled its potential and having united Europe against U. S. 
imperialism. Therefore, even though discourses are not fixed and do change, this change 
is usually gradual rather than automatic and swift. 
9 The term was originally used in Althusser's essay Contradiction and Overdetennination (1962), in which he argued 
that all incidents are the result of conflicting instances, rather than a singular cause. 
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The subject and subject positioning 
Another characteristic of discourses is that they construct the identities of subjects and 
objects, because "all 'experience' depends on precise discursive conditions of possibility" 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 115). Subjects don't merely use language to do things, but 
operate, exist and acquire their identities within prevailing discursive practices, "which 
contain preconceived ways of thinking that are predicated on rules with a content, a 
content involving modes of interpersonal relations" (Shapiro 1981: 144). Thus, the idea 
of a rational subject as the originator of ideas is misleading since "the historical analysis 
of scientific discourse is subject not to a theory of the knowing subject, but rather to a 
theory of discursive practice" (Foucault, 1973: 172). Thus, it is the discourses which 
"define subjects authrorized to speak and to act, and the relations within which they see 
and are seen by each other and in terms of which they conduct business with respect to 
that issue area" (Milliken, 1999: 229). Therefore, questions such as 'what are the 
author's intentions in the text' and 'have we got proof of the text's authenticity", should 
be replaced by questions such as 'where does the discourse come from, or 'what subject 
positions are created in the text' (Foucault, 1977: 127). Consequently, the category of the 
subject can only be used in the sense of subject positions within a discursive structure 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 115). Moreover, the concrete, empirical subject is 
constructed through a plurality of discursive subject positions. For example, one can be 
white, middle-class, Greek, Christian Orthodox, a student and a woman. 
Such a conception of the subject and its discursive construction is reminiscent of 
Althusser's theory on the interpellation and hailing of the subjects by ideological- 
practices. However, this analysis departs from "the deterministic connotations of 
Althusser's theory", since the analysis doesn't view ideological practices as an 
autonomous region of social formation and opposes the reduction of the autonomy of 
social agents "to the mere effects of pre-existing social structures" (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis, 2000: 13). Subjects are neither autonomous agents who constitute the 
structure, as has already been pointed out, nor are they mere products of the structure, as 
Althusser suggests. Instead, "structure itself is constructed along with the meaning which 
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simultaneously produce subjects' identities and their positions vis-a-vis another. 
Possibilities are not explained by the prior existence of structures or social actors but 
rather by the continual and simultaneous production of subjects and structures" (Doty, 
1993: 305). In other words, this analysis transcends the agency/structure divide (see 
Bieler and Morton, 2001; Dessler, 1989; Wendt, 1987) and asserts that "the specificity of 
the category of subject can't be established either through the absolutization of a 
dispersion of subject positions, or through the equally absolutist unification of these 
around a transcendental subject. The category of subject is penetrated by the same 
ambiguous, incomplete and polysemical character which overdetermination assigns to 
every discursive identity" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 181). This understanding of agency 
and structure enables one "to conceptualize agents and agency without falling into the 
trap of attributing some timeless and unexplained quality to all subjects" (Doty 1997: 
384-5) and without establishing structure as overpowering and unchanging. 
Antagonism and identity construction 
The fluidity of discourses and the non-fixity of different identities raises the question of 
how discourses are subverted and replaced by different discourses as well as under what 
circumstances agency is made possible. Key to understanding this issue is the term 
antagonism, which "constitutes the limits of every objectivity, which is revealed as partial 
and precarious objectification" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 125). Laclau and Mouffe call 
antagonism "the witness of the impossibility of a final suture" (1985: 125), while 
Howarth and Stavrakakis characterize antagonisms as revealing "the limit points in 
____ _ 
society in which social meaning is contested and cannot be stabilized" (Howarth-and- 
Stavrakakis, 2000: 9). According to Laclau and Mouffe, social antagonisms occur 
because social agents are unable to attain fully their identity and thus construct an enemy 
who is deemed responsible for this failure and lack. An antagonism occurs when the 
presence of an "Other" "prevents me from being myself'. Thus, the relation arises not 
from full totalities, but from the impossibility of their construction. Moreover, this 
blockage of identity is not one-sided but experienced by both the antagonizing and the 
antagonized force. "But nor is the force that antagonizes me such a presence. Its 
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objective being is a symbol of my non-being and, in this way, it is overflowed by a 
plurality of meanings which prevent its being fixed as full positivity" (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985: 125). Antagonisms show the failure of difference and the limits of 
objectivity which characterize the social and never allow it to turn into 'society'; they 
show the non-fixity of identity and its contestation by forces which stand either outside or 
at the limit of the contested order. However, antagonism not only shows the 
impossibility but also demonstrates the possibility of the social, since "the construction of 
antagonisms and the institution of political frontiers between agents are partly 
constitutive of identities and of social objectivity itself' (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 
11), since by means of antagonism old identities are subverted and temporarily 
substituted by new ones. 10 
Hegemony and hegemonic formations 
Crucial to understanding the political role of discourses is the notion of hegemony. 
Hegemony is not a new concept and has been t ouched upon by different thinkers. This 
project adopts Laclau and Mouffe's conception of hegemony, which resembles the 
Gramscian conception (1971), " but moves away from two important aspects of his work; 
the assertion that subjects are constructed on the plane of the fundamental classes, and his 
suggestion that every social formation structures itself around a single hegemonic center 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 138). Hegemony can be defined as any attempt to achieve the 
impossible, that is, social unity. According to Laclau and Mouffe, (1985: 112), "if the 
social doesn't manage to fix itself in the intelligible and instituted forms of a society, the 
social only exists, however, as an attempt to construct the impossible object7l. Hegemony--"- 
is thus the process by which a concept attempts to establish itself as universal and 
achieves fixity of meaning. Any bid for universality is hegemony, while "hegemonic 
practices are those practices that seek to create a fixedness of meaning" (Doty, 1996: 8). 
10 The process through which old identities are subverted and new ones emerge is explained in detail in the 
methodology section of this chapter, under "the logics of equivalence and difference". 
" Gramsci developed his notion of hegemony in order to account for the fact that the socialist revolution predicted by 
Marxists had not occurred by the early 2Uh century. In contrast, capitalism was still thriving and maintained control 
economically, politically, but also through a hegemonic culture which created "common sense" and thus maintained the 
status quo of the bourgeoisie. T'hus, the revolution didn't take place because the dominant class had managed to 
maintain the status quo and achieve hegemony through a number of institutions and ideas. 
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Similarly, Howarth and Stavrakakis refer to hegemonic practices as "an exemplary form 
of political activity that involves the articulation of different identities and subjectivities 
into a common project, while hegemonic formations are the outcomes of these projects' 
endeavours to create new forms of social order from a variety of dispersed or dislocated 
elements" (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 14). 
Because of the impossibility of social closure, these hegemonic formations are not 
permanent and a fixedness of meaning can never be fully achieved; however, partial 
fixations are possible. In fact, "even in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has to 
be partial fixations - otherwise the very flow of differences would be impossible. 
Even 
in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be a meaning" (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 112). 
Hegemony is achieved through the temporary exclusion of some item which threatens a 
discursive order by preventing ultimate closure. One the means by which meaning is 
temporarily fixed and thus a content becomes hegemonic is through nodal points, defined 
as those privileged discursive points (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 112), which "confer 
partially fixed meaning on a particular set of signifiers" (Howarth, 2000: 110). In 
particular, "what happens is this: a variety of signifiers are floating within the field of 
discursivity; suddenly some master signifier 12 intervenes and retroactively reconstitutes 
their identity by fixing the floating signifiers within a paradigmatic chain of equivalence" 
(Torfig, 1999: 98-99). In other words, "by filling these nodal points with meaning 
through the tying together of a number of discourses on other, more general concepts, 
meaning becomes --stabilized" 
(Diez., 2001: 26). Nodal points "sustain the identity of-a 
certain discourse by constructing a knot of definitive meanings" (Torfing, 1999: 98-99), 
they unify a discursive terrain and thus conceal ambiguities; this, in fact, seems to be the 
main aim of hegemonic projects. 
12 Floating signifiers are words that have no meaning of their own, but acquire their meaning when linked with a 
variety of other signifiers in chains of equivalences. Master significrs (or nodal points) are those signifiers which do 
not have a referent, but give meaning to those floating signifiers by reducing them to a common referent and thus 
bringing them together in a single system. 'Mus, master signifiers act as a centre around which other signifiers obtain 
their meaning; they therefore structure the whole articulatory system. 
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Drawing on Slavoc Zizek, Howarth and Stavrakakis use the example of those pre- 
existing signifiers, such as democracy, state and freedom, which in communist ideology 
acquire a specific meaning through their articulation around the signifier 'communism', 
which functions as a nodal point. Due to the intervention of this nodal point their 
meaning is partially fixed, since "democracy acquires the meaning of 'real' democracy as 
opposed to bourgeois democracy, freedom acquires an economic connotation and the role 
and function of the state is transformed" (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 8). Using an 
example from the British press discourse, after September II 'Islam' functioned as a 
nodal point, which formed and held together the discourse that established the meaning 
and significance of the war on terror. Islam was an empty signifier in the British press 
discourse; it had no symbolic value in itself but acted as a centre around which other 
signifiers acquired their meaning. It signified all those negative features that the western 
liberal democracies lacked, namely backwardness, brutality and totalitarianism. It was in 
contrast to Islam that the west gained its meaning as modem, peaceful and liberal. 
Moreover, the nodal point 'Islam' united in a chain of equivalences different Others 
under the label of one main Other. Thus, 'The Taliban', 'suicide bombers' and 'Saddam' 
were also defined in relation to the same nodal point 'Islam'. 
Methodology 
As was pointed out above, discourses are "relational worlds of meaningful practices that 
systematically form the identities of subjects and objects" (Griggs and Howarth, 2002: 
101). Moreover, meaning is ascribed to objects and actions through these historically 
specific systems of rules, making meaning discourse dependent. In fact, discourses are 
highlý political since they are characterized by a constant effort to create hegemonic 
contents and to fix meaning around nodal points through constructing chains of 
equivalences in an antagonistic relationship to other discourses. Even though hegemonic 
formations are possible, they are only temporary, need conscious effort to be articulated 
and rearticulated and can be subverted as well as substituted by other discourses. 
Consequently, "in the modem era the world of politics is the world of contingent 
hegemonizations, an arena of incommensurable choices, of undecidability and acts of 
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power, which are the products of the interplaying logics of equivalence and difference" 
(Townshed, cited in Laclau. and Mouffe, 1985). ?1 
How does one then analyze and explore issues such as the construction and subversion of 
identities, the play of practice or hegemonic articulations? This section is divided in four 
parts; the first three parts elaborate on those methodological tools that I use in the 
analysis of the Greek and British press discourse. These representational practices work 
together to both fix and subvert identities, to establish and reverse hegemonic 
formulations or to demonstrate this play of practice, the impossibility of complete and 
infinite closure and a distinction between them is not always clear-cut. However, they 
are discussed separately in this chapter for explanatory purposes. Thus, the first part 
describes and analyzes those representational practices by means of which meaning is 
temporarily fixed and nodal points are established. The concept of discursive nodal 
points has already been defined as those privileged discursive points upon which meaning 
is fixed and positions are established. As Doty points out, "it is possible to locate 
representational practices in texts that work to establish these nodal points" (Doty, 1996: 
10) that "provide analytic categories" that enable one to "get at how discursive practices 
constitute subjects and objects and organize them into a 'grid of intelligibility... (Doty, 
1993: 306). These practices, which will be analyzed in the first part of this section, are 
presupposition, subject positioning, predication, articulation and interpellation, which all 
work both separately and together to establish those nodal points that fix meaning and 
identities. It is by means of these practices that common sense is produced and particular 
representations become acceptable at the expense of others: The second part of the 
section will focus on the logics of equivalence and difference which show the ways in 
which- identities are simultaneously fixed and subverted and how political frontiers 
discursively divide political space into opposing camps or undermine that division. Even 
though these two logics could have been analyzed in the first section along with 
articulation, predication and the other methodological tools, they are discussed separately 
because they are capable - at least more evidently than the previous methodologies - of 
showing the ways in which discourses change over time. Through the interaction 
between the two logics, it is possible to account for change. In the third part, 
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deconstruction is analyzed as a methodological tool capable of exposing the play of 
practice. This is a very important task, because exposing the instability of discourses 
enables an understanding of different possibilities and options. The fourth part engages 
in an analysis of photos and captions which are essential elements of the press discourse 
and which can be analyzed as texts. Finally, the fourth section elaborates on the 
workings of a discursive analytic approach and its relevance to the project. 
Predication - Presupposition - Subject positioning/ Interpellation 
Presupposition 
Presupposition refers to all those background assumptions which are implicit in an 
utterance. All texts, even those which seem clear and straightforward, carry with them 
presuppositions or background knowledge that is taken to be true, when in fact their truth 
claims may be highly debatable. Presupposition, as Doty observes, is therefore "an 
important textual mechanism that creates background knowledge and in doing so 
constructs a particular kind of world in which certain things are recognized as true" 
(I 993b: 306). Presupposition is very useful, since many statements in news reports seem 
to rely on common sense, expressed as if they are uncontroversial facts. Narratives on a 
particular issue build on one another, with references to past actions and understandings 
about the issue becoming accepted as conventional wisdom. For instance, the statement 
"Even Mary wasted the money" presupposes that there is such a thing called money, that 
it was wasted by more than one person, that Mary wasted it and that she did waste it even 
though she was the least likely person to waste it. Doty (1993b: 302) provided a very 
goodWafiýjre of presupposition by quoting that "the logic of realpolitik ... best captures 
the essential nature of the international political system", presupposes that there is 
something called realpolitik, that it has a logic, and that there exists an international 
system which has an essential nature. 
Drawing from the present case study, and according to the hegemonic representation in 
Yhe Times, a war in Iraq was imperative and necessary, not only because Saddarn 
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Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, but also because a war would liberate 
the Iraqis and allow Iraq to become a model country. Such statements include various 
presuppositions which are presented as 'facts' and 'truths' and described as what simply 
'is', rather than a debatable assumption. Specifically, it was presupposed in the dominant 
Times discourse, not only that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction, but also 
that he was prepared to use those weapons. It was also assumed that the Iraqis welcomed 
a war and that a post-war Iraq would be a better place for the Iraqis. Moreover, these 
taken for granted 'truths' were based on specific presuppositions as to what constitutes a 
democracy and the ways in which democracies are meant to act both domestically and 
internationally. As a result, a war in Iraq was naturalized as a moral and necessary 
enterprise bound to be beneficial for everyone and questions such as what the negative 
effects of a war in Iraq would be were rendered inconceivable in The Times discourse in 
the months leading to the Iraq war. Moreover, in the absence of these 'facts' and 'truths', 
the statement that the war was a moral and necessary enterprise would make no sense. 
Predication 
Predication attributes and assigns intrinsic characteristics, differences, qualities and 
properties to the different subjects and objects in a discourse. That is, predication 
demonstrates how language practices construct meaning in regard to subjects and objects. 
This is done through the use of particular terminology and verbs, adverbs and adjectives 
that attach to nouns. Thus, 'ýpredications of a noun construct the thing(s) named as a 
particular sort of thing, with particular features and capabilities" (Milliken 1999: 232; see 
also Doty 1993b: 307). In predicate analysis a text's object space is thoroughly analyzed 
and attention-is paid to these adjectives, verbs and adverbs linked to subjects to see what 
negative or positive qualities these subjects are constituted as possessing, and how they 
are distinguished from and related to one another. Yet, it is not only the identification of 
the object spaces of different texts that is the concern of predicate analysis, but also the 
comparison of these object spaces "to uncover the relational distinctions that arguably 
order the ensemble, serving as a frame for defining certain subject identities" (Milliken 
1999: 233). Thus, predicate analysis is an effective method to understand how discourses 
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are related, in what ways subjects are positioned and how power works to favour 
particular interpretations. 
In the months leading to the Iraq war, the Greek newspaper Eleutherotipla described the 
Americans as "ruthless, bloodthirsty, murderous ... hypocrites ... who deny civilization 
... you see them in battle array and you are filled with disgust" (Tsalidis, 2003). This 
statement attributed specific qualities to the Americans, and constituted them as particular 
types of subjects, in this case undesirable and very negative subjects. Specifically, the 
Americans were seen as merciless, brutal, hypocritical murderers, warlike, uncivilized as 
well as a threat to civilization. Moreover, the pronoun "you" created a relation of identity 
between the reader and the author and a relation of opposition between these two subjects 
and the Americans. Thus, the Americans became the "other", while the reader and the 
author become the "self' as "speaking, writing and knowledgeable subjects" (Doty, 1993: 
307). Thus, the reader and the author were established as subjects who "knew" the 
Americans and their real nature, and were at the same time superior to and more virtuous 
than them. 
Subject positioning - Interpellation 
Finally, subjects are always positioned in relation to one another, and it is by means of 
this positioning that they are defined and understood. As a textual mechanism, subject 
positioning examines these kinds of relationship between different identities or subjects 
and objects. For example, a discursive analysis of the Greek and British newspapers and 
the way they understand the role of the U. S., as well as their country's position in the 
international-system-and as E. U. -members would be interested in the positioning of 
different identities, such as for example that of the Greek versus the Greek-European 
identity, the British versus the British European, the British versus the American and 
many others. As Doty observes, examples of these types of relationships that position 
subjects are those of "opposition, identity, similarity, and complementarity" (Doty 1993b: 
306). Thus, for instance, immediately after the war in Afghanistan, the British press 
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States and of opposition to the terrorists. Moreover, the 'west' was positioned in a 
relationship of opposition to the terrorists and the 'Muslim world', while the terrorists 
and the Muslim countries were positioned in a complementary and similar relationship to 
each other. 
Similarly to subject positioning, interpellation highlights and examines this creation of 
subject positions, but also points to the hailing (see Althusser, 1971: 174) of individuals 
by those subject positions. That is, "subjects recognize themselves in the discourse" and 
thus "speak it spontaneously as its author" (Hall, in Weldes, 1999: 105). Thus, meaning 
is naturalized and temporary closure is achieved. On a state level this identification is 
achieved primarily by creating a sense of belonging. Thus, after the September II events 
the British press constructed this sense of belonging by representing "the wesf' as the 
family to which "3ve" belong. As Weldes points out, the "we" is very important, since 
interpellation is achieved by means of this "we" which functions as a "shifty-shiftee', that 
is a "context-sensitive personal pronoun" by means of which "the 'person' designated by 
the message is always determined by the message itself" (Schwichtenberg, in Weldes, 
1999: 105). Moreover, the shifter is characterized by ambiguity since it can be seen as 
referring to many different people and entities. Precisely because of this ambiguity "it 
helps to define the subject position that the audience is asked to assume; it helps to weld 
potentially disparate members of its audience into a single, unified identity" and therefore 
helps to create common sense and provides legitimization (Weldes 1999: 106). 
Articulation 
Articulation illustrates how common sense is produced and in what ways discursive 
constructions are naturalized, taken for granted and treated as if they are real and 
uncontroversial. As Weldes points out, "articulation refers to the process through which 
meaning is produced out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources. Meaning 
is created and temporarily fixed by establishing chains of connotations among different 
linguistic elements" (Weldes, 1999: 98), which come to be associated with each other, 
even though there is no necessary connection, and thus specific representations of the 
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world are created and meaning is temporarily fixed. As Stuart Hall (1996) also said, an 
articulation is the way in which two things are linked together, while Laclau and Mouffe 
define articulation as "any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their 
identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 
105). For example, after the September II events nouns like "terrorist", "sheriff', 
"empire", adjectives such as "evil", "aggressive", "bearded" and "uncivilized", as well as 
metaphors of disease and containment were combined to temporarily fix meaning and 
create common sense. One element which is particularly important in articulation is 
repetition, because "with their successful repeated articulation, these linguistic elements 
come to seem as though they are inherently or necessarily connected" (Weldes, 1999: 99) 
and thus their meaning is naturalized despite their contingency. Precisely because of the 
non-fixity of meaning, articulation reveals the non-necessary character of specific 
articulations by pointing out how things could have been represented differently. 
Drawing once more from the British press discourse, in the months after the September 
II events the terms terrorism and "Islamic terrorism" were granted specific meanings and 
acquired particular connotations which in turn resulted in the alienation and "othering" of 
the "Islamic terrorists", whose actions ended up having no motivation other than the 
destruction of "western civilizatioif'. The constant articulation and re-articulation of 
terrorism as an infectious epidemic, of Islam as a religion and political system in clash 
with modernity and of Muslims as "bearded aggressive cavemen", placed in contrast to 
articulations of western leaders as symbols of globalised modernity and defenders of a 
superior civilization, widened the gap between "us" and "therre'. It also naturalized 
identities and legitimized particular responses to the attacks in Washington as well as 
silenced alternative i@i-erpr-e'tations. If we focus on the articulations of the Taliban and the 
terrorists as bearded (see also Weldes, 1999: 182-186), it could be argued that this 
articulation of the Taliban and the "Muslim terrorists" as bearded carried with it 
connotations of dirtiness, uncivilized behavior, irresponsibility and a threat to the liberal, 
western values. Thus, terrorism became a problem of uncivilized terrorists attacking the 
civilized, superior western liberal values. 
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The logics of equivalence and difference 
How, then, are identities simultaneously fixed and subverted? This is achieved by means 
of the logics of equivalence and difference, which, seemingly opposed yet also working 
together, show how political frontiers discursively divide political space into opposing 
camps or undermine that division. The logic of equivalence depends on the disbanding 
of the particular identities of subjects within a discourse by the creation of a totally 
negative identity that is presented as threatening. "The logic functions by creating 
equivalential identities that express a pure negation of a discursive system" (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis, 2000: 11). Thus, and as Norval also points out, "Where the logic of 
equivalence predominates, social division tends towards a dichotomization of political 
space, a paratactical division of the social sphere into two opposing camps" (Norval 
2000: 221). While equivalence functions by dividing a system of differences and 
constructing a political frontier between two opposing camps, the logic of difference 
takes place when a discursive order is expanded by breaking existing chains of 
equivalence and creating more differences, which in turn are included in the discursive 
formation. Therefore, "the logic of equivalence is a logic of the simplification of political 
space, while the logic of difference is a logic of its expansion and increasing complexity" 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 129). 
For example, in the aftermath of September 11, a chain of equivalences was created in 
the British press between the terms civilized, humane, western and defensive, while 
another was created between the terms uncivilized, aggressive, inhumane, evil and non- 
western. An antagonistic frontier divided 'us' from 'them, as two opposing camps. This 
chain of equivalences -united --a- set of otherwise different identities into a "totality" in 
opposition to 'terrorism' and whatever that signified, since all those "differential 
elements on either side of the sets of oppositions referred back to one another in an 
endless signifying chain" (Doty, 1996: 46). Therefore, being civilized was equated to 
being from the 'west' and to be 'western' was equated to being humane, while being 
uncivilized was to be inferior, aggressive and inhuman. Unlike the war in Afghanistan, 
in the months leading to the Iraq war these chains of equivalence were unable completely 
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to subvert the relations of difference, and therefore the frontier vis-ý-vis the antagonistic 
outside wasn't as clear-cut and fixed. For this reason, there wasn't a united hegemonic 
articulation in the British press in favour of a war in Iraq, since it was no longer possible 
to represent the enemy as an absolute threat. Thus, the war was represented in The 
Independent and ne Mirror as a unilateral U. S. unlawful action that the British 
government should oppose. 
Similarly, in the Greek press in the months before September 11, a chain of equivalence 
was in place between the terms powerful, profit-seeking, unilateral and anti-European 
and another one between the terms weak, multilateral, collective and pro-European. This 
divided the E. U. in two opposing camps, namely the more powerful countries of the G-8, 
with the less powerful, pro-European countries, which were seen as positive forces in 
contrast to the more powerful members. After September II and in the months leading to 
the Iraq war, these chains of equivalence were progressively substituted by a different 
chain of equivalence between the benign, civilized, peace-loving E. U. (the anti-Iraq war 
countries) and the benevolent, uncivilized, aggressive United States (and the pro-war 
European countries secondarily). 
The workings of deconstruction 
Finally, deconstruction as a methodological tool reveals the play of practice that was 
analyzed in the first section; it reveals the instability and non-fixity of discourses and it 
exposes the myth of a unitary subject and of 'established truths. Through the privileging 
of certain abstract oppositions. and logics, and the repression of others, texts create 
particular 'realities', which are taken for granted and are accepted unquestioningly. 
Since these discourses with their privileging of certain 'truths' and the displacement of 
others have real material effects on the structuring of social relations, a deconstructive 
approach is politically important in its critique and exposition of the volatility of these 
guniversal realities', which could have actually been represented in different ways 
(Milliken 1999: 242). A deconstructive approach involves "critically examining the 
discursive processes of materialization that produce settlements - such as the idea of pre- 
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given subjects upon which the criteria for judgement are based" (Derrida, cite in 
Campbell 1998: 30). Deconstruction is based on the premise of the infinite play and the 
impossibility of total closure of discourses. Thus, what is 'destroyed' in a deconstructive 
reading is the claim to the domination of one mode of representation over another. 
Simply reducing a text to a 'correct' or single homogeneous reading contains the free 
play of its elements. This means that it is possible for a particular articulation to be 
privileged and to become hegemonic, suppressing other alternatives and silencing voices. 
For this reason, deconstruction is a very useful technique and philosophical orientation, 
since it allows for an examination of how certain myths of unity are created, thereby 
enabling a particular discourse to create hegemonic meanings. 
How, then, does deconstruction expose the play of practice? The key term here is binary 
oppositions. A binary opposition is a pair, usually but not necessarily a pair of opposites, 
which are used in such as way that one of the terms is privileged over the other, thus 
creating a hierarchy and rendering the two terms mutually exclusive. Deconstruction 
involves identifying the binary oppositions working in a text and then showing the ways 
in which the text itself undermines the hierarchy implied or asserted by the opposition. If 
we see deconstruction as a step-by-step process, 
13 the deconstruction initially traces all 
the bipolar terms and dichotomies implicit or explicit in the text. It could be, for 
example, that one term in the dichotomy precedes the other, or is thought to be more 
natural than the other, or is seen as a manifestation of the other. It could also be that one 
term is seen as original whereas the other is seen as an imitation of the original, or that 
one term is the rule and the other is the exception. It is important to note that both terms 
often do not appear in the text. Rather, the term mentioned implies its partner, since one 
term depends on its binary f6r its-meaning. The second task of the deconstruction is to 
explore and reinterpret the hierarchy, to examine how the two terms are related and one 
privileged over the other. Third, the deconstruction denies the authority of the dominant 
voice, showing the other side of the story, which is usually marginalized and silenced. 
13 Derrida refused to break down deconstruction in a series of steps since he did not merely view deconstruction as a 
methodology. Even though I view deconstruction as a philosophical orientation and not simply a methodological too,, 
I have broken down the process in four steps based on Derrida's deconstruction of the speech/writing binary (Derrida, 
1976) for explanatory purposes. 
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Thus, the story is reversed, but not with the intention of replacing one center with 
another, but in order to deconstruct the underlying hierarchy and ultimately demonstrate 
this play of practice. Finally, the opposition itself is deconstructed by deriving another 
reading of the text and by finding out what is not said, by tracing what is between the 
lines. In other words, "the deconstructive critic seeks to find by this process of retracing, 
the element ... which is alogical, the thread in the text in question which will unravel it 
all, or the loose stone which will pull down the whole building. The deconstruction 
annihilates the ground on which the building stands by showing that the text has already 
annihilated that ground, knowingly or unknowingly" (Miller, in Leitsch, 1983: 195). 
For example, the binary good/evil was prevalent in both the British and Greek press 
discourses. A speech by President Bush (2001) to the United Nations made this 
distinction between good and evil. "The evil has returned ... we know that evil 
is real, 
but good will prevail against it ... it is our task ... to provide the response to aggression 
and terror". In this speech Bush refers to the return of evil and the prevailing of the good. 
In the first step of the deconstruction, the opposition between the two important terms 
good and evil is identified. The second step shows how the term good is privileged over 
the term evil. Thus, on a state level, this good/evil dichotomy is usually implicitly linked 
to an inside/outside dichotomy (see also Campbell 1998). As is also implicit in this 
statement, the good resides inside and the evil intrudes from the outside and against this 
evil the good must be defended. This statement assumes a world divided between good 
and evil, in which one can be either good or evil. By proclaiming that the evil has 
returned and that the good will prevail, people are divided with the good ones on one side 
and the evil ones on the other. Thus, the statement draws a sharp distinction between 
those who are good and can under no circumstances be evil and those who are evil and 
will stay evil. Therefore, the terms good and evil in the good/evil dichotomy are seen as 
mutually exclusive terms; one is either good or evil. Third, the deconstruction puts the 
dominant term under erasure and shows the mutual dependency of the two terms. Good 
and evil cannot be treated as mutually exclusive, because they depend on each other for 
their meaning. There can be no evil without good, and no good without evil. Thus, this 
sharp separation between good and evil is a construction, which simplifies the political 
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space, is characterized by moral certainty and precludes the possibility of a middle 
ground. All binaries exist by virtue of their opposite; these two terms rely on each other 
for their definition, since in order to assert goodness, one has to juxtapose it against evil. 
Similarly, according to Belousek, the good/evil dichotomy is far from innocent, since it 
"assumes that evil is found primarily in human intentions: the origin of evil is the evil 
will of evildoers. Evil does not have its source in human nature so that humankind as a 
whole is not "fallen" - otherwise, we, too, would be mixed with evil". Moreover and 
most importantly, "this is a paradigm without either the necessity of repentance or the 
possibility for redemption - the good are beyond judgment, and the evildoers are beyond 
salvation" (Belousek, 2005). Finally, having shown the mutual dependency on the two 
terms, the deconstruction can uncover all those repressed presuppositions which led to 
the privileging of the one term over the other and thus free the text from determinate 
meaning opening it up to multiplicity. Thus, moving beyond good and evil (Nietzsche, 
1990) with the recognition that good and evil can reside with everyone, encourages 
dialogue rather than war and aggression and peaceful resolutions of conflicts rather than 
constant warfare, which perpetuates conflict. 
The role of imal! es and captions in the press discourse 
One of the most distinguishing aspects of newspaper discourse is the coexistence of 
written text and image. Texts, images and the accompanying captions interact in an 
elaborate, mutual relationship. It is thus important to take news photographs and 
cartoons into account in the analysis of newspaper articles, since they work alongside the 
written texts to temporarily fix meanings and can enable the privileging of one 
interpretation over another. Cartoons which are described "as a means of expressing 
usually critical political and social commentary through a visual fonnat that may include 
images, words, or both" (Bergen, 2003: 2) can be analyzed in the same ways that texts 
are . 
Traditionally images have been regarded as more 'objective' than texts; they are 
perceived as carrying a tangibility lackirig in other communicative forms (Hall, 1981: 
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240). Due to their visual impact, they "have a specific way of passing themselves off as 
aspects of nature". They are conceived as "visual-transcriptions of the real world", as 
witnesses to "the actuality of the event they represenf'. Yet the choice of a particular 
moment of an event as against another, of one person rather than another, and of one 
specific angle shows that photos don't simply accurately represent the 'real world' (Hall 
1981: 241). As Barthes points out, it is by virtue of their being iconic that images are not 
subject to an interpretative reading, that they are taken for granted. "The absence of a 
code clearly reinforces the myth of photographic 'naturalness': the scene is there, 
captured mechanically, not humanly ... This purely denotative status of the photograph, 
the perfection and plentitude of its analogy, in short its 'objectivity' has every chance of 
being mythical" (Barthes in Weber 1980: 185). Thus, in reality images don't speak for 
themselves. They can fix meanings, at least temporarily, and construct or support 
hegemonic articulations in a similar way to written texts. 
Images, like other texts, can acquire a multiplicity of meanings. As Burgin stresses, there 
is no single signifying system upon which images depend, but a "heterogeneous complex 
of codes upon which photography may draw" (Burgin 1984: 143). There are many 
different issues that an analyst of photographic discourse should be aware of when 
looking at photos so as to determine issues of subject positioning and presupposition. 
Kress and Van Leeuwn have touched upon some issues, affecting the way an image will 
be read and thus how a specific interpretation of the image is more likely to be reached. 
These issues include the image act and the gaze, the size of the frame and the creation of 
social distance, the amount of involvement and the horizontal angle, as well as issues of 
power and the vertical angle (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1999). 
As far as the gaze is concerned, Kress and Leeuwen indicate the difference between 
pictures in which represented participants look directly at the viewer's eyes, and pictures 
in which they don't. Contact is established between the gazing represented participant 
and the viewer, even though it is only on an imaginary level; it seems as if the person in 
the photo directly addresses the viewer and demands something from him/her. In 
contrast, pictures which address us indirectly position the viewer as the subject and not 
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the object of the look; the viewer's role is that of "an invisible onlooker" (Kress and Van 
Leeuwen, 1999: 380-383). 
The size of frame and the choice between close-up, medium shot and long shot position 
people within the frame and show the distances people keep, which often depend on their 
social relations. Thus, images allow us, imaginatively, to come as close to public figures 
as if they were our friends or to look at people like ourselves as strangers (Kress and Van 
Leeuwen, 1999: 387-388). Finally, the choice of the photographic angle may affect the 
viewer's relationship with it. The body of a represented subject may be angled away 
from or near the plane of the viewer, which will facilitate the "othering" of the participant 
or his acceptance as one of "our own". Similarly, "if a represented participant is seen 
from a high angle, then the relation between the interactive participants (photographer 
and viewers) and the represented participants is depicted as one in which the interactive 
participant has power over the represented, the represented participant is seen from the 
point of view of power" (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 1999: 390-397). 
Conductinj! discourse analysis 
One of the main premises of a discursive analytic approach is its emphasis on the 
discursive construction of reality. Discourse analysis does not treat agents as rational 
actors, does not "look at individual or collective actors as the locus of meaning" (Doty, 
1992: 302) and refutes the idea that meaning is there to be discovered. Moreover, such 
an approach maintains that discourses are power structures, with power being "inherent 
in the linguistic practices by which agents are constructed and become articulated within 
particular discourses" (Doty, 1992: 302); merely the fact that meaning often appears to be 
fixed and stable as well as uncontested manifests the workings of power. Thus, discourse 
analysis "embraces a logic of interpretation that acknowledges the improbability of 
cataloguing, calculating and specifying 'real causes', concerning itself instead with 
considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation 
over another" (Campbell, 1993: 7-8). Finally, discourse theorists emphasize the non- 
fixity of social constructions, which undergo continuous historical and social change as a 
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result of political practices, with the analyst's main task being to "chart and explain such 
historical and social change by recourse to political factors and logics" (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis, 2000: 6). 
Since discourses construct subjects and position them vis-a-vis each other, it is very 
important to study these subject positions in order to understand the ways in which reality 
and meaning is constructed and what the implications of this are. By means of "how" 
rather than why questions (see Chapter 1) the discourse analyst can understand the 
"necessary but not sufficient conditions of various practices" (Doty, 1992: 303). 
Moreover, by comparing different discourses, it is possible to gain insight into how 
discourses differ in their constitution of reality. Also, by such examinations it is possible 
to question and denaturalize dominant forms of knowledge (Milliken, 1999: 237). 
Similarly, a main concern of discourse analysis is to "deconstruct the center itself, to 
expose its arbitrariness and contingency and thereby call attention to the play of powers 
in constructing all centers" (Howarth, 2000: 12). 
One of the major intentions of this project, then, is to look at the Greek and British press 
discourses and to find out what the representations were in the proposed period of study, 
to examine what type of subjects were produced and reproduced by the discourses, to 
determine whether there were prevailing hegemonic articulations before September 11, 
and to investigate the extent to which the September II events affected the Greek and 
British press discourses. This comparison of different time periods is essential because it 
allows for an examination of the possibility of change and the formation or subversion of 
potentially dominant discourses. Similarly, a comparison of the press discourses of two 
culturally distinct members of the E. U. allows for an examination- -of the cultural 
specificity of discourses with the "same" event potentially being represented in quite 
different ways and enables a c1cconstruction and denaturalization of the myth of an 
uncontested meaning. Finally, drawing from the belief that discursive practices are 
political practices, I am interested in the ways in which these discourses may have 
enabled or disabled particular responses and courses of action and they ways in which 
they may have marginalized other discourses. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE PRE-SEPTEMBER 11 
DISCOURSES IN THE BRITISH AND GREEK 
PRESS 
The U. S. refusal to ratify the Kyoto protocol, the G-8 summit in Genoa, the anti- 
globalization marches and the spy plane incident between China and the U. S. were some 
of the incidents that received extensive coverage in the British and Greek press in the six- 
month period prior to the September II attacks and generated discourses on the role of 
the U. S. and the E. U. in the international system, the role and alliances of the U. K. and 
Greece respectively, as well as the meaning of globalization and its perceived benefits or 
ills. 
Even though this thesis concentrates on the period after September 11, in particular after 
the attacks in New York and Washington and during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it 
is essential to explore the dominant discourses prior to the events. By looking at the 
representations of the U. S., the E. U. and the perceived international threats/challenges in 
the period before September 11 it is possible to determine whether these representations 
and any existing hegemonic articulations remained the same or changed after the events, 
as well as the ways in which any changes may have occur-red. Since this thesis aims at 
looking at the ways in which discourses are fonned and change over time, it is important 
to study the discourses and the formations of identity prior to the September II events, 
which will also enable me to evaluate the ways and the extent to which the September II 
attacks had an impact on existing discourses. 
For this reason, the chapter focuses on the discursive articulations in the British and 
Greek press from March to September IOh 2001. There clearly was diversity in the 
British press representations during this period, with The Times newspaper adopting a 
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pro-globalization, pro-Bush, and anti-E. U. stance, while 71e Independent and ne Mirror 
on the whole adopted a more critical, though still mostly positive, globalization stance, as 
well as a generally anti-U. S. and pro-E. U. stance. The Greek press representations were 
less diverse with the bulk of articles focusing on globalization as a world ill, the anti- 
globalization movements, and the G8 summit in Genoa. At the same time there was less 
focus on the U. S. itself or the Kyoto protocol. Not only was there less diversity in the 
Greek than in the British press, but there was also only one overarching discourse in all 
three Greek newspapers, which consisted of prevailing anti-globalization, anti-capitalist, 
anti-G8 as well as anti- E. U. representations. The chapter is divided in three sections. 
The first concentrates on the British press discourses, while the second section examines 
the Greek press representations in those six months. Finally, the third section delineates 
points of convergence and divergence within each country and between the two 
countries. 
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The British press representations: April to September 2001 
This section comprises of three parts: In the first part I analyze the Times representations 
of the Kyoto protocol as a "dead letter" and as "anti-American". I also elaborate on the 
construction of the U. S. government's handling of the plane incident with China 14 as a 
manifestation of 'Chinese totalitarianism' versus 'U. S. wisdom and true, conservative 
leadership' and on the construction of the E. U. as an "imperialist venture" and the U. K. 
involvement in the E. U. as "enslaving". These distinct representations are joined 
together to fix meaning around nodal points resulting in the 'U. S. rightfulness versus the 
EU wrongness" discourse. The second part of this first section focuses on the 
Independent and Mirror representations of the Kyoto protocol as "a matter of life and 
death" and of the U. S. as "toxic", as well as the representations of the British relationship 
to the U. S. as "subservient" and its relationship to the EU as "empowering". The third 
part of the first section analyzes and compares the constructions of globalization, which is 
described as either "liberating" or "exploitative". 
Discourse One: U. S. rightfulness versus E. U. wrongness 
The main discourse in Yhe Times, which was only marginal in the Independent and 
Mirror, represented the U. S. as a superior, positive force. The U. S. government and 
president Bush were constructed as mature subjects, whose realistic and down to earth 
approach on issues as diverse as the Kyoto protocol, missile defence and China was 
refreshing. At the same time, the U. S. was positioned in opposition to the E. U., whose 
attributes of oppression, immaturity, hypocrisy and ignorance rendered it an inferior 
subject to the U. S. This naturalization of the E. U. as enslaving and regressive enabled 
and facilitated the constitution of the U. K. as a power whose participation in the E. U. 
would result in its loss of freedom and stature. 
14 On April 1,2001, a U. S. spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter while gathering intelligence off the Chinese 
mainland. The U. S. plane landed on a Chinese island, where the US crew was detained for eleven days. 
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ne Kyoto disaster and European anti-Americanism 
In 2001, George Bush pulled the U. S. out of the Kyoto accords as one of the first acts of 
his presidency, a move heavily criticized by many European leaders. This incident 
received extensive coverage in the British press. Specifically, Yhe Times discourse 
construed the Kyoto protocol as "a dead letter"(Sullivan, 2001a), "a self-indulgent, 
dangerously expensive exercise that will do nothing to help the poor or to control climate, 
a force over which we have no more control than did King Canute over the waves and the 
tides" (Stott, 2001). Not only was it stressed that "the prospective gains [of the Kyoto 
protocol were] unreliable", but it was also pointed out that "the environmental science on 
which it was built is unproven" (McElvoy, 2001a). Specifically, global wanning was 
constructed as a minor problem only, since "there is no conclusive evidence to support 
the global warming theory ... many of the claims are false", and "our current rate of 
warming is no big deal and is part of the natural cyclical pattern in which the Earth has 
periodically warined and cooled" (Phillips, 2001a). "Even the gloomiest of 
environmentalists concede it [global warming] wouldn't shift temperatures by much more 
than a trifle" (Sullivan, 2001a). It was thus questioned whether global warming posed a 
problem, but "Even if there is a problem, Kyoto cannot be the answer" (Anderson, 2001 a: 
3). Besides, "Asking a leading country to forgo up to 2% of economic growth every year 
for a decade in pursuit of a theory that has as many holes as the ozone layer is at best a 
gesture in grandstanding. At worst, it's pure cant" (Sullivan, 2001 a). 
As is evident in the above extracts, 77ie Times constructed the climate as a physical force 
which could not in any way be affected or controlled by -human activity, since 
it was 
governed by its own rules. Therefore, human activity would neither result in global 
warming nor be able to stop it. Human agency was thus discursively erased with regard 
to global warming, and responsibility for the emergence of the problem, as well as its 
solution, was relocated from specific agents to the climate itself (Carvalho, 2005: 6). 
Moreover, such a discursive construction was triggered by and made possible what 
Dryzek (1997) calls Promethean perspectives, whereby human beings have an infinite 
capacity to intervene and exploit nature, since either nature itself has an infinite capacity 
43 
to endure this exploitation, or it is governed by its own laws which are not affected by 
human activities anyway. Naturalizing the climate as an independent, unaffected force 
rendered the Kyoto protocol irrelevant. 
The condemnation of the protocol in Yhe Times discourse was facilitated by the 
construction of global warming as a purely technical issue, "which demanded technical 
solutions rather than moral reflection and discussion. Environmental issues could best be 
resolved by recourse to straightforward, auditable questions of 'costs" or 'rational 
science"' (Crane, 2000: 4). The global warming problem was thus discussed in terms of 
frationality', costs and benefits, and economic growth and scientific certainties, which 
were seen as the only valid basis for policies. In addition, these representations were 
privileged over those representations which called for different, non-technical solutions 
and which were constructed in this discourse as either "false" or "Pure cant". Therefore, 
global warming issues were understood and explained in economic or technical terms and 
economy was constructed as of a higher order than other social, political, cultural or 
moral dimensions of the issue (see Doty, 1996). Business concerns were positioned over 
different types of concerns; growth and economic prosperity was classified as the top 
priority. 
As a result of the above representations the U. S. refusal to sign the Kyoto protocol was 
overwhelmingly represented in Ae Times as "sensible" (Stelzer, 2001a). With global 
warming having been constructed as either an uncertainty or non-existent, and with the 
economy having been prioritized over a very uncertain environmental concern, Bush's 
position was described as "not the result of some crazed Texas oilman wanting to foul up 
the planet, but the simple recognition of reality. It won't happen. It can't happen. Nor 
should it" (Sullivan, 2001a). In fact, Bush was compared positively to other leaders, 
emerging as "one of the few politicians who is not a hypocrite on global warming" 
(Henderson, 2001), and "one of the most innovatively green presidents in recent years" 
(Sullivan, 2001a), since he "plans to put forward alternative proposals for meeting any 
threat that may exist from the burning of fossil fuels" (Stelzer, 2001 a). In other words, 
"Bush has done the world a favour" (Henderson, 2001). Not only was it presupposed that 
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the president would propose different solutions to the problem, when in fact the Bush 
government had not at that stage made such promises, but the President was idealized as 
environmentally conscious, even though he had clearly pointed out that he would not 
ratify the protocol, since "it would cause serious harm to the U. S. economy" (Bush, 2001) 
and had shown no signs of placing environmental issues high on his agenda. 
While the U. S. government was commended for its refusal to ratify the protocol, the E. U. 
was described as "speaking nonsense" (Stelzer, 2001a) and as absurd. "In Europe the 
voice of the cuckoo is heard in the land" (Stelzer, 2001a). The Union and European 
leaders as well as the Kyoto protocol itself were described as anti-American, as the E. U. 
means to diminish the U. S., rather than as a treaty aiming at protecting the environment. 
"Europe ... inclines towards a sort of ill-defined, uncomfortable, it'll -all-end-in-tears 
anti-Americanism" (McElvoy 2001a) and is overcome by "envy" and "resentment" 
(Sullivan, 2001a). This envy, it was maintained, resulted in unjustified accusations 
against the U. S. and the distortion of reality as far as global warming was concerned. 
"The science of global warming ... was hijacked by those who wanted a new stick with 
which to beat western capitalism, America and globalisation. It is the green version of 
the big lie" (Phillips, 2001a). Therefore, "Something less overtly anti-American than the 
Kyoto protocol will have to be fashioned" (Stelzer, 2001a). Finally, the Kyoto protocol 
was seen as an immoral enterprise, aimed at blaming the U. S. and avoiding responsibility 
for shared responsibility in world problems. "And how moral is this strident European 
Positioif' (Stott, 2001)? "It is much easier to criticise the 'Toxic Texan' than to leave 
your car at home ... Bush is a scapegoat for political cowardice everywhere and the oil 
companies are laughing all the way to the bank" (Henderson, 2001). European 
governments were thus described as hypocritical and dishonest for accusing the U. S. of 
being anti-environmental, when they had not made any effort themselves. "Not a single 
leading country has even come close to ratifying a treaty the Europeans currently 
describe as the only thing that stands between us and climatic ArmageddorP (Sullivan, 
2001a) and "the European nations who are so unhappy with Mr. Bush have chosen a 
curious way of showing their commitment to Kyoto. None has yet ratified it" (Anderson, 
2001a: 3). 
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In the above representations the E. U. was positioned in an oppositional relationship to the 
U. S., with the U. S. acquiring all the positive attributes and the E. U. being constructed as 
an inferior subject. Predicates constituted European leaders as envious, resentful, crazy 
and hypocritical, in contrast to President Bush, who was described as sensible, honest and 
sane. Such representations were rendered possible through the construction of the Kyoto 
protocol as inappropriate, but also reaffirmed the 'uselessness' of the protocol. 
Moreover, the naturalization of the 'reality' of the unsuitability of the protocol, the 
construction of the U. S. as right and of the E. U. as wrong, all added up to the 
construction of the protocol as 'Anti-American', as a means to attack the West, 
capitalism and the U. S. Thus, the protocol was ftirther delegitimized by constituting 
global warming as a tool to attack society, rather than, for example, an existing problem 
that needed to be dealt with. 
Yhe spyplane incident and true conservative US. leadership 
The representation of the U. S. in positive terms was reinforced by its juxtaposition with 
China after the spy plane incident, whereby a U. S. spy plane collided with a Chinese 
fighter while gathering intelligence off the Chinese mainland. In particular, China was 
described as a "totalitarian state that routinely tramples on human rights and bullies its 
neighbours, a land riddled with corruption" ('This row over a spy plane', 2001: 3) and 
which "like all communist dictatorships has no respect for truth" (Sullivan, 2001b). It 
was also seen to be characterized by "hegemonic ambitions" and a "desire to place itself 
above the normal rules by which democracies play ... Beijing 
is-determined to crush 
democratic forces within its own country and to bring all Asia under its dragon's wing" 
(Gove, 2001a). "There is no prouder, nor more racialist nation on earth" (Anderson, 
2001a: 3). While the Chinese government and China in general were heavily criticized, 
the Bush government was highly praised for its handling of the plane incident. "The spy- 
plane stand-off showed a new administration adept at crisis management, firm in refusing 
to apologise for something that merited no apology" (Sullivan, 2001b). Elsewhere, it was 
pointed out that "the open minded are likely to be impressed by the President's quiet 
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authority and willingness to accommodate the views of others - without abandoning his 
bedrock principle that he must act in the best interests of America7'(Stelzer, 2001c). It 
was also stressed that a different approach towards the incident would have been a huge 
mistake. "Had Bush appeased, and apologised over the spy plane, he would not have 
been contributing to a more peaceful world. He would have been paying danegeld to the 
most reactionary and anti-democratic forces in Beijing ... Bush's refusal to appease 
Beijing shows he's smart enough to learn the lessons of history" (Gove, 2001a). 
The meaning of this representation is fixed around the nodal point of democracy, which 
serves the function of positioning China as a very dangerous actor, while at the same time 
positioning the U. S. in a defensive stance against aggressive Chinese expansionism. As a 
nodal point, democracy is an empty term which only gets filled with meaning through its 
juxtaposition to the non-democratic other. Democracy as a nodal point classifies states 
into presupposed categories, the democratic and the non-democratic, thus enabling the 
logic of equivalence to operate. It is clear from the above representational practices that 
China was described as an undemocratic communist state, a term which has negative 
connotations in western liberal democracies. In her deconstruction of democratic peace 
theory, Grayson explained that in DPT "liberal democracies are naturalized so that they 
can be objectively differentiated from non-liberal/democracies". Moreover, "the 
framework of this relationship shapes our thinking to naturally view liberal democracies 
as predisposed towards peaceful interactions with each other" and therefore only likely to 
employ non-peaceful methods towards those states which are 'objectively' non- 
democratic. Force against those states is justified because they are necessarily aggressive 
and are therefore not legitimate global actors (Grayson, 2003: 5).. By, being branded as 
undemocratic, China was automatically seen to be characterized by totalitarianism and 
hegemonic ambitions. It was therefore constructed as an unwanted, aggressive and 
dangerous 'other'. This othering of China as undemocratic and authoritarian at the same 
time affirmed the self as democratic and liberal. 
Therefore, the U. S. government was cleared of any possible responsibilities with regards 




non-conciliatory action on the part of the U. S. was justified since it was positioned as a 
liberal democracy with the right to defend its democratic values against aggressive 
totalitarianism. Such a representation of the China/U. S. spy plane incident called for 
policies of provocation rather than appeasement. As Hall points out, "all these 
inscriptions have effects which are real. They make a material difference, since how we 
act in certain situations depends on what our definitions of the situations are" (Hall, 1986: 
39). 
Interestingly, this discourse was mainly, yet not exclusively, a Times discourse. Both The 
Mirror and The Independent also represented China as an undemocratic, authoritarian 
actor, but without incorporating positive U. S. representations within discourses. 
7he European path and UK. enslavement 
In this primarily Times discourse, the E. U. was constructed as an imperialist, mal- 
functioning bureaucracy which was intent on destroying the states' sovereignty. In 
particular, the E. U. was seen as "too ambitious, too intent on empire-building and too 
eager to take control over more and more areas of national policy" (Quinn, 2001a). 
Elsewhere it was pointed out that "they [the Europeans] are illiberal and authoritarian, 
and intend to impose their particular world view on everyone else" (Phillips, 2001b). The 
E. U. principles of "convergence", "common standards" and "consistency" were 
compared to the "dogmas of the medieval church", and the E. U. as the "new Holy Roman 
and Napoleonic Empire" (Selbourne, 2001). In short, the E. U. project was seen as being 
"all about political unification and the destruction of member states' ability to govern 
themselves" (Rees-Mogg, 2001 a). 
Following the representation of the E. U. as an oppressive, hegemonic regime, the British 
system and its values were compared to those of the E. U., with the British system 
emerging as far superior. "In the real Europe, as I know, the British are most admired for 
the very institutions and traditions that are being transformed in order to meet the 
demands of bureaucratic 'Europe' - the rule of common law, parliamentary sovereignty, 
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local autonomy and accountability" (Selbourne, 2001) and "big bureaucracy, corruption 
and bungling cannot do what legislative autonomy, democratic dissent, national cultural 
independence and un-interfered-with local administrative choices can achieve" 
(Selbourne, 2001). 
For this reason, British participation in the E. U. was seen as enslaving and damaging. 
"The United Kingdom is being destroyed by ... a relentless process of obedience to the 
will of unelected forces in Europe" (Howard, 2001). Similarly, under the E. U. "the 
concept of Britain as a self-governing nation is under wholesale assault" (Phillips, 
2001b). It was also pointed out that adherence to the E. U. principles would mean a 
denial of Britain's glorious past. "British history, culture and language point them 
politically in the opposite direction. To go deeper into the history of the 'European idea' 
brings us to a landscape where Britain belongs even less" (Selbourne, 2001). 
Nevertheless, "our governing class is intent on destroying the idea of an indigenous 
culture with its own history and traditions" (Phillips, 2001b) and to "surrender almost 
anything just for a European motorcade" (Lamont, 2001). The E. U. was thus seen as "the 
real extremism, against which liberal values, freedom and democracy must be defended" 
(Phillips, 2001b). 
In this discourse the notions of 'Europe' and 'nation' were constructed in antithetical 
terms, even though in essence the two notions were closely interlinked, since the 
definition of Europe as 'other' was at the same time closely tied to the definition of the 
self The constitution of the E. U. as the opposite of the U. K. was fashioned in a similar 
way to the oppositional subject positioning of communist China and the liberal 
democracies. However, in this discourse the contrast was represented as even more 
striking, and the E. U. was construed as a very dangerous and threatening other, intent on 
destroying the nation, by depriving it of its independence and sovereignty. This 'other' 
was constructed as much more menacing, since it attacked the core values of the nation, 
meaning that it attacked 'the self'. 'The self' was therefore constructed as under attack 
by the E. U., while 'the other' was constructed in direct, threatening opposition to the 
nation and its identity. State sovereignty and E. U. membership was thus impossible, and 
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the only way that the U. K could be a member of the E. U. was as a slave. As Painter 
stresses, "the growth of European identity is normally presented as a mutually exclusive 
alternative to national identity, as if to be European is not to be British" (Painter, 2000: 
235). Thus, Britishness and Europeanness were mutually incompatible. 
In fact, the metaphor of occupation, which as seen above was emphasized through the 
overwording (see Fairclough 1992: 193) of phrases such as "sovereignty", 
"authoritarian", "autonomy". "obedience", "assault", "surrender" reinforced the need to 
break free from such an oppressive regime. At the same time that the E. U. was 
constituted as an ominous occupier, the U. K. was represented as the paradigm of 
democracy, values, efficiency and accountability in a discourse of British exceptionalism, 
in which the U. K. was idealized as the model nation-state towards which all other states 
aspire or should aspire. Such representations of the U. K. and the E. U. created a sharp pro 
U. K. - anti E. U. dichotomy, thus precluding the possibility of cooperation between the 
two actors, not only because the U. K. was superior, but also because the E. U. desired 
crushing this superiority and destroying UX sovereignty. However., as will be seen in 
the following section, other possibilities do exist and different representations can 
construct different possibilities, whereby for example a close U. K. relationship with the 
E. U. is not only desirable, but even imperative. 
Discourse Two: The U. S. threat versus E. U. partnership 
The main discourse in The Mirror and The Independent represented the U. S. as "a rogue 
state" (Boggn, 2001: 4), "a military, economic and cultural imperialist superpower" 
(Routledge, 2001: 6). Bush was described as planning "to slash taxes for the rich, wreck 
the environment and threaten world peace" ('Bush-beater', 2001: 6). The main issues 
that received extensive coverage in both these newspapers were the Kyoto Protocol and 
the U. S. missile treaty agreement. In fact, both these topics were very frequently covered 
in the newspapers' leading articles, which constructed the Bush government and the U. S. 
in general as a unilateral, peace threatening actor. While the U. S. was positioned as a 
'dangerous other', the E. U. was constituted as an indispensable ally, 'an essential other', 
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which would strengthen the U. K. role in the world. As in the previous Times discourse, 
the U. S. and the E. U. were construed as opposites. Nevertheless, in this case the E. U. 
was endowed with positive qualities, which in turn naturalized the inevitability of 
stronger U. K. links with the E. U. 
27ie Kyoto Protocol - Our only hopefor thefuture 
This second representation of the Kyoto Protocol was the hegemonic representation in 
both The Mirror and Vie Independent. To begin with, global warming was represented 
as a very serious problem which would definitely have to be dealt with promptly. Thus, 
"the weight of scientific evidence suggests that the earth is warming even more quickly 
than only recently forecast" ('Europe must persuade', 2001: 3) and "the world is heating 
up twice as fast as has previously been thought" ('This is no time for Mr. Blair', 2001: 
24). The threat was constructed as an imminent inevitability, and failure to act quickly 
would be disastrous. "That is the only hope. There is no alternative to the Kyoto Protocol 
that could be brought into effect in time to stop global warming running out of control" 
('This is no time for Mr. Blair', 2001: 24). Moreover, "we are running out of time" 
(Lean, 2001: 14) and we therefore "have to make a start or the future of the planet will be 
bleak", (Wital fight for future', 2001: 6). 
While the importance of swift action was constantly pointed out, Bush was heavily 
criticized for his decision to withdraw from the protocol. "George W. Bush ... is 
extending his toxic touch to the rest of the world" ('Our future threatened', 2001: 23) and 
"the negotiations have been thrown into chaos by George W. Bush's unilateral decision 
last March to reject, and to try to kill, the Kyoto Protocol" ('This is no time for Mr. 
Blair', 2001: 24). Not only was Bush condemned for his rejection of the protocol, but 
this rejection was directly linked to his economic aspirations, which would be impeded 
were he to abide by the protocol's regulations. "The US's most polluted state allows big 
businesses with deep pockets to disregard environmental concerns" (Buncombe, 2001: 9) 
and "The President ... is telling the rest of us that he's prepared to destroy our planet if it 
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helps the billionaires who elected him to make another buck ... there is something 
far 
more precious than money, called the future of the human race" (Reade, 2001 a: 11). 
Moreover, such a prioritization of business over the environment would endanger 
humanity in its entirety. 'This is short sighted and dangerous. We are all on this earth 
together. No nation, however powerful, should avoid its responsibility to the future" 
(Tirty Dubya', 2001: 6). Finally, even though the U. S. was seen as an immoral, profit 
oriented actor, cooperation was still perceived as imperative, since only collective action 
would prove effective. "The Americans cannot simply be ignored. Coaxing them into 
doing the decent thing sometimes seems doomed to failure. But simply turning away 
from America would be just as unproductive" (Tudge is now the only way', 2001: 3). 
Similarly, "it will be hard to change President Bush! s mind. But the EU countries are 
right to try. The consequences are far too great to let him get away with what he is doing" 
(Wital Fight for', 2001: 6). 
The above representation was substantially different from Yhe Times discourse since it 
constructed global warming as an undeniable reality, an existing problem which would 
inevitably destroy Earth unless it was tackled immediately. Phrases such as "we are 
running out of time" or "out of control", constructed global warming as spreading fast 
and needing to be stopped. Such a representation of global warming as an imminent 
global threat rendered cooperation for the solution of the problem imperative and any 
refusal to deal with the issue was therefore condemned and heavily criticized, hence the 
construction of the U. S. as an inconsiderate actor, interested in protecting its financial 
interests at the expense of the human race. Even though this appears to be the exact 
opposite of Yhe Times discourse, there are some common presuppositions underpinning 
both, namely the technical framing of global warming, which was only seen in physical 
terms. 
More specifically, global warming was constituted as a globalized, generalized, physical 
problem (see Carvalho, 2005: 6), which existed 'out there' and needed to be stopped, 
since it would eventually be destructive towards humanity. Global warming was seen as 
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a problem that emerged out of the blue. Its causes and effects were mainly seen in 
physical terms and in a very straightforward and technocratic manner. There was, in 
sum, a clear "denial of an explicit political understanding of environmental issues in 
preference for a technical understanding" (Dalby, 1996: 602). Agency was deleted from 
the global warming problem, since it was represented as a negative force which was self- 
constructed. Even though the U. S. and big businesses were heavily criticized, this 
critique was confined to the reaction to the problem rather than its construction. 
Therefore, the criticism of the U. S. and the economic conglomerates had to do with their 
refusal to deal with global warming, rather than their possible contribution to its 
emergence and escalation. 
What is also interesting is the construction of the Kyoto protocol as the only solution to 
global warming. Phrases such as "only hope" and "no other alternative" naturalized 
Kyoto as the only viable measure. However, this was merely a presupposition and not an 
undeniable 'reality' that could not be contested. It could and has actually been claimed, 
for example, that the Kyoto protocol is an insufficient measure which perpetuates rather 
than seriously deals with global warming. For example, Lohmann points out, that "the 
Protocol opens up new ways of subsidizing global warming", its "trading schemes 
worsen inequalities", it uses "technical fixes to remedy political problems", and thus 
"piles inequality on inequality". Moreover, "the current negotiations distract from or 
even threaten many existing climate-friendly practices and initiatives" (Lohmann, 2001: 
2-16). If one accepts such a representation of the Kyoto Protocol, the Independent's and 
the Mirror's discourse on the Kyoto protocol as the only solution to global warming 
doesn't make a lot of sense. 
The third and final point about this representation is the positioning of the U. S. in 
opposition to the E. U. as the only actor impeding solutions to the problem. Following 
from the representation of the Kyoto Protocol as the only solution to global wanning, the 
U. S. was represented as 'the rogue actor' who had refused to ratify the protocol. The use 
of the shifters (see Weldes, 1999: 106) "we", "us", or "rest of us" versus '%&' or "them" 
othered the U. S. as the only one responsible for 'the future of the human race'. Signing 
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the Kyoto was thus seen as the ultimate commitment to the protection of the 
environment, while refusal to ratify it was seen as the ultimate negligence and 
irresponsibility. Therefore, such representations not only demonized the U. S., but also 
shifted all the responsibility for global warming to one particular actor, while absolving 
the rest from accountability. 
Ourfuture lies in Europe 
One hegemonic discourse in The Independent and in The Mirror represented the U. K. 
need to disassociate itself from the U. S. and embrace the E. U. The U. S. - U. K. special 
relationship' was undermined and the U. K. was represented as a slavish follower of the 
U. S. "Special relationship? What special relationship? Like a teenager who doesn't 
realise their true love is a faithless slut, Britain doesn't understand that America has a 
special relationship with lots of countries ... We probably sneak into the top 10 of special 
relationships. But then so does Vietnam" (Parsons, 2001b: 8). Similarly, "the US itself 
cares less about Europe and Britain ... It is time to bury that hackneyed, and misleading, 
phrase, the special relationship" (Riddell, 2001 a). 
Not only was the special relationship a myth, but the U. K. by constantly obeying U. S. 
orders, showed it had no will of its own. It was described as "slavish" and "incapable of 
independent thought, let alone action, in foreign affairs" (Jenkins, 2001 a). Likewise, "for 
the past 60 years Britain has done nothing but suck up to their [U. S. ] every whim. Forget 
the way we slavishly offer ourselves as a launch pad when they want to 'take out a nutty 
A-rab'. Forget the way we beg them to tell us we still have a special relationship" 
(Reade, 2001 a: 11). This 'slavish' behaviour was condemned, since it weakened the 
U. K and drew it apart from the E. U. "We don't always have to follow meekly behind 
America" ('Listen to us', 2001: 6). "A subservient Blair government ... Do we really 
have to do EVERYTHING the Yanks tell us? I damn well hope not" (Routledge, 2001: 
6). Finally, "it concerns me that we British still trot along at Uncle Sam's heels, while 
remairung suspicious of our fellow Europeans" (Lewis-Smith, 2001b: 6). For this reason, 
"there needs to be the very maximum of pressure exerted on the Prime Minister to 
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encourage him to line up with the rest of Europe, and not with the United States" 
(Seddon, 2001b: 4). 
The slavery metaphor and the representation of the U. K. as subservient and submissive 
resulted in the positioning of the U. K. as a dependent subject who would remain a 
follower rather than a leader unless it disassociated itself from the U. S. This discourse 
held that the U. K. should stand on its own feet rather than be dependent on the U. S. An 
association with the U. S. equaled the loss of sovereignty and the continuing of a 
submissive policy to the will and dictates of another state, the U. S. Considering the 
construction of the U. K. 's role in world politics as a leader and not a follower, as will be 
seen in the following paragraphs, an engagement with the U. S. was harmful. 
While a close relationship with the U. S. was discouraged, the discourse in ne 
Independent and Yhe Mirror pointed towards close U. K. -E. U. cooperation. The E. U. was 
praised as a normative organization, capable of and intent on building peace between and 
amongst countries. "The thinking within the EU is to unite the countries in Europe in 
peace and prosperity after hundreds of years of conflict and inequality (O'Rourke, 2001: 
6)" and "for nearly 50 years now the countries of Europe have put war, conflict and 
poverty behind them and worked together in the European Union. We have helped one 
another and grown prosperous together. That's what the European Union is all about 
(Ahem, 2001: 6). The E. U. was thus envisioned as the means for the U. K. to achieve 
both safety and affluence. "For long-term prosperity and security, there must be long- 
term vision. That means ... strengthening our links with Europe" ('Europe is strongest 
link', 2001). As a consequence, "the Independent's vision is of Britain as a modem 
European country" (Let us hope, 2001: 3). Not only was the E. U. seen as a means to 
prosperity but it was also envisaged as a means of continued existence in a globalized 
world. "We want a stronger EU to have better tools to survive in the globalised world" 
(Soltyk, 2001: 4). 
For all these reasons, it was generally agreed that "Europe is Britain's future. A move 
away from Europe would be catastrophic for all" ('Let us hope', 2001: 3). It was 
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constantly pointed out that Britain's national interest could only be defended through the 
E. U., which was the only way for the U. K. to maintain and even enhance its international 
leadership role. "The real choice is between those who would fight to advance Britain's 
national interests through meaningful engagement in Europe, and those who would 
weaken our global standing and undermine our economic performance by turning our 
backs on the EU ... Let us be clear: saying "No" to the euro would undoubtedly relegate 
Britain to an outer tier of the EU, damaging our influence and our prosperity" (Buckby, 
2001: 4). The choice was easy according to this discourse because an involvement with 
the E. U. would definitely be beneficial for the U. K. both domestically and 
internationally, while a withdrawal "would leave Britain weakened ... The era of 
imperial power is over ... But we can still be a world leader, particularly in alliance with 
our partners in Europe. The EU gives us a chance to assert a decisive influence in world 
affairs, arguing for free trade and fair conditions. An isolated Britain would be a small 
voice, trading on past glories. It would only be a matter of time before a Britain out of the 
EU would be stripped of its international influence ... we would just be another medium - 
sized country on the fringes" (Cook, 2001: 6). It was also stressed that the E. U. would 
not impede or destroy state sovereignty. "Europe, as it is likely to develop over the next 
decade, will not threaten the survival of Britain as a nation-state" (Garton -Ash, 2001 a: 
4). 
In this representation, the E. U. was positioned as an actor who would enhance Britain's 
role in the world. There is a clear divergence between The Times representations of the 
E. U. and the U. S. and the representations in'The Independent and The Mirror. Thus, the 
metaphor of slavery was used in both cases but for different actors. The U. S. was 
emancipating and the E. U. was enslaving in Pie Times discourse, whereas the opposite 
was the case in The IndependentlMirror discourse. However, a question that is worth 
asking is what sort of Europe was constructed in this discourse. In other words, how was 
an ideal E. U. envisaged and what was permissible? 
The E. U. in the discourse of 77ze Independent and 71e Mirror was articulated as an 
'other'. Nevertheless, this other was not threatening, but welcoming and useful. 
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Therefore, the UX and the E. U. were positioned in complementary subject positions. 
However, the role of the E. U. was represented as confined to that of a facilitator 
enhancing the centrality of the U. K. in the world. In the above discourse, then, the 
nation-state and sovereignty are prioritized over a European collectivity. The importance 
of being an E. U. member and E. U. necessity was thus linked to national interest and the 
maintenance of the state's power. 
Articulations of Britain's 'glorious past' and its role as a 'leader' formed the discourse of 
exceptionality, which clearly demonstrated the primacy of the nation state. Thus, 
cooperation was essential and the antithesis between 'leading' and 'diminished' country, 
'international influence' and 'medium-sized country on the fringes' constructed the E. U. 
as an absolute necessity; nevertheless, the relationship constructed was economic, rather 
than cultural, social and ideological. Predicates such as 'prosperous' and 'economic 
performance' highlighted this primarily economic relationship, while at the same time 
predicates such as 'partners' or 'partnership' constituted the E. U. as a union of self- 
interested nation states. As Buonfino also points out in her study of New Labour's 
discourse on Europe and immigration, "discourse on Europe is constructed around the 
notion of cooperation for national interest and for the maintenance of sovereignty" 
(Buonfino, 2005: 8-9), and "the E. U. is cautiously portrayed as a grey, functional 'box', 
as a background for cooperation of self-interested nation-states ... a 
functional framework 
for survival". 
Globalization: A blessing or an ill? 
The press discourses on the the U. S. and the E. U. were very similar in The Mirror and 
Yhe Independent and substantially differed from Yhe Times. Moreover, on the issues 
discussed here there was homogeneity within each newspaper and the representations 
were dominant. However, globalization was a slightly more contested issue. Even 
though the hegemonic representation in 71e Times was of globalization as the means to 
achieve global prosperity, the discourses within the other two newspapers were more 
varied. There was a mixture of representations, ranging from globalization as a positive 
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force to discourses of globalization as an exploitative force. On the whole, however, 
globalization was more likely to be represented in (mainly cautiously) positive than a 
negative light. 
ne Needfor globalization 
Globalization was constituted as the only way to defeat poverty and guarantee global 
prosperity. "Free trade ... offers ways out of poverty" (World leaders must', 2001: 
3). 
"We cannot hope to defeat poverty without embracing globalization" (Brown, 2001). 
Similarly, "globalisation is not a force for ill" (Wheatcroft, 2001), and "a global economy 
has huge potential to liberate" ('Global good', 2001). While globalization was praised 
for its liberating potential, any alternative to globalization was heavily criticized as 
protectionism and as enhancing poverty. "If you want to help the poor, protectionism, 
regulation and higher taxes won't do if' (Sullivan, 2001c). By the same token it was 
accepted that "the challenge is to spread the benefits of globalisation more widely, not to 
halt it by buckling to demands for 'fair' wages and labour standards which are 
protectionism in humanitarian disguise", since "the poorest are not victims of predatory 
capital but of the lack of access to it ... the protectionist retreat of the Great Depression 
years, which put the baniers back up, was an unmitigated disaster, above all for the 
pooresf' ('Global good', 2001). It was therefore imperative that globalization was 
allowed to spread its benefits unhindered, since it was a guarantee of prosperity. "The 
world of open, not sheltered, economies; of intemational, not national, capital markets; of 
global, not local, competition ... the way to attack poverty is not to walk away 
from 
global co-operation but to enhance it" (Brown, 2001 a). 
Capitalism, in turn, was compared to all other systems and emerged as superior. 'No 
rival system has emerged with such an extraordinary capacity to generate wealth. This 
may produce inequalities, but that is an argument for modifying rather than destroying 
capitalism" (Appleyard, 2001b). Even though it was at points recognized that 
globalization/capitalism was not flawless, it was nonetheless seen as the only possibility. 
"Global capitalism is not perfect but, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, the alternatives 
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would be much worse" ('Save our summits', 2001). Therefore, revision of the system 
rather than rejection were encouraged. "Even those of us who rejoice in the global 
triumph of the liberal market economy must seek to fix the problems it generates" 
(Mcrae, 2001: 5). Moreover, anti-globalization protesters were criticized as ignorant and 
dangerous. "If the goals of these self-proclaimed champions of "the wretched of the 
earth" were to be realised, they would condemn them to poverty for ever ... they have 
turned against the great liberalising forces that have made their own societies prosper" 
('Global good', 2001). 
In the above representation globalization was represented as an external force, something 
that naturally happens and has even effects on everyone in the world. As Painter (2000: 
23 1) also points out in his study of the discursive construction in the U. K. of Britain's 
relationship to European integration, globalization was represented as "a single, 
uncontradictory, unidirectional phenomenon exhibiting the same features and producing 
the same inevitable outcomes everywhere ... as if it is a self-regulating and 
implacable 
force of nature". Globalization was constructed as a nominal condition, with no attention 
being paid to what may have caused it and to the actors involved. Even though its effects 
were explicitly stated (prosperity, liberalization), what was meant by globalization was 
either taken for granted or left undefined. 
Such representations of globalizations have implications for the way it is perceived. By 
constructing it as an objective, self-created, natural phenomenon, rather than, for 
example, an engineered phenomenon, global change is exogenized as something to which 
actors merely respond. (see Rosamond, 1999: 667). In this discourse, globalization was 
not produced by the actions of actors (governments etc. ), but merely happened to national 
governments. Therefore, governments were seen as external to globalization, as outsiders 
and agency was ascribed to globalization, which was described as a subject that did 
things and had the power to, in this case, "liberalize", "generate wealth" and "defeat 
poverty". 
59 
The above representation also constructed globalization as an inevitable, unstoppable and 
irreversible process (Rosamond, 1999: 664; Weldes, 2001), since "the alternatives would 
be much worse". Thus, according to this discourse, the most that could be done was to 
attempt "to fix the problems it generates", rather than, for example, completely to alter its 
course. As a result, politics was reduced to "nothing more than a clean-up process to 
smoothe over some negative externalities of globalization" (Risse, 2004: 15). Not only 
was globalization constituted as inevitable and as the only option, but it was also seen as 
the wisest option, since it would result in global prosperity and liberalization. 
In this liberal globalization discourse (see Weldes, 2001), it was, thus, presupposed that 
globalization would inevitably lead to progress which would be beneficial for everyone. 
Such a presupposition naturalized a progressive evolution where "everybody is affected, 
no matter where you reside on the globe" (Risse, 2004: 14), and did not acknowledge that 
globalization could have both winners and losers, that it is not necessarily beneficial for 
all at all times. Moreover, such a presupposition meant that any state intervention to the 
workings of the market would be harmful and should therefore be prevented. 
Not only was the state constructed as an 'other' to globalization, but it was also 
constituted as a 'threatening other', an enemy. This was achieved through the binary 
positioning of the state and globalization, with globalization described in positive terms 
and the state perceived as "protectionism in humanitarian disguise" and as "disastrous". 
While globalization eliminated poverty, state intervention increased it. It was therefore 
state intervention that had inhibited and was inhibiting progress and liberalization. The 
impression wasl created that the reason globalization had not yet benefited everyone was 
this state intervention and that if the market was allowed to act unfettered it would 
resolve poverty and other world problems. 
Globalized exploitation 
Globalization was not only represented in positive terms, although representations of 
globalization as exploitative and harmful were less common in the British press. This 
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British press discourse described a gloomy picture of the world, which was controlled by 
the few at the expense of the rest. "The wealthiest countries ... are dominated by the 
wealthiest people, a very small number of whom control a huge amount of the collective 
wealth" (Orr, 2001: 5) and "we have a Third World fiill of starving people, a developed 
world full of workers who have lost control of their lives and a global environment 
heading for disaster. And all this so the billionaire can make more billions" (Reade, 
2001b: 11). 
A distinction was also made between developed and developing countries and it was 
pointed out that developed countries prosper at the expense of developing ones. 
"Grotesquely unfair global distribution of wealth and the miserable conditions that the 
citizens of many Third World countries have to endure, just to provide rich Western 
nations like ours with cheap trainers and designer sweatshirts (Lewis-Smith, 2001a: 6). 
Swift action was therefore rendered imperative for the sake of humanity. "We need to 
take action against the destruction of our planet, and of human life on a massive scale, 
due to IMF/World Bank policies in developing countries ... We believe that the priorities 
of the system are wrong, that at the beginning of the 21st century, no child should starve 
to death, no one should be poisoned by agribusiness, or be enslaved in sweatshops by 
multinationals; and that it would be nice if the next generation had a planet capable of 
sustaining life (Taylor, 2001: 4). 
Such a discourse constituted a completely different picture of the world, since 
globalization was not described as an external, self-functioning actor, but as a means for 
the powerful to exploit the rest, or as a means for the exploitation of developing 
countries. Thus, globalization was not disassociated from the state, but was seen as a 
product of states, agencies and institutions, with emphasis placed on the 'priorities of the 
system', which were 'wrong'. Therefore, according to this discourse, globalization was 
constructed as exploitative, but nonetheless reversible, since it was not an external, 
uncontrollable force but the product of actions either of states or multinationals. 
Moreover, and even though globalization was represented as an ill affecting everyone, it 
was acknowledged that the negative effects of globalization were more devastating for 
61 
the developing countries, thus pointing to the presence of hierarchies and the existence of 
a global North and a global South. Constructing globalization in such a fashion meant 
that swift action was necessary not just for the correction of some minor externalities, but 
for the radical transformation of the system, which generated life-threatening problems. 
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The Greek press representations: April to September 2001 
Unlike the British press, the Greek press representations were strikingly similar within 
and across the newspapers. For this reason, the second part of this chapter analyzes the 
Greek press representations as one hegemonic discourse revolving around the interrelated 
constructions of globalization as 'the mother of all ills', the G8 as imperial dynasts 
aiming at enslaving the rest of the world, the U. S. as an arrogant, neo-imperial 
superpower and the E. U. as either part of this dynastic system as a powerful, corrupt 
actor, or as enslaved to the globalized markets, capitalism and the American superpower 
and in need of restructuring. Finally, the anti-globalization movement was 
hegemonically constructed as the people's revolutionary movement of resistance against 
the globalized dynasts. 
Globalization: The sum of all fears 
Globalization, capitalism and neo-liberalism were often used interchangeably in the 
Greek press discourse as authoritarian forces which have taken over the world and which 
are bound to create havoc. Thus, articles referred to globalization/capital ism as "a new 
form of totalitarianism" (Papakonstantinou, 2001b)ls or as a "totalitarian ideology" 
(Koulourianos, 2001 )16 that is "notorious" since it "kills more people than all wars 
together" ('What Genoa showed', 200 1). 17 The markets were seen to have imposed "a 
global dictatorship" (Sotirhos, 2001)18 and capitalism was described as "unrestrained, 
absurd, unfair and inhuman ... the root of all evils ... absurdity of globalization" 
(Votsis, 
2001). 19 Moreover, references were made to "the destructive domination of the markef' 
(Skotioniotis, 200 1)20 -and it was constantly pointed out, that "capitalism can only be 
inhumane" (Fakatselis, 200 1). 21 It commits "crimes ... at the expense of 
humanity ... 
15 "tva E(So; vtou oXorXijp(oTtaRoV' 
16 , OloC), Ilpo)nCt; t8eokoyj&ý, 
17 TpogepA nayicoupionolýaq ... 
DCOTd)VEI nEptoakEpou; av0p(bnou; an'on 6%ot ot n0xpot vctýf' 
'a MyOcypta 8tKTaTOPW' 
19 "7rap&loyo, d8tKO Kal Ctn&VOpo)no ... a7r6 Tov olcolov anoppkouv 
6Xae dUa 
... napdvota q; nayw%ttonoilqaqý' 20 t4 1007CESCOTIKI) KUptapX(a Tqq ayOpdý' 
21 44 TO np6crcono Tou icantTaXtapW 8ev gnopE( va elvat avOpd)ntvo" 
63 
capitalism ... renounces all the values of civil humanism and shows 
its real face, with all 
its barbarity... The enemy of humankind" (Bitsakis, 2001b: N06). 22 
The market's logic and aims included the "maximization of profits, with a minimization 
of cost and with a complete disregard for its effect on human beings, their health, and 
their quality of life as well as the natural environment" (Votsis, 200 1), 23 and "the creation 
of a unified, global unregulated market which is controlled by multinationals, where any 
significant control of the markets for the protection of employment and the environment 
will be impossible" (Fotopoulos, 2001a). 24 The consequences of globalization were 
described as economically devastating. "It is common knowledge that globalization 
brings about social inequalities, it makes the rich richer and the poor poorer ... 
Globalization is harmful for most people, a nightmare for the deprived and for the annies 
of unemployed" ('Globalization of the police', 2001)25, and "the first thing that has 
become globalized is poverty. The gap between the rich in a rich country and the poor in 
a poor country has never been larger" (Vranas, 200 1 b: N42). 26 
However, it was not only the economic sphere that was so negatively affected by 
globalization, since there was an "absolute reign of the logic of the market not only in the 
financial but also in the social and cultural sphere (Mouzelis, 2001: N14). 27 In fact, 
"nowadays, globalization and the worship of the unaccountability of the markets have 
reached colonial levels, both financially and culturally" (Vergopoulos, 200 1)28 and "the 
22 "ra EYKXAPaTa TOI) VEOTOXUIUOCPICFtIO6 ct; pdpoq Tq; avOpcon6rqTa; ... 
0 KaxtTaXtcrp6q ... anapvE(Tat Ti; 
6nom; 
a4(E;, rou acmicob oupaviapo6 Kat npop&Wt yup6;, ge 6)Lq Tou Tq pappap6TqTa. EXOp6; Tou avOpd)irtvoi) EiSOA);. 
23 64 tIMGTOXO(qOj TWV KEPSd)V, ýLC EXaXIMMOITIMI TOU OaTou; Kai tIS nMPTI dtaTopia yla n; c7unT60m; crrov 
6VOP(OICO, TqV'UYE(a TOX) Kai TqV not6iMTa Tq; ýCOA; TOU Kai CrTO (PucytK6 7tcptp&UDV". 
24 sýo crr6Xo; dvat T(xvcp6;: il 8ijgtovpyfa pta; cmia; nayOupta; anoppluOpogtvil; ayopd; tXM6gcqq cm6 u; 
iro), ucOmt;, 6nou KdOs oumacrruc6; UMO; UOV ayOpd)V Yta VCL 7EPOCrULTEUTal Tj tpyacia Kai To uptPWlov Oa Elval 
aHvawý'. 
25 "Elvat YWOOT6 6Tt il naywaptonoij" 7rpOKCLXEI KOMOVIKI; CEVtCY6qTE;, 8jXaSA KeLVEI TO'U; ItX6CY101); 
70,01)GOTEPOI)i Kai TOU; (PT(OXOL; (PTO)X6T&POU; ... 
E(Vat I RayKouptono(qoll pa 7tp6K), qOll yta TOID; 710XX06;, LVCL; 
c(pd%Tqq yta Tou; c4aO%tcqttvou; Kat Tt; aTpctut; T(ov avtpycov". 
26 '70 XP6)TO. 7cpdypa nou tXci Xotn6v nayKoptonotqOcl civat il (p'cd)XFtct. To Xdcrga avdpcoct a' tvav nXdcno Pia; 
nWata; Xd)paq Kat tvav vTcoX6 pta; qn)Xý; Xd)pct; kv ATav 71OTt gcyaxbTCPO". 
27 sc a7c6XVTq ICUptapXfa Tq; ýZylk-4; Tq; CEYOP6; 6XI tl6VO CrTOV OtKOVOPIK6 01M Kai aTOV KOtVO)VIK6 Kai 710xtTtallIY6 
& 11 J( po . 8 'ýj 011PEPINI) 7[aYKOG`gtO7[OiTjqq Kai 11 ýATPE(a Tq; aouSociaq Tow ayopd)v IXaPaV CL7[OtKIOKPCLTIKI POP(PA, T6aO 
OtKOVOlitKd, 600 Kat ItAtTlanW. 
64 
'neoliberal' foolishness arrogantly downgrades every cultural element, in the name of 
money and trade" (Vergopoulos, 200 1). 29 
In addition, globalization was articulated as a relatively recent phenomenon which was 
increasingly undermining the state and social achievements. "The last twenty years we 
have been witnessing an unprecedented attack on every social achievement, on all 
democratic and human rights" (Kostadopoulos, 200 1)30 and "even though national states 
had achieved significant progress in democratic governance, democracy has shrunk 
during this last century, as the economy has expanded" ('It is harmful for democracy', 
200 1). 31 "What neoliberalism demands is the demolition of the 'welfare state" (Bitsakis, 
2001b: N06). 32 It is "a value system which undermines human dignity, emphasizes 
vulgarity and transforms national governments in guardians of the economic interests" 
(Stavros, 200 1). 33 
Similar to the British press discourse, globalization in the Greek press was constituted as 
an overpowering force that affected the entire world. Unlike in the British press, this 
domination of the markets was constructed in very negative terms in the Greek press. 
Specifically, globalization was "unregulated", "unified" and "harmful for most people", 
while its "domination" and "absolute reign" had "reached colonial levels". Therefore, 
globalization was less than welcome since its effects were "devastating" and 
"destructive". Even though globalization was not defined, and even though there was no 
conscious effort to explain its causes, its effects were very clearly represented. 
In fact, globalization was anthropomorphized, since it could think, make plans, and act 
upon people: -- Scr, -globalizhtidn was "fiotorious", "absurd", "unfair", and "inhuman". It 
also "imposes", "it shows its real face" and was, in short, "the enemy of humankind". 
29 "H $(Pl4)xýOCPTj' a(ppo6vq Unopaoplýct axaýOVIK& KdOC 710ktTtOTIK6 XctpctKTqpicrrvc6, ev MpTl TOU a(PIPTIJAVOU 
? fAVCETOq Kat vpxop6p=ý'. 
"Ta TEXzx)Tala thcout Xp6via yw6paTe RdpTt)pc; lita; irponoyavoýq cniOcoil; antvavn ac icdOc Kolvwv'Ký 
KCLT&KTqUq, antvavTt (ye K606 gnpOKPCLTuc6 Kt avOpd)7nvo BtKaiwjicý'. 
31 "H SqýOKPCLTW, AýGTEPCL CM6 aqRQVTIKA np6o8o GTQ EOVIKd KpdTq, KaTd TOV TCXnTatO KUPIW; CLI&Vat 
6PXIGe VCt 
CFUPPUCVd)VCTat, 6oo 8teupbveTat ýq oticovopla". 32 "AlTqpaTOA) VEOVtXE4UOEPtC%LOý E(VCtl 11 K(ITES&(PtCq'rOU 4y6gevou 'KpetTOU; np6vola; "'. 33 44tva 6aqlLa attd)v nowu7copa0lifýEt Tqv avOpd)ntvq a4tonptnact, e46pct Tq XuSat6TTITa icat tmmptnej Tt; COVLKtq 
IKUPFEPVýCrCt; CFE TbXaKEq TON OIKOVOPIK6)V icctpcty6VTO)V'. 
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These anthropomorphic metaphors constituted globalization as a tangible and imminent 
threat, as the ultimate enemy. As Barkan points out, "the human body is both 
phylogenetically and ontogenetically one of the first and most basic entities the mind can 
grasp" (Barkan, 1975: 62). Since "it is instinctive for humans to make sense of objects in 
their own terms" (Luoma-aho, 2004: 123), the use of these anthropomorphic metaphors 
to describe globalization rendered it a very powerful actor and the negative connotations 
in these anthropomorphic metaphors also rendered it a very threatening actor, the 
ultimate Other, in direct opposition to the Self. 
This threat posed by globalization was accentuated by constructions of globalization as 
an enemy, waging war against the state. Predicates such as "unprecedented attack" and 
"demolition" constituted globalization as an attacker intent on "demolishing the welfare 
state" and imposing its 'lotalitarianism" and its "global dictatorship". The state and 
globalization were positioned as opposites, since the state stood for "progress", 
"democratic governance", "social achievements" and "democratic and human rights , 
while globalization stood for "totalitarianism" and destruction of all those values. In 
addition, this relationship between globalization and the state was constituted as linear, 
meaning that the more globalization expanded the more the state shrank. 
Such a construction of globalization as an attack on the state had implications not only 
for the way globalization was perceived but also for the way it should be dealt with. 
According to Christie, "When the physical body of the state is attacked, our very identity 
is assaulted. In essence an attack on the soil of a country is an attack on the people" 
(Christie, 2003: 7). Since globalization (which, as seen, was represented as a tangible 
actor) attacked 'th&'ýtate, 'ifffillowed that the attack was on the people themselves. 
Consequently, the only way globalization could be dealt with was with a revolutionary 
counterattack to defend the state's identity and values. In other words, such a 
construction of globalization would not consider the possibility of alternative courses of 
action other than the complete eradication of globalization. Finally, such a construction 
of globalization was also based on a further presupposition, namely that globalization is a 
very recent phenomenon. However, it could and has been argued that globalization has 
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been going on for many centuries, and is not merely a phenomenon of "the last twenty 
years" or of "the last century", as was assumed in the Greek press discourse. According 
to Lloyd, "unification of markets on greater scales and the widening powers of imperial 
states and now firms to create and manipulate markets have been features of particular 
historical eras in many times and places in the past ... Even in the time of Alexander the 
Great and his successors in the third century BC, a kind of Hellenized, quasi-globalized 
world existed across the vast reaches of Eurasia from the gates of Hercules to the Indus 
river" (Loyd, 2000: 264). If one conceptualizes globalization in such a way, then the 
construction of the state as attacked by the market does not necessarily make much sense, 
since globalization has been part of the world system for centuries without threatening 
state power and state identity or reducing states to slaves of the world economy. In fact, 
it could be argued that "the de/territorialization of the state, in both its roles in identity 
formation and security, has been followed by a re/territorialization that has re/entrenched 
the role of the state" (Christie, 2003: 12). 
Globalized dynasts 
The Genoa G8 summit of July 2001 received extensive coverage in the Greek press and 
the G8 leaders were represented as the actors behind globalization, maintaining and 
spreading globalization for their own profit in an "imperial raid to conquer humans and 
all the riches of the planet" ('What Genoa showed' 2001)34 and thus revealing "its [he 
New Order] cynicism, its vicious soul, its raw violence" (Stamatopoulos, 2001a) . 
35 
According to this representation, globalization was only beneficial for these few powerful 
men, who aim at profiting at the expense of the entire world, Specifically, "the 
financially powerful- 'i-nid- the-1'r local representatives want to create an international 
community which looks like the Third World with abundance and provocative luxuries 
for the few, and misery and unhappiness for the rest as well as totalitarian 
regulations"(Tsovolas, 200 1)36 and "a planet which looks like a prison, a cemetery or a 
34 s4 
35 t4 
al)TOKPaTOPtk-4 TOI)q EnISPOPA crTouq avOpd)7tov; Kai TOV nX06TO TOU 7[XaAlrq". 
36 66 
Tj Nka T641 Scixvct nXfov -rov Kuvtap6 Tqq, Tqv aSI(TraKq "XA T% TqV 0)ýLA p(a q; ... E4LYCpgqý' 
Ot OIKOVOPIK& tCVPOI'K(It Ot TOntKO( avnnp6cr(onoi TOU; PtUIJV Va OSqACrOX)V GE Ria StCOA KOIV(OV(a XdVO) crra 
xpftunct -rov TplTou Map% lie viloiSeq ay0ovlaq Kai XPOKXTITtKt; IEO%'UTtXZtE; yta Tov; Myou;, ptcra C; e (OKE=6; 
8vmX(q Kai P41ptaq Yla TOI)q 710Wýq Kai pe EVW01); OXOKXqPO)TIK013 XctpaKn)pa". 
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casino" (Skarvelis and Tsirigotis, 200 1). 37 The G8 were therefore deemed responsible for 
world poverty and for accelerating rather than impeding the globalization processes 
through destructive policies and ideologies. "These policies and this civilization which is 
being implemented by the G8 transforms life into bank transactions and is responsible for 
the poverty and wretchedness of millions of people in the third world as well as in the 
heart of the capitalist countries (E. U., U. S. A. )" (Alfieri, 200 1). 38 This destruction that 
they caused was massive, global and affected everyone. "The U. S. and the governments 
of the NATO and EU countries, along with the industrialists and the gun traders, murder 
and massively destroy human beings (both the citizens and the soldiers), nature and the 
environment" (Georgiou, 200 1). 39 
In fact, the relationship between the ones in power and the rest of the world was 
constituted as one between slaves and dictators, since the G-8 were described as 
"globalized dynasts" (Korovesis, 2001a)40 and "masters of the world" (Votsis, 2001), 41 
who "will keep treating human rights as miserable relics of the past ... They will keep 
dividing people in plebeians and patricians and only accept those who are obedient. They 
will keep globalizing inequality, oppression and violence" (Boukalas, 2001 a). 42 
Therefore, the current system was described as undemocratic, since people were not 
allowed to disagree or express their views, but were treated as inferior. "In our 
'democracy', nowadays, the citizens have the right to agree with what is being decided, 
but nothing more; they are 'spectators' and not 'participants"' ffiewers rebel', 200 1) . 
43 
To sum up, "the paradise of the 7+1, who grant wishes, smile and promise a better life, 
after death that is. For now, the armies of the modem slaves (who have a tv, a car, many 
37 "tvav n%aAq qoXaKý, vEicpora(pE[o, icaý(vo". 
38 s&qXo). tnCA c=4 icat o no), tnajt6; nov qpapg6ýUal CM6 mi); G8 PETaTptnEt qV ctvOpd)7nvq ýa)A cc egnoptict; 
xpdýet; Kat fXCt TqV cuObvq yta TqV E40AUcil Tqq ; (Dý; EKC(T0pgA)p((0V aIlVCtV0p(Dn(j)V gCLq CrTOV TP(TO K&yp Icat 
MV K(XpStd TON KCLInTCtktMK6)V xo)pd)v (E. E., HTIA)". 
39 "Ot HrIA icat ot KUPCPV4GEtq T(OV X(Opd)V Tou NATO icat Tqq E. E, paýf " Tou; Ptog7jx6vou; lCal Tou; Elln6polo; ... 
6nWv, SoXo(povobv Kat KCLTC(aTpt(POI)V ttaýMd ... TOU; av0pd)nou; 
(7[OXITC; Kat CTTPCLTt6TEq), rq Than KCLI TO 
7rEptp&UDV". 
40 447iaywagtonotný&ot 6uvdauý'. 
41 c4 ot aymd8c; Tov Wcrpu". 
42 4-Oct crunXicrow va avuýtvrcwtfýouyra c"pd)7twcL Sticat6liam ... CFCEV 
4OXICL KCLTdkOtnC[ TOU 7iapEX06vio; ... 
E)CE 
cruveXtuoi)v va Itotpd; ouv Tou; XaoO; oF. nXýPCIOUq KCEI IECLTPIKIOU; K(It V(l MOW IM6 TqV CUTISCL TOV; p6V0V TOI)q 
UI[dK0I)0U;. E)a c; -ovcXiaouv Xotn& va ((nCLYKOCF . JL=016W) TTIV avt(y6TqTct, TqV CEVCXEA)OCP(C4 Tq PICe'. 
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credit cards and Big Brother) should keep working; everything else in moderation ... 
That is what the modem hegemons of the 21" century Middle Ages command" 
(Roubanis, 2001 a). 44 
The first point that needs to be made about the above representation is the positioning of 
the G8 leaders in a relation of similarity (Doty, 1993: 306) to globalization. The 
characteristics attributed to the G8 and to globalization are very similar, since they are 
both treated as unified entities, with similar aims for and effects on humanity. 
Specifically, similarly to globalization, the G8 are constituted as one unit, rather than, for 
example, as a collection of different states whose interests may not always converge. 
Moreover, globalization "kills" and the G8 "murder"; globalization is "colonial" and the 
G8 are "imperial"; globalization "makes the rich richer and the poor poorer" and "aims at 
the creation of a unified, global unregulated market" while the G8 "keep globalizing 
inequality" and "transform life into bank transactions". The relationship between 
globalization and the G8 was constructed not only as one of sin-dlarity, but also as one of 
complementarity, since the G8 and globalization were seen to need each other and 
complete one another. In particular, the relationship was articulated as one in which the 
G8 relentlessly promoted globalization in order to profit at the expense of everyone else, 
while globalization's destructive expansion was facilitated by the "G8 dynasts". 
Therefore, the G8 and globalization were constituted, both separately and as a single unit, 
as destroying humanity and promoting authoritarianism. 
Another relationship established in this discourse was one of opposition between the G8 
and everyone else. The G8 were constructed as a big, threatening 'other' endangering the 
identity and existence of-the 'self'-. This was achieved by means of predicates that 
endowed the G8 with very negative attributes. The metaphor of enslavement to the 
"modem barons" highlighted this opposition between the G8 and the rest, while at the 
same time constructing the world as a united front against the eight hegemons and 
44 'V liapäöctcro; Tcov 7+1. Ot oxotot goWäýOUV Euxtg, yall6YL ýa )Cut u710axtaEt; Tta pta icamTEP1 ýCOA. METä 
OävaTov. Td)pa ot oTpaTik; Tüov o-üyyovo)v cnckäß(DV (JIF, t946pCLU9, al)TOKIVIJTO, 'ROW; 1rOWý lCtCTO)nICt; Käp'r£; 
Kat Meydlo A&cl96) irptnEt va 8ouXL6o, )v. Tct ult61otna Ilg gt-rpo ... 
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suggesting a common cause against the "tyrants". In addition, such a binary 
representation, whereby the G8 were the oppressors and the rest were the victims, 
transferred the blame for any problems onto the G8, who were seen as the only culprits, 
while absolving 'the self' of any responsibility. 'The self' was not part of the system as 
an active agent, but was merely the passive victim of globalized exploitation. As 
Schopfin stresses, "victimhood is a highly effective form of identity construction, in as 
much as it satisfies the need for a sense of moral worth and does so relatively easily" 
(Schopfin, 2001: 3). Therefore, constructions of the G8 as the oppressors both 
constructed a relative sense of 'self' and constituted this self as morally superior and 
ethically right. 
The United States as the leading corruptor 
Even though the G8 were heavily criticized for their 'totalitarian' policies and their 
promotion of 'globalized inequalities', the U. S was singled out for criticism rather than 
merely as part of a coalition of powerful countries. For example, France or Germany 
were at no point individually accused of promoting globalized inequalities, but only as 
G8 members. In contrast, the U. S. was criticized both as an individual actor and as a G8 
member. As a result, the U. S. was constructed as the most powerful, accountable and 
dangerous 'other'. 
In particular, references were made to "the greed of American financial interests" 
('Environmental darkness', 2001 )45 and the Bush administration was constituted as 
exclusively driven by economic motivations and intent on resorting to any means in order 
to profit. "President Ruslf-pldces-ffe American financial interests, which gain by 
polluting the Earth, above the planet's life, and also above human life" (Tush's cruelty', 
200 1), 46 and "Bush merely aims at serving the American financial interests and the 
American war industry" ('Europe and Bush', 200 1)47 since "the American government is 
45 GcH an%qa-ria Tow %wptjccrvtKd)v otlcovot,, Kd)v O. Uýjýpep6VTO)v, % 46 "ndvo) an6 ill ýwjrox) nXaATq, Kai y, )(ytK6, x6v(j) cm6 Tqv av0p(bnivq ýo)A, Urn o nXavqTdpXqq MXOU; Ta 
4 
tKctvtK& owovottwd crug(ptpowa, 710-0 KEpSgouv punafvowaý'. T. 20palla. 
rd, Tou, nou govaSIK6 crr6Xo LXOUV Va Vn-nPEACFOUV Ta aWptKaVIKd OtKOVOptlCdt crugytpowa Kai TK 
apepwavid; no)-Cgid; Ptojqxav[Eý'. 
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greatly vulnerable to and dependent on business interests" (Vranas, 2001: N46)48 and 
adopts "a political stance of violently defending the American national interest with a 
complete disregard for the consequence" ('Bush against all', 200 1). 49 Besides, "one only 
needs to glimpse at the list of the supporters of Bush's pre-election campaign in order to 
'read' the future in this country in which the governmental policies are directly and to a 
great extent affected by the business interests" (Elafros, 200 1). 50 
Other than financial gain, the U. S. was constructed as interested imperial expansion, 
since "after the war, Washington emerged as an imperial city" (Mourtos, 2001)51 "With 
the intention of imposing their global hegemony, shaping the world as they see fit" 
(Moronis, 2001b). 52 Even more than previous administrations, "the Bush administration 
aims at imposing its views all over the world, disrespecting the international system and 
ignoring the international rules and international justice" (Moronis, 2001b). 53 The U. S. 
was not described as an empire in the traditional sense. Instead, "the new imperial power 
does not conquer lands, but intervenes with bombardments and creates tension in many 
areas in the world, solely aiming at promoting the interests of the empire, exploiting the 
planet's wealth, selling guns and controlling the 'world order' with the sheriff's laws" 
('New Imperium', 200 1). 54 
These U. S. interventionist policies were heavily criticized in the discourse, since 
"American interventions with bombs and guns have opened bigger wounds, which don't 
48 , To apeptKavtic6 6=9tla 8taKUPLPVqqq E(Vat EýalpEnKd EU&%WTO Kal E4apTqptvo an6 -Ta EntXctp%lanKd 
(TutLTtpOvTa ... 
Me Mitovq avTf yta I: T4%tv', ' --., _-, 49 64 Ina noLnK4 otafaq apoTd4cw; Tolo cLlicptKavticoO COMO cuý(ptpowoq, crovoScuolitq; an6 70, ýpq aStaTopia itEpt 
Tow auvcnetd)v, Tn; 8, ucr(poplaq Kat T(OV aVTt(TU(MEtpd)(; E0)V 7101) 7[POKG)xr'. 50 6c QPKOL0F. va PgCt KaVd; ttla paTIdL OTq X(CrTa CVITVT6)V Tqq WPOEKXOTIKý; KCtR7[&Vta; TOU MITOU; Yla Va VSICLP&TEUý 
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52 4c oqv np60E(nl T(ov HrIA va ERIO&U, 01W W 67EEtpOv rlv nayOcypta qycpovict Toluq, StallOpyd)VOVTa; Tov ic6op cna 
titTpa m4'. 
'TT6XO; Tq; icuptpvqo7j; TýopT; MnOUq Eivat Va CXtp6), ICI TI; ctn6Vctq qq GTOV Oup 8p(bvTa; t4w a7t6, ro BLEOvi; 
6aqpa icat ayvod)VT(X; TOU; 81COVE(; KaV6VE; Kal TO 8(K(110". 
54 "ACV KCLTCL%allp&VE4 PCPCLICI);, ES&(Pll Tj Vta tpncptcL%tomK4 86va^ cNA EnElipalvet pE poppapStupoL; ical 
sniltouplyet EVT&Cyct; CYF- Std(POPEq REPIOxt; Tou ic6apolu, lie Ct7EOK4taTIK6 o'r6Xo va npoo)Od Ta aupTtpovTa Tq; 
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close" ('Manufacturing Consent', 2001)55 and "American policyrnakers design bloody 
and miserable 'solutions' for many parts of the world" (Papathemelis, 2001: NIO). 
56 
Moreover, not only was the U. S. seen as intervening unjustly, but it was also represented 
as "indifferent towards the tragedy that faces millions of people who die of thirst, hunger, 
exhaustion and illnesses; it is indifferent towards the value of life itself' (T. S. 
harassment', 2001). 57 Moreover, "because of their military and financial power, the 
United States 'have the right' to abrogate any law they don't agree witw' (Galiatsatos, 
2001a: N41). 58 It was thus concluded that "what in reality happens is that the U. S. 
government goes against the entire world" (Trigazis, 2001)59 and that "George Bush has 
managed to transform America into a rogue state ... America 
is transforming into an 
Empire of Evil" (America has transformed into a new pariah', 2001). 60 Resistance to the 
U. S. imperialist reign was thus rendered imperative in this press discourse. "Anti- 
Americanism means fierce opposition to the logic of the gangsters, to the beastly 'we 
decide' of the empire and ... to their terrorist reign" (Triadis, 2001). 
61 
The representations of the U. S. were similar to the representations of the G8, since they 
were both constructed as self-interested, dangerous 'others' who "go against the entire 
world". However, there were also differences between the representations of the U. S. as 
a member of the G8 on the one hand and as a single actor on the other, as well as between 
the G8 and the U. S.: Specifically, the G8 were largely represented as the main agents of 
globalization, while the U. S. was constructed as a modem empire interested in world 
hegemony. In other words, while the G8 were constituted as a single unit interested in 
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"globalizing inequality" and disciplining, while at the same time maintaining the status 
quo, the U. S. was construed as aspiring towards an indefinite expansion. 
The G8 were "dynasts" who"want to create an international community which looks like 
the third world", "a planet which looks like a prison", and people who are "slaves" and 
"spectators, not participants". The U. S. on the other hand was "a new imperial power", 
"an empire of evil" and "an empire city", which "intervenes" "with the intention of 
imposing their world hegemony". Thus, the G8 metaphor of slavery mostly connoted 
control and authoritarian governance, rather than an expansionary politics, whereas the 
constitution of the U. S. as an empire connoted expansion. This meant that the G8 were 
articulated as exercising a different, more indirect type of intervention by means of 
globalization and the economy, whereas the U. S. engaged in a more traditional type of 
intervention, with direct threats to state sovereignty. 
By singling out the U. S. as a self-interested, independent actor and by positioning it as an 
imperial subject, the above press discourse constructed the U. S. as both the most 
powerful and the most dangerous 'other': It caused destruction by intervening both 
indirectly and by means of the globalized markets, as a G8 member, as well as directly, 
through military, expansionary interventions. 
Alliosevic's arrest and the menacing New Order 62 
On I April 2001, Slobodan Milosevic was arrested in Belgýade and was later transferred 
to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Greek press 
represented Milosevic's deportation as a manifestation of the big powers' (and especially 
the U. S. ) authoritarian imposition of their own interests. Milosevic's arrest and the 
forthcoming trial was summed up as "another step ... towards the submission of states 
to 
62 1 only discuss the representations of Milosevic's arrest in the Greek section because it wasn't of major importance for 
the British press. Even though it was discussed in the British press, it was only a minor issue compared to issues such 
as global warming. Similarly, global warming was a minor issue in the Greek and for this reason I don't discuss the 
Greek press representations of global warming. 
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the will of the New Western Order" (Pap adopoulos-Tetradis, 2001a)63 and a "cynical 
demonstration of power of the 'international community' (which is neither international, 
nor in essence a community)" ('The criminal and the criminals', 2001). 64 It was also 
described as aiming "at paralyzing any contestation of the New Order of Things ... we 
should think of the International Tribunal as a collective organ of the new "Holly 
Alliance" of our era, which is used as a means to consolidate its authority" (Delastik, 
2001b). 6s 
Miloscvic was represented as another victim who got punished because he resisted the 
capitalist market. 'The nation-state is an obstacle to the domination of 'the market'. 
Whoever tries to resist will be eliminated for the sake of 'humanism"'(Bitsakis, 2001: 
N06)66 and "the leaders of the United States, as well as the socio-democratic hyenas of 
the European Union grant themselves the right to punish those nations which resist their 
capitalist globalization" (Bitsakis, 2001c: N06). 67 Thus, the trial was seen as the 
completion of "the plan which was devised by certain powers in the European Union and 
by the United States ... The leader who didn't succumb to the 
blackmailing of Ms 
Albright from Washington and who resisted Nato should be punished (Diakogiannis, 
2001: N5 1). 68 Since Yugoslavia "represented the last remnant of the 'socialist camp', it 
had to be smashed" (Bitsakis, 2001: N06) . 
69 The U. S. more than any other state was 
heavily criticized for its unaccountable interventionary policies and breach of state 
sovereignty. 'None of the fundamental rules of state sovereignty will be respected from 
now on, if it goes against Washington's wish to intervene militarily or politically in a 
country" (Polimilis, 2001a) . 
70 Elsewhere, "the truth is that the American imperialists in 
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their competitive race for the redistribution of the world promoted the shattering of a 
country and the massacre of its people ... they are truly carnivorous, these 
imperialist 
wolves who tear the flesh of Yugoslavia and hypocritically talk about 'peacemaking 
initiatives' and 'humanitarian assistance... (Samaras, 2001 ). 71 
This section is very much in line with the three previous discussions. In fact, this section 
brings previous discourses together, since it is presented as an example of how state 
sovereignty is threatened both by the globalized markets and its representatives, as well 
as by imperialist U. S. interventionism. Yugoslavia was articulated as a socialist, and thus 
non-compliant, sovereign state, whose sovereignty was attacked initially by the 
imperialist U. S. in the Kosovo war and later by globalization and its representatives by 
means of arresting Milosevic and trying him in Hague. Milosevic's Yugoslavia was thus 
articulated as an example of how the "New Ordee, "disciplines" those who don't 
"succumb" or obey the rules set by globalization. Milosevic, in particular, was 
positioned in an oppositional relationship to the U. S. and the remaining powerful 
countries, while Yugoslavia and all sovereign states were juxtaposed with capitalist 
globalization emerging as the victims of the "truly carnivorous ... imperialist wolvee'. 
While the U. S. and the other powerful countries were endowed with aggressive attributes, 
Milosevic was constructed as a defensive and somewhat heroic actor who was protecting 
his state's sovereignty. Thus, on the one hand, the big powers were "imperialist wolves", 
who "smashed", "intervened", "dominated" and showed their "cynical demonstration of 
power", while Milosevic "didn't succumb" and "resisted". This representation created 
certain 'realities'; that is, it constructed Milosevic's arrest as a dangerous and disgraceful 
event, while at the same time precluding other possible scenarios. A different 
representation which, for example, emphasized Milosevic's brutal and deadly rule would 
have created different realities and possibilities. It is also worth pointing to the striking 
similarities between this discourse and the Greek press discourses during the Kosovo 
'I "ro xpaTpanK6 ycyov6; Elvat 6n ot aticptKavot i4LxcptoLXtcrTI; mov avrayamoo ToxK Ya To 
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WXEPtCLUCrrtIC01 ) U01 4F. CFK(; OUV Vj IU4KC;, rq; houmaxapla; icat Tqv (Sta cmTAA pe axtpavrq vnoicptcFia plAvE Ya 
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war, which openly and uniformly condemned NATO actions against Serbia. This 
uniformity amongst newspapers was emphasized by Kondopoulou in her analysis of 
Greek media representations during the Kosovo war: "The offensive against the Serbs, 
according to Greek media, was an unjustifiable action against a sovereign neighbouring 
state whose internal affairs were being used as a vehicle of western intervention and 
expansion at the expense of civilians, both in Kosovo and Serbia, and ultimately on the 
Balkan peninsula as a whole" (Kondopoulou, 2002: 2). Headlines in the front pages of 
the newspapers during the Kosovo war, such as "war criminals: Americans, NATO, EU", 
"senseless slaughter", "human sacrifice in the name of human rights" (Kondopoulou, 
2002: 3) were very similar to Greek press representations of Milosevic's arrest in 2001, 
as desribed above. 
A glimpse of hope ... Resisting the globalizcd market 
While there was continuous condemnation of globalization in the Greek press, there was 
also a simultaneous appraisal of the anti-globalization movements, which were defined as 
a confrontation between "the two worlds, that of riches and imperialism on the one side, 
and that of poverty, work and struggle on the other (Skarvelis and Tsirigotis, 2001 ). 72 
Elsewhere it was pointed out, that 'Iwo worlds confront each other. power and riches 
against conscience which cares about humans and the planet, keeping hope alive" 
(Bakomarou, 2001a). For these reasons, the anti-globalization movement was 
hegemonically represented as "revolutionary" (Mihailidis, 200 1)73 in the Greek press 
discourse, since "it preludes a major cultural resistance of modem societies against the 
unaccountability of the markets and the Stock Markets" (Vergopoulos, 200 1)74 and was 
$_ ;ý re I reminiscent of "the great message of the 'French Mai rich is still alive: Be a ists. 
Strive for the impossible... (Bourdaras, 2001a). 75 . Ile protesters themselves were 
described as "the children of resistance who generate hope ... Resistance to the 
72 "ot SUO lc6<; llot, Cluz6; ir01) R). oem, ) Icavrou WxtptaXtcrpoe ctit6 rq pm, ctuT6; in; ipT6)Xcta; irg; Eplacia; Kat Tq; 
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unrestrained globalized market... resistance with the motto "the man above profite' 
(Votsis, 200 1). 76 This movement was represented as "a new movement of political 
disobedience to the plans of the rulers of this world" and was thus, "quoting from Brecht, 
'the world's hope... (Valavani, 2001: N06). 77 Similarly, "the international movement of 
disobedience which started in Seattle against the laws and the rules which are put in 
practice by the globalized economy of the markets, brings hope and slowly but steadily 
constructs a new society of solidarity and humanism, a society which recognizes that all 
humans are above profits" (Alfieri, 200 1). 78 
Since the movement was the world's only hope, it was very important that all citizens 
joined in and resisted the market exploitation. "We shouted in Genoa, but we will also 
shout wherever it is necessary, 'Youth of all nations resist'... don't let your soul be a 
pray to the modem 'vampires' of money and exploitation" (Georgakakis, 200 1). 79 
Submission or compromise would only have negative effects. "We will not succumb or 
stay satisfied with the few crumbs of provisions or with the few hopes. -Submission 
has never been a good tactic for liberation; neither has the reconciliation with the 
executioner" (Panousis, 2001: N06). 80 Finally, it was pointed out that the movement 
should keep struggling against globalization. "We are not scared of. it [globalization]. 
We reveal its aims and at the same time we pursue to control and subvert it" (Zohios, 
2001). 81 By the same token, "the struggle will continue by all means, against 
imperialism and the capitalist storm" (Tsirigotis, 2001 ). 92 
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avna-rcL0ei, rs' ... pilv a(pýVETE ýMV'#UA au; 
ßopä mu; oüyxpovou;, ßptK6lalcc;, tou XPýlia-rK ICCLI Tqý 
80 "Sev Oa crupkiopff6)00eps cxpic06pcwl crtcL 6x01a VIIO»la xapoxd)V A mý 6A0W.; "se; ... 11 -OROruh Nott 
örv 
ctx-O£-uOtpwol;. Oete 11 cruprf iXiwol pc mv öAgto-. 
"ätv -rg goß6pa(TTF- AxoKoLkenToulie, xffl6(YlitcL, zou; cyTöXoug Tq; Kal taluT6XPOVa exIßAKOUJIE TOV LIM() CM im 
ruaTPOKA im(ýM. 
2 "0 cty6)vaý Oa ouvtliaTel pE öla m pLoa. Evävna ... T0v 419£PmltaP6 Kat M IccLmtult(ynA lcamlY0ä»- 
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This discourse follows from the representations of globalization as a dynastic, enslaving 
force and its representatives as authoritative dictators. However, the new discursive 
element added here is the anti-globalization movements, located in a position of 
similarity to 'us' and in one of opposition to globalization and the big powers. This 
relation of similarity was achieved through the frequent repetition of the personal 
pronoun 'we', by means of which the reader was hailed (see Althusser, 1998: 302) to 
identify with a particular position. Moreover, the ambiguity and non-specificity of this 
'we' "helps to define the subject position that the audience is asked to assume; it helps to 
wield potentially disparate members of its audience into a single, unified identity" 
(NVcldes, 1999: 106). As a result, the anti-globalization movements were constructed as 
representing everyone. 
Ilis identification of the anti-globalization movements with 'us' was both facilitated by 
and, in turn, facilitated the oppositional structuring of the movement and globalization/its 
representatives, which were constituted as belonging to "two worlds", the first standing 
for "poverty, work and struggle", as well as "solidarity", "humanism" and "conscience". 
while the second standing for "power", "riches and imperialism". Ilis construction of 
the world in terms of two broad categories, the all-righteous oppressed and the evil 
oppressors necessitated a revolutionary reaction on the part of the oppressed - 'us, that 
is, and naturalized the construction of the anti-globalization movement as "revolutionary" 
and as a necessity for "liberation", while the protesters themselves were called the 
"children of resistance" against the "capitalist storm". 
The European crisis 
The discourse on the E. U. consisted of disillusionment about the democratic ethos of the 
union, as well as an aspiration towards a more democratic union which would be capable 
of gaining power and independence from the U. S. To begin with, the development of a 
socially democratic and politically united E. U. was deemed imperative in the Greek press 
discourse in order to deal with the threats of globalization and the U. S. "Europe needs 
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independence and power" (Bush's message to Europe', 2001). 83 As far as globalization 
was concerned, the E. U. was seen as "the only power which can now seriously contest 
the global marketization as well as the resulting capitalist culture is United Europe ... For 
this reason, those who are really interested in our cultural autonomy should be fervent 
14 
supporters of a united, socio-democratically oriented Europe" (Mouzelis, 2001: N14). 
Besides, "a Europe which is subjected to the laws of the one and only globalized market, 
which is socially powerless and politically unstable will soon find itself in a dead end" 
(Polin-tilis, 2001b). 85 
Bush was also described as disempowcring the E. U., which was losing its independence. 
"They [the U. S. ] mistreat their globally closest ally, the EU ... The tragedy is that 
European security is decided in Washington and the Europeans slavishly follow ... 
Europe is the Pontius-Pilate for what goes on in its area" (Papathernelis, 2001: N 10). 86 
Moreover, the situation will not change unless the E. U. itself takes some initiatives. 
Since "the EU is only an economic union and is lacking a common vision and common 
planning for issues of global strategy ... the U. S. intervene and play the role of an 
international referee" (Liapis, 200 1). 87 "As long as the Europeans don't commit to shape 
the future of the EU, Washington will take up this role' (Kapopoulos, 2001b). 88 It was 
therefore imperative that the E. U. attained that all important empowering unity which 
would give it a voice. "It is ridiculous that Europe is still under American guardianship 
and still hasn't got its own autonomous politics for its security and its defence, as well as 
its foreign policy" ('No to closed doors, 2001). 89 "Let's hope that European solidarity 
83 li Eupd)xq xpctd4ETat crv&4apTq(; Ia Kai Uvaýtj". 14 "H p6vq 66vapyl tou Ita Tq cmypl fXm Kai rq SuVaT6Tqm Kat -to cupiptpov V ap(ptopq4cret copapd rqv xaTK6apta 
cryopogaTict KaOdK Kai Tqv dKpo); KaTavaXwnxA KovkTobpa xovTqv cruvo8c6ct dvauq Evcopfvq Eupd)xq. Kai p6vo 
Te avT6 To )Ayo, cruml xou xpqpauKd rvSta(ptpov-rat Tta qv nokinaliucA pa; cmrovopla Oa txpent va tival Ocppof 
'Usocrnpunt; pta; cvwgtvq; croataUrlpopamd xpocravaToLognq Eup&xq; ". g5 "pta Eupd)xq I)IOmTptn (nou; v6pou; Tý; pta; Kat p6vil; xaTKoup%oxotTjptq; aTopd;, ahvapiq Kow(mcd Kat 
C[VrPPdnaq ROXITUCd, PXOPCI XOX6 6VTOpa VU PPEOEI CF8 Q8114080". 96 ýrOV XaTKOCPICK KCLXOTEP6 Touq crOppaXo, Tqv F-E., aptaKovTat va TOV tXOUV "TOU OATGOV Kai TOU PXdTCF0V"- 11 
TpaT(L)Bfa elvat 6n il Eup(mmix4 ampdkEta amo(p(XCFL; &Tat OTTIV OUdCFtTKTOV Kai ot Eup(onalot atSnp6vo); aicokovOOOV 
W 11 Eupeoxq I. EtTOUPYE(w; n6vTtoq nOATo; yta Ta TExTatv6Ma aqv xp-ptoA q(; ". "Iýpcpa, axM Tj EE. EfVQt pta Kotv6TqTa oucovoptKd)v crippEp6mm Kai MEPE(Tal cv6; icotvo, 5 opdpaTo; Kai 
KOW016 CFXEStacrpo6 Tia Otpara xaTK6cpta; mpaqpxý;. Me cruvInEta, ot I UU va ppl(wouv T6vtpo l8a4po; va 
naptppafvouv icat va xai; ouv -to p6)Lo Tou &t&Ovol6; anStatrjr4". 
Ooo ot Eupconalot anoTOyouv va ava)Apouv Tq Btag6pfpcoaq -rou pWowo; T% E. E. il OudatyrTov Oa TO KdVEt 
Acv pxopc(q Eupd)xq va PplaKeTat aK61iq ux6 apzpucavikA xqS&govfa Kat va pqv txci pta aui6volill XOLTIK71 Tta 
Tqv aavdLXtuz Kai Tqv dpuvd Tqr, 6xo)q Kat Tta Tqv ttcouptK4 Tq; xoXtmý". 
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will be enhanced and that European unification will move in a different direction than the 
one it is currently heading towards, so as for Europe to rid itself of 'Euro-Atlanticism' 
and to defend the 'european social model' against the American one" (Trigazis, 2001). 90 
The case of the need for political unification was made possible in this discourse through 
the juxtaposition of the E. U. and the U. SJglobalization in an oppositional relationship, 
whereby the E. U. was dependent on and enslaved by those two actors. Predicates such as 
"defend", "autonomous" and "independence" were repeated in juxtaposition with 
"guardianship", "slavishly", "intervene" and "subjected" and constructed the E. U. as both 
a dependent actor and are in need of liberation through unification. In fact, the repetition 
of predicates such as "solidarity", "unify" and "unification" and "social model" 
reinforced this necessity for a stronger, more socially and politically united Europe rather 
than a mere economic union of separate nation states. As Diez also points out, "the way 
these arguments are structured is different from a purely economic interest based 
argument, and it is this structure, and its implication for politics that is decisive Erom a 
discursive perspective" (Diez, 2001: 24). In fact, this oppositional positioning of the E. U. 
and the U. SJglobalization facilitated the construction of a common identity. Tle U. S. 
was an 'other, an 'outside' threatening the existence of the 'inside' in the above 
discourse. As Doty also emphasizes, "identity is contingent and exists only by virtue of 
strategies which expel the surplus meanings that would expose the failure of identity" 
(Doty, 1993: 454). Therefore, the existence of an 'outside', the U. S. in this case, 
strengthened the identity of the 'inside', the E. U. that is. The political community of the 
E. U. was distinguished and differentiated from the U. S. and at the same time established 
itself as a unity. Moreover, the threat posed by the U. S. rendered further unification 
imperative. 
Even though the necessity of a "united Europe" was continuously stressed, there was also 
the recognition that this unification was not being realized because the most powerful 
E. U. countries were not acting collectively as E. U. members but were taking advantage 
"0 "A; "croupt S& 6n zapdlkqXa Oa rvtMOEI q cupcOnalkl aUljXEjYVq KCU 6n Tj CUPWXCLIK4 CVO7Wbla9 Oa ICtVTIOEI 
crc KaTc6Ouv(; il Bta(popcmý cLR6 Tq UqWPt, &G-rE va cmaUayd Tj Eup&n cm6 mv 'cupomkamapW Kai va 
vxtpa(mw-rc(To ((EupomaTO Kotv(ovtic6 ILovTW)) Evavn Tou apEptKawcoi)". 
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of the smaller and less powerful members. The E. U. was therefore described as a union 
of the few: "The small countries of the EU are not taken into account anymore" 
(Delastik, 2001)91 and "only the most powerful members of the EU regulate the EU 
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politics" (Oikonomopoulos, 2001a). For this reason, "the Union is in danger of 
becoming an oligarchy of the most powerful countries" (Fragoudaki, 2001: R07). 
93 "One 
should see the suffocating atmosphere in international and European conferences in order 
to understand how unbearable the pressure [towards the less powerful countries] is" 
(Koumados, 200 1). 94 
While the E. U. as a whole was constituted in opposition to the U. S., the most powerful 
E. U. leaders were often also similarly positioned to the U. S. as equally lawless actors. 
"The great European powers (Germany, France, Britain) may obviously be less 
significant actors than the United States in the leading bloc of the New Order of things, 
but they still belong to the leaders rather than the marginalized in this international power 
nef' (Delastik, 2001a). 95 Elsewhere, "according to Chomsky, all the postwar presidents 
of the United States should be hanged. I would add: And all the current socialist leaders 
of the European Union. I would add this, if I was not in principle against the death 
96 penalty" (Bitsalds, 2001b: N06). These most powerful E. U. governments were thus 
severely criticized for imposing "an immoral and illegal authority" (Panousis, 
200 I: NO6)97 characterized by "democratic deficiency" ('Globalization of the police', 
2001). 98 They were also described as destroying Europe, since "they build the Europe of 
unemployment, the Europe of the submissive to the transatlantic leaders and the Europe 
of wars, the Europe of the terrorist laws and of the cops" ('Europe as a policeman', 
91 "ot cm6yet; r(ov ILticp(bv icpaT6)v Sev kappdvovrat Wov ux6W. 
92 u crroAK 6pou; zou ot mappob) Mow vcx plu0p(; oi)v Tqv 6XTJ XOXIUK4". 93 "TTjv7Evcoaq, 6pa, xapapovdEt o KfVSUVOq VCX IIETaTPUXEI GE OXI-fapXfa T(OV lGVp6TEMV X(DPeOV Tq(ý"- 
" "npt? (Et Va tXEt ý4= KaVEI; TO K; Lfpa XOU bqploUpyE(rat GE &LEOVE(; 4 EUPO)ndd; BtacrKITEt; yla V(l KaTCLIAP&t 
n6cro aq6pTjTCq JUEOPEI Va EIVCLI Ot XIIG&tý". 
93 "Ot M61C; CUP07ECLIKL; blUVdlltl; (rEppaVio, rmUlct, BpcTavia) pnopF. 1 va tivctt tpqxrvdn vloSelcupot xapdyovTc; 
cre cXtaq pt r4 HrIA crro TlymK6 Pn)LOK q; Nla; T649; npayp&T(J)v, av4lcouv 61iý oTo'U; TrftTt; Kat 6Xt (YTON 
naple; auToO Tou Wygaw; E40UGia; GE &ZOVI; EWIXESO". 
96 "Kad Tov To6tion, 6Xot ot ; =cmoXEpuco( xp6&8pot Twv HrIA Oa t7tpEne va ctnayXovtaOobv. Eyd) Ou jEp6c6cTw. Kat 
Ot VUV GOGICIM4 lqyLTE; qq F-F. Oa To xp6crOcTa, av 6ev ýpuv Otlia CPA; cvavliov q; OavaTtIc4; xotA(; 7- 97 s4 pla aAOucq icat avoptlioxotTiq t4ouala xou bey lun6lCEtTat CC lCaVtVa AIXIO icat Oscrpuc6 WtoptoO". 
99 " To 8TIlimcpanO V-Xctpgd". 
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2001). 99 For this reason, the E. U. had been turned into "a violent, money - oriented 
dictatorship" (Skarvelis and Tsirigotis, 2001)100 wearing a "faqade" and hiding "its true 
identity of violence and repressi&' (Skarvelis and Tsirigotis, 2001). 101 
As a result of all these representations "the objective of an EU with more political 
coherence which will be the protagonist in the global scene has not been achieved" 
(Kapopoulos, 2001e). 102 Despite what was described as an E. U. failure, it was 
maintained that the vision of a more united Europe was still feasible, but only with brave 
moves. "rhe European case cannot be won with weak compromises. What is needed is 
bold initiatives" (Katiforis, 2001: N07) 103 and "the vision can only be feasible if Europe 
decides to implement policies of genuine coherence and convergence, which will 
eliminate the current inequalities" (Tision and delusion', 2001). 104 
This representation constructed the E. U. as it currently was, 'false Europe', but also 
visualized the E. U. as it should be, 'true Europe' (also see Makarychev, 2005: 489). Both 
discourses were made possible by means of binary identity constructions and 
demarcations of an insideloutside. To begin with, the E. U. was dichotomously 
represented as divided in two c=ps; the more powerful members of the E. U., 'the 
oppressors', versus the remaining E. U. members, 'the oppressed'. While 'the oppressors' 
"regulate", "build" and "impose", 'the oppressed' are "taken for granted", "suffocate", 
they are "marginalized" and "pressurized". There was therefore a division between those 
countries who controlled the E. U. by taking all the decisions, and those countries who 
had no say and were controlled by the bigger powers. Moreover, the countries belonging 
to each camp were constituted as unified wholes, rather than separate state entities. Thus, 
" "Aumt wov ptooöticä xTgouv -rijv Eiup(oln Tq; avcpytar, rnv Ei)p(üxq Tcov i)xomicnlcd)v oTou; uzg«, rIamKOil; 
! tXmviltäpXc; Kat T(üv wollpo)v, Tqv EuAin twv irpopov61i(av Kat irwv pnätaü)V". 
100 "11 Evü)pLvq El)Pd)IM 
... pta MM KIOUTOKpaT1A 
8ucTatopfe. 
101 "rci xpoconeia irg; 8rpoganicA; Täya Eup(O7M; Ica, 8£iXml)v to yuilvö xpöuü)xo ng ß(cL; Kat irg; Kuracrrolii(ý». 
102 "n wp6Klil(M yta pta E. E. pe upioad-repil nolinA ouvoA wov Da bt£x8ticE1 p61a xpcoTayo)vxrffi Mv nffl6e«L 
eqvA Sevunýpýc gyt cryliA; ctpictA yia va repäam KaTa), unicä crTou; cuponalKoü; eunmailoeý". 
103 "Nft xIasapoÜ; Glopßecwlk 8£: v xpoxtüpF1 ina 9 i)n60tan rg; EuAinr, Xpctäýovrat Tolgilpt; wpwroßouM£; 7- 
l" "To 6papa Da KaTaatti egucT6 p6vo av il Eupd)irg anoipaaicrci KM EMP6GE1 pla 7co14nKA xp«WaTtrA; cx%yKItcnN 
Kai ouvoXA;, zou Da Ftticplüv£t to)ý icat Da gagav(crei n; onltcpivt; crm61M-rcý7. 
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what was seen as a problem of European governance was mostly put down to the more 
powerful European countries which were responsible for the E. U. having become an 
"undemocratic", "violent" and "repressive' "oligarchy" rather than the "united" and 
"socio-democratically oriented" entity that was desired, while the smaller countries were 
absolved of any responsibilities for the current shaping of the E. U. Following from this, 
one side pursued their own interests whereas the other was willing and eager to selflessly 
give up their national interests, but was hindered by the most powerful countries. Even 
though Greece was not verbally associated with either camp, it was obvious that it was 
essentially linked with the smaller and less powerful countries which were not to blame 
for the existing undesirable situation in the E. U. 
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Conclusion- Comparing the British and the Greek Press 
Representations 
The press representations were quite distinct both between the two countries and in the 
case of Britain, across the newspapers of the same country. At the same time, there were 
many similarities between and across the newspapers in the metaphors and techniques 
employed, which led to similar attitudes of closure. This final section compares the 
British press discourses, and also makes a cross-country comparison, examining the 
press's constructions of globalization, the U. S. and the E. U. 
The British press representations 
Since the representations in Yhe Independent and Yhe Afirror were very similar, the 
comparison is between, on the one hand, 7he 771mes representations and, on the other, ne 
IndependentlAfirror representations. Die Times discourse constructed the need for UK 
engagement with the U. S. and disconnection from the E. U., while 7he 
IndependentlAfirror discourse encouraged closer U. K. ties with the E. U. and 
disengagement from the U. S. 
To begin with, the Kyoto protocol was represented in two different ways, as an 
inappropriate protocol which manifested E. U. anti- Americanism in 71he Times, and as the 
only solution to the very serious problem of global warming in 71e Independent and Vie 
Mirror. These two representations seem very dissimilar, since 77ie 7-smes construed 
global warming as uncertain and the climate as an independent force non-affected by- 
human intervention. Consequently the Kyoto protocol was naturalized as irrelevant and 
the E. U. as either absurd or anti-American, in contrast to the U. S., which was sensible. 
On the other hand, global warming was represented as an undeniable reality and the most 
important threat facing humanity in both Vie Independent and in 71eXfirror, while it 
was also presupposed that the Kyoto protocol was the only solution to this serious threat 
of global warming. As a result, and in contrast to Yhe 7"Imes discourse, the E. U. was 
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constructed as a rational actor and the U. S. a selfish actor promoting its business interests 
at the expense of humanity. 
However, these two representations are not as contrasting as first appears. Both 
discourses framed global warming in technical terms and as a physical, self-constructed, 
a-historic problem, which could be dealt with in a straightforward and technocratic 
manner. Moreover, such a framing of global warming absolved any actors from the 
responsibility of its construction. In The Independent and Afirror discourse, for example, 
the U. S. was criticized for not implementing the Kyoto protocol and for not having 
contributed in its construction, while the E. U. leaders were not criticized at any point; by 
contrast, they were praised for their decision to implement the protocol. 
The two main constructions of the U. K. role in the world were antithetical in terms of 
content, but very similar in the representational techniques and metaphors employed to 
position the U. K. either in a relation of similarity and complementarity with the U. S. and 
opposition to the E. U, in the case of ne 771mes, or the reverse in Yhe Independent and 
71e Mirror. 77ie 7"Imes and 71e IndependentlAfirror constructed the E. U. and the U. S. 
respectively as imperialist powers, intent on destroying the state's sovereignty and 
enslaving the U. K. in a state of powerlessness, submission and dependency. The 
metaphor of slavery was very prominent in both discourses, even though in Vie 7-Imes the 
enslaving actor was the E. U., while in Die Independent and in 71e Mirror the U. S. was 
the oppressive, enslaving power threatening the U. K. Moreover, the representation of 
'British exceptionality' was prominent in both discourses, and the U. K. was envisioned 
and constituted as a powerful actor, a leader in world politics. Where the two discourses 
diverged was regarding which other actor could provide the U. K. with, or not deprive it 
of, this power. Thus, a partnership with the E. U. in The IndependentlAfirror discourse 
was constructed as a partnership facilitating U. K. centrality. The E. U. remained a Union 
of self-interested states, rather than for example a United Europe. Therefore, both 
discourses and consequently all three newspapers constructed the U. K. similarly, as a 
major actor in world politics which should endeavour to maintain and increase its 
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influence. The only difference in the discourses and between 71e Pmes and 71e 
IndependentlAfirror were the ways in which this power can be maintained and enhanced. 
Finally, there were two main representations of globalization which differed significantly 
from each other. According to the first Times discourse, globalization was a beneficial 
force capable of eradicating poverty. The second representation, in ne Independent and 
Yhe Mirror constituted globalization as a means of exploitation by the ones in power, 
which creates inequalities. However, the distinction between newspapers in the use of 
these two representations isn't straightforward. While the first representation was 
hegemonic in 7he 7-imes, one could find both representations in the other two 
newspapers. These two representations were not compatible, since they constructed the 
world in completely different ways. The first constituted globalization as an external 
force, a natural phenomenon, to which actors merely respond. Globalization was not 
merely seen as something which happens to national governments in the second 
representation, but as a product of the state and of the multinationals. Therefore, 
globalization was not in this case external to the system, but part of the system. 
Moreover, the state was not an enemy or an obstacle to globalization but an actor 
essential for globalization's operation. 
Greek versus British press representations 
The Greek and the British press representations that are compared in this section concern 
globalization, the E. U. and the U. S. To begin with, the representation of globalization in 
the Greek press is in some ways similar to and in other ways different from both 
representations on globalization in the British press. Ile initial link would be between 
the Greek press representation of globalization and the second (mostly 
IndependentlMirror) British press representation, since both construct globalization in 
negative terms, as exploitative and as enhancing rather than decreasing poverty. 
However, the representational techniques were more similar to the first (mostly Ylinies) 
British representation and even though thematically these two representations differed, 
they both used very similar techniques to reach different conclusions. Specifically, and 
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in accordance with representation one in the British press, the Greek press constituted 
globalization as an overpowering and total force, an anthropomorphized actor capable of 
independent thought and action. Even though the G-8 were represented as exploiting the 
world and countries by means of globalization, it was nonetheless constructed as an 
independent force rather than in line with state action. In addition, both in the pro- 
globalization British press representation and in the Greek press discourse, globalization 
was positioned in an oppositional relationship to the state, the difference being that in the 
first case the state was seen as hindering globalization's positive effects, while in the 
second globalization was diminishing and weakening the state and creating havoc. In 
both cases, the state was described as external to globalization. 
The U. S. was hegemonically represented as a very negative actor in the Greek press, both 
as a G-8 member and as an individual actor. This construction was very much in line 
with the Independent and Mirror discourse, since in both cases the U. S. was seen as 
powerful and dangerous, as well as imperialist, while in 7be Pines the U. S. was 
constituted as a sensible actor and Star Wars as a defence rather than an expansionary 
strategy. 
A very interesting comparison is that of the Greek and British press representations of the 
E. U., which was constructed as a completely different actor in all three discourses that is 
the two British and the Greek one. The Greek press discourse was similar to Yhe 2-imes 
discourse, in the sense that it constituted the E. U. as a failed actor, but it substantially 
differed as well as it also constructed it as a potentially powerful and very important one 
as well. While the press in both countries positioned the E. U. as an 'other', it was also 
evident that this was desirable in the British press, in which the nation state had to be the 
primary and most important actor, and the E. U. was either a threatening other, in 7he 
2-Imes, or a beneficial other, in 77ie Independent and 7he Mirror, the E. U. was only seen 
as other in the Greek press discourse so far as it had not yet met the requirements of being 
part of the self. The ideal E. U., as constructed in the Greek press, was a United Europe, 
rather than a union of self-interested nation states. In fact, the most powerful states in the 
E. U. were very heavily criticized as self-interested actors, in a union that had to achieve 
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more political unity and a common identity. It is also not coincidental that the British 
press referred to the European Union as E. U., whereas the Greek press often referred to it 
as Europe. Besides, Greece's role and interests in relation to the E. U. were very rarely 
mentioned; rather, Greece's interests were only seen through the prism of the &U. rather 
than as an individual state. 
The representations of the U. S. in relation to the E. U., in the case of the Greek press, or 
the U. K. in relation to the E. U. and the U. S. in the British press, also form a very 
interesting comparison. In the Greek press the E. U. was directly juxtaposed with the U. S. 
in an oppositional relationship. In contrast, in the British press the comparison was not 
between the E. U. and the U. S. directly, but the question posed was whether the U. K. 
should form closer ties to the E. U. or the U. S. The main similarity between these three 
opposites - the E. U. vs. the U. S. in the Greek press, the U. K. versus the EU. in Vie 77mes, 
and the U. K. versus the U. S in Vie Independent and The Mirror - was the metaphor of 
slavery, which was used to construct the second part of the binary as the dangerous other, 
and the relationship between the two parts as one of submission and slavery of the first 
part in the binary construction to the latter. Thus, in 77te Tinies the E. U. was a 
threatening other enslaving the U. K. and depriving of its sovereignty and power, in 71e 
Independent and 71e Mirror the U. S. acquired the exact same role that the E. U. did in 
77ze 77mesý while in the Greek press the E. U. 's sovereignty and unity was threatened by 
the U. S. which was constituted as enslaving the E. U. 
To conclude, thematically and in terms of representational practices there were both 
similarities and divergence within the British press and between the British and the Greek 
press. What effect, if any, would the September II events have on the British and Greek 
press discourses? The following chapter looks at the press discourses of both countries in 
the four months following September 11. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 
DISCOURSES IN THE BRITISH AND GREEK 
PRESS: SEPTEMBER 12-DECEMBER 31,2001 
After the September II attacks in New York and Washington European governments 
expressed their sympathy towards the U. S. and pledged to assist in any way possible in 
the new 'fight against terror'. Britain seemed to have adopted the most empathetic stance 
towards the U. S. In his first speech after the collapse of the Twin Towers, on the I Ith of 
September, Tony Blair expressed his conviction that "this is not a battle between the 
United States of America and terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and 
terrorism. We, therefore, here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American 
friends in this hour of tragedy, and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven 
from our world" (Blair, 2001). During the speech he emphasized, that the U; S. was only 
one amongst many targets "and therefore it is important for us, whilst this has happened 
in the United States of America, to remember that very basic fact - this is an attack on the 
free and democratic world as a whole" (Blair, 2001). This British support persisted in the 
next few months, with a full military involvement in the Afghanistan war. Moreover, the 
majority of the British public approved of the American and British military action in 
Afghanistan (Guardian poll, 2001). 
By contrast, following the events of September 11, the majority of the Greek citizens 
adopted a very critical stance towards the U. S. Even though the Greek government 
expressed their sympathy for the U. S., many Greeks expressed a fierce criticism of the 
U. S. and its foreign policy. As Takis Michas points out, not only did some of the most 
prominent figures in Greece, such as the Archbishop Christodoulos and the composer 
Mikis Theodorakis, directly accuse the U. S. of being responsible for the September II 
attacks, but the majority of the Greek population shared similar sentiments. In a football 
match between Greece and Scotland which took place a few days after the September II 
events, fans of the Greek team tried to bum the American flag before the start of the 
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game and then booed when they were asked to keep a minute of silence as a sign of 
respect for the victims of September II (Michas, 2002). In a poll conducted by the 
Gallup International Association between the 10 and the 18 Ih of September in 34 
different countries, only Greece, Finland and Austria were very negative towards any 
type of military intervention (Iriotou, 2001: N16). At the same time protests and 
marches were ongoing outside the U. S. embassy and many protesters crammed the main 
squares in Athens. 
The representations between the British and Greek press substantially differed. As is 
analyzed in this chapter, the British press hegemonically represented the terrorist attack 
as an event of epic proportions and terrorism as the biggest threat facing humanity that 
needed instantly and drastically to be dealt with. By contrast, the Greek press 
hegemonically opposed a war in Afghanistan and represented the U. S. as the greatest 
global threat and the biggest terrorist of all. As far as the British press was concerned, 
discourses in the British press of course varied and a range of different representations 
appeared over many, primarily practical, issues, especially about the extent of any course 
of action and possible outcomes. However, as I demonstrate certain issues such as the 
nature of the attacks or the intentions of the terrorist were barely questioned, thereby 
rendering certain courses of action more desirable than others. Specifically, I argue that 
discursive constructions of the terrorist threat as well as the subject positioning of the 
U. K. and the U. S. as two liberal, democratic, western countries in defence against Islamic 
radicals constructed views on the attacks in Afghanistan and rendered a military strike 
necessary and desirable, or at least acceptable and justified. Such arguments were based 
on very specific, taken for granted ideas about what the attacks signified, the role of the 
main actors and the disposition of the terrorists, as well as distinctions between "the 
west" and the rest, "the inside" and "the outside", "Christianity" versus "Islam". It is the 
naturalization of such ideas and binary oppositions that shaped the character of the 
response and rendered certain options more appealing and seemingly more appropriate 
than others. Thus, in the first section of this chapter I deconstruct and analyze the 
representations in the British newspapers of the terrorists and the so-called Islamic 
radicals, the U. S., as well as the role of the U. K. in the conflict, from September 12 until 
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December 31,2001, that is between the original attacks and the end of the war in 
Afghanistan, and show the non-necessary character of the representations as well as the 
ways in which the representations rendered certain courses of action essential while at the 
same time marginalized others. 
The Greek press representation of the U. S. did not change substantially after September 
11. In fact, criticisms of the U. S. grew in fervour and scale. The U. S. was not only seen 
as a paternalistic bully, an arrogant superpower who disregards everyone else's wishes, as 
was the case before September 11. It also came to be seen as ruthless and aggressive, a 
terrorist empire and an evil superpower, the main cause for many world problems. Only 
one out of the three newspapers under study, the conservative, right-wing Kathimerini, 
represented the U. S. as a positive force under attack by evil terrorists -a representation 
similar to the British press discourse. However, such a representation of the U. S. was 
confined to the leading articles in Kathimerini, with the hegemonic discourse in the 
newspaper representing the U. S. in a very negative light, similarly to the other two Greek 
newspapers, Eleutherotipia and Ta Nea. Moreover, apart from the increasingly negative 
representations of the U. S. after September 11, the level of coverage on the U. S. and its 
deeds was also intensified in the Greek press discourse. Whereas before September II 
the topics of interest in the Greek newspapers were more diverse, after September II it 
was all about "America" and the war in Afghanistan. Most news topics, whether related 
to the U. S. or not, ended up being discussed in relation to the U. S. In addition, topics 
relating to Turkey, Israel and the E. U., wl-dch were more important before, lost their 
appeal and only appeared occasionally in the Greek papers. As with the British press, 
such discourses on the U. S. constructed the "truth" as uncontested and undeniable. The 
purpose of the second section of this chapter is -to explore these discourses on the 
September II attacks and the U. S., as well as representations of the terrorist threat and 
the role of Greece after September 11. Finally, it is worth noting that there were very few 
differences with the press discourse of each country. For this reason, I do not analyze the 
discourse of each individual paper, but refer to the British or the Greek press discourse in 
its entirety. 
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British press representations after September 11 
This section is divided in 5 parts. In the first part, I look at representations of the 
September II attacks themselves as an event of epic proportions as well as an attack on 
civilized values. In the second part, I examine representations of the terrorists and 
terrorism as an infectious disease, while the third part explores the discourses on 
terrorism and the ways in which terrorism came to be associated in the British press 
discourse with Islam and Muslims, who were "othercd" as backward, with the constant 
articulation of terms such as "bearded" also connoting their aggressiveness. In the fourth 
part I expand on the two main, yet contradictory, representations of the U. S. as either a 
good force, or a typically unilateral superpower, while the fifth and final part 
deconstructs and analyzes representations of the post-September II Britain as the good 
Samaritan of international politics. It should be noted at this stage that all these 
representations of the U. S., the U. K., terrorism, and Islam are discussed separately; 
however, they all complement each other and essentially work together to form the 
hegemonic British press discourse on the "War on Terror". The only representation 
which was not in accordance with the overall discourse on the "War on Terror" was the 
representation of the U. S. ' as a negative force. However, this representation was not the 
predominant one, and did not seem to affect the overall discourse. 
September 11 as 
... an event of epic proportions 
The attacks on the Twin Towers and on the Pentagon were described as an unprecedented 
event of epic proportions, which was bound to change the world forever, and which 
would affect American lives to such an extent that people would struggle to get to grips 
with norniality again. "Yesterday's coordinated attacks on the nerve centres 0 American 
power were Pearl Harbour and Oklahoma City, Apocalypse Now and the Towering 
Inferno all rolled into one: the ultimate American nightmare" (Dejevsky, 2001a: I). 
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Similarly, "no thriller writer or film-maker could have dreamed that their wildest 
imaginings would come true in such appalling fashion. But yesterday's was a disaster of 
such astonishing proportions that not even movie makers in Hollywood could have 
imagined it in their wildest dreams" (Scott, 2001: 23). The events were thus represented 
as being grander than fantasy could capture, more astonishing than any Hollywood 
blockbuster movie and utterly unexpected. "Until last Tuesday planes crashed into 
skyscrapers only when Steven Spielberg ordered them to" (Humphrys, 2001a). As a 
result, the attacks were represented as marking the new millennium, as one of the most 
important events in the history of mankind. "We can now say that II September is a date 
that will live in infamy" ('Mr. Blair had a speech', 2001: 3). Moreover, "if the fall of the 
Berlin Wall was the true end of the short 20"' century, there is a good case for arguing 
that the demolition of the World Trade Center was the true beginning of the 2l't" 
(Garton-Ash, 2001b: 5). It was constantly reiterated in the press that the attacks "marked 
the true millennium ... The reach of modem terrorism has been demonstrated" (Rees- 
Mogg, 2001b). 
Moreover, the hegemonic discourse described the events as not merely marking the 
beginning of a new era, but also one that would be more dangerous and insecure. "Never 
again will we be able to bask in the warmth of safety ... We know that at any moment a 
great black chunk of metal can come crashing out of the skies and obliterate everything 
we hold dear" (Malone, 2001a: 16-17). Elsewhere, "out of a clear, blue sky came a 
different world - more insecure, more vulnerable, more full of fear. Headline writers are 
naming the days we live in the age of anxiety. The terror has touched us all and we will 
carry its stain forever. Anyone who doesn't feel afraid is probably lacking either 
imagination or a brain" (Parsons, 2001 f. 14). 
The attacks on the Twin Towers were thus described in an apocalyptic manner, as if this 
were the end of the world, or as if Armageddon were approaching. Such representations 
were enhanced by means of visual material. Huge headlines and visually and 
emotionally stunning images of the Twin Towers, of weeping or terrified individuals 
covered in dust running in the streets of Manhattan, and of brave fire-fighters intensified 
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the drama. For many days after the attacks, the newspapers dedicated pages to this 
&ongoing mourning, publishing photos from all over the world of people holding 
American flags or pictures of missing relatives (see Appendix A, Figures 1-4). Most 
pictures were family-oriented; weeping children holding American flags and hugging 
their mothers or fathers were clear favourites, while headlines dramatically expressed 
universal declarations of fear and grief, such as "A silent world, united in grief' (Vallely, 
200 1: 1) or "America wakes up to a world of fear" (Sullivan, 2001 f). 
This representation of the attacks was naturalized on the basis of one main 
presupposition, namely that the September 11 events were indeed major. They were 
elevated to the status of a major historical event, of equal or in some cases of more 
importance than, for example, the end of the Second World War or the fall of the Berlin 
wall. They were constituted as opening a new and very important historical chapter and 
have since come to be known merely as "9/1 P. It was never questioned whether the 
events were as significant as they were described to be and whether they in fact deserved 
to receive the status of marking a date in history. As Derrida points out, "to mark a date 
in history presupposes, in any case, that something comes or happens for the first time, 
something that we do not yet really know how to identify, determine, recognize or 
analyze but that should remain from here on in unforgettable" (Derrida, 2003: 86); a 
major event is meant to be unprecedented and unforeseeable. The September II events 
do not necessarily fit this definition of a "major evenf', since many examples can be 
given either from the two world wars or latter events of "quasi-instantaneous mass 
murders that were not recorded, interpreted, felt, and presented as major events" (Derrida, 
2003: 89). Moreover, the attacks themselves were not that unforeseeable, in the sense 
that the towers had been bombed before and "there have been many attacks of the same 
kind outside American national territory but against American 'interests"' (Derrida, 
2003: 91). 
Finally, that the attacks were a very threatening "major evenf' is also contestable. 
Statistically the chances of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack are insignificant. "Of 
the 2.4 million Americans who died in 2001, only 0.8% died from any form of criminal 
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action. The total number of people who died in the atrocities of I Ith September 2001 is 
now thought to be 3,030, about 14.9% of those who died from criminal assaults in 2001 
or 0.0125% of those who died from any cause". Actually, 29% of deaths were the result 
of a heart attack, and cancer was the second most important cause of death at 22.9% 
(Eurolegal services, online). The events of September 11 may, thus, have been shocking 
as well as novel in some ways, and the death toll may have been high, but their 
immediate elevation to such a status cannot be so easily justified, 
To conclude, and even though the representation of the attacks as a major event can be 
contested, the continued articulation of the argument reconstituted the world we live in 
and therefore brought about this change that was meant to have happened with the 
attacks. As a result, such representations provided "a widely disseminated discourse 
which reffied the threat and naturalized both the interpretations of the act and the 
subsequent Western response" (Christie, 2003: 15). 
an attack on civilized values and a declaration of war 
In line with representations of the attacks as an event of major proportions, were 
articulations of the events as an attack on liberal democracies and on the civilized values 
of the West, rather than, for example, merely an attack on the U. S. "The slaughter in 
America was a wound against democracy and humanity" (Keane, 2001a: 3), "it was an 
attack on the civilized values of the whole world" ('Mr. Blair had a speech, 2001: 3) and 
on "civilized liberal society" fferror for All', 2001). Similarly, "this is a tragedy for 
everyone" (Parsons, 2001c: 16-17). "This was never an American catastrophe but always 
the world's" ('With One Voice', 2001). Such a representation of the September II 
events as an attack on the west and its values were facilitated by representations of the 
Twin Towers as western symbols. Thus, along with representations of the towers as "the 
most potent symbols of American prestige and economic power" (Pepinster, 2001: 10) 
and "symbols of American economic might" (Lines, 2001: 4-5), there were also 
representations of the towers as "the most powerful symbols of capitalism in the world" 
(O'Hara, 2001: 28-29) and "one of the symbols of the free world" (Brown, 2001: 6-7). 
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Therefore, "the American dream itself was the target of yesterday's co-ordinated and 
deadly terrorist attacks on the most potent symbols of Western political, commercial and 
military power. But it was more than that; it was an attack on civilised liberal society, 
designed to force all countries that could conceivably be targets to become, in self- 
defence, high security states" fferror for All', 2001). That the Twin towers had 
acquired symbolic status was also evident in that they became the focal point in the press 
discourse's imagery with the majority of photos in the weeks following September II 
depicting either the towers themselves or people around them. 
A very compelling photo published in ne Independent on September 15 showed part of 
the site after the attack (Appendix A, Figure 5). The site of the Twin Towers was 
covered in smoke and dust. The place looked as though it had been swept by a tornado, 
with destroyed cars covered in dust and ruins everywhere. What was particularly 
interesting was that one could discern a street sign --w%iberty Street"- in the foreground 
which dominated the landscape. In fact, this sign was the focal point of the picture, and 
carried with it very similar connotations to the ones described above. Text and images 
worked together to construct the events as an attack on liberty, democracy and libertarian 
values. The connotation implicit in the photo was that the Twin towers stood for liberty 
and that the terrorists had attempted to demolish liberty by attacking the towers. 
However, that the sign of "Liberty Street" was still standing, even though the towers 
themselves had collapsed, constructed the attacks as a battle, which had nonetheless not 
yet been won by the terrorists. 
In fact, the superiority of those values which were under attack and the 'evil' nature of 
the attacks were juxtaposed in the press discourse. "It becomes terrifyingly clear how 
close the 'barbarians' are, perhaps in reality always have been, to our gates. How 
literally, a symbol of our age can be destroyed in a moment, much as the fierce greatness 
of Rome was destroyed by hordes lacking science, literature, art but fuelled by a fanatical 
hatred of an urban, cosmopolitan, commercial culture and civilization far grander than 
their own". Precisely because the threat was tangible and very serious, and since, as was 
proclaimed, "the west is dealing once more with an ideological challenge to its values" 
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(Gove, 2001d), "it is not an arrogance to assert them [the values) but a necessity" ('Blair 
Shuttle', 2001). "There is a danger to every civilized country" ('It's time to stand by our 
troops', 2001: 6), but "democracy and modem civilization cannot be allowed to die in the 
rubble of the World Trade Center" ('United we can defeat', 2001: 6). "Against this 
monstrosity, the grandest of coalitions must be forged if evil is not to prevail" fferror for 
all', 2001). "Out of the good, the evil must be defeated" ('United world can 2001: 
2). 
As has been shown above, what underlined the hegemonic discourses in the press was a 
clear demarcation between 'us' and 'them' through the use of binaries, mainly 
civilized/barbarian and goodlevil (also see Kellner, 2003: 89). These binaries have clear 
implications on how 'we' envisage 'ourselves' versus 'thern'; the binaries construct our 
identity in contrast to the identity of the 'other', whether that 'other' is a person, a 
country, a thing or an anonymous force. In both binary pairs, good and civilized stand 
for something positive, while evil and uncivilized stand for pure negativity. Moreover, 
evil and uncivilized intrude to disrupt and destroy our goodness and our civilization. The 
juxtaposition between good and evil, as well as between civilized and uncivilized has 
clear implications for the way we envisage the 'other' as well as ourselves. Moreover, 
such dichotomies construct people in opposing terms, with the world seemingly 
consisting of absolute goodness and absolute evil, of superior civilizations and inferior 
ones. Since positivity lies always and only within 'ourselves' and 'they; can only 
represent negativity, such dichotomies constitute a divided and more dangerous world by 
reducing "human beings into objects that embody the undesirable" (Muscati, 2003: 261). 
Specifically, evil is usually defined as (Oxford Advanced Learner's dictionary) "a force 
that causes wicked or bad things to happen", "a wicked or a bad thing", "something 
which is morally bad", or "connected with the Devil and with what is bad in the world". 
Evil, thus, is something that simply is, it is inherent, an essential trait, that determines the 
ways in which one will act in the world. Based on the above, the "evil" that struck on 
September II was absolute and no further explanation is necessary. As Lakoff points 
out, "there can be no social causes of evil, no religious rationale for evil, no reasons or 
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arguments for evil" (Lakoff, 2001). The enemy of evil is, of course, good. "Good is our 
essential nature and what we do in the battle against evil is good. Good and evil are 
locked in a battle ... only superior strength can defeat evil, and only a show of strength 
can keep evil at bay" (Lakoff, 2001). Thus, not attempting to defeat evil is immoral since 
it will encourage more evil deeds from these evildoers. Especially since evil has a 
"mystifying, supernatural quality" (Kellner, 2001: 1) about it, it is essential that the battle 
against it is fierce and relentless. In fact, performing non-permissible actions in the name 
of good while fighting evil is justified, since it is absolutely essential to obliterate evil and 
dialogue or concessions can only have negative effects. Thus, to sum up the use of 
binaries such as good/evil and civilized/uncivilized, not only enabled constructions of 
"selir' and "other", but also emptied the attacks of any political motivations as well as 
rendered future British or U. S. actions, such as the war in Afghanistan, essential and 
unavoidable. 
Not only were the September II events seen as an attack on civilized values, but they 
were also unanimously articulated as a declaration of war. "Peace as we knew it 
vanished on September 11,2001 and today we are facing a new threat to the free and 
democratic world ... No one will forget those terrible images of the day freedom and 
democracy were attacked and defiled" (Cordy-simpson, 2001: 20-21). "Such wholesale 
destruction and loss of life is an act of war, there can be no doubt about that" (Stott, 
2001b: 16-17). The assumption which prevailed was that the terrorists declared a war 
on 'us' and we therefore have to respond by declaring a war on 'them' in order to defend 
courv values. The word 'war' featured in most articles and there was only very rarely 
expression of doubts as to whether this really was a war or not. "War is neither an 
inaccurate term nor a word without meaning in this hour" ('Old War', 2001). Restraint 
and caution were deemed essential by many commentators, but, with the exception of a 
few articles, the attacks were articulated as a "just war" to be conducted in the name of 
freedom and democracy, a war which was unavoidable and inevitable. The only 
divergence in the press representations concerned the type of war to be declared. Thus, 
on some occasions the attacks were described as a war between the terrorists on the one 
hand, and the U. S. and the U. K. on the other. A photo depicted a sailor hugging his wife 
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and holding his newborn child in his arms. Both the sailor and the baby wore a white 
navy hat, while the headline stated in big, black bold letters, "Hold tight for wae', and 
was followed by the following caption: "After the sorrow comes the struggle. Britain 
and America are braced for a battle they cannot afford to lose" (Woods, 2001: 7). On 
other occasions, the attacks were articulated as a war on the west. It was loudly 
pronounced that the West was at war with the terrorists, a war that the terrorists 
themselves had declared. "Why are we about to fight a war? We are doing so because a 
war has been declared upon Western societies. It is mistaken to view the events of 11 
September solely as a war on America. It was an act of war in America, on the West" 
(McElvoy, 2001c: 3). "Defeating Japan was like shooting an elephant, defeating the 
terrorists who inflicted the wounds upon America will be like stomping on jellyfish" 
(Kennedy P., 2001: 28). "The West has a fight on its hands" (Fielding, 2001). Finally, 
the "war" was often equated with a world war. On September 16, the Sunday Times 
published a picture of a heart that had been torn in half, bearing the pattern of an 
American flag next to the leading article. The headline of the article read: "This is a 
world war" (Appendix A, Figure 6). Elsewhere, "the war against terror is the new world 
wae'(Keane, 2001a: 3). 
The September 11 attacks were thus represented as war and a number of different 
identities were constructed which were all positioned in a relationship of opposition to 
the terrorists. Thus, it was not only the U. S., but also the U. K., "the West", and "the 
world", which were all positioned in a relationship of identity to each other as victims of 
the "terrorist war", and in opposition to the terrorists. As a result of this subject 
positioning, the U. K. would have to be involved, since war had been declared on it 
directly as a state, (a war on the U. K. and the U. S), or on the western culture and the 
world (to which it belonged). Thus the boundary separating the U. S. from the threatening 
other, was pushed outwards to include the U. S., the U. K., the west and the entire world, 
creating a chain of equivalence in opposition to the terrorists. On the one side were the 
terrorists and their supporters, and on the other was the rest of the world (also see 
Christie, 2003: 18). The war metaphor itself has material effects. By defining the 
September II events as war, the discourse of war was redefined and actual military 
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action was justified in response to the terrorist acts. As Slotkin also stresses, "once 
invoked the war metaphor governs the terms in which we respond to changing 
circumstances. It spreads to new objects; it creates a narrative tension for which the only 
emotionally or esthetically satisfying resolution is literal rather than merely figurative 
warfare" (Slotkin, 1992: 50). 
To conclude, there was unanimity in the British press about the nature and the character 
of the attacks. Such a position is not to be taken for granted, however. The reaction to 
the attacks could have been different. As will be illustrated in the second section of this 
chapter, the same attacks were perceived in a very different way by the Greek press. 
Specifically, they were described as a result of western, and mainly U. S-led, globalized 
polarization. Therefore, a military response was deemed not only unnecessary but 
actually harmful. Similarly, the fact that the attacks were seen as a violent act of war and 
as a fierce attack on western' civilization in the British press affected the ensuing 
responses to the attack. Once, for example, the presupposition that the attack in New 
York aimed at all Western liberal democracies was naturalized, and treated as a fact 
rather than a mere hypothesis, it became more likely that a full British involvement in the 
ensuing conflict would become necessary. Likewise, once the September II attacks were 
unquestionably and unanimously accepted as a declaration of war and a crisis of gigantic 
proportions, it was more likely that a fierce military retribution would be accepted as the 
most appropriate response. As Murray points out, "a crisis, like all news developments, 
is a creation of the language used to depict it, the appearance of a crisis is a political act, 
not a recognition of a fact or of a rare situation ... The political spectacle encourages 
people to support good causes and leaders and to oppose enemies, to sacrifice for the 
common welfare and to acquiesce in the inevitable'-' (Mlirray, - 1988: 31). - In the case of 
the British press, the description of the attacks as massively destructive acts of war 
against all western, civilized countries rendered a military response appealing and 
appropriate. 
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The Terrorist threat 
In line with discursive constructions of the September II attacks, the representations of 
terrorists and terrorism in the period between September 12 and December 31" 2001 
were very similar across the British newspapers. The image of the terrorist as evil and 
terrorism as an infectious disease that needed drastic responses, acquired hegemonic 
status. Essentializing representations of the terrorists and their positioning as particular 
types of subjects vis a vis the U. S. and the liberal, Western democracies not only 
enhanced the role of the 'West' as a beacon of freedom, prosperity and goodness, but also 
rendered justifiable and even in some cases imperative specific types of intervention by 
the U. S. and its allies. 
Definitions of terrorism in the British press 
In the British press discourse the terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center were 
hegemonically represented as "evil bastards", "barbarians with no principles or 
compassion" ('It's time for reason', 2001: 16) and "fanatics" (Holmes, 2001: 16-17), who 
"lack any shred of humanity" (Parsons, 2001d: 14), are "driven by blind hatred" ('It's 
time for reason', 2001: 16) and "despise our liberalism and tolerance" (Parsons, 2001d: 
14). These are people "who will kill our families and then not only justify it, but laugh 
about it" (Parsons, 2001e: 14). Loathing, jealousy and fanaticism were the three main 
qualities attributed to the terrorists, whose "hatred is directed against the lives, 
livelihoods and values of all those, including Muslims, who do not share their fanatical 
bigotry or their murderous intentions" (Another Front', 2001). Elsewhere, "it is 
impossible to keep cultural America at bay. The terrorists know this and it feeds their 
hatred" (Darwish, 2001: 29). Terrorists were therefore depicted as either motivated by 
hatred and jealousy, or by "irrational ideologies" ('When the dust clears', 2001: 3), or 
even by pure madness. They were thus described as "madmen", whose ultimate-aim is 
44our total destruction" (Parsons, 2001f: 14), "suicidal madmen" (Humphrys, 2001a) 
"bent on destruction" ('When the dust clears', 2001: 3). Moreover, it was constantly 
pointed out that the September II attacks were the first of many future terrorist actions: 
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"There are other madmen out there who would do the same again" ('Be vigilant of 
madmen', 2001: 6). "If madmen can strike again, they will" (Parris, 2001b) and "will kill 
even if every injustice is ended" (Annan, 2001: 4). 
Terrorists, then, were constituted as mad, evil killers, with twisted minds and distorted 
ideologies, prepared to do anything to destroy civilization. In his study of ABC's 
representation of terrorism in the 80s, Dobkin concludes that the terrorists possessed 
certain unifying features, very similar to the ones described above. They were outcasts, 
suicidal, religious fanatics; they designed weapons to kill Americans because Americans 
represented the forces of good and civilization in the world (1992: 46-48). "Since 
terrorists are irrational and embody evil, hatred of what is good suffices as a plausible 
motive for terrorist action. Presenting terrorism as an ideological opposite to the United 
States empties terrorism of both political motivation and historical context" (Dobkin, 
1992: 51). Such representations of terrorism merely described terrorist tactics and 
emptied the phenomenon of history and politics. Terrorists, thus, appeared to be devoid 
of any political motivation and were reduced to evil villains, who one cannot understand 
and with whom one could not negotiate. 
Terrorism is infectious 
This depoliticized and a-historical phenomenon of terrorism was intensified by 
representations of the "terrorist threat" as a disease, primarily an infectious one. Such 
representations were common amongst British newspapers and added to the construction 
of the terrorist threat as "a major threat to human life across the globe' (Clark, 2001: 4). 
Frequent references to deadly diseases, such as metastasizing cancers and contagious 
viruses infecting the 'body politic' constructed the threat as one that needs to be dealt 
with promptly, before it turns into an epidemic or metastasizes. Thus, terrorism is "a 
cancer whose tentacles spread to every country and society, whatever its origins" 
(Mandelson, 2001b: 4), it is "a cultural phenomenon, more akin to cancer in the 
world ... which is able to exploit the terrible weakness at the heart of the western values it 
is trying to destroy" (Phillips, 2001c). Terrorists "live, as parasites do, within the vital 
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systems of the host they mean to destroy. They may have bases which like the turnours 
of a cancer, are the centres of infection. But the disease is in the bloodstream of our 
systems and societies" (Ashdown, 2001: 25). Terrorists were thus represented as those 
cancerous, unwanted cells which reside within the body politic and which are threatening 
to spread by metastasizing in other parts of the 'body'. Moreover, similar to cancer cells, 
terrorist cells cannot be reasoned with, and thus have to be killed. Since, when a group of 
cells within the body become cancerous they multiply uncontrollably, and if it isn't 
treated the mass of cancerous tissue continues to grow as the cancer cells continue to 
multiply (CancerBACUP, online), terrorism as cancer requires immediate and fierce 
treatment, which does not promise to be painless. Moreover, it is understandable and 
even on some occasions required, that some healthy cells will die along with the bad, 
cancer cells. 
The metaphor of a virus which prowls through a body and infects it as soon as the body is 
more vulnerable and least prepared to deal with the disease was also used to describe 
terrorism. "These two ancient mental illnesses (hatred and fanaticism) still bedevil us. 
Let us be careful not to be infected" (Oz, 2001: 8). According to the press 
representations, nobody is immune and no place is safe. The terrorists are everywhere, 
they are "scattered around the world" (Richards, 2001: 26). For this reason nobody can 
get away from the "infection of fanaticism and blind hate" that the terrorists carry. "It 
can strike anywhere" ('Mankind's humanity', 2001: 8). 
/ Moreover, the terrorist virus is 
and will always be a threat to "mankind", since it is characterized by adaptability and 
flexibility. It will never completely vanish or be destroyed. "The terrorists method can 
mutate and adapt and adapt again to the measures that are used against them" fferrible 
acts of barbarism'j- 2001: 3). - Since-there-is such a huge-danger that "We, the pure ones" 
could also be infected we should do our best to avoid any type of contact, or negotiation 
with the terrorist viruses, because they "form a deadly threaf' (Fielding, 2001). In the 
terrorism as a virus metaphor terrorists live as part of the environment and are constantly 
present in one form or another. Their flexibility, adaptability and potential to mutate and 
change tactics make them very dangerous and necessitates their containment and 
extermination. 
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Even though cancer and viruses are different types of diseases, the implications of 
articulations of terrorism as cancer or as a virus are very similar, since they call for very 
similar types of treatment. Thus, in both representations terrorists are deadly, they can 
and often do multiply in an uncontrolled way, they are difficult to deal with and need 
immediate and drastic treatment. A very important implication of such a discourse is that 
the terrorists were constructed either as external threats or internal pests which needed to 
be eradicated. Such a discourse dehumanized the terrorists, excluded the possibility of 
any form of compromise or dialogue and called for drastic measures to quarantine and 
then exterminate the terrorists. David Campbell (1992: 84-86) asserts that 
representations of moral and social threats in medical terms has a number of 
consequences: 
It casts the danger as an aberration that deviatesfrom the norm of health and threatens 
the integrity of the body of its habitual functions: it establishes a power relationship in 
which the authority making the diagnosis occupies the position of a doctor vis-a-vis the 
patient, thereby reproducing the notion that the health (or security) of the larger 
population is dependent on the specialized knowledge of an elite; it renders complex 
problems simplistically as the symptoms of an alien infection that is external in origin; 
and it mandates (often violent) intervention as the appropriate course of action that will 
result in a cure... In such discourses there are no grey areas, no complexities, no 
historical understandings, no doubts about the setf, and no qualms about the nature of 
the response. 
The same rhetoric of cancers and viruses has been used in the past to represent threats. 
As Jutta Weldes points out, metaphors of infectious diseases were part of the U. S. 
security imaginary during the Cold War, only articulated to communists and communism, 
rather than terrorists and terrorism. U. S. officials described communism as a 'parasite', 
an 'infection', a 'virus' or a 'cancerous threat' that needed to be contained before 
spreading and infecting the healthy American body politic. Such a representation, 
Weldes maintains, enabled the U. S. to implement draconian measures against Castro and 
his regime (Weldes 1996: 180-2). Nevertheless, terrorism was not always described in 
these terms. Even though infection and cancer were the primary representations, an 
article published in TFie Times deviated from this norm. Terrorism is still an infectious, 
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scary illness, but this time it is a different type of ailment, it resembles more the HIV 
virus. 
Terror as a political movement is not a rampantly infectious disease galloping towards 
epidemic unless "stamped on" fast; it is more like the HIV virus: desperately fragile, 
tender, able to survive and spread in only the most specialised environment, and very 
containable indeed once we understand how and where and why it spreads. This is 
because no terrorist moves in a vacuum. He lives in our world with us and cannot 
operate without many quite uninvolved citizens seeing or getting a hint of his presence 
(Parris, 2001a). 
This metaphor entails a subtly different understanding of terrorists. Terrorism is still 
external and very dangerous, but it can be contained, provided the appropriate 
precautions are taken. It is also a virus which can only develop in very particular places 
and under very specific circumstances. Thus, it can be managed, if its causes are detected 
and the problem is in turn dealt with. This metaphor, though quite similar to the more 
commonly encountered ones in the sense that it presents the terrorist as an illness, still 
invites another understanding. It does entertain the possibility that terrorism has tangible 
causes that need to be addressed. Thus, understanding and trying to deal with those 
peoples' dissatisfaction and misery, may be the actual solution to the problem. 
Islam and terrorism: The connection 
It was constantly highlighted in the British press, after September II and throughout the 
attacks in Afghanistan, that Muslims were not to blame for the attacks in the United 
States and that Islam is a religion of peace. It was also pointed out on many occasions 
that this was not a "clash of civilizations" (Huntinjion; --l 9-9--8-Y, -s-inc e- '-'-the actions of the 
hijackers has nothing to do with Islamic theology ... what we will increasingly 
face will 
be the capacity of a few determined individuals to involve their entire civilization 
whether or not it agrees with their thinking and actions in confrontation with other 
civilizations" (Akbar, 2001: 4). The problem was articulated as one of 'extremists' 
committing crimes in the name of a religion. Therefore, whereas there was a clear 
polarization created between "us" and "them, the mad and villainous terrorists", the 
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polarization between 'us' and 'the Islamic them' was avoided, in the sense that there 
were only few explicit references to the 'threat' of Islam as a religion or of Muslims in 
general. "This is once more the battle between fanatics ... and the rest of us, who ascribe 
sanctity to life itself.. the vast majority of Arabs and of other Muslims are neither 
accomplices to the crime nor rejoicing in it" ( Oz, 2001: 8). "To cite Islam as their cause 
is a sham; they do not represent Islam" ("Treat Taliban recruits", 2001: 14). 
However, even though Islam was not directly constituted as a threat, the overall 
impression created was nonetheless of Islam as an inferior, backward religion, that 
essentially hindered the progress of Muslim countries and of humankind in general. In 
short, the British press projected negative images of Islam and of Muslims, which 
constructed Muslims as specific types of subjects, as at least "uncomfortable others" or 
even "dangerous and threatening others", even with the ongoing argument that Islam is a 
peaceful and welcoming religion. Through this representation, not only the terrorists but 
Islam as a religion and Muslims the world over were represented in a negative way, 
inferior to "our civilized Wesf'. Islam came to be represented as the religion best suited 
for the breeding of terrorists. 
Islam and its clash with modernity 
British press representations created an incompatibility between the religion of Islam, on 
the one hand, and modernity as well as capitalist, liberal democratic notions, on the other. 
Islam was constituted as a backward religion, or at least a religion that resists modernity, 
and Muslims as more susceptible to terrorism and extremism than Christians. "There 
does seem to be something ý abbut 'Islam or at least fundamentalist Islam that makes 
Muslim societies particularly resistant to modernity. Of all contemporary cultural 
systems, the Islamic world has the fewest democracies and contains no countries that 
have made the transition from third to first world status in the manner of South Korea or 
Singapore ... Islam is the only cultural system that regularly seems to produce people, 
like Osama, Bin Laden or the Taliban, who reject modernity lock, stock and barrel ... the 
hatred is born out of resentment of western success and Muslim failure" (Fukuyama, 
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2001: 5). Moreover, "no Muslim state is a liberal democracy, certainly not in the Middle 
East. This means there are few brakes on Islamic fundamentalism" (Quinn, 2001b). 
Islam and Western liberalism were juxtaposed, with Islam seemingly containing inferior 
values or values which resist any kind of novelty. "Whatever reservations we have about 
U. S. tactics to be decided, the values which underpin U. S. democracy are our values ... 
But we have failed utterly to communicate those values to the dispossessed of the Muslim 
world" ('Bring the murderers to justice', 2001: 3). There was a sense of "Muslim 
failure" in the press discourse, whereby Muslim countries "simply could not be adapted 
to the changing world ... Islamic 'fundamentalist' extremism is a violent reaction to the 
failed secular dreams of the Arab world and beyond, a simplistic turning back to old 
certainties ... Muslim governments still could not match the technology of the West; and 
most importantly, there was little reconciliation between modem life and Islamic 
teaching" (Binyon, 2001). There was, thus, the insinuation that Muslim countries are by 
definition impoverished, violent and backward because they are Islamic. Islam seemed to 
possess inherently an anti-democratic and authoritarian ethos that precludes 
democratization or "modernization! ' in the liberal democratic sense. 
The main presupposition that facilitated and rationalized this representation was that of 
liberal, capitalist modernity as the most appropriate and superior form of governance. 
The world was described in evolutionary terms and systems were classified as superior 
and inferior, with liberal capitalist modernity emerging as the "ideal" system and the last 
phase in the evolutionary cycle of civilization (also see FukuJama, 1993). Moreover, this 
was a condition that liberal democracies had reached, but which Muslim countries would 
probably never manage to achieve due to the incompatibility between their religion and 
modemity. Specificallk, - -predicates such as "success", "transition7, "progress", 
"changing world" naturalized the liberal democratic system as the latest and most 
successful phase in the history of political 'evolution'; at the same predicates such as 
"failed", "failure", "simplistic", "could not match", "reject", "hatred" and "resentment" 
constituted Muslim countries as inferior subjects since they had remained "backward". 
Moreover, Muslims were doomed to failure due to 'natural' factors that precluded 
progress and modernization. Specifically, Islam was represented as the opposite of 
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modernity and liberal capitalist democracy, thus precluding the possibility of an Islamic 
country ever 'modernizing'. At the same time, Islam and Muslims were doomed to 
failure due to 'natural' factors that precluded progress and modernization. Essentially, 
Muslims were seen as representatives of a traditional, backward world, which is "an 
underdeveloped version of the modem world" (Ifversen, 2002: 4). 
Not only did Islam come to connote backwardness, but this representation also facilitated 
constructions of the western, liberal democracies as embodying the universal. As 
Ifversen points out, "western values are viewed as modem per se. A standard narrative 
about the universal values of Enlightenment typically supports this claim. But it also 
needs an image of (an entity named) Islam as being immune to those values, either 
because Islamic values are radically different from the Western ones or because Islam got 
stuck in the past" (Ifversen, 2002: 5, also see Said, 1995: 304). Similarly, Inden points 
out that Indians were perceived as irrational, undisciplined and backward. This was put 
down to India itself, which as an Asian country is naturally inferior to the Western 
countries. Furthermore, this backwardness resulted from the fact that Indians belonged to 
an earlier time, "a prior stage on the human developmental or evolutionary scale. 
Oriental despotism and the Asiatic mode of production were, when they first appeared... 
at the forefront of the evolution of human civilization ... After Alexander the 
Great's 
conquest of Asia, however, the Hegelian light passed to the West itself' (Inden, 1986, 
pg. 423). Essentially, Islam acted as the centre around which other signifiers acquired 
their meaning. It signified all those negative features that the western liberal democracies 
lacked, namely backwardness, brutality and totalitarianism. It was in contrast to Islam 
that the west gained its meaning as modem, peaceful and liberal. Moreover, the nodal 
point 'Islam' united in a chain of equivalences different Others under the label of one 
main Other. Thus, 'The Taliban', 'suicide bombers' and 'Saddam' were also defined in 
relation to the same nodal point 'Islam'. 
The representation of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism as resistant to modernity can be 
problematized, however, because Al-Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism have quite 
convincingly been characterized as entirely modem phenomena. Rather than being a 
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relic of the past, radically antithetic to modemity, Habermas, for example, argues that 
Islamic fundamentalism is a distinctively and uniquely modem phenomenon, precisely 
because of its opposition to modemity and modernization. "Whether we discuss Islamic, 
Christian, or Hindu fundamentalist beliefs, we are talking about violent reactions against 
the modem way of understanding and practicing religion. In this perspective 
fundamentalism is not the simple return to a pre-modem way of relating to religion: it is a 
panicked response to modernity perceived as a threat rather than as an opportunity" 
(Habermas in Borradori, 2003: 19). The Encyclopedia of Religion and Society (online) 
also defines fundamentalism as "a quintessentially modem phenomenon. It actively 
strives to reorder society-, it reasserts the validity of a tradition and uses it in new ways; it 
operates in a context that sets nontraditional standards; where it does not take decisive 
control, it reproduces the dilemmas it sets out to resolve; as one active force among 
others, it affirms the depth of modem pluralism; it takes on the tensions produced by the 
clash between a universalizing global culture and particular local conditions; it expresses 
fundamental uncertainty in a crisis setting, not traditional confidence about taken-for- 
granted truths; by defending God, who formerly needed no defense, it creates and 
recreates difference as part of a global cultural struggle. So compromised, 
fundamentalism becomes part of the fabric of modemity". Therefore, it could be claimed 
that Islamic fundamentalism is a contemporary phenomenon, a reaction to various aspects 
of modernity. It opposes the modem world, but still remains bound to it. But American 
style democratic capitalism is perceived as modem in the British press. As John Gray 
says, however, radical Islam is also modem, insofar as it is represented by Al Qaeda. It 
may be anti-westem, but it is to a great extent influenced by western ideology. "Like 
Marxists and neo-liberals, radical Islamists see history as a prelude to a new world. All 
are convinced they can remake the human condition. If there is a uniquely modem myth, 
this is iV(2004: 3-4). 
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Radical versus moderate Islam 
One ongoing argument in all three British newspapers under study was that "the Wesf' 
was under threat from radical Islam represented by fundamentalist Muslims and that the 
"moderate Muslims" had an obligation and a duty to voice their dissent against their 
"fundamentalist brothers". "There was no association between Islam and violence; but 
those complaining of prejudice should not be surprised by this false Western assumption 
if they do not counter the claims of the fanatics ... British Muslims are overwhelmingly 
appalled at what terrorism has done to their image. Those who expound Islam's tenets 
should make that revulsion explicit" ('Fatwa on Terror', 2001). As has already been 
mentioned, Islam as a religion and the values it adheres to were not usually directly 
attacked, but the dichotomy that was created between moderate and radical Islam or 
moderate/liberal and radical Muslims served the function of categorizing Muslims and 
Muslim countries in two groups, those who are moderate and thus are accepted or 
tolerated (the moderate ones usually being "our British Muslims"), and those who are 
radical, a threat and needing to be annihilated. Moreover, the radical ones "reject the 
modem world", while the moderate and wise ones "wish to bring their civilization into 
the community of world civilizations" (Akbar, 2001: 4). This dichotomy ended up 
essentially representing Muslim countries and Muslims in general as either "mad 
supporters of terroe' and "mad Mullahs" or more enlightened Muslims, who have a more 
secular vision of the world. 
Moreover, the phrase "Muslim world", which was so often mentioned in the British 
press, is-evidence of this perception of Islam as having a uniform, massive and inflexible 
character, with the religion being the only guiding principle of all Muslims. The pictures 
published in the British press all depicted 'bearded' Muslims, holding guns and 
aggressively looking at the camera, or praying in the mosque, or praying while at the 
same time keeping a gun next to them, or violently protesting in favour of Bin Laden. 
The pictures of protesters were usually close-ups which depicted a few shouting 
demonstrators with glaring eyes, holding banners and flags. The effect of these close-ups 
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was to create the impression that the protesters were fanatics, since they expressed their 
convictions with such fervour (Appendix A, Figures 7-10). Headlines, in turn, would 
highlight this alleged Muslim obsession with guns and religion. "Battlefield of guns and 
prayers" (Loyd, 2001 a: 9) and "If you think Bin Laden is extreme - some Muslims want 
to kill him because he is soft" (Hellen, 2001: 4) appeared daily in the press. A picture 
published in Yhe Independent on October 27 (Appendix C, Figure 11) showed a disabled 
Pakistani who had climbed on a lamp-post and was staring at the camera while at he was 
at the same time holding a big poster of Bin Laden. In the background one could see 
what appeared to be a march attended by thousands of Taliban supporters protesting 
against U. S. imperialism. 
However, this monolithic image of the "Muslim world" is far from realistic. In reality, 
the "Muslim world" consists of over a billion people, with different traditions, languages 
and historical experiences, while "the social and cultural similarities between Muslims of 
different communities, be they Senegalese, Moroccan, Iranian, Chinese or Indonesian, 
are far fewer than the similarities shared with non-Muslim members of the same 
community" (Muscati, 2003: 261). As Derrida also points out, "we should not consider 
everything that has to do with Islam or with the Arab Muslim 'world' as a 'world', or at 
least as one homogeneous whole. And wanting to take all these divisions, differences 
and differends into account does not necessarily constitute an act of war; nor does trying 
to do everything possible to ensure that in this Arab Muslim 'world', which is not a world 
and not a world that is one, certain currents do not take over, namely, those that lead to 
fanaticism"! (Derrida in Borradori, 2003: 112-3). 
Beards, burqai, "turban"'s- ... and the Muslim "other" 
In the British newspapers' discourse 'beards' were granted specific meanings and 
acquired particular connotations, which in turn resulted in the further alienation and 
'othering' of the Taliban, as well as Muslims in general. The repeated articulation of 
certain linguistic items such as beard or burqas enabled the representation of Afghans, the 
Taliban and the Northern Alliance in a very specific way, enhancing the opposition 
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between "us" and "them". Similar descriptions of "bearded Castro and his lieutenants" 
were also common within the U. S. cold war discourse and stressed the malevolent and 
aggressive character of the Cuban regime (Weldes, 1999: 182-184). Such articulations 
are not necessary and uncontested; neither are they logically and structurally coherent or 
essential. However, their constant articulation and rearticulation resulted in the 
positioning of the Taliban as particular types of subjects, hostile and primitive aggressors 
who needed to be eradicated. 
Bearded aggressors: The constant use of the adjective "bearded" and the very 
frequently elaborate description of Afghan beards added to the image of the Afghan 
warlords, both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, as aggressive and primitive others. 
Through the characterization of the Afghans as bearded there was a continuous reminder 
of the distance between "us" and "thene'. "We [British Muslims] have nothing in 
common with bearded men who beat up shrouded women7 (Alibhai-Brown, 2001 a: 5). 
This distinction was further enhanced with images of Afghans declaring their hate for the 
"West" and the U. S. "People say we Afghans are hairy people", he spat, "and it is true: 
we have long beards and long hair, we have hairy ears and we have hairy hearts too. We 
will never hand over Osama Bin Laden, and we will be glad to fight America7' (Popham, 
2001b: 9). 
Moreover, the detailed descriptions of the length and lack of tidiness of the beard and its 
depiction as the main and foremost characteristic of the Afghans enhanced this feeling of 
primitiveness and threat. "The cold steely eyes, the thick black beard and the craggy face 
framed by a white turban... " (Hibbs, 2001: 8-9). The state and colour of the beard, for 
example, seemed to-determine the-degree of backwardness and wildness of the Afghans. 
Beards were described as "ruggedly groomed", and people were seen as "heavily 
bearded". Bin Laden himself was depicted as "a mad bearded terrorist" (Aaronovitch, 
2001b: 3) or "the one with the beard who we don't like" (Steel, 2001c: 5). The beard was 
thus elevated to a metonym. of ferociousness and brutality, with the Taliban and the 
Alliance being obsessed with their beards. "His beard had been smoothed to the shape of 
a pear by so much stroking" (Campbell, 2001). The longer and less combed the beard, 
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the more unruly and fierce was its bearer. Greying of the beard, on the other hand, was a 
sign of defeat. "Even bin Laden's precious beard has turned grey and his skeletal faces 
shows he has lost a tremendous amount of weight" (Dutt, 2001). Bin Laden's beard was 
elevated as a major symbol in the British press imagery, with progressive pictures of the 
amount of whiteness of the beard, from October to December; the last, picture in which 
his beard appeared to be in its whitest was depicted as a sign of defeat and withdrawal 
(Appendix A, Figure 12) 
Furthermore, those Afghans characterized as more liberal had their beards "trimmed". 
"Mohammed, his beard freshly trimmed, is not a tyrant. For an Afghan, he is quite 
liberal" (Huggler, 2001: 3). Obviously, as has been already delineated, being Afghan or 
Muslim and liberal didn't go together in the British press discourse. However, having a 
neater beard was definitely a sign of improvement. This relationship between 'us' and 
'them', the 'west' versus 'the rest', with the latter being the inferior part in the 
oppositional pairs, was prevalent in the newspapers' discourse and the articulations of 
beards as signs of aggression and backwardness established such oppositions. 
The beard, however, was not merely a symbol of aggression and primitiveness; beards 
were also symbols of oppression. For this reason, their removal signalled liberation and 
freedom. The main representation was that people in Afghanistan, with the exception of 
the ruling parties, would wear the beard not out of their own will but as a result of 
coercion and oppression. Shaving of the beards was, therefore, used as proof that 
Afghanistan was now free and liberal. This seemed to have been the only problem in 
Afghanistan and since it was solved, there was nothing else to worry about. "Everywhere 
in Kabul yesterday the men had shaved off their beards in small but telling acts of 
defiance" (Clark, 2061b"l), -6i "men in turbans queue to have beards trimmed by Asian 
barbers" (Studd, 2001). That this imagery was the only one prevalent in the press after 
the fall of the Taliban, not only constructed the U. S. intervention as liberation, thus 
legitimizing it, but also trivialized a very serious and still unresolved political issue, that 
is the future of a post-war Afghanistan. 
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Bearded pride: This representation of beards as signs of brutality and backwardness is 
highly contestable. Beards amongst Muslim men are generally viewed as symbols of 
faith and pride. As Weldes has also pointed out in her analysis of the U. S. 'Cuban 
problem', the beards had a positive symbolic value for Cuban revolutionaries, although 
they connoted irresponsibility and threat in U. S. discourse. Castro and his compatriots 
used the word bearded to describe each other, with positive rather than negative 
connotations. "Bearded" in their discourse stood for courage and determination; the 
beard represented the revolutionary hardships that they had eagerly accepted (Weldes 
1999). Likewise, Muslims, and not only, (but it is the representation of Muslims that is 
of interest on this occasion) can willingly grow beards. Extracts from a poem by Tushar 
(March 2001), which is published on the website of the Islamic society of the University 
of Leicester, clearly shows that the negative description of beards in the British press 
cannot and should not be taken for granted. 
Viere is beauty in the beard ... And a Muslim man grows his beard in pride ... 
Showing 
the rest of humanity that he is to be respected. Can someone imagine a lion without its 
mane? Nay, thou canst not! 77ten imagine a man without his beard ... All the prophets 
had beards - yes they did! Muhammad had a beard - so big! So big! A 11 the companions 
had beards -o yes! 0 yes! ... All the wise have beards. Tis true! Tis true ... What greater 
reason than this can there be. 7hefact that ourprophet told us to see ... 7-hat we make 
ourselves appear to the world As full bearded men with honour untold ... So indeed I 
love my beard And adore the curls and tangles ... Which no oil, gel or superglue can 
everstraighten ... My glorious long, curly, messy, fluffy hairH 
The above extract is just one example which shows the contingent and constructed 
character of the articulations- of the British press. Alternative representations are always 
possible. The beard, in Tushar's poem, signifies pride, honour and faith, all positive 
connotations. However, what one gets from the newspaper's discourse is only an 
abhorrence of beards. 
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Our mighty friend 
The U. S. was both positively and negatively represented in the press discourse, either as a 
powerful empire standing for democracy and liberty, or as an arrogant, self-serving 
power that wreaks havoc with its unjust actions and double standards. Even though these 
two discourses are very different, they shared a common point; they constructed the U. S. 
as the strongest global actor, with unrivalled power and influence. "Bloody indignities 
may be inflicted upon it, but America-like Rome-will weather them. Like it or loathe it, 
the U. S. is a modem Rome" (Cornwell, 2001b: 7), or "[America] it can outlast or absorb 
practically anything" (Hitchens, 2001: 28). 
Discourse One - The Empire as a goodforce or the angelic hegemony 
According to the first of the two prevailing discourses, the U. S. has, despite some 
failures, generally been a very positive and peaceful force in the global system. 'This 
country stands for unity, freedom, opportunity, equal rights, diversity, liberty and justice" 
(Jurski, 2001: 14-15). Elsewhere, "America is free, very democratic, and hugely 
successful" (Appleyard, 2001c). Moreover, the U. S. was as benign an empire as it 
possibly could be. "The U. S. is at its heart a peaceful country. It has done more to help 
the world than any other actor in world history. It saved the world from the two greatest 
evils of the last century in Nazism and Soviet communism. It responded to its victories 
in the last war by pouring aid into Europe and Japan ... America need not 
have done any 
of this. Its world hegemony has been less violent and less imperial than any other 
comparable power in history" (Sullivan, 20010. In short, the U. S. was positioned as one 
of the finest examples of a liberal democratic country which demonstrates the best of 
humanity, and which everyone should aspire towards. It was precisely this U. S. 
superiority that, according to this discourse, triggered and facilitated the attacks. "So at 
the most basic level America is loathed simply because she's on top. The world leader is 
trashed simply for being the leader" (Appleyard, 2001c). Similarly, "its cultural and 
commercial superiority, and the relentless drumbeat of its free market doctrines have 
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been seen as a threat to many religious and class groups especially in traditional 
societies" (Kennedy, 2001: 28). Besides, due to its freedom and tolerance, the U. S. was 
challenged by terrorists who abused its lenience and open-mindedness. "A free country 
with open borders and a multiracial population carries within it its own self-detonation 
button ... in a country that pioneered religious freedom, and guarantees it in 
its 
constitution, there is no ability to deter or even stamp out even the most crazed religious 
sect. The enemy knows this" (Sullivan, 2001f). America's freedom and openness, its 
strongest points, were at the same time its Achilles' heel. 
Finally, the critics of U. S. foreign policy or those who were more sceptical about the 
September II attacks were constituted as unworthy subjects in this discourse. "The 
failure to rally behind a freedom loving people world wide, not just America, at this time 
in our history is appalling - especially coming from those who earn their bread and butter 
from a free press" (McGilton, 2001). "Pinterism is all around, wearing its badges" 
(Aaronvitch, 2001 a: 3). In fact, scepticism was equated with anti-Americanism. "A 
virulent anti-Americanism exists in Europe - and it is probably worse on the continent" 
(Parsons, 2001c: 16-17). Similarly, "this is the anti-Americanism that informs the 
ignorant dinner party guests of the west who, in their comfortable stupidity, pretend to 
have more in common with fanatical theocrats than they do with the land of The 
Simpsons and John Updike ... So they blame the victim" (Appleyard, 2001c). In 
line 
with the above, it was established that "our cause is just. Our fight is right ... as the 
shooting begins America is doing exactly what it should do. Showing the world that the 
extremists are all on the other side" (Parsons, 200le: 14). 
In this representation, positive predicates such as "equality", "freedom", "democracy", 
"liberty" and "justice" constituted the U. S. as a positive force. Moreover, the 
presupposition that the U. S. by definition was endowed with those qualities constructed 
the U. S. as a rightful subject, who would under no circumstances act in a non-liberal and 
undemocratic way. Such a presupposition not only legitimized any past and future U. S. 
actions and construed the U. S. as the blameless victim of the September II attacks; it 
also 'othered' anyone who challenged this presumption as anti-American. Since the U. S. 
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was positioned in this discourse as a peaceful, democratic and just subject, any criticism 
of the U. S. could only be unjust and ill-founded. Thus, this discourse essentially 
reinforced the "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" (Bush, 2001) binary 
of inclusion/exclusion (see Christie, 2003: 17), whereby the world was divided in two 
camps. 
Discourse Two - Ae U. S. as a typical superpower 
The second main discourse constructed the U. S. as a unilateral actor not abiding by 
international norms or laws. "Since September, the US has in essence, despite the 
convenient cloak of an alliance, been acting on its own, unilaterally, with no resource to 
the collective advice and wisdom of those who know a lot more about the situation than 
the US does or who will suffer the consequences of US actions" (Sayle, 2001: 5). 
Elsewhere, "Mr Bush's unilateralism is deplorable" ('President Bush's missile plan', 
2001: 3). Not only was the U. S. construed as unilateral, but it was also positioned as a 
belligerent, bellicose and self-serving power intent on solving issues by violent means. 
The Americans "are not up for peace keeping, peace making, security assistance or that 
sort of business by whatever name ... America has thus evolved a modem warrior ethic, 
sharper yet under president bush, which will engage in conflict wholeheartedly when it 
believes its cause right, but considers, in the words of one former senior military figure, 
that peace keeping is for wimps - which means, as far as the US is concerned, for the rest 
of us" (McElvoy, 2001 e: 3). In short, "Washington s priority is the war ('America must 
build peace', 2001: 3). In addition, the U. S. was criticized for its violent expansionary 
politics. "Since the Second World War, American governments have sought to impose a 
Pax Americana on the entire globe through the barrel of a gun, in Korea, in Central 
America, in Eastern Europe and the Middle East" (Routledge, 2001b: 12. ). 
In fact, the September II attacks themselves were at least partly seen as a result of unjust 
U. S. foreign policies, which had incited hatred. "America's failure to act with honour in 
the Middle East, its promiscuous sale of missiles to those who use them against civilians, 
its blithe disregard for the deaths of tens of thousands of Iraqi children under sanctions of 
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which Washington is the principal supporter-all these are intimately related to the society 
that produced the Arabs who plunged America into an apocalypse of fire last week7 
(Fisk, 2001b: 29). In other words, "at the heart of problem is the duplicitous nature of 
American foreign policy, which has been responsible for thousands of deaths around the 
world over the years ... which has gained the US so many enemies" (Nyatsumba, 
2001b: 
4). 
This discourse substantially differed from the previous one, since it constructed the U. S. 
as a different, more negative subject. Predicates such as "warrior", "deplorable", 
"unilateralism", "failure" and "disregard" not only constituted the U. S. in negative terms, 
but also introduced a more political and historical understanding of the events. 
Specifically, the U. S. was constituted as an actor whose history of violent and belligerent 
behaviour had gained it enemies. Thus, this discourse allowed for an understanding of 
the September II attacks as something more than an unjustified act of violence by 
irrational, evil madmen towards an innocent, freedom-loving U. S; it allowed for an 
understanding of the events as acts of violence, partially rooted in U. S. -induced 
in ustices, poverty and anger. Moreover, this discourse is incompatible with 
representations of the U. S. as an innocent victim, since it positioned the U. S. as an 
expansionary and warlike actor, which had gained its power by violent means and was 
thus neither innocent, nor a victim. 
The U. S. was represented in two completely different ways, as has already been outlined. 
However, the second discourse, which was critical of the U. S. and its policies was not as 
prominent as the first. There was generally a positive posture towards the U. S. in the 
newspapers' discourse, but it was not hegemonic, since the U. S. also received a fair 
amount of criticism. However, even though the U. S. was criticized, the constructions of 
the terrorist threat and the da ger it posed to the "west", combined with positive 
representations of the U. S., still positioned it as the inevitable leader on the inevitable 
"War on Terrorism". Besides, the U. S. was still part of "our western civilized culture", it 
was on our side. No matter what the discourses on the U. S. were, it was constituted as 
6our') closest friend and ally, which holds 'our' values and thus deserves 'our' support. 
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Britain's role was, in turn, hegemonically defined as that of a "wiser" and more 
experienced consultant and minor partner of the U. S. in the "war on terroe,. 
The U. K. after September 11: The good Samaritan 
After the September II events and throughout the entire period of the war in 
Afghanistan, the U. K. was positioned as a central actor in the international arena, with 
Tony Blair as its gifted Prime Minister and most appropriate representative. While there 
were different representations on the aims of the war, as well as the extent of its 
"rightfulness", there did not seem to be any substantial divergence in the press 
representations as to the role that the U. K. ought to play and the suitability of Blair, "the 
Persuader" ('Pakistan might yet prove', 2001: 3) as one of the most important actors in 
the global field and as the closest U. S. ally in the "war on terror". Since the conflict was 
presented as an attack on "Western culture and democracy", it was Britain's duty to 
respond. Moreover, it was Britain's, and Blair's, duty to stand by their closest ally, to 
face the common threat united. "Britain has always stood shoulder to shoulder with our 
friends and allies in America against terrorism, tyranny and oppression of every kind. 
Together we have pursued the causes of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. 
Our horror at what happened yesterday has reinforced our joint resolve. This morning, 
the people of the United States can be sure of the support of their closest allies" (Straw, 
2001: 18). Therefore, the U. K. was positioned in a relationship of similarity, identity and 
complementarity with the U. S., and of opposition to the terrorists in the "war against 
terror". 
Moreover, Tony Blair was depicted as the ideal leader to deal with the serious issues 
emerging after September 11. "He has been Prime Minister for almost five years, which 
makes him one of the world's most experienced leaders. He has been tested in 
international conflict before and came through strongly. He combines toughness with a 
cool head. The essential qualities that are needed today" ('Blair must point way for 
Bush', 2001: 8). Moreover, "Mr Blair is a born leader" (McElvoy, 200le: 3), and "an 
inspiring leader" ('Even this Prime Minister', 2001: 26), "courageous" and "not worried 
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about sticking his head above the parapet or standing up for what he believes in" 
(Malone, 2001b: 27). In a photo published in The Independent right after the September 
II events, Blair is shown during a press conference in 10, Downing Street (Appendix A, 
Figure 13). He is standing in front of the portrait of King George the second. King 
George II was the last British monarch to lead troops to battle and was renowned for his 
lifelong passion for the military and his courage on the battlefield against the French in 
1743 (BBC history: online). In the portrait, the king is extending his hands towards the 
horizon and so does Mr Blair, who is right in front of King George's portrait answering 
questions from journalists. The similarities between Blair and the portrait are obvious, 
since their posture is strikingly similar. Thus, the photo of Blair in front of King 
George's portrait positions Blair in a position of similarity to the king, and creates 
connotations of Blair as a capable and courageous leader, ready to lead the U. K. in the 
44war on Terror". 
Additionally, Blair was often juxtaposed to other European and world leaders, emerging 
as a worthier leader. Specifically, "Blair understood more quickly than most national 
leaders the degree to which the global kaleidoscope has been shaken by the mass murder 
of II September" ('Mr. Blair was right to avoid', 2001: 3). Besides, "the Prime Minister, 
uniquely among Western statesmen, is a leader who has seen through a war and emerged 
with his international reputation enhanced" (Gove, 2001c). In short, "I am proud we've 
got this guy as our leader ... You just have to look at other political leaders around the 
world to know that ours stands head and shoulders above all of them" (Malone, 2001b: 
27). 
Finally, Blair was contrasted to President Bush, who was either seen as a weak leader or 
was believed to be dealing with his country's plight in quite a restrained and cautious 
way, but was in no way the leader that Blair was. Specifically, Blair was characterized as 
"one of the democratic world's most sophisticated communicators", who being a lawyer 
"has an almost mystical belief in the power of good argument" (Macintyre, 2001d: 4). 
On the other hand, Mr Bush's speeches "have lacked both resonance and deptw' 
(Dejevsky, 2001b: 8), while "his thin-lipped, somewhat superficial manner of deliver 
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does not help" (Cornwell, 2001 a: 7). Besides, as soon as the U. S. was attacked, it was 
Blair, not Bush who had dealt with them effectively. While "it looked like they [the U. S. 
citizens] were led by a petrified pygmy" (Reade, 2001c: 16), or a "frightened schoolboy 
who didn't know his lines" (McKean, 2001: 16), "the PM has effortlessly become an 
intemational statesman ... As America was plunged into chaos, the 
PM was phoning 
world leaders in a bid to forge an unprecedented united front" (Hardy, 2001: 13). For all 
the above reasons, "we must throw full support behind President Bush but we must also 
be prepared to look elsewhere for leadership. And that means looking to Tony Blair" 
('Blair must point way for Bush'. 2001: 8). 
Therefore, the conclusion was drawn that Bush and the U. S. were in need of guidance 
and advice, which only an accomplished leader like Tony Blair could offer. "As candid 
and loyal friends of the American people, Mr Blair must speak for the British in 
counselling restraint and understanding rather than revenge" (, Hold Fire', 2001: 3). "Mr 
Blair, by all accounts, has been a voice of reason in Washington" (Macintyre, 2001c: 2). 
It is evident, then, that Blair was depicted as a European leader, ahead of other European 
leaders, who was capable of offering insightful advice. "No one doubts that Mr. Blair is 
playing a pivotal role" (Grice, 2001 a: 9). 
Britain thus had a mission to fulfil in this conflict, the mission to guide, advise and stand 
"shoulder to shoulder" with the U. S. as the second most important actor in this long-term 
struggle against "terrorism", not only because it is a struggle which is moral and "light", 
but also because it is dangerous to leave the U. S. on their own. The U. S. was construed 
as a mighty "superchild" (see Milliken 1999) which may be powerful economically and 
militarily but is in desperate need of guidance from a more mature partner so as not to 
44mess up". Such a representation of the U. S. is not new. Milliken described the 
representations of the U. S. by British policymakers during the Korean War. The U. S. 
was then also seen as an impulsive, often irrational actor who could resort to isolationism 
and so act unwisely. For this reason, the intrusion of the British government in the 
Korean War was essential; it would enable the older and more mature partner to advise 
the inexperienced child. The similarities in the British press discourse after 9/11 were 
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striking. The imperative to cooperate with the U. S., so it would not pursue unilateralist 
tactics, was strong. "The dangers of alienating an American administration at the time of 
its greatest test could not be plainer ... We need to ensure that the US is not, at this 
moment of unimaginable tragedy, forced back on to itself ... The allies have no chance 
whatever of promoting these causes unless they stand by the U. S. now" (Macintyre, 
2001 a: 4). 
Moreover, the constant juxtaposition of Blair's and Britain's maturity against U. S. 
military and economic might is also worth noting, since it is this juxtaposition that 
constructed Britain as a wise actor, yet ultimately unable to determine events. "Mr Blair 
is in danger of giving the impression that he is co-equal to President Bush. In reality he 
is the junior partner who will have limited influence on the course of events" ('Even this 
Prime Minister', 2001: 26). Similarly, "for all Mr. Blair's prominence and eloquence, 
Britaiifs influence and contribution should not be exaggerated. It is primarily a US 
operation. Mr. Blair is certainly consulted, but President Bush takes all the key 
decisions" (Riddell, 2001a). Britain was, therefore, essentially presented as a wiser 
partner, who will help the inexperienced, yet powerful giant, the U. S. that is, which needs 
assistance. Britain may be wise and powerful, but it cannot compete with the military 
and economic giant, the U. S., which can and will act the way it wants unless Britain 
subtly interferes, always on the side of the U. S. so as not to aggravate the giant. "Blair 
realized immediately that it [military action] would happen whatever American allies did 
the question was whether Washington would act alone or in a coalition. If the U. S. 
closest ally offered support militarily and rhetorically, its influence might be 
circumscribed. But otherwise it would have none" (Macintyre, 2001b: 3). Therefore, it 
was imperative that Britain stayed by the U. S. side, as a partner, who will try to avert any 
possible disaster rather than let the U. S. act unilaterally. This, added to the fact that the 
U. S. is a democratic country, "like the rest of us in the West", which justly wants to and 
should eradicate terrorism, legitimates and renders important Britain's involvement in the 
Afghan conflict and in the longer "War on Terrorism" as the main U. S. ally; an ally who 
will have to compromise and accept possible U. S. caprices for a just world order to 
remain in place. "That is an unchallengeable reason for Mr. Blair's presence in 
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Washington tonight. To listen. To report. And within all the limits which he well 
understands, to advise" (Macintyre, 2001b: 3). 
To conclude, Blair was essentially hailed as a capable politician and a stabilizing actor. It 
is the way Blair and Bush were depicted that positioned Britain as a subject destined to 
play a dutiful role in the events. A different representation would have positioned Britain 
as a different type of subject, one, for example, that would side with Europe and let the 
U. S. act unilaterally, or even try to obstruct the U. S. from pursuing a war in Afghanistan. 
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Greek Press revresentations after Sentember 11 
In the first part of this section I analyze the September II events as they were represented 
in the Greek press; as a U. S. punishment, the humiliation of the superpower, a result of 
U. S. induced poverty and an excuse for U. S. aggression. I then analyze definitions of 
terrorism in the second part, where the discourses on the suicide bomber and on the U. S. 
terrorist are compared. I then illustrate the role of Islam and Muslims in the press 
discourse as victims of U. S. imperialism. Finally, the role of Greece as an honoured 
member of the "Western hemisphere" (see Weldes 1999: 146-7) is stressed, a discourse 
in conflict with previous representations, which demonized the powerful, western 
countries, primarily the U. S. 
Dominant representations of the September 11 attacks 
Yhe Empire crumbles: Retribution ofjustice 
Unlike the British press, which primarily represented the attacks as a terrorist act of great 
proportions and a declaration of war on the "civilized West", which needed to fight back 
and defend itself, the dominant representations in the Greek press were considerably 
different. They were nonetheless based on the same logic of stereotyping, naturalizing 
and asserting ones own identity through the exclusion of the "other" (for example see 
Campbell 1998; Doty 1996; Said 1995; Weldes 1996). A very similar representation of 
the events to the Bfitish press did, in fact, exist in the Greek press, but it was confined to 
only one of the three newspapers, the right-wing Kathimerini. However, even within 
Kathimerini it was a weak and marginal discourse, so it will not be elaborated on in this 
section. 
There was clearly a hegemonic discourse in the Greek press, however. Specifically, the 
attacks were to a large extent represented as the just punishment of the ruthless 
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superpower, a punishment long awaited due to U. S. arrogance and disregard for any laws, 
rules or principles. "Our society may not have ever been 'just', but this should under no 
circumstances 'justify' practices that take for granted injustice, inequality, 
marginalization of whole groups of people" (Oikonomopoulos, 2001b). 105 Likewise, 
"humankind wept yesterday for what happened in the U. S. in the same way that the 
Americans mourned for the innocent when the bombs were spreading death in Serbia and 
Iraq, in Libya and Sudan" (Triadis, 2001b) 106 and "the villainies of a gang either of 
knights, or aristocrats, or respectable Texans in costume that control our lives and our 
existence with the comfort that they wind a swatch (not even a rolex), are well recorded 
in thousands volumes of a Black Bible written and dipped in oceans of the blood of 
millions of innocent creatures. How is it ever possible to expect a tear to fall from the 
wrinkled cheeks of an Iraqi mother for the innocent victims of Pearl Towers"? (Danikas, 
2001: N20). 107 
Similar sarcastic statements of the "it serves them right" variety, whereby the superpower 
brought this disaster upon itself and deserved to be taught a lesson for all its 
wrongdoings, were abundant. "For a long time now, this country has spread injustice, 
has robbed and tyrannized; and, with the exception of Vietnam, never did America pay 
the toll for this criminal behaviour. Nemesis follows when there is no attribution of 
justice; and Nemesis is never just, it is horrid. It resembles the crime that caused it, and in 
this case it resembles the deeds of the U. S. for which they are now paying" (Nautilos, 
2001b). 108 Thus, the element of shock or surprise was absent in the press discourse, 
according to which some sort of attack was expected and bound to happen because of the 
105 44 jinopF. 1 Fffl q icolvo)via T(t)V c(V0P6)71(OV VGL p1V ATCLV IroTt «8(KGLIIJ», 0,1, xä ctl)T6 ÖCV civctt 81)VctT6V V(C «8tKcttd)V£l» 
710%tTtKt; icat npa=d; 7[01) OCL OC(OPO& mq v8c8optq>> Tqv aSuda, Tqv crvtcr6TqTa, -rqv ncpt0o)ptono(qaq IcaTqyoPtd)v 
0%6KXjPC0V". 
106 "Onou; Micpuýav ot APEPIK&VOI-Kat OpqVO6CFaV Tta TOU; aOd)01); -6T(XV Ot p6ppC; GK6pX4aV TOV 0dVaTO M 
F-CPPiat 
op lpdK, aq AtpýTl, GTO EO'USdV, iTM 86KPI)Crc X04 oX6KXTIpiq q avOpcon&q; Ti'auT6 nou cn)vtpq on; HTIA". 
107 c. ot a0ki&nTe; Via; ui)VIiopja; ' 
6). ), oTe urnoT6)v, 6), XoTe apjaroKpaT6)v, &WT& ypapaT%&wv Kai Enn6kil7mov 
Tc4avd)v nou PIUOý(ýOUV TqV kaP4ý ýLaq " n1v dvccrq nou Koup8lýouv ba Swatch (oýTe icav Rolex), dvat 
KaTaX(op7jgtveq cre xtXtd5Eq T6go*o; pia; Mdpqq BfpXou yp%tp&ilq Kai POI)TqygVq; Ge COMV6; Cdý(ITO; 
CKCLTOPPI)PI(OV CLO(WV 7EXaCFgdOrO)V. nd); ElVat 71OTL 8uvaT6v va upigbet; PET6 Va VUXýGEI LCM) Kat PIG6 8&KPI) YICt TCL 
aO&a HRaTQ T06 ... ncpX T6ox)cpq, an6 Ta puTtStaagba ji6yo-Aa gia; p4vaq =6 Tq BaySdrl"; 108 "Eni [Laicp6v I &VaRTI al)Tý a&KEý %11=6u, Tupaw6EL OuS' En' tMXmov 6Xa avid -ra Xp6via, ve 4APEOM Ta 
enixetpa TOu BtsT-N%t, nkýpwuvro 6notov -r(plpa Ita avAv Tq; rIv eyKXqjia-mc6Tq-ral Kt 6TavbEv anoSISETW LCYTO) 
KaTd PtPO; AtKaI06VT], PentpXuat il Ntgccn; l Kai il Ntpscrt; 8ev Eivat 8ficaq, dvat yptKA. Elvat crav To fTKXnPa NOu 
TqV 71POKdXE(YC -ICI EV 7[POICEI[ILVED C[Vat Crav Ta tpya Tcov HrIA nOIU Td)pa d(pTovv ndvo) aTo Kc(p6kt Tou;. ". 
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long-standing brutality of the "empire". The attacks thus came to connote the well- 
deserved and long awaited retribution of justice. "The capitalist giant is hit and I am not 
the only one who admits a feeling of justice" (Hatziioannou, 2001: N47). 109 Similarly, 
"if it weren't for the dead, the melted towers of Manhattan would be the prettiest of 
sculptures ... Not even two oceans can wash out the blood with which they 
[the U. S. ] 
have painted their hands and their soul (Triadis, 2001d). 110 This last quote was 
accompanied by the famous Vietnam picture of 1972, depicting the naked little 
Vietnamese girl running down the street whilst screaming helplessly. Some other 
frightened children were shown running in the foreground, whereas in the background 
one could discern American armed soldiers. The caption next to the photo read: "They 
spread hubris, they breed anger" (Triadis, 200 1 d). 
In fact, the notions of 'hubris' and 'nemesis' were very often employed in one of the 
three newspapers, Eleutherotipia, to refer to the attacks of September II as the natural 
and just consequence of U. S. arrogance and exploitation of their power. "The United 
States, the greatest world sponsor of Islamic fundamentalism have decided to annihilate 
their former friends, who are now called terrorists and are backed by their former 
common enemy! ... The culmination of hypocrisy. Hubris" (Bakomarou, 
2001c). 111 44 If 
only they taught children the timeless notions of ancient Greek tragedy: Arrogance, 
Hubris, Nemesis" (Bardiabasis, 2001). 1 12 In Greek myth and tragedy, hubris is the 
pretension to be godlike and thereby fail to observe the divine balance among god, man 
and nature. It is seen as "an offence against the order of the world, it is having energy 
and misusing it self-indulgently, it is a behaviour that was intended gratuitously to inflict 
dishonour and-shame to the values that hold a society togethee,, -(Ronfeldt, 
1994: 1-2). 
Hubris would usually afflict leaders who abused their power and authority, whether 
intentionally or not, and exceeded the fate and fortune ordained by the gods. "Nemesis, 
109 'V KGLIEITGLXIOTtK6; TIYCCVTCt; )CTUlrAOnKF, KM ÖEV Eigat n 110V11 it01U OýoXoy£( ba Gt(010ýýLCL 8tKCtt007ÜVIJ; ". 
110 "Av 8£V V#PX(IV 0tVEKPO4 01 Xt(J)gVOt 1rÜpyot Toi) MaVX&TTCLV Oa Am To 7r10 6140p(PO yll)XT6 ... 
OÜTE 8e0 COK£aVO( 
8£V 4£ILUVOI)V TO Ufga PF TO 071010 txouv ßäyct TCL xtptcL Kat T9V YUA TOUý'. 
111 "ot HIIA, o «licyäln,; itccyK6(rjito; XopIly69) Tou taýmgtKOÜ (POVTaktmctxtcriloý, kX0I)v Ctlroga(Ficyct va £40vTd)o01)v 
Touý 7rctxtoe;, r01); rfuu;, n01) ... ctvctßagT1crrnKav tpollolcpärr;, RE TIV niApil ýtä), toTa 1)7r00-Mpgll zov na). 
t0,6 KotvoÜ 
EXOPO'61 .... 
H KOPýyü)(3T1, rn; 1)IEOKPICFICL;. 11 tßptý'. 
112 "Na päOatvctv TouMxtaTov oTa nctt8tä -rt; nävTa ElriKcLtpc; twot£; Tq; ctpxaiag tunviKý; TPCLTW8ia;: Yircpoyta, 
Yßptý, Ntlicaiý'. 
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the goddess of divine vengeance and retribution might then descend to destroy the 
vainglorious pretender, to cut man down to size and restore equilibriumý' (Ronfeldt, 1994: 
2). The implication, then, was that the U. S. had committed hubris, and the terrorist 
attacks of September II were the nemesis, the just punishment of the superpower. 
This sense of exhilaration for the assumed downfall of the U. S. was adomed with biblical 
images and allusions of former empires, whose own arrogance led them to self- 
destruction. "There have been major powers in the past of humanity and the beginning of 
their end happened exactly when their global domination led them to arrogance and 
overconfidence in their power. Before the United States came Athens and Rome" 
(Oikonomopoulos, 2001b). 1 13 Elsewhere, "Babylon! Babylon was defeated! The "Roman 
Empire" of our modem times seems to be wobbling ... In the ancient times when a 
Roman general or emperor would enter the city in triumph on his chariot, a slave would 
whisper in his ear- Don't forget, your are only mortal. The Americans seem to have 
forgotten this ... The moment that the U. S. had come to 
believe that they could wage 
wars now and in the future with no losses or dead soldiers David reminds Goliath that a 
stone suffices" (Nautilos, 2001a). 1 14 The David versus Goliath metaphor, which was 
repeatedly employed in the Greek press, refers to the Biblical story of David, the 
diminutive, but brave and God-loving Shepherd who managed to defeat the nearly 10 
foot tall giant who seemed to be unbeatable, merely by throwing a stone on him. 
Obviously in this case Goliath represented the "Evil Empire", whereas David stood for 
the terrorists, who had caused destruction, but were nevertheless heroes because they had 
beaten the invincible giant. The representation of the "U. S. empire" as fallen and 
defeated permeated the press discourse. "No truth is absolute. No matter how many 
megaton bombs it may contain; no matter how many diamonds, gold and dollars it may 
113 , y7(Ep&UVdýtCtq IXOI)V ý(, VaCý(PCLVIGTEI GTTJV (IVOP(1)716111TOL Kai q UPXý TOU Jt'XolUq ToUq "gQTO&OTýOIJKc 
6TCLV 
CtKptpd)q al)Tý Tj RaVTOKPaTOpfa TOI)q, TI; oSýyquc aqv aXaýovda Kai TqV 'J7lEPEýLXt(TTOO-6vq Tq; to-c6o; Tou;. 
Tow 
Hv(j)lttv(t)v nO), tTEt6V 7EPOqYýOýKCEV GU; ICYTOPtKt; Clek(Scq n AOýVCL Kai n Pd)g1l". 
114 "H BaPOAA H Baplu%&v ETpd)On! To opcogaYK6v auTov6qTo)) q; 6yXpovq; c7toAq (PaiveTat vct KxovgcTat 
ITQ 
na). t& Xp6via, 6Tav Nogalo; oTpaTqy6; ý ourOKPdTOpa; tgnalVC OqV 716%11 KdVOVTaq Opiaýpo, ndv(o mo dppcL TOU 
nicco a7e Tov d)p Tou tvaq 8o0oq Tou VtOpt; e aTo auri: 'Na Ouýtdaat 6n etcrat OqT6; 1'. (Daiverat 6Tt ot AlLepticavol 
To E(Xav tqdact auT61 Tq crnyVý nou ot HrIA c(Xav yo&clct (yTo 071gio Va ntcrToouv 6T, Vxopo& va Sic46yow rd)pa 
Kai (yro tLLWv 7roUvouq Xwpl; (Sic; a7td)Xzti:;, X(Opi; OUCCIOV; VCKP016;, (MaaoPo), tpxcTctt o AaPIS va Ouplact crr0v 
roXidO 6Tt apKd pta, ntTpa". 
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have saved or how many marines or rockets it launches ... Nothing, absolutely nothing 
is 
indestructible and eternal. Not even the American Imperium" (Danikas, 2001: N20). 115 
The employment of metaphors, such as David and Goliath, whereby the giant is defeated 
by the powerless, yet brave, Christian shepherd, or the association of the U. S. with the 
'blood sucking' crusaders, reinforced the image of the U. S. as the aggressor rather than 
the victim and thus minimized the impact of the September II attacks. 
An excusefor the United States to enforce its expansive global vision 
The September II attacks were also depicted as actually serving U. S. interests, since they 
facilitated future U. S. imperialist strategies. "It is clear now that this tragedy will be the 
official and the legal excuse of the United States, to transform our planet into one of their 
states" (Koroversis, 2001d). 1 16 Moreover, with the end of the cold war, "there ceased to 
be a rival and the argument of an 'enemy' ceased to exist. The U. S. needed to invent a 
new enemy in order to maintain and establish their world hegemony. They finally did 
find a new 'invisible enemy', that is terrorism" (Metas, 2001). 117 Similarly, "Bin Laden 
was in many ways useful to the Americans. With Bin Laden faceless terrorism acquires a 
face, the Saudi Arabian becomes the personification of 'evil', which is essential for the 
launching of a crusade of the 'good"' (Vranas, 200le: N30). 118 Terms such as 'War on 
Terror' and 'Counterterrorism' were thus seen to be stemming from the lust for power 
and were not associated with feelings of revenge orjustice, as was the case in the British 
press. "The declared "counterterrorism war" was not merely designed by anger and 
115 "Kajud alýftia Bev Eivat an6XuTq. 'OaF,; fMýpq peyar6v(ov Kai va nCpltXEL IDaa Bialidma, Xpucrd(pt Kat 8ompta 
va IXEt anoTapteikict. lDoouq neýovakq Kat pouKtTcq va EKCI(PCVSOVgEt. IDaOU; KOPMOftp Kai va icoup&ýct. TinoTa 
LICL T17EOTa 8ev Eivat aKaTaV[KTITO Kai atd)VIO. (NT& Kav To ApeptKaviK6 Imperium". Imll 
Elvat nUov cia(pkq, n(oq auý il Tpayo)Sfa, nou LýnGE 6Xt POV6XCL 0 aýCpWaVIO; Xa6r, aW 6XTI I avOpmR6T71Ta, 
Oa yivet q t7d(MlIn Kai OýLtglj 8tKCLtO%Oyia Tow HnA yta va WTaTpbyo1uv Tov n%avýTq as r1oXtTda Tový'- 
117,, Me qV KaTdPPEUO-q q; Eoptcmý; Evcoqq UctiVe va un&pXct awfnako; Kai KaTfpppacTo 
cntXF(pilpa Tou 'cXOpot'. Ot Hv(optvcq no%tTEiC;, Tia VQ 8taTnpý(YOW Kai vct &Spat6)cyoi)v Tjjq JjyEPOVfa TOI)q CFTOV 
nkaAT9, Oa tnpcne va Ppouv tvav vto <(cXOp6)>. Kai PpAKav tvav ((a6paTO EXOp6)), nou Elvat iq TpopoicpaTia". 118 "0 Mxtv AdvTcv virýptc xollanXk XpAcnpo; mov; AlmpiKavok. Me Tov Mntv A&vTcv Tj cLnp6cr(I)Irq 
TPOýLOKPCLT(a CL7tOKT& 7cp6(y(j)no, o I: ctouSdPCLPCI; 4aVCtyfVCTat 11 CV(TdPKO)" TOU 'KaKOW, 7101) E(Vat al[CLPCX(TqTO 71a Va 
E4a7[OXUOd 11ta OTCLI)POTOPICL TOU 'KaXW". 
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mourning, but by politics and love of power" (Boukalas, 2001b)., " Most commentators 
predicted that the horrors of the past would inevitably be repeated, with the U. S. basing 
its foreign policy on the employment of binary oppositions, constructing enemies and 
thus furthering its self-centered objectives. "We will relive, it seems, the demonization of 
'the evil', and the glorification of 'the forces of goodness', as happened in the past, so 
that any criminal action for the defense of "goodness" will be legally and ethically 
permissible, and will be blessed by the viewers of any and every religion" (Karkagiannis, 
2001 a). 120 The September II events would, thus, mark the initiation of a new Cold War 
on the part of the U. S. "Did you like anticommunism? You will love anti-Islamism" 
(Ramonet, 2001). 121 In fact, a cartoon (Appendix B, Figure 1) depicted two frustrated 
and disappointed looking men. "'Every now and then, America invents a new enemy; 
and the arms industry flourishes' commented one of them. The second replied: 'The 
other day it was Castro, afterwards it was Kadafi, yesterday it was Saddam. Today it is 
Bin Laden. Who will it be tomorrow ... ? 122 
A cry ofdespair as a result of U. S. led globalizedpolarization 
The attacks themselves were seen as a result of poverty and inequality created by U. S. - 
led globalized imperialism. "Ferrorism is a wound. However, it is produced (and 
reproduced) by the politically, financially and militarily powerful, the powerful of 
globalization" (Kiaos, 200 1). 123 In the hegemonic representation in the Greek press, the 
world is divided in two sides, the governors and the governed, with the latter suffering 
from the greed of the former. "I believe that nations are divided in those which govern 
and those which --suffer-;; ý- the notion of national sovereignty has vanished. The 
foundations of national sovereignty have been modified substantially in favour of a 
119 44 TOV "Puxotwa ((avTtn6xtgo)>BCV TOV GxcslaýEt g6vov o Ov[L6; Kai To ntvOoq u), M Kai il no)-tTIKA Kai 0 
LP(OTCL; 
laX64'. 
"E)ct tavctýý(; ovpc, 6no); Vaimat, Tq 8atpOVOnOij(Fq TOU 'KalCOW icat Tjv anOOI(t)O-q TOU 'KCLX06'. 671(0; T9 
yvo)piaapE Kai GTO napF. XO6V, d)(ITC K60F. 7#49 yta -nlv untpdantaq Tolu wako-6o, aic6pll Kai CYKXnýLaTIKý. va CiVal 
y6giga Kai qOtKd E7nTpt7rrA, nOl) OCt TqV CU"CFEt KCLI 0 ... 
UCLA; KHE Opq=faý'. 
121 "Ea; dpeas o avnKopjiovvt%L6;; ()a ýATPIVCTC Tov avrttakaptaýt&'. 
122"'KdOET6ooavaicaMnTFiKit-vaEXOp6ilAlicptKA. Kat8ouXdttilPtoýtilxavia6nXwv'I 'Avn7TPOX04ATctvO 
K&crrpo. TlpoX6l; ýTavoKavTdyt. X0t; ATavol: avTdýL. EýVepaEtvatoMn(vAdvTcvlAupto7tot6; OaE(v(Xldpayc"'- 
123 "H rpoRoicpctTia dvat nXqyA. Tlqv napdyouv 6ýtw; (Kca Tqv avanapdyouv) ot taVpol noXtTtKd, OIKOVOI"Icd, 
(; TPaTt(I)TIK6L. 01 tOPPOi TTI; 71(tyKOUP10710410qý'. 
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military mechanism, that is global capitalism" (Negri, 2001: N16). 124 Even though the 
U. S. was the primary capitalist aggressor, it was the western capitalist system in its 
entirety and the western elites that were responsible for global inequalities and injustices. 
"The West (United States, North Atlantic Alliance, European Union, Multinational 
Corporations) have enforced a strategy of political, military, financial, and 'cultural' 
imperialism ... At the same time, the West looks down on International 
Law and tries to 
impose unjust solutions in Palestine, Cyprus, the Aegean. The main cause of this western 
behaviour is capitalism, which depends on 'globalization' and alienates conscience" 
(Stoforopoulos, 2001: N14). 125 Furthermore, "the instigators of this attack were the elite 
itself and the system of concentrated power that depends on the free market economy and 
the representative 'democracy' that creates and supports the elite ... This attack can 
be 
explained easily if one realizes that it was conducted by people who grew up knowing 
that their brothers in Iraq were being slaughtered by the most sophisticated war machine 
in the world" (Fotopoulos, 2001b) 126. "How many fanatical terrorists were bred until 
now from this strategy of aggressive and massive military action"? (Vranas, 2001d: 
N22) 127 Therefore, terrorism was represented as the direct consequence of Western -- 
primarily U. S. - induced poverty as well as U. S. military violence; terrorism would likely 
thrive in the future unless this polarization and U. S. military and expansionary violence 
came to an end. "As long as there is social impoverishment in the Muslim world, there 
will always be human material for terrorist actions" (Agelopoulos, 2001c). 128 It is thus 
impossible "to demand understanding, patience and compassion from the billions of the 
wretched who consume less than a quarter of the global goods, when the world is divided 
124 rCL 1, tVCL, ra LeVtl Z(OpiýoVtat CtVälleaa & Ctl)Tä no» 81011C0eV Kai GIEKEIVa ICOU Uno#POUV ... 
Eýgpa, 8£v %)lräpytt 
ma cOviA Kuptapx(a. Tu i8tct -ra OepUta -M; cMICA; Kuptapxia; LXOUV Tpon07iotnoci pgtlcä.. lrpo;. 690.0;. £v6; 
1[0)£ýLucoü kLllxcmcrlloe: lou nayk6(rptou Kalrurco. Icrktoe". 
123 "H Mý (Hvcolibt; no). t-reicý, Bop£toazlavnKA EuýgaX1cL, EupwlrcLYicA Twal, 8tF. Oýut; £ýrcLtP£IC; 
) LXOI)v 
Egapgöcct crTparr(tA goltTtKoe, (yTpctnü)nKoü, otKovolltKoe Kai «n02, tn(FýLlicoe» 1117rEptall(woý ... 
T. 'uyxpÖvw;, 11 
Mal xtptgpovst To ät£Ovtg A(Kaio Kai itpocmctOE1 va Futßä)£t ä8tKF; Uast; uMv rlcLxawTivq, Tnv Kü7rpo, '90 AtTcLio. 
]BacrticA atifa rg; 6X11; 8unKA; crulintpt(pop64 CiVal 0 ICantTCLXtg116;, Kolo MpgFrCLt MV «7rCtylCoopt0790tIgn» Kai 
a»ýoTpid)vEt Tt; (ruvE18A0eiý'. 
126 tto, ilotKoj al). rol)pyoj Tqý F , X(0,: 0.9; CLUTA; 
ATav ot (Sie; ot Ellt Kai To o-üMkia CilUyKtVTPO)ang cýoucrig. To oicoto 
C; T9PiýETCtt MV OIKoVOkt1Q lM; (lY0päý Kai VIV CLVn7[POCF(i)7161)TIKý «81110KPCLT(a» ICOU 8111tOUPI£( Kai aTlpgtt Tt; Ei(T 
auTt; ... 
OýTS ßtßCL1a EIVat CtVE4ýynT9 11 £7110£99 C(V itäpol)ýLS U7C6V9 6Tt J-PVC CL7[6 C1V0P6)7tOV; ICOIU m"CFCCV 
ßxknovTa5 Tou; CL8eIgoe; Toi); cro lpäic Va CF(PäýOVTCLI MV KUpt04ýia CL'n6 TqV TEý£t6T£Pll 1rOý£91KA lInXC(VA OTOV 
K6(FIIO". 
127 « An6 lil icoltnkA. CtUTA Tqý EMOETIKfý Kai ýtaýUCý; UTPCC'nCOTtKý; 8päffln, X6001 äpaTE q)aVanCpkV0t TPOPKpäT£; 
1. EVVAO1lKctv 11txpt T6)pa, '? 
'28 't OCO OCL V7läpXE1 KotvOMA gaexko" CrTov POI)Cr01)11iCtVtK6 K6(; ki0, CLV0p6)7nVo WUK6 yM TPOIIOKPCtTIKt; 8pä(7£1; 
8£v Oa )£lnre'. 
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in two unequal slices and since many of us either approve of or are indifferent towards 
this segregation and this incredible inequality" (Danikas, 2001: N20). 129 
The September II attacks were thus represented as an "emergency language which the 
repressed and the pursued started using when they realized that any other language they 
had used had no effect, and so resorted to "the language that requires no translatiolf', that 
is, the language of despair" (Fotopoulos, 2001b). 130 Therefore, even though terrorism 
may be "appalling", it can "in some cases be considered as the only available strategic 
option for a nation in extremis, which yearns for freedom and self-determination" 
(Heraklidis, 2001: NO6). 131 "Terrorism was always solitary, nihilistic and desperate" 
(Karkagiannis, 2001a). 132 The solution to the problem of terrorism would thus involve 
satisfaction of the fundamental rights to "country, justice, freedom, democracy and other 
similar values", since "if those countries that the U. S. regards as terrorist nests were not 
deprived of these values, what would be their reason to breed terrorists or 'terrorists"'? 
(Renieris, 2001: N22). 133 It is only "when a society is deprived of basic means of living 
and basic rights, when the injustices it suffers seem neverending, when the 'enemy' is 
powerful and the 'subordinate' is treated with brutality that rationality loses its meaning; 
and then two things fascinate the brain, the idea of a better life after death and the idea of 
revenge. Under poverty, repression and despair, human life loses its value' 
(Papadopoulou, 200 1). 131 These representations of the suicide bombers were 
accompanied by photos of protesting Muslims followed by captions pointing out that"the 
129 " Arpoe o K6crixo; Fivat y(i)piajitvo; os 81üo ävtcrc; 99te; Kai Ct(p016 CLPKETOI g Ilki(OV EIIIKPOTOeg A (18tCLTOP()ýJIF- Te 
ct»T6v Tov 8taX(optcrIi6, ye au-Mv Tqv anicrTeu-rg avta6TnTa, 716); c(vat no-rk 8uvaT6v psT6 va ý, n-räg KaTav6'109, 
IMOJIOVA Kai CU)l196vta CL7t6 TU ÖtacKCLTOpkLýptU TWV £4C(OXt(0ýL-V0)V noi) KaTaVaxävouv -rwv icayK6crilicov- - 
clýictod)v". 
13 "H C7ii06C11 En04V0)ý F(VCtt UXUý 1 'TUGGCC taxarn; aväffl; 1.6non LI5OTOX(I xapctlrnlpimKt, nou äpxtcav va 
Xpll(; 11107r010eV Ot KCLTCLIttFCFkItV0t Kat 01 KCLTCt8tOylltV01 6TCrV 8tCL7ti(JTO)CYCKV Mt Käft äull T). 6)GC; CL 1101) xpll(nýOICO(IICFCLV 
lltxpt td)P(l 8£V EIXC CLItoTtucy14(I Kal KGLTtyluyav 0-M 'TUGcra' icoi) 8ev XPEläýETat gTä(Ppaan T9 Tucaa in; 
CLXEIMC; taý'. 
131 "H TpogoKpcLria ... 600 Kai UIIOKPOUGTIKA va Elval nou ßtßata Efvat, 11nOPE1 os optailkvg ntpmTd)Crct; va 
0FcoPF-i-rat 1 ý6vil aTpa'rlytKA yta Lva 1a6 in extremis nov enginTti £4u0ep(ct Kai cturo8täocall". 
132 "H TpoýoKpctT(cL nävtoTe AT(iv liov(iXiKý, liT18cvtanKý Kat ctiter(üapkvq". 133 *'St£K8(K11U9 1[CCTPI8CL;, 8lKCLIOI), ÜM0Epia;, 811ROKPCLTIC(; Kai ä"V Itap6110t0V M610)V GLýtd)V 111; ýA; ... av 
Ctl)Tä TCL CtyCL0ä Kai ot aýig loirýpX(iv Kai cm; taTic; (X(opF.; - ncptoXt5) nou ot HrlA OF(üpoev ojýFpa (0; (p(ß)tt; 17); 
,r -rc; A (crpOltOKpät«,. 
, 
f4OktOKPCLTia; » 7C0t0V 
X6T0 OCL EIXCrV Ot ICEPIOXtg CLIW; VU YCV0eV TPOIIOKpä 
"OT(IV Pla KOIV(OV(CL CFTEPEITC(t Ta ß(XC; txä Tqý cLyaOä Kat 8ix(iAgaTct, 6, rav ot aStick; irou'Ug(GTaTat 110täýOUV Va PAV 
tXOUV T910ý;, 6TaV 0 'cxOp6; ' tivat ncLvicXupo; K(II 0 MIZOTElý9) CLVtlýt£T(OltiýETOtt " KT9VCO8IGt, 16T8T0 IIUCM KWEITUt 
ittpa an6 ta 6pta vl; Xoyticýg. Kai -r6Te 816o npäyilaTCL TO y01qTlýeOUV. 11 18ta Pta; ICaX6TCpln; gTä OäVCLTOV ýA; l(GLI 11 
t8ka Tq; Ei(si"uq; ... 
1: 8 CUVOAKE; (PT(üXtta;, KUTan(Effqý Kai Ctn£Xntaict; 11 CLVOP(07nvil ýc0A xävctrqv aýia Aý, - 
131 
failure of the West to understand the dispossessed of the world breeds Islamic 
fundamentalism" or that "the terrorist action is not the result of madness, but the logical 
outcome of injustice, torture and death". 
The above discourse was based on the employment of binary oppositions, such as the 
West versus the rest, the governors versus the governed, oppressors versus oppressed, 
aggressive actors versus passive victims, rich versus poor, which fixed identities and 
constructed knowledge. As Doty points out, "thinking in terms of representational 
practices calls our attention to an economy of abstract oppositions that we routinely draw 
upon and that frame our thinking" (Doty 1996: 2). These binaries were used in a similar 
fashion to the ones encountered in the British press, but the reality constructed was 
entirely different. The U. S. -led capitalist West appeared to be the negative force 
assaulting the rest, who were seen as defenceless victims attacking the U. S. as a desperate 
last resort (see also Kaitatzi-Whitlock and Kehagia, 2004: 141). 
The presupposition that the terrorists were driven by feelings of U. S. -induced despair, 
injustice and poverty naturalized the attacks as something that was bound to happen and 
which may have cost lives but was essentially 'America's' fault. At the same time, the 
polarization created by the division of the world in two spheres, the developed and the 
developing, with the developing utterly controlled by the rich residents of the developed, 
demonized and empowered western elites, particularly the U. S., which was represented 
as having a mighty, Unstoppable power determining global processes. This polarization 
also deprived the non-westem, less powerful states of agency, representing them as 
helpless, passive actors, whose- lives -and history were shaped by others and who were not 
responsible for their actions, mistakes or achievements. Thus, the common sense was 
created that the September II attacks could essentially only be understood in terms of 
former U. S. or western imperialist policies. This, in turn, created the implication that the 
solution to the problem rested with the U. S. and the western elites, since they were 
constructed as the actors responsible for the world ills. Moreover, such a representation 
precluded diplomatic or political solutions and thus legitimized terrorism as a means to 
deal with the mighty U. S. superpower. As Kataitzi-whitlock and Kehagia stress (2004: 
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151), these discourses "reveal a tacit accommodation to power politics rather than 
pursuing principled diplomacy and common interest politics. Thus, the ideology of 
'might is right' advances unrestrained. This contingency is alarming as its certain 
outcome is more chaos and impotence to settle crisis rationally and collectively". 
A noticeable feature of the press discourse was the lack or at least the scarcity of the 
shifter 'we' (see Weldes 1999: 105). At very few points in the discourse was the pronoun 
'we' mentioned and the reader wasn't directly addressed. This was definitely not the 
case in the British press, where the employment of the shifter 'we' produced the 
appearance of a conversation of which the readers became a part (Sharp 1996: 559) and 
enabled the interpellation of the individuals into specific subject positions. The 
ambiguous 'we' helped "define the subject position that the audience is asked to assume, 
and created common sense, by rendering the argument being offered intelligible to that 
audience" (Weldes 1999: 105). In the Greek press discourse there was a notable absence 
of the shifter 'we' or 'us' and the binary opposition constructed was between 'them, rich 
invaders' and 'them, poor victims', rather than 'us' versus 'them'. The reader was 
neither positioned in the fist category of the western elites, nor in the second of the 
exploited nations; both were 'othered, even though 'sympathies' and 'antipathies' were 
constantly created, with the criticism of the U. S. and western foreign policy being the 
most favourite topic amongst the columnists. , 
This struggle to identify with neither 'camp' even though there clearly was the 
demarcation of two camps in the discourse can be partially explained by the fact that 
Greece is a country whose identities are blurred. Greek discourse contained a clear 
demarcation between 'the west' and 'the orient', but it was not clear to which of the two 
binaries Greece belonged. As Herzfeld points out, one of the main questions that Greeks 
pose to foreigners is where they position them, as European or as Oriental. This tension 
is prevalent in many aspects of Greek society, with newspaper and television channels 
daily asking whether Greece belongs to 'the west' or to 'the third worldlorient'. "In a 
country like Greece, which largely owes its independence to the self-interest of other, 
stronger nations, one will find an especially painful awareness of the inequality of 
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cultural models. The adoption of emblematically 'western' clothes or other symbols of 
externally derived status - reproductions of political hegemony built or draped around the 
consumer's body - does not mean passive acquiescence in the hegemony of this 
essentialized 'west"' (Herzfeld 2003: 220-221). Therefore, the Greeks are ambivalent as 
to which of the two camps they belong to, but are in no doubt as to the existence of these 
two camps, and cannot purely identify with or disassociate from either one of them. 
The different faces of the terrorist 
The suicide bomber 
The representation of the perpetrators of September II as victims was not hegemonic; a 
second discourse constructed the suicide bombers as less sympathetic actors. This 
discourse didn't appear as frequently as the one described above; nevertheless, neither 
can it be seen as a marginal discourse because it was articulated by many commentators. 
According to this representation, the suicide bombers were fanatic and vicious 
individuals with perverse minds who acted in the name of their own twisted version of 
Islam and were driven by their hate towards the West and civilization itself. Such a 
representation resembled the one encountered in the British press, since the terrorists 
were seen as irrational creatures, whose totally unjustiflable actions could only be put 
down to fanaticism and blind hatred. Irrespective of U. S. foreign policy, the suicide 
bombers were guilty, the argument would hold, since their actions were both horrific and 
had nothing to do with U. S. oppression. The attacks of September II were in no way 
connected with-feelings-of desperaticrn., --because: they-were conducted by crazy barbarians 
with no political objectives, merely intent on destroying what they hate, "In the post-cold 
war era, we are witnessing an infinitely deadlier form of terrorism by fundamentalist 
religious or right-wing organizations with no political objectives, the blind and 
destructive hatred being the only incentive of those who feel ostracized from the global 
economic and political developments" (Papakonstantinou, 2001C). 135 As in British press 
135 ac GTOV PCTaIVVXpO7CO4VIK6 K6crp, eigacrre p6. pTupe; pta; ancip(o; (POVtK6TEpil; TPOIIOKpaTia; -npoXft; (ITO lisTp6 
Tou T6KtO, XOC; MV OKXaX6gCt, GýgCpCt cyTo MaVX6TCEV- (17E6 TqV 7E)XUP& TovTaAEVTatCrTtK6)V, OPTI(TKCUTtK6)V A 
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articles, the perpetrators of September II were constituted as fanatics who hated the west 
and thus targeted it in order to destroy everything related to western culture and 
civilization. "The terrorists are not 'innocent, oppressed victims of the Arnericans'; they 
express a completely different logic and culture, which in its extreme form hate the 
western type of life and aim at destroying it" (Loverdos, 200 1), 136 or "in the atrocious 
criminal act of September II there is less deep rooted and more tangible causes. The 
blind religious fanaticism, the paranoid intolerance, the primitive barbarity" (Zoulas, 
200 1). 137 This hatred and spite towards the world was the main characteristic ascribed to 
the terrorists, who were entirely disassociated from any form of rationality or sanity. 
Their only interest seemed to be the creation of absolute chaos, death and destruction. 
Their only motive was extremism. "He [the terrorist] is a neglected Satan, one cursed. 
He forgets his limits, his bonds, his burdens and spreads his destructive fervour all over 
the world, for him a collection of murderers and parasites. The only thing he loves is the 
fire to which he gives birth. The pictures of destruction, the panic, the screams, the 
unutterable pain ... he is absolutely convinced that he saves his own 
life by spreading 
death to innocents, he wins his immunity from mortality, he transcends to eternity 
(Karaiskaki, 200 1). 138 Finally, "this new type of war ... isn't in the name of countries, 
banners, ideologies, gods or anything else. It is only interested in the rhetoric of mass 
death" (Boukalas, 2001b). 139. The articles which referred to the perpetrators of the 
attacks as nihilist madmen were fewer than the ones which presented them as the victims 
of an unjust world. Moreover, their impact was diminished due to the prevalence of 
representations of the U. S. as a terrorist state and a ruthless ruler. The terrorists in the 
Greek press discourse did not pose as large a threat as the "U. S. terrorists" did because 
cLlcpostýtd)V opyctv(O(; EO)v x(opi; lcctRicz ico), inicA iýivqTpo To tuglö, icaTctcrrpogi1C6 p(cro; 60wv 
ato06vov-rat gouTpaictcrkttvot anö To n(zyK6(rkLt0 OIKOVOýIK6 KCLI ICO). tTLK6 TIYVCGOae'. 
136 4601'rp0110KpäTF; kV tiVCtt «CtO(Oa, KaTUlttFC; gtVCL NIMM Twv AlitpiKavd)v». E(Vat EKTpaCrtt; ffl"5 81CL9OPETIKA; 
XoyiKA; icat icoulToepaý, irou Mv aicpaia tou; pop9A anEXOävov-rat Tov 8v-rtic6 Tpfto ýtüA; icat cntSt(üKouvvct Tov 
KctTacrTpt, qouv". 
137 t4 crro gpticalto tyK), il14a z-95 11115 EenTepßpi0-0 lUltäpXOUV ). tY6T£PO ßaOtä Kat UptGG6TEPO CLItT& a(Tia. 0 ru(p16; 
OP11(YKCUTIK6; gaVCCTICFýt6;, 11 IMPCIVOYA picraW6oýict, il irpü), r6yovij ßapßap6rITUý'. 
13s t-Eva; 7rapayK(üvicilitvo; GaTaVä;, tva; KaTapagbog. Anapovci Ta 6ptä Tou, tGL 8£(Fllä TOI), ta ä)c01 Tou Kat 
gU7rOlett TO KCLT(IC; TPO(PIK6 kLtVO; TOI) 716W0 CTOV K69kL0 - Te CLUT6V, tVCt CUV0V0e)£1)gU EV6XWV KCLI icapaaimw. 
To 
116V0 7[OU ayanä tival 11 9(J)Tid ROI) T£Wä. 01 EUC6VE; 1CCITCLCFTPO(PA;, 0 IZGLVIK6ý, M olupxtavd, 0 CIVE('9(»To; n6vo; ... 
EiVat an6X1UTa lrtn£tCrýtkVO; 6T1 CTKOpnd)VTCL; To oävaT0 (YE ctod)01); lipooTaT£15£t In 81A Toi) ýWA, KEP8(ýE, ! MV cLcrulict 
a716 T9 0V9T6T9Tct, 7[Epvä 0T9V «10)VI6T9Ta". 
139 "Ai)Tö; o vtoi) tönoi) ir6ý£iioc, iroi) PläýSt VCL CLVTCL1rOKpiV£TCLI M g0P9A TOI) tgý£nOxkllOU ge toV 071010 
gO1K6Vi)0AKCCIIE M TÜMM(a XP6Vta, 8£V EMKco£iTcL1 7c(ITpl8eg, tepä, läßctpct, pä" iSE(ov, Osoý; A 69n äX). o. M6V0 11 
PITOPtklýTO1) TP61101)TOV EV8taTtptt, 11 PITOPUCA TOU PaýWA OCtVäTOV'. 
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they were only a few individual lunatics who could, therefore, only pose a limited threat. 
On the other hand, as will be seen in the following section, the U. S. was seen as a 
rational, calculating and immensely powerful terrorist. Even though both the executors 
of the September 11 attacks ýand the U. S. were equally loathsome, the U. S. was 
articulated as a much more 'effective' terrorist, due to its power and might. 
The U. S. terrorist 
In this hegemonic representation, the U. S. government was represented as a corrupt actor, 
whose history and present actions were based on the abuse of other nations and people. 
For this reason, the U. S. was construed as a hypocritical power, not entitled either to 
denounce the September II terrorist actions or to take further actions against states and 
innocent civilians. "Good and essential is the condemnation of terrorism. However, the 
chief instructors, the global terrorists themselves, those whose state was built out of the 
blood of the native Indians, the black slaves, the exploitation of the nations of the third 
world or the abandoning of their own soldiers in Vietnam, have no right to condemn 
terrorism7 (Roussis, 200 1). 140 Not only was the U. S. accused of inducing poverty in 
nations all over the world, but it both created terrorism, and then used anti-tefforism as its 
method to expand its colonies. "The CIA constructed and donated three gifts to the 
universe: Poverty, Terrorism (in the labs of the CIA), and Anti-Terrorism (in the labs of 
the FBI)" (Nautilos, 200 1 C). 141 Moreover, such a "terrorist behaviour" was bound to 
result in global distrust and antipathy towards the U. S., which was positioned in a 
relationship of opposition to the rest of the world as the archetypal terrorist. "Let the 
world terrorists [meaning- the U. S. ] threaten. andAet Ahem make malignant plans. Their 
new "invisible" enemy is not the atrocious terrorists, but the crowds which are 
increasing" (Triadis, 200 IC). 142 Similarly, "the seemingly proper ones are the real 
140 "KcLký Kat C(VCLTICCLi(1 Kal 1 K(ITCL8iq Tq; TPOýOKpaTiGg. M6V0 7Z0U ÖEV LXDUV 8tKCL(0)IICL VU T9V KCtTCL8lKäýOUV 01 
ItPd)TOI 8tSÜ4(IVTC; 01 (810101 It(ZYK6Cr14101 TPOýOKpäTE;, EKEIV0t 1t01) tXnciav TO KpäT0; TO1); " TO Ufga TWV 1V8täV(OV 
tOCLYEV(bV, TOW IIGLýP0)V 80eXWV, r1V EKKT&), )£U1311 WV lüd)V TOU tp(TO1) K6(; MU, TIV CyKaTC£ln (IdýLn Kai TON 
8u(6)v tou; ßcTtpäv(üv TOU BtETV6kel. 
141 "Tp(cL Mpa icctrcccrKt0a(Yav Kat Xäptc; av ot HIIA aTIv oticoi)iitvil: Tg 0-r(üXcta, rIv TpokLoKpatia «na eplyac-ZýPta 
Tj; CIA) Kai -rqv AvnTpoktoicpaTia (ma cpyacrApia Tou FBIY'. 
""'A; ans"ev, Xotn6v. Kt a; KctTa(yTp(ovouv OXt5ta Ot TPOkLOKpäTF; Tq; 0 ICCLIVOIýpYt0; 'CL6PaTO; ' EX0P6; 
MIO; 5ev Fival 01 mYrPol lngrpoliolcpaTtag. Eivat To iLXAOo; icou i&lOctivcC'. 
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terrorists of the whole world. Am I an anti-American? If Americanism is inconsiderate 
violence, injustice, censorship, arrogance, the disregard for all the others, fanaticism, the 
lack of critical thought, the lie, the right to the life of the other, the imposition, blindness, 
egocentrism, ignorance, lack of culture and spiritual civilization, then yes, I am an anti- 
American" (Kairos, 200 1). 143 The predicates in the above sentence constituted the U. S. 
not only as a violent actor, but also as an uncultured and uncivilized one; this, in turn, 
facilitated the further "othering" of the U. S. 
The U. S. was also not only constructed as a coercive actor, but also as intolerant of those 
who disagreed with its policies and actions. "How can we put up with the fact that entire 
nations are blackmailed with the slogan 'whoever is not on our side is against us"'? 
(Papadopoulos I. St., 2001: N16). 144 The U. S. was, therefore, accused of violating basic 
human rights and democratic values by forcing everybody to side with it. "The values of 
democracy, freedom and human rights will once more be smashed and debased" 
(Poudourakis, 2001: N07). 145 Many cartoons criticized this U. S. bullying. In one 
cartoon, Jesus Christ had been captured by two Romans, whose helmets had CIA and FBI 
inscribed on them. They needed to take a decision on what to do with him, so the CIA 
Roman soldier asked his FBI counterpart. 'Why should we crucify him since he doesn't 
seem to be against us"? "Because he is not on our side either", the FBI soldier replied 
(Appendix B, Figure 2). In another cartoon, one could distinguish two fully covered 
figures standing next to each other. One of them was enveloped in an Afghan burqa and 
the other one, which stood for the U. S., was a Ku-Klux-Klan member, who uttered: "We 
or them" (Appendix B, Figure 3). In a final cartoon, a U. S. soldier aimed his gun at a 
civilian who looked terrified. - The soldier-reassuringly: uttered: --"Don't worry, I won't 
eliminate you if you don't think badly about me"; and the civilian thought to himself: 
"You didn't kill my grandfather, you didn't amputate my mother, you didn't drive my 
143 "AUTO[ elvat ot TPOROICPdTEqTOI) K6crpou Am Ot E4cuyemýLvot SAOcv ... As purd; av, Elpat AvTtavcptKav6;. AV Eivat %ICPIKaVtog6; q 6KPIT9 pla, 9 a8tKja, Tj XOYOKPIG(a, 0 I)Rcp(ptaXtcrp6q, Tj tnapaq, Tj 7jtpt(pp6vqoj Tow 6XXmvo 
0 TaVaTICYJ16q, q tWtAn ICPMKýq GdAnq, TO Ytila, TO 81KCLI(I)IlCt (YM ý(04 TOU &WU, lq EMPOM, Ot 7[aPo)7T'SC; l 0 
M KEWptUll6; s lq dTVOIa, 11 tWtVj KELUttpyEICLq Kat 7CVCIUILanKOb ROXIT10116, Vat, cipat AmaptPwav6ý'. "AvcX6paaTc OX6K%ljPa KP&Tq Va MpldýOVTat JIE TO GX6yKaV '67roto; BEV E(Val pct; i pa; Elvat EvavTfOV paq"'; 145 "Ot OL416; q; 81111OKPaTia;, q; EXMOCp(Ct; Kat TOW aV0P(0l(fV(0V StKOKOýLdTCOV TICE Pta CLK6pil (popd 0a 
KaTaXaTq0ObV". 
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sister crazy, you didn't destroy my country ... I am not thinking of all these things, so you 
let me exist" (Appendix B, Figure 4). 
In line with previous representations, the Wild West metaphor was widely used in the 
Greek press to describe U. S. foreign policy and intentions. President Bush was depicted 
as a cowboy or a sheriff, launching into a mission to hunt the Indians, who represented 
not just the terrorists, but also the poor and dispossessed. "Bush, the new sheriff, gets his 
troops ready so as to hunt the Indians" (Roubanis, 2001b). 146 "The cowboy ... constantly 
wearing a scornful smile, as though he was enjoying a movie, where the civilized and 
brave American soldiers hunt the wild and uncivilized Indians, slaughtering them in the 
woods" (Bakomarou, 2001b). 147 The U. S. cowboy government, it was maintained, didn't 
hesitate to use violence and spread death in order to expand their economic empire. 
"Sheriffs, cowboys and gangsters only take the power of the gun into account and money 
is their only interest and concern" (Papadopoulou, 2001: 10). 148 Articles commented on 
the violent and unlawful means that the U. S. used, which allude to another epoch, less 
civilized and more backward, where the law of the gun ruled. "We still live in an era 
where anyone even remotely suspicious is lynched, where the sheriffs shoot before trying 
to find out the truth; in an era where human life has value only for the 'proper' few 
residents of the village and nobody else ... if this is what civilization is about, I 
belong to 
the uncivilized" (Kairos, 200 1). 149 Therefore, "the global western is not a soluti&' 
(Galanopoulos and Spiropoulou, 2001). 150 In many cartoons Bush was portrayed as a 
cowboy-sheriff, while a photo (Appendix B, Figure 5) showing a poster of Osama Bin 
Laden served to make explicit what was seen as a U. S. foreign policy resembling the 
Wild West. The main focus of the photo was the poster itself which was glued on some 
kind of gate and depicted Bin Laden, with 'wanted dead or alive' written above his photo. 
146 4. () Mnol. );, (Ln Vko; acpi(pn;, gnäXVCIro Yta v(1 Icuv9. Moet Touý 1V8tüv0. Uý'. 
147 4. mr rcLtv(cl, 6nou ot ico). tztolitvoi Kat ycvvatot AgFpi)ccLvol . 
ba pEt8iapa CM XFill OUVEX(üg, CraV VCL UlrOMilpave 
CFTPCtT1(OTt; KlOVnY0ý)V TOU5 äypt01); KOtt a7[01(TICTO1U; IV8täVOU;, (YgaytäýOVTä; TOI)g, gtOCL Ma 8äOn"- 
"E£Piyn8£;, KGLOI)l17tÖn8Eg KGLI YKäyKCTEP, g6V0 Tnv te TO)v 6"v ýßyctptäý0'UV KCLI ýt6V0 crro ypýP OPKgmV'. 
149 *'E8ei4c LT(n 0 7tOltTtCr146; 6n ßpi(lK£TC[t CM6141 CnV VIOA 7rOU EltVTCFäpovt0 816 ßOA; C)t 8CLMXO&£tKT0eý9V0t, 
.a O-rqv Enox4 noio 01 atpt(pn8F,; irp(ßTa nupoßo10eCFaV Kat ýLETä P(OT0eCrCLV, MV EXO)M XOU 11 CtVOPd)nIV11 
ý(DA F"YF Va 
P6V0 Tta TO10; Ka0(1)(YXP£7984614£Vol); OXJTOI); 1CCITO1K0U5 TOD XO)PIOÜ Kat yta Kctvtvctv &Wv ... 
Av Eival CM CLUT& 
n0) tn(; 0;, ET6) A6Va PI), EilMt M TOV; CL7gOliTtOTO1Uý'. 
150 "To nayKoaýtto youccrTcpv Uv Etvai luag". 
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This photo represented the U. S. as an unlawful subject, or at least as an uncivilized 
subject which sorted out its affairs by means of violence rather than dialogue. 
The Greek press discourse often compared Bush and Bin Laden, with the former 
emerging as an equal, or bigger, villain. Both Bush and Bin Laden were depicted as 
demonizing their enemies and thinking in absolute terms; their only difference, it was 
claimed, was the capitalist drives of the former and the backward, anti-modemist urges of 
the latter. "President Bush talked yesterday about the battle of Good against Evil ... this 
duality also dominates Osama Bin Laden's thoughts, as well as the thoughts of all fanatic 
Islamists ... the first needs Evil so as to justify the stock market games, the second needs 
it so as to justify his inability to comprehend the complexity of our modem world... 
Both, it seems, need each other" (Kabilis, 2001: N06). 151 Pictures of Bush and Bin 
Laden, one next to the other were followed by the caption "The Sheriff and the 
Sheikh" 152 (Bakomarou, 2001d). Elsewhere (Appendix B, Figure 6) Bush was depicted 
looking at himself in the mirror only to see the reflection of Bin Laden. "Are you here, 
you fool"? Bush asks. "Of course, where else could I have been", the reflection of 
Bush/Bin Laden replied. Thus, both Bush and Laden were constructed as very similar 
type of subjects, namely very negative subjects. "The 'faithful' commits suicide so as to 
kill 'infidels', because he is certain that he wins the eternal pleasure of paradise with his 
faith. And the 'civilized' uses his technology to bum the entire country where the 
kamikaze is believed to come from, because he is also certain that he serves the 
'humanistic values' of his 'civilization'. Every 'truth', every 'faith', every 'civilization' 
which acts as if it is objectively correct and absolutely superior, is the womb of 
inhumanity and of any type of terrorism" (Giannaras, 200 1). 153 Similarly, a cartoon 
showed a Taliban and an American soldier sitting next two each other, playing the guitar 
151 "0 np6&8poq MnOI)q pDque npoX01q yta Tq p6xi Tou KaXo6 evavTiov Tou Kaico-6 ... 
Aur6 0 Wopk cival 
KuplapXo; icat aq crKtWq Tou Oodga Minv AdVTCv, aW Kat 6Wv Tow (pavaTtKd)V tG), agt(YT6)V... 0 7IPd)TO; XPf t*Tat 
TO KaK6 yta va SUCaLOXOYýOCI Ta natxv[Sta Tou XpqpCtTtG-MPIOIU, 0 8C6TCPO; TO Xpctdtýcmt yta va BtKato), OAcyct TTIV 
(IVIKav6TqTd TOU Va KaTaVOýCFEt T71V RO). U7EXOK6TqTCL TOU 6YVOVOI) K6apolu ... 
Kat ot 8uo TWO WCAMat 0 fva; 
TOV "I 
'52 "0 (rFpiyq; an6 Til Ilia IIF-Ptd, 0 cyttxq; ax6 Tqv dlXq". 153 660 (cnicrT6; )) aluromovd Tta va Oav(xTd)act 'an(crToi); ', EnctSA dvat ptpato; 6Tt icep8get lie Tqv nfaq TO-0 Tqv Cttd)vt(l 
an6Xau" TOU napdcluou. Kat o 'xoXt-nugLvo; ' icaTaica(ct VF Tqv m4jukA Tou -rcXvokoyla o%6KXnpll Tq Xd)pa Tn; 
m0avA; npoVxuoll; Tou Kajwcdýt, mtBý eivat Enfaq; ptpato; 6Tt -o7MpeTFf Tt; lavopomo-ndq a4tc; ' Tolu 
((nOxlTtGjlOb>> TOU ... 
KdOs 'aoem', Kdos JIM% Kdoe lm"pq' nou cg(pavgcTat pe attd)(Yet; avTtuymicý; 
OP06TqTa; Kat ctiE6XUTqq Cr, /(OTCp6qTa;, ElVat PATpa MUIVOPOMia; Kat RaVrOE18d; TPOIIOKPCITia; ". 
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and singing, "while you exist I will exist" (Appendix B, Figure 7). In a final cartoon, an 
adult explained to two children, that "state violence is very different to terrorist 
violence". The children walked off and commented: "Maybe we should ask those who 
were the victims of violence to tell us the truth" (Appendix B, Figure 8). 
Especially during the war in Afghanistan the U. S. was directly accused of exercising state 
terrorism and the air raids in Afghanistan were equated with the September II attacks. 
"With the air attacks on Afghanistan and the slaughtering of innocents we don't have a 
war of 'the good' against 'the bad', but 'the bad' against 'the bad', who use the same 
condemned violence. There is no difference between the scenes of the criminal action of 
September 11, and the ones taking place in Afghanistan now"154 ('Collateral damage', 
2001). In fact, the terrorism inflicted by the U. S. was often presented as even worse than 
that caused the suicide bombers: "What is being planned is not only tragic, but it is an 
action even worse than the one of the terrorists ... It will 
be an action of state terrorism 
which will cause incalculable 'collateral damage' and will result in the reproduction and 
the culmination of violence" ('Increasing Terrorism, 2001). 15S In a cartoon Bush was 
interviewed by a journalist, who posed the following question: "Mr. President, what 
would you tell the terrorists if they were watching now"? "Stupid amateurs", was the 
President's answer (Appendix B, Figure 9). Thus, the superpower's war in Afghanistan 
was established as a major terrorist action, comparable to the September II attacks. 
"With the declaration of war, the U. S. is launching a global terrorist attack and 
strengthens rather than deals with and eradicates terrorism ... Discovering the causes of 
terrorism and criticizing its policy, the American government is capable of and should 
realize that the real enemy is the arrogance of the superpower, which always wants to rule 
the world enforcing its own laws"156 ('Absurdity of War', 2001). 
154 "Me Tt; CLEP07FOPIKtq EMSP%tt; KaTdl Tou A(pyavtcrr&V Kat Tq c(payA a0d)(OV 6CV fXOVRC 7[64RO TO-0 'KaXOO' 
CVaVT(OV TOU 'KaKOW, a),. ýA TOU 'KaKOW EVOLVTIOV TOU 'KaKOW, 71OU c4opt6mvTat PC Tq XPTj(%L07(0(q(nl Tq; 181a; 
KaT(XSIKacrTta; plaq. ACV tXOlUV Kaýla 8taqOPd Ot G"Vt; Tqq EYKkIpaTIKýq EVLPIEla; q; II qq I: EnTCý000% " CLI)T4 
iro peTaSiSOVT(It Td)PQ U96 To ATyavmdV'. 
153%EV E(Val CLRU; TpayIK6 aIUT6 7(01) tJC0056ETCIý QA)A Kat cnjvtaTd cvtpycict Xey6T&pil cKtfvqq T(I)V TP%LOKPaTd)V 
... Oa e(vat pla NP6411 1CPankil; TPOILOKPCXTia;, 7[OV Oa IXCt Kal aVU7(OX6ytCrTC; ((71apd71XCVpC; 
ýIjRiEq* Kat Oa 
o, uvTcXtcyet mv avcurapayorfý Kat TqV KktlLdK(OCllq nlq pfaý'. 156 "ME qV KýPU411 71OXtgOU Kal ýL&XICYTCL ((BtapKEia(; )) -KQTd TOV E7[10'qgO allEptICCMK6 XaPCLKTnptap6' ot HfIA 
C4Ql1OXO0I)V JIM Vliftaq =YK6clita; TpOtIOKPaTW; KQI VVIGXft)V, aVT( Va aVV4tETO37[VO'UV KQt VQ C40USETEP6VOI)VO TqV 
TPOPOKPaTfa ... EVTO)nfýowa; nq at*; nou np=XOýV TqV TpopoKpaTia Kal KPIVOVTa; TqV ROXMICA 
nl; o 11 
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Islam, the West and the clash of civilizations 
One of the prevailing characteristics of the Greek press discourse after September II was 
the disassociation of terrorism from Islam. Even though it was often argued that the 
attacks on the Twin Towers were organized by people who had fanatically adopted a 
twisted version of Islam and had conducted crimes in the name of Islam, it was at no 
point stated or implied that Islam was in any way responsible for this fanaticism. It just 
happened that the extremists on this occasion happened to be Muslim: "Instead of 
describing these acts as what they really are, that is the adoption of distorted ideologies 
by small fanatical organizations, it has become the object of exploitation by different 
political cycles"157 (Kosmos, 2001). Poverty was seen as a much more salient feature of 
Muslim countries than terrorism, and terrorism was represented as much more likely to 
be incited by poverty, than by religion. "Poverty is a parameter that characterizes the 
Muslim world to a much greater extent than terrorism. Of course, the constantly 
widening gap between North and South is not as exciting and moving as terrorist blows, 
such as that of the Twin Towers" (Tonchev, 2001). 158 
Additionally, many articles attacked the Huntington thesis that the primary conflicts in 
the 21" century will be conflicts between civilizations rather than between nation- states 
and that the dominating source of conflict will be cultural, with Islam one of the foremost 
opponents of the Christian West (Huntington, 1998). "As far as Islam is concerned, it is 
neither naturally violent nor fundamentalisT ... The Huntington theory 
is not valid. There 
aren't any unbridgeable gaps and differences between certain 'civilizations, and what 
allEPUCaVtKI 71JECTia RnOPEI ICCLI OqIEDXt Va KaTaMpm 6n o npctypxTuc6; EXOp6; Elvat il a%aýovda Tqq UnEpUv%inq, 
7rou 00xt va icuptapXEI crrov 0%to ttF., ro StO q; ORO". 157 "H uuyicpoucnaicý Oempla 71PODWOLTEI TqV UXEpa7lXOVCrTEUýltVq ftaptij No EuOTaTcov Kal toXupd)v P&Td)190)vp 
EICEIVOU TOU XptG`naVtCrg6 KC(t EKEIVOU TOU IaMp. 0 X4VTIyKTOV p0ldýEl Va CtSta(pOPEI yta TV, EGMEPIKL; GUYKPO*6(TEt; 
Kat aVTtOtaEl; 71OU cvyaviýovmt aTo povaouXjiavtcqt6, E7(LUyOVTa; TnV VnEpan), ouCFTEIUTI" KCU Sqpaywymý 
d7lo4M, 
nOU ntptypdyEt TOV; 71OXtnagOý; Q); pOVOXj0tKd;... AvTl Ot nP64EI; ctvTtq va XapaKTqpta0dv yf ca)T6 nou 7[PdYgCLTt 
EfVCtt: 11 MOUTTI(T9 jIEYCL%OySEaTtCFRo6 a7t6 PtKpt; OPYCtVd)CFEI; T(XVCLTtKd)V trV& CiVnKE(ILEVO tKVET&UMGq; C016 
8la4pOpETtK6; 71OXMKOý; dKXOj<. 
158 "Elvat P6)w%OV aVaKptpt; VCL Oecopobvmt 6Xot ot povaov%ýtdvot Tou JtXaVýTTJ aKpCtjOt JOkglaTt; KCtl VITOKWOýEwl 
CE16 KdIEOtCt cvtaia 18EOXoyia. EK Tow 7cpaygdumv, dvat H=Xo 1,2 StacKaTopopta dvepo)7tot va c; uj+cpf; ovTat n; 
(StE; ctx6yet; ... undpXEt Toi)XdXt(nov pta Wliq nap6licTpoq nou XapaKqpi; Et TO WucyoW*avIK6 K6allo a& ROM) 
twyaXt-repo PaOýt& 11 (pTd)xctcL. AW, Pkpatct, To cruvcx* 8tEupuv6gvo Xdaga Boppdt - N6Tou GUYKtVd nOM Xty6TF-po 
a7c6 Ta TP%LOKPaTLICd nXýTjlaTa Tftou Twin Towers" 
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type of 'civilizations' are we talking about? Islam has many versions and is 
multidimensional ... Moreover, there is more violence and even more clashes amongst 
parties that belong to different cultural and religious worlds. The Huntington schema is 
based on binaries: we (the West and U. S. A. ) and 'all the others"' (Heraklidis, 2001: 
N06). Islam was perceived as a divergent and heterogeneous religion which should not be 
reduced to Huntington's oversimplified conclusions, themselves based on binaries and 
the demonization of entire states and peoples. "There isn't any unified antidemocratic, 
terrorist 'Muslim position', as there isn't any unified democratic, liberal 'Christian 
position' (Vranas, 2001f). 159 
The 'clash of civilizations' was therefore represented as nothing other than a consistent 
effort on the part of the capitalist, elitist West to disguise their hegemonic vision as a war 
against the enemies of the West. "As far as this so called clash of civilizations is 
concerned, it is obvious that it merely aims at cultivating war hysteria and justifying 
measures which will constrain even further the freedoms of the people. The ulterior 
causes of the clash have nothing to do with cultural differences, unless we call 
'civilization' the system that perpetuates the concentration of economic and political 
power in the hands of the western elite" (Fotopoulos, 2001b). 16() An article entitled 
"Mujahideen of Liberalization! ' stressed the hypocrisy of the West, which supported the 
Taliban during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the early 80s and represented them 
as the defenders of a glorious tradition that atheist Russia had tried to destroy. "In the 
eighties, the Westerners were fervent supporters of the extreme version of the Islamic 
burqa, which they now denounce. Photos of covered women next to communist mottos 
would appear in the western media with captions which blatantly declared their objection 
to every attempt of "modernization" of the female attire in Afghanistan". 161 The article 
159 41 Acv ui[&pXci Evtala UMSýpoicpanKý, TPOPOKpctTtKA ogolucraukliaviKA crT&cM)), 67coK &Ev I)n6pXct mala 
8 ýLOKPCMKý, (pL4tpnVIKA VXPtOlLaWKý CYTdUn)). " 1 
161 6,000V a(pop& q 8ýOEV OljyKPOU" nOXITIGpd)v, tivat yctvf: p6 6Tt anoTEW Xpýcnpo jacoX6Tqgct yta Tqv KO)attpyEtCL 
Tq; xoXegwý; i)crrcpta; Kat Tq &KalO%6jq(M PtTPO)V ROU O(t 7[EPIOPICYOUV CLK61ij 7ECplaCY6TEPO TI; KaTaKTqPIVE; 
c4ukpiq tow kadw. Ot and)TEpe; atT(c; Tq; 6yKpouaTI; Scv tXouv v(I Kdvouv ýtc noXtnanKt; Stayopl;, cKT6; ptpata 
av pagriaoula (croXtTtcrjl6)) -to 6aTqga 71OU StatO)Vgtt Tq UU^(KLVTP(J)CFq Tq; OtKOV%UKýq KCLI XOXMKý; E40uoiCL; OTa 
ftpta i(ov eXIT" I 
061 'vrin SMETICL TOI) '80,01 81UTIKOI altOSi: iXOTIKCEV LVOEPýLOI OnaSOI Tq; CLICpaja; CtUTA; CKSOA; TOU IC; XalltlcO'6 Tuaw6p, 
71OU TOU; KdVtt CrýJACPCI VCt KpaUyd4O'UV a7[6 CLYCLVdKTqGn. OO)TOypa(p(E; PE KCL%UjLtttVC; '(UVCLIKE; Sinka cre 
KOgVOI)VI(TnKd OUV(MIACLTa tKaVCtV TOV Mlo6 CKEIVO TTIV C1196VIGA TOU; CTTCt SUnIC4 gaCt Enjitp(O"; PC )X46VTC; 71OU 
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was accompanied by photos of Mujahideen 'guerrillas' posing for Western magazines 
and newspapers, such as 'Now', VExpress', 'Stem' and Te Point' and being 
represented as brave resistance fighters against the Soviet 'totalitarianism' (Ios tis 
Kiriakis, 2001). Muslim countries were therefore seen as victims of an exploitative U. S. 
foreign policy. "Not only are they not world terrorists, but the nations of Islamic 
countries are victims, that is, the victims of American fundamentalism, whose power in 
all its forms, whether it is military, strategic or economic power, is the greatest source of 
terrorism on EartlP (Pilger, 2001: N07). 162 Orientalism and Edward Said were often 
cited and it was repeatedly pointed out that the. image of Islam and the Arabic world is a 
constructed one that caters to western expansionary strategies. "The image of the Arabic 
world that the western civilization has available and puts in practice whenever the 
military needs call for it, is a racist ideology that in the 190' century, during colonialism, 
was shaped into an academic field ... and is called 
Orientalism" (Terzakis, 
Eleutherotipia, 200 1). 163 Furthermore, the representation called for equality in the 
treatment of others, who should neither be treated as enemies or immature adolescents. 
"The so-called 'multiculturalism' presupposes tolerance towards the others, as valid and 
equal actors, and not as inferior and in need of protection adolescents, or even worse, as 
enemies who need to be destroyed" (Tsalikoglou, 2001: N06). 164 
Even though one of the main themes in the Greek press discourse was the rejection of 
Orientalist ideology and the need for the treatment of Muslims and Muslim countries as 
equal actors, this discourse often adopted the ideology that it overtly rejected. As has 
already been delineated, Muslim countries were depicted as victims of American, and to 
a lesser extent western, imperialism and were deprived of any sort of agency. Especially 
during the war in Afghanistan, descriptions of Afghans and their daily lives were 
StaTk(owtv cuOapcr(oq Tqv crvT(ppTloA Touq CFE 1006 curketpa (occruyVovtcrpob>) Tq; Tuvallcelct; CVSI)I'a(; Iaq GIO 
A(pyavtaTdv". 
1624tOt Xaot -rcov icykailtK6)v X(opd)v 6Xt P6VO 8CV E(Vat Ot TPOIIOKP&TC; TOU Ocrpov, OJA anouko& Ta NpaT4 TOU 
Sq%a54 TCL NpaTa Tou appmawcot yowaliewaXtagob, q Nvapl Tou onolou, as 6kc; TK popTt; TO-U, mpanamicý, 
crTpaTqytKA icat owovogwý, civat n MaUTEpil xqyArpopoicpaTia; M DI". 16344 H ctic6va TOU CLPCEPLK06 K6crpov nou o BuTtK6q 7roXtTtaV6q fXct cFe t0vtRq Staftnoqut ical KtvqTo7totEi 6noic ot 
crTpaTqytKtq Tou aVdTKE; TO cmatTobv, civat ME PaTC; =K6 ISEOMnRCL 7rOU CrrO 8tKaTo tvato atd)vct -Mv KaPS16 Tou 
a7tOtKIOKPCLTIKOb CUMPýýt=; - 8LCLgOp(pd)OTjKC GE CLWSýpctTK6 KMSo ... K(It 
fXct To 6vogct Tou optmaktalLoV. 
164 "H lrcp(ynplq Vno), u7ToXtTtcrgtK6TqTCD) 7Epoij7roOtTct Tqv a7roBoA Tou Mou, co; tyKupou Kat taftpu cruvopt%IqT4, 
6XI 00q KaT6)TEPO'Uu7t6 "SEPViCL aVA), t]COU, A, CEK6p Xcip6TEpa, co; wO 8((o4q q0poV. 
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frequently essentialized and idealized (see Spurr 1993) to the extent that they lost their 
agency and were transformed into stereotypes. Even though such descriptions of Afghan 
daily life mainly aimed at widening the difference between 'them, the kind, poor and 
innocent Afghans' and 'them, the evil, capitalist empire', it also ended up estranging and 
isolating Afghans by merely presenting them as victims. Hall points out that stereotyping 
"reduces, essentializes, naturalizes and fixes differences" (Hall, 1997: 258). 
Unlike the British press, the Greek newspapers didn't publish many pictures of the 
Taliban or the Northern Alliance. In contrast, there were many photos of refugees and 
the daily lives of Afghans. For example, a picture published in November showed an 
elderly Afghan carrying wood on his shoulders (Appendix B, Figure 10). The text 
following the photo read: "The old man in the photo- a figure which could have been 
derived straight from the Bible- is one amongst thousands of unlucky people who didn't 
manage to desert Kabul because he was short of money. He thus wandered around the 
streets - these deserted streets of the capital city, gathered as much wood as he could, 
loaded the wood on his shoulders and made his way back home. Alone and deserted. 
That is how history is written; through the tired gaze of a human being whose life has 
always been a burden, and who now, in his final years, sees even those little things that 
were still his, turn into dust". 165 Another picture (Appendix B, Figure 11) showed an 
Afghan lying on the dry ground of Afghanistan looking at the sky with his hand pointing 
towards the horizon. A cage with a canary lay next to him. The photo was very artistic 
and was followed by the following caption: "Despite the mayhem of the war, there is 
always space for some tenderness. Mustafa, the commander of an outpost in Rabat, 
watches the action of the American B-52 in the company of a- canary". 166 The text 
following the caption added: "The reality may be different. It could be that the Afghan 
warrior has the canary with him in fear of the deadly chemical gases. Nevertheless, we 
163 o YtpovTa; Til; g(OTO7pag(aý (gop(pý nou Oa j=POýGE VCL tßTalVE KCtTEUOF, (aV ct7r6 rl BißXo) Eivat CLI[6 WO; 
Cl(aTOVT65£; Xt11ä8£; äTUXOUý nOU 8£V gn6p£Gav va cyKaTcO£iqouv iMv Kaktiroe4 ytct-ri 8ev Toi); tgTctvav TCL XPAIICLTCL 
yta va qýyouv. «DavTctcrOetTe: va Otcopticrat TUXEP6TEPO; cäv £(gut CLväpcaa OTOU; i[p609uy£; 1). rItpe x0tR6V touý 
8P6P0-0;, -rou; tpnllou5 8P6kLO-og Tq; npüoTdo-Ocrct;, päýEVE 6cra ýöla lixopoegt, Tct opTüwt MV RMTI tou ical 
KivllaE yta'ro (MITL M6vo; icat tplgo;. Eun ypägcTat 11 ICTOP(a. Mtcra OTO lcoupaupbo ßlIppa £v6; CEVOP6)'ROU'90u 
aweia, n6cra ßäpq va Glimas crT9 v0A Tou'. icat Td)pa, crra ýcmaTä Tolo XP6vta, 0 ßlinet Kat ta euxt(na CLIC6jia icoi) 
Tov an61ittvav va YivovTat PilkLa8t6". 
166 4411a ä r9V aVräpa rol) 7iolký101), 7C6 CLUnäp , (opo L li r gep6, rnr ,F p VT X£ x; Tto 19 pl) a 
86) mouaTagd, 8totq'A; cv6; 
91U1aIC(OU OTO P%L7räT, 7gCtpCLKC)k01U0F1 TI 8p&an to)v ciliFpucavi1c6)v B-52 cruvTpogtä". 
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do prefer the first version. It is more hopeful and humane, more optimistic and probably 
more real as well". 167 Both pictures were followed by text written in a more poetic and 
lyrical language than is usually used in newspapers. The first described the old Afghan 
as a saintly figure, since he was seen as a Biblic figure, and the second presupposed that 
the commander in Rabat had the canary with him to keep him company. In both pictures, 
the Afghans were idealized and interpellated as particular kind of objects, as innocent, 
saintly-like victims exploited by 'the Americans'. 
Moreover, this discourse explicitly rejected Orientalist ideology, but at the same time its 
references to the "west" or to the "western civilization" constructed and reinforced the 
same dichotomies that it criticized. Thus, this discourse falls into the category of what 
some have termed Occidentalism. Orientalism is a style of thought "based upon 
ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and 'the 
Occident"' (Said, 1995: 2); the orient and the occident are treated as binary opposites, 
with the orient seen as the negative term in the pair. Occidentalism (Buruma and 
Margalit, 2004, Carrier, 2003) is a mirror image of Orientalism with the occident 
acquiring the negative connotations in the pair of opposites. Therefore, Occidentalism 
produces essentialist representations of "the West" which is usually seen as responsible 
for the majority of world ills. 
In the Greek press discourse, the U. S. and the west were positioned in a relationship of 
identity and similarity as subjects favouring an ideology of clash; it was also pointed out 
that the problem should not be defined in terms of a clash of civilizations or cultures, but 
as the result of U. S. or western induced feelings of despair and injustice. In the press 
discourse the constructions of Islam as a monolithic entity were deconstructed and 
criticized. However, at the same time, the construction of the West was that of a 
monolithic entity accountable for the oppression of the rest of the world. Thus, in this 
discourse the conflict was still defined in terms of a clash, only this time between the 
167 $611 7cpaylianic6q; 6p); popci va IXet icat ptav &XXTI avdTvo)"l Mnopel o Ayyav6; no)XgIGTý; va tXEt 11CLU TO'u 
, ro icavapfvt yta Tov TOO Tow aepiwvl Tow Xqgticd)v aeplo)vE(vat gta nto EXxt8oq6pc4 xto avOpd)invq, 7w aunMotTj 
Rand ... (m); icat mo aXqOtvý" I 
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imperialist, capitalist "western civilizati&' and the rest of the world (see also Mersen, 
2002: 12). 
The role of Greece 
Such negative representations of the "west" were not uniform in the Greek press 
discourse. The newspapers' representation of the role of Greece in the international arena 
since September II is striking, considering the dominant and barely questioned anti-U. S. 
and anti-Western feelings, articulated in all three newspapers. In all the articles 
preoccupied with the role that Greece was meant to play after September 11, as well as its 
position in the international arena, a completely different discourse appeared, one 
resembling the British press discourse. The West acquired primarily positive 
connotations and Greece was positioned as a Western state and an American ally. The 
dominant representation undoubtedly was that Greece needed to side with the U. S. and 
"the West", as "an inseparable member of the family of the free, western democracies" 
('Time for responsibility', 200 1). 168 
Such a representation doesn't seem to blend in well with the ongoing anti-war and anti- 
Western or anti-American argument that was evident throughout the Greek press 
discourse. There seems to be discrepancy between, on the one hand, the depiction of 
Western values on their own, and, on the other hand, their depiction in relation to Greece. 
All articles concerning the role of Greece in the post September II international arena 
were clearly in favour of Greece acting as a dynamic member of the Western alliance. 
Even though the articles and the columns dedicated to the role of Greece in the so called 
War on Terror were far fewer than the ones elaborating on the role of the U. S. and the 
West as well as the ills of an attack in Afghanistan, the fact that there was such 
remarkable shift in the discourse once Greece was implicated is intriguing. "Whether we 
like it or not, we are not the far West of the East, but the Far East of the West, where we 
168 "Avan6oxacrro ptXo; rqq OtKoytvcta;, ro)v EXEvOlp(ov, SuTtK6)v S%LoKpandw". 
146 
belong" (Moronis, 2001c). 169 Similarly, "Greece is clearly a member of the Western 
world, and has by definition sided with the West in this conflict" (Galatsiatos, 2001c: 
N06). 170 "Greece has changed ... If 20 years ago we simply had to understand that we 
belonged to the West, now we have to realize that we are strong members of a powerful 
alliance; and even if we don't believe it, the other countries do actually believe it" 
(Voulgaris, 2001: R08). 17 1 There appeared to be a consistent attempt to assert a Western 
identity as the primary Greek identity, and an urge to link Greece with the West with 
articles elaborating on "why we belong to the West' ' (Karkagiannis, 200 lb). 172 
According to this discourse, Greece was positioned as a subject in line with Western and 
E. U. post-September II policies. In fact, the west and the E. U. were positioned in a 
relationship of similarity. "As far as the current events are concerned, Greece doesn't 
need its own policy: it should adopt and implement the E. U. policy" (loakeimidis, 
2001b). 173 In a way, such a representation is unsurprising, considering the position of 
Greece as a small and essentially powerless country in the international system. 
Therefore, as Michas observes, feelings of anti-Americanism or anti-westernization "go 
hand in hand with a pragmatic attitude on the part of the majority of the Greek population 
toward Greece's membership in NATO and its relations with the U. S. Thus, as many 
opinion polls have shown, the majority of the Greek population combines a critical 
attitude toward the United States and its policies with an acquiescence to the Greek 
government's formal support for those policies" (Michas, online). It could be argued that 
the press discourse followed a similar pattern, driven, on the one hand, by anti-American 
and anti-Western sentiments and, on the other, by a 'realistic' and 'down to Earth' 
consideration of the repercussions of non-compliance with its allies. 
169 "Moutm Bev OWI)IIE, To xm6outm 8ev To wto-rdouge, Sev e(pacne il Maq Tqq AvaTokýq, aw 0 ffdpoq TlIq 
Ma%, 6nou icatavtcoupe. 170 "H EWSa dvat pla X6)pa Tou Aumd dagou icat tXci TonoOeT90d cre auA Tq 6YKPOUOIJ Ek OPICF90U". 171 "ExEt aW4et lKat Tj EWSa ... Av npiv cxx6 clicom exT6 Xp6vta tgptne Va EGo)TCpLjC6(jOj)jtC VVXOXOYIKdL 6n 
uAicape M Abaq, Td)pa nptnct va XowtVougi: 6n avlwurv tic rovc toXvpo6q. Kt av Sev '10 xto-ri: 60via rglq- TO 
alawom Ot'ant4o)"'. 
172 TUXTI CEV41COUJIE M Mgq". 
173 'Te 6. Tt a(popd Ta TPtXovTa yeyov6Ta, Tj EWSct 8ev XpetdýETat BtKA Tqq lto%tnKA: (; UVSICXpopyd)VEI KCEt E(PaPýOýEt 
Tjv noktTtKA Tqq Eup(oxaTkAq7Evo)aqý". 
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Thus, Greece is a small country, it was claimed, which should not isolate itself, so as not 
to be left alone and unsupported in today's dangerous international environment. 
"Greece, as a member of the European Union, as well as a country with geographical and 
other particularities, reacted in the right way and bearing in mind its position in the 
international and regional system, as well as the protection of the values it holds. Of 
course, there inevitably were those voices, which would have wanted, once more, to lead 
the country to isolationism, they would have wanted Greece to become a dangerously 
queer and old fashioned presence in Europe and in the civilized world in general" 
(Ioakimidis, 2001c: N06). 174 For strategic reasons, it would thus be damaging to create 
more enemies or lose U. S. support. "Chomsky, the Islamists, and Mohammed Omar 
don't have open fronts in Cyprus, Skopia (FYROM), and Albania and neither do they 
always plead for economic aid from the European Union. The only way of salvation for 
Greeks is maybe the organization of a new protest march - this time against shame and 
stupidity!! " (Andrianopoulos, 2001: N23). 175 Protests and dissent would thus lead to 
instability and volatility, which would invalidate Greece. "For a country like Greece, 
which has invested everything for its political and economic stability in today's status 
quo, the issue of which camp it belongs to is out of question ... No matter 
how many 
marches there are out of the American Embassy" (Kapsis, 2001: N06). 171 "'Powerful 
Greece' is deeply dependent and the consequences of any diversion in matters of 
international politics would be disastrous" (Kazakos, 2001). 177 Therefore, "we Greeks 
have to realize that we are in the same boat as the others. Our short-term as well as long 
terrn interests are tied to the ones of the West. We should think and act accordingly" 
174 t; H EWSa, w; giko; q; EvpomaYKý; Tv(j)cMq, aW Kai u); Xd)pa ge OPICY91vc; YEMYPaylld; Kai dLkg 
t8talTf: p6njTcq, CEVTLSP(XCFE ERICTI; CF(Omd Kat ge yvd)ltova qv cýwMpftqoij Tow crup(pEp6vTo)v q;, q Olaq q; Olo 
bt&Ovt; Kai xcpupEpetaO 6aqga, aW xat TqV npocrraula Tow a4t&v Tic, onolt; npcc; pdEL Bcpa*, X)RAp4av Kai 
ndkt ot uvan&pcurre; ycovt; nou Oa AOcXav, pict ax6jrq (popd, va oSqyAaouv Tq xd)pa aqv axop6vom 0); gla. 
E7nK(V8UVa ypaytKA 7rapouala o-qv Evp6M Kai cTov 7toXtTtugtvo K6(yVo ycvtK6Tcpa" 
175 4, o Ta6poxt, ot taXaptud; Ki o MoXdpm OýL6p Bev tXouv avotXT& liftma aw Klunp=6, CFTO I: KOIIICLV6s OTO 
A4CLVtK6 06TE Kat ýqTOýV allVtXEI(I OtKOVORIKi; cvtaXGcrFtq aiO Tqv Evpwital(KA Tmall. M6vq 086; owirqpla; yta ToU; 
Extqpovc; TUlqv8; civat low; il opydv(j)q Ilia; via; nopda; Stappwplaq auA Tq q)opd Evav-dov Tq; vTP07[Aq 'cat 
TlJC OkKE(a;! I" 
176'-rta pta x6pa ftco; il EWSa, nou tXct EnevUGM T(X n&VTCL 71a TqV ROXMUC4 Kat TqV OIKOVOJIIKý Til; (3, TcLOEp6TqTcx 
cro cnllmptv6 wnftou; Kooo, To cpd)Tqpct (YE NOW CFTPCLT67EESO CLAM OOTE KaV TfOCULL-1009; 710PCiE; Kat aV YIVOUV 
GTqV CXPCPLXaVtKA npFGPCfQl" 
177 "It moXupý EX)ASa>> ElVal PQOtd E4apTqgtvTl Kai Ot OMMIC; OnOladý=Tg axUXIGý; Tq; OC ý11Týýtm BtEOVOý)q 
ROXMKý; BEV Oa ATav ageXqTftý' 
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178 (Iordanoglou, 2001: R08). To make matters worse, "we are the political and cultural 
borders of the free, democratic and advanced world, and we will be lose first, if this 
world is defeated" (Malouhos, 200 1). 179 
What is fascinating, nevertheless, is the way that the argument unfolds. One would 
anticipate that the columnists would push for Greece to maintain a non-aligned stance 
after the events. Another "rational" option, following from the ongoing argument 
concerning September II would be for the journalists to encourage commitment towards 
the E. U., since Greece is undeniably a small country that cannot stand on its own and 
needs to abide by certain rules and act as a member of an alliance. Nonetheless, this 
argument was only part of a wider discourse which deified the West and linked Greece 
with it, while at the same time silencing any form of criticism. What was stressed was 
the superiority of the West and the Western identity of the Greek nation, whose culture, 
history and development called for an endorsement of 'Western views' and the ostracism 
of any 'backward, Ottoman relics'. 
Thus, this discourse on "the west" differed substantially from the one in which the west 
was constituted as an unlawful, imperialist actor. Not only was Greece's relationship to 
the West construed as that of an obligatory alliance for political reasons, but there was a 
clear positioning of Greece in a relationship of identity to "the West", which was 
associated with the ancient Greek heritage. "Western civilization is the one which is 
deeply rooted in Greece. Since colonialism and the civilization of the barbarians, since 
Alexander the Great and all the way to the establishment of democracy and rationalisrw' 
(Moronis, 2001c). 180 Similarly, "the great and for many unexpected tragedy that hit the 
U. S-Aastquesdary, 'algo hit-the Western world, the Western way of life and the Western 
civilization in its entirety, which owes a lot to the ancient Greek thought" (Loverdos, 
179 6'0, n icat va y(vet 6ýtw;, cVc(; ot'E)IllvC; RptREI Va CTUVEt6qTonOtAoO'UVe no); ElVa(Tre (3'To (StO Kap6pl VC TOI); 
Mov;. Ta dpcoa Kat paicpoXp6via crupytpovTd pa; Elvat cruvu(pctcrptva pe ctuTdL Tqq Mýq. npftEt va V60ou" va 
cKm6pacrte avdkoya". 179 6s c(p(x(; Tc ro nolmO Kat noktucmd a6vOpO TOU 9460EPOU, SnPOKPaTtKOO Kat av&7myptVOU K60POI), NOU, C(V 
lTqOCL CIA OCE IlTrl0dýW WP&TOL ECTO) KI CIV (CYW; BEV TO tXOU[tF, KCLTaMpee'. 
106, 0 6'OSuTtK6; 7roXtncqt6; 6ýuw; civat ctvT6q nou tXct Tt; plýc; rou anlv EWSa. An6 TqV anOlKlOKpaT(a Kat TOV 
EKnOktTtcytL6 TO)v PUPP&NOV, Qn6 Tov Mtya AXL408PO PtVt rl SnPOKpaTla icat rov opOo%oytcqt6, nou nel%taulcd 
Moupe va cmoppinTauge'. 
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2001). 181 The "Western civilization" was constituted as superior, and no negative 
connotations were attached to it; moreover, this civilization seemingly stemmed from the 
Great ancient Greek civilization, which most Greeks strongly identify with, even though 
there doesn't seem to be much in common between modem Greece and the Greece of 
that era. As Chrysoloras points out (2004: 7-18), the national imaginary which has 
attained a hegemonic position in Greek society since independence in 1821 has been 
structured around a series of nodal propositions, a primary one being that there is a 
unified Greek history of a unified Greek nation, which starts from the pre-Homeric era, 
through to Classical Ancient Greece, the Hellenistic period, the Byzantium, and 
extending up to modem Greece. 
That there is little common ground between modem and ancient Greece does not 
diminish the importance of this representation, which constructs the West as a 
continuation of ancient Greek thought and thus positions Greece in a relation of identity, 
or at least in a relation of similarity and complementarity to the West. In fact, such 
representations are not new. As Huliaras and Tsardanidis point out, historical and 
cultural arguments, such as the ancient Greek legacy, seemed always to justify any 
territorial, identity or existence claims since the Independence in the early nineteenth 
century. Even when they applied to join the E. U. in 1974 the main arguments employed 
were historical rather than geographical. "According to the relevant official discourse, 
Greece was European not because of its geographical location, but because it was 'the 
birthplace of European civilization"' (Huliaras and Tsardanidis, 2004: 19). 
This construction of a western-Greek identity and the interpellation of Greeks as 
primarily western was facilitated by depictions of the western model as a superior one. 
"We belong in the West, not because it is a paradise, but because it is the most free 
battleground, where social clashes and their dynamic were never banned either through 
law or due to a holy command" (Karkagiannis, 200 1 b). 182 Besides, "we are on the side of 
181 "llgcydkq icat al[pOcyS6qTq yta noU6q TpaycoSla nou LnXnýc Tiq HrIA Tqv ncpaagtvq Tp(rq L*4 crrO 
dvOX6 
Tou Tov SUTIIC6 Ic6ago, Tov 8I)TUC6 Tp6no ý(Oýq icat Tov 8=0 noXtTtcrp6, nou o(peDzi noW cnov cEPXatOdITIMý 
oxtvTf'. 
182 "AAKovýtz M M", 6Xt TtaTf clvat n(xpdSFtGO5 QW YtaT( E(Val TO MO &%dOEPO USIO PdXqq, 6nOl) Ot ICOtVCOV"Ct; 
OUTKP016CFEtq I(CLI Tj &I)V%UKý TOU; Bev KaTOPTýOqKaV CEIC6ýj ... 
8td v6pu ý KaT6inv OCTKýq EVTOXýý'- 
ISO- 
our own people, those who will put an end to the spreading of madness. We may not 
always agree with our allies. We are nevertheless always tied to our western cultural 
democratic tradition, precisely because we defend our right to have a different view and 
to criticize all the mistakes of our side" (Papadimitriou, 2001b). 183 Finally, this western 
liberal model was juxtaposed to what was seen as an eastern fundamentalist one. "The 
solution is the enrichment and the expansion of the model of representative democracy, 
individual freedoms and multiculturalism. This model, whether we like it or not, is not 
defended and articulated by the Eastern fundamentalists, but by the Western 
democracies... " (Mitsos, 2001: N24). 184 For this reason, "it would be ethically 
inconceivable for Greece to pursue any middle way" (Alevizatos, 2001: N07). 185 
Furthermore, complete adherence to Western values was articulated as being in the 
interests of Greece, since not only were those values superior, but they had only benefited 
Greece in the past. "Thanks; to this [western model] we Greeks enjoy an unprecedented 
level of welfare ... we are by far the richest country in the Balkans. Who could have 
imagined what would have happened if Greece had adhered to another model ... we 
would have probably collapsed economically and socially, like other countries around us 
... This observation may displease those who safely accuse the western way of life ... 
because they enjoy all its privileges ... because they have the right to think and speak 
freely" (Kiriakatikes Voles, 200 1). 186 Elsewhere, "if we look at our position in the 
modem world and if we compare our country to our neighbouring ones, we can clearly 
see that we definitely are not the victims of Western imperialism ... isolationism ... 
183 44 E(gaarr. ým Tov; -Sucoý; pa; avOpd)nou;, ciCE(VoUq ROU Oa qtxoS(cro-OV -rqV E4tLg)aaq "; TpOA;. MROPEI Va P11 
47011TWVOýpg U6VTOTC JIPS 101); Mpdplq pCl;. rlapagtvouýtc 6pio; dppilicTa Bctttvot " Tq bunKA NO%tn(; PtKA ýlq 
7rapdSocM 8qpOKPaTiCE;, CtKptpk Tical unEpa(Mt4611CLCFTE TO &KCLICDýd ýLa; VCI tXou" 8taqopMKý alroln, va aCrKO13" 
KPtTLKA Tta Ta ; AOq -Kai Eivat noW- Tq; &KA; p; nkvupdý'. 184 t4 11 %6aq ... Va EgnIouncral Kat va citacTa0d To jtovTW Tq; MrMPOCF6)XCUTIKý; S%lOKPaTfa;, TOW CETOILtKd)V 
EXCU0Cpt6V Kai Tqq 7E0XU-7(O%tTtGplK6TqTa;. Kt OLuT6 To pvTtXo, Ka)* A KaKd);, SEV TO KTIP6(Y(YO'UV Ot 
TovTctpmcLXto-rtq Tq; Avmro%ý;, all(t ot AqpoKpctr(z; Tq; Aban; ". 185 460a ATav TlOtKd a8tav6qTo il MdSa va cnt864ct qv 6nota ptaq o56". 186 "Xdpt; crauT6 Elid; ot 'Ealve; axoXappbovtte tva apanoynt; cnbt&So cuillaptaq ... Ical c(paTe VaKpdv q 
nXoum6, rcpTj X(bpa Twv BaXicavicov ... 
not6; 0a popoýcrc va yavTacyTcl Tt Oa cruvtpatve ctv 11 EWScl EIXF- 
71POCYX(J)PA(Ygt 08 6)-XO ýLOVTLXO ... TO ItOav6Tcpo elvat 6Tt OCt E(Xag& METTapebat OtKOVOjlIKd KCEI KOw(. )vtKdt, 
6nan 6Xz; 
ot Mtq Xd)pE; yýpw pa; ... 
Dmoq I AXPavlý, il PovItavla, q BouXyctpia, il rioumaxapla. ... 
11 anOllavan clulrý 
1171OPEI Va SUMPECTTEI KdXOtOl)q ROU EK TOA) CLCYq)CLý, Ob; pop6v va KaTqyopd)v Tov 81unic6 Tp6no ý(oAq 
rtaTi'anOzýtPbouv 6Xara 7rpov6giarou... rtaTf 'fXOVV TTI SuvaT6qTa va CFKL7[TOVTat Kai VCL PIXO& FItUOCPCL"- 
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doesn't serve our national interests" (Moronis, 2001 C). 187 The presupposition that Greece 
would have been much worse off had it not sided with the Western, U. S. -led bloc after 
the second world war added to this urgency to go along with the E. U. and the U. S., 
which, according to this discourse, was not only superior but had always helped "us" 
prosper and advance. 
Thus, it becomes evident that there were two different discourses concerning the West, 
one that dominated the bulk of the articles, whereby western values are corrupt and 
essentially inferior, based on capitalist and individualist pursuits, and one that always 
appeared once the role of Greece was debated. In this second discourse, there seemed to 
be no doubts as to the righteousness and supremacy of the western values and the western 
democratic tradition. Like in the British press, the 'western democracies' and the 
'eastern fundamentalists' were constructed as binary opposites. A chain of equivalences 
was created between the terms civilized, democratic, liberal, cultural and western on the 
one hand, and authoritarian, eastern, fundamentalist on the other. Moreover, being 
civilized and democratic was equated to being liberal, and being liberal was equated to 
being western. In contrast, being uncivilized was equated to being from the East, and 
being eastern was to be fundamentalist and illiberal. Thus, an antagonistic frontier was 
created that divided "us, the western democracies" and "them, the eastern 
fundamentalists" 
Therefore, there was an effort to construct a Western-Greek identity and denounce other 
identities, for example, a Greek-Balkan identity or a South-European-Greek identity, or 
an Orthodox Greek identity; moreover, any and every criticism towards the West was 
classified as anti-Americanism or anti-Western. Specifically, it was implied or even 
clearly stated that any condemnation of U. S. and generally Western actions meant a 
denunciation of the West and its way of life. "It appears that it is virtually impossible to 
calculate the degree of possible stupidity. It was only in Kabul, in Jakarta and in Athens 
that protest marches were organized against the American embassies ... the stamp of 
117 "Kat IL6vov il c; nlltptA paq Olaq (nov Oago icat q cr6yKptaq "; Xd)pa; ga; tic TV, YEtTOVId; p;, bc(Xvo-ov ciaTd); 
6Tt g6vo NpaTQ TOU SUTMOý) týLnEptCLXtGjLOb BEV FtýLaCrJEO anottowncyp6; 6p); ... 
WTE ploata XpOdyEt Ta EOVIK& 
pa; crupytpowa". 
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stupidity marks a society which aspires at being included in the cultured communities and 
to possess the humanistic heritage of a bright ancient tradition" (Andrianopoulos, 2001: 
N23). 188 "Our anti-Western feelings have very deep roots in history, since they stem 
from the historical backwardness of our area compared to the West. Emotionally we still 
belong in the Ottoman Empire and we can actually see this in our everyday lives both in 
theory and practice" (Karkagiannis, 2001c). 189 "How could we hate the American more 
than the Turk"? (Mitsos, 2001: N24). 190 "Our passion with intrigues and dark theory 
where the U. S. and the CIA are to blame for everything should finally finish ... It is 
finally time to decide and practically prove whether we belong in the West or not" (Elis, 
2001). 191 There were thus two options available; compliance with the Western allies or 
withdrawal from the Western "family". Assertion or prioritization of any other identity 
equalled denial of the European or Western Greek identity. 
Considering all those anti-U. S. or anti-Western sentiments which were manifest in the 
Greek press discourse after September 11, this effort to assert a specific Western identity 
at the expense of other identities when it came to determining the role of Greece after 
September II seems contradictory to the general press discourse, which represented 
"Western crusaders" and "American terrorists" as world ills. However, it has already 
been pointed out that Greece never sided with either "the west" or "the resf'; it refused to 
take sides in this "us" versus "them" dichotomization even when it was fiercely 
condemning the U. S. Even though the Greek press discourse disapproved of what it 
perceived as being U. S. and western imperialism and greed and even though it 
sympathised with the poor victims of this imperialist drive, it at no point took sides. 
Therefore, the sudden reversal towards the "western camp" is not entirely antithetical to 
188 «7£Xticä Eivat aUvaTov va 1)710ýoylott iccrvci; ptxpt iloý ilnopci va 90ägEt n ßlaicFia. AX6 VIV vTAkto OMK). lipil 
P6vov mv Kalme), cTIv TgaicäpTa Kai Mv AOAva 8topyavM1icav 7roptf£; 8taliapTup(a; cvavT(ov Tüav irpeaßei(üv 
Tü)v HflA ... -ii UYPCtl(8a 111; CLn8ia; OTIýtü8£e61 ILUOV gtCL KOIVCOV(a nOU OWt VCL X£TFTat'KO1tT1C4V1 Kal Va 
ÖtEKÖIKEI 
TIV. (XVOPO)Itt(yTtA KXIPOvokttä lila; Iall7rPA; (lpxaict; Ir(Xpä500TK'. 
la *o avn81)TtKt(F116; LXEI noxe nio ß(leit; pgrr, MV ICTopia, Ka04 ILIJyäýet CL7Z6 lmv taT0P1A KctouOTtplon 95 
lrEPIOA; Pu; kvavTt Tq; MGIN. 1: 1)vatcolgaTtK6 «AKoi)lie aK6iiii ... Mv 00o)PcLviKA 
Al)TOKPUTOptu lKul TO 
8ta7rICFT6)Vol)Ilt KotoTIllcptvä crnj Oto)pia icat TIV irpäýn". 190"Nci ptmells ILUOV ICFPlac; 6Tepo Tov «Agpticävo» an6 irov 'ToepKo... 191 "TO 7rä00; PE Tl; iVtptyKE; Kat tt; CFKOTEtVt; OE(üpig; 61CC)U 7t«ro) CL7r6 Ta lr&VT(I KpýßoVTat Ot linA Kat 11 CIA, xptnct 
ElrITLXC'U; Va TÜ£td)(; EL Mg 'MV LUKaW«l TOI) TPOIIOKPCLTtKOÜ XTUNýPCLTD; EiVal (Opa Va a7[Oq)Ct(; 1(; 01)99 Kat Va 
c(7r08egol)ge t147rpctxTct, cäv EilictoTe PE rl Aeug A 6xi". 
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the general discourse. It can be put down to the fact that the commentators were 
convinced that Greece would have to take sides in this conflict if it was to survive and 
prosper. It can also partly be explained by, the existence of a confused Greek identity, a 
Hellenic-Christian identity which drafted Western, liberal political institutions onto the 
traditional Greek heritage, which as Diamandouros asserts, resulted in "the emergence of 
powerful and often sharply conflicting cultural traditions, embedded in the novel 
(Western) and antecedent (Byzantine-Ofioman) elements of the Greek cultural 
experience, which, over time, reproduced themselves through ongoing and overlapping 
processes of interaction, accretion, assimilation and adaptation" (Diamandouros cited in 
Fokas, 2002: 8). 
154 
Conclusion - The British versus the Greek press discourse 
In this concluding section, the discourses of the British and Greek press are compared. 
Due to the homogeneity and striking similarities in the press discourse of each country, 
this comparison does not aim at delineating differences amongst newspapers of each 
country. Thus, this section primarily provides a comparison of the discourses of the 
British and Greek press, which share many differences as well as similarities. I initially 
compare representations of the September II events and then move on to a comparison of 
discourses on terrorism, Islam, the U. S. and the West. I finally look at the proposed roles 
of the U. K. and Greece in the "post-September II era" as represented in the British and 
Greek press. 
Representations of the September 11 events 
The September II events and the ensuing war in Afghanistan received extensive 
coverage in both the British and Greek press. While the level of coverage of the events 
was equally high, the differences in the representations were striking. 
Specifically, in the British press the events were represented as an attack on all of "Us", 
with this "us" referring often to the U. K. and the U. S., but also to "the wesf' and "the 
world" in its entirety. Thus, the events were constructed as an attack on "our civilized 
values" which "need to be defended". Moreover, the metaphor of war, which was often 
employed in the British press, accentuated the seriousness of the threat, as well as the 
need for immediate and relentless response. In contrast, the Greek press discourse 
constituted the events merely as an attack on the U. S. Greece was not positioned in a 
relationship of similarity or identity to the U. S., since the attacks were seen as afflicting 
only the U. S. The lack of shifters such as "we" or "us" also enabled this disassociation of 
the events from "us". 
155 
Another difference between the British and Greek press discourse was the construction of 
the events as completely unexpected in the British press discourse, and a long awaited, 
logical consequence of past U. S. imperial ventures in the Greek press discourse. 
Metaphors of "hubris" and "nemesis" in the Greek press and allusions to former empires, 
which had been punished for their arrogance, de-victimized the U. S., which was 
construed as an aggressor rather than a victim of unexpected, nihilistic attacks. Such a 
de-victimization was further achieved through representations of the attacks as a last 
resort and a cry of despair of the dispossessed and the use of predicates such as 
"arrogant" and "merciless" to describe the U. S. 
As a result of all the above these two discourses constituted a contrasting picture of the 
September II events. The first discourse construed the events as a major threat to "Us" 
and as a result of unjustified, "evil" terrorist actions, which need to be drastically dealt 
with; the second discourse, constructed the events as an expected retribution of justice on 
the U. S. only, which was justified because of past U. S. actions. It is also important to 
point out that these two different discourses were enhanced by, but also facilitated, very 
different representations of the U. S. and the terrorists. 
Representations of the "terrorists" 
There clearly was a hegemonic and uniform discourse on the terrorists in the British 
press. Thus, the terrorists were constructed as irrational, "evil" madmen with no real 
motives or reasons to attack, driven by a malevolent and twisted vision of the world. 
Moreover, this discourse on terrorism dominated the British press with a large number of 
articles engaging in extensive analysis'of the "terrorist threat". Such representations of 
the terrorists, as has been seen, were also present in the Greek press, even though they 
were not at no point represented as posing a serious threat. Moreover, these 
representations were relatively "unpopulae' in comparison to the primary discourse on 
the terrorists as victims of the U. S. aggressors, which were in line with the previously 
analyzed hegemonic discourse on the September II events. Moreover, representations in 
the Greek press of the terrorists as "evil madmen", was not in opposition to 
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representations of the U. S. as aggressors and of the attacks as retribution of justice. An 
interesting comparison is the two different hegemonic discourses on terrorism in the press 
of the two countries, namely the September II terrorists and the U. S. terrorists. While 
the September II terrorists were constructed as irrational subjects, the U. S. terrorists 
were constituted as rational and very calculating ones. However, in both cases these two 
different types of terrorists were described as equally threatening, since they were equally 
malicious and bent on destruction, only for different reasons and using different tactics. 
Representations of Islam 
In both the British and the Greek press Islam as a religion was disassociated from 
terrorism. However, in the British press metaphors of beards and constructions of Islam 
as the binary opposite of modernity, as well as the binary positioning of Muslims as 
either moderate or radical, constituted Islam as a monolithic religion, which was the most 
appropriate candidate for terrorism. Moreover, such representations encouraged the so- 
called clash of civilizations that was renounced by positioning this "backward Islam" in 
opposition to "western, civilized modemity". The Greek press discourse on Islam was 
very different, since Muslims were constructed as innocent victims of western, 
expansionary policies. While such representations are different, they both result in 
constructions of Muslims as one-dimensional stereotypes, in the Greek case as victims 
rather than aggressors. Moreover, and similarly to the British press discourse, this 
discourse confirmed and established the clash of civilization that it renounced, by 
positioning "the West" as a negative subject in opposition to "the rest". 
Representations of the United States and the West 
There were two main discourses on the U. S. in the British press, one which represented 
the U. S. as a positive and superior subject, as well as the finest example of a liberal 
democratic country, and one in which it was seen as a negative force. However, it should 
be pointed out that the second discourse was not as dominant as the first one and did not 
affect the overall post-September II discourse. In contrast, the hegemonic and sole 
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discourse in the Greek press was of the U. S. as an "evil, terrorist nation" and as a 
malevolent empire. It is quite interesting to compare the two negative discourses of the 
U. S., since even though they both represent the U. S. in a negative light, they still are 
quite different. Specifically, in the British press discourse the U. S. was constructed as a 
unilateral, self-serving power, intent on solving some of its issues by violent means rather 
than dialogue. In the Greek press, the criticisms of the U. S. were much fiercer. Not only 
was the U. S. constituted as an unlawful, terrorist nation, but it was also positioned in 
relationship of similarity to former empires, and was seen as responsible for the majority 
of world ills. Thus, in this case, the U. S. was not only self-serving and unilateral, but 
also expansionary, utterly violent and very dangerous. Clearly the U. S. in the Greek 
press discourse was positioned in opposition to the world, in a similar way that the 
terrorists were positioned in opposition to the world in the British press discourse. Thus, 
in the Greek press discourse, the U. S. acquired a very similar position to the one that the 
terrorists had acquired in the British press. 
The British press discourse positioned the U. K. in a relation of identity to the west, which 
was represented as the beholder of superior values. Moreover, the U. K. was constituted 
as a primary actor of the "western community", who would be capable of and was 
entitled to assume the role of the leader in the "war on terrorism" alongside the U. S. The 
representations of the "west" were conflicting in the Greek press discourse. It was 
primarily positioned in a relationship of similarity to the U. S., with western elites 
described as exploiting entire nations and peoples. However, such representations were 
non-existent once the role of Greece in a post-September II era was analyzed. Even 
though only few articles referred to the role of Greece and its position in the world after 
September 11, in all those articles "the west" was disassociated from the U. S. and was 
positioned in a relationship of similarity and identity to Greece, as the beholder of a 
superior civilization. The ideal role that Greece was thus meant to play was alongside the 
superior and righteous "western family". This latter discourse is strikingly similar to the 
British press discourse on the west. Nevertheless, in the British press discourse the U. K. 
assumed the role of a westem leader, whereas in the Greek press discourse, Greece was 
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seen as a small country, in need of protection, whose best interests lie within the E. U. and 
the westem family. 
In sum then, the marginal or less dominant discourses in the press of each country shared 
more similarities with the dominant discourse of the other country. This was the case 
precisely because the British and Greek press discourses were for the most part very 
different. However, as has been shown, these differences created similar attitudes of 
closure. It would be interesting and useful to determine the extent to which these 
representations changed in the months leading to the Iraq war. This is the concern of the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 5: British and Greek Press 
Representations: October 2002-April 2003: The 
Iraq War 
On 2 October 2002, the U. S. Congress passed a Joint Resolution which authorized the 
President to use the U. S. armed forces in any way deemed necessary and appropriate 
(White House, 2002). A month later, the UN Security council (2002) unanimously 
approved a resolution on Iraq, forcing Saddam to comply with its disarmament 
obligations as had been set out in previous resolutions. The following months witnessed 
heated debates and diplomatic rifts. On 15 February more than 10 million people 
protested against the war in Iraq in over 600 cities worldwide. Moreover, the UN 
Security council rejected the 24 February 2003 resolution by the U. S., the U. K. and 
Spain, which called for military action against Iraq. This was followed by a unilateral 
invasion of Iraq, with the first U. S. bombs dropping on Baghdad on March 19. 
With the U. K., while the war in Afghanistan had, on the whole, been positively received 
by British public opinion and the British government, there was contention over the 
subsequent war in Iraq. Even though Tony Blair expressed support for the U. S. 
government and an unwavering conviction about the need for war to topple Saddam, the 
British public remained divided, as was evident in protest marches and widespread 
support for groups such as the "Stop the War Coalition". Moreover, the government 
itself was split, with Labour MPs openly expressing their opposition to a potential war in 
Iraq. This dissent was not only evident within the UX, but also all over Europe and 
even within the U. S. itself. The British press was equally divided; after the almost 
unanimous approval for a war in Afghanistan following the September II attacks, there 
was now a more critical and divided assessment of the war in Iraq. The discourse in Yhe 
Mirror and 7he Independent significantly differed from the discourse in The Times, and 
could be seen as oppositional at most points. While the majority of articles in Yhe Times 
endorsed the morality of the war, 7he Independent and the Mirror discourse represented 
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the war as immoral. However, the variation across the British press was not reflected 
within each newspaper. The hegemonic discourse in The Times was pro-war, anti-E. U. 
and pro-U. S., whereas the discourse in The Independent and The Mirror was, on the 
whole, anti-war, anti-Bush and even anti-U. S. 
The war in Iraq was also a major concern amongst scholars, politicians and the wider 
public in Greece. Greek citizens frequently marched in protest to the U. S. Embassy in 
Athens and the U. S. Consulate in Thessaloniki. On 14 February 2003 approximately 
100.000 people participated in the anti-war demonstration in Athens. There were 
nationwide strikes against the war, with the public services, private companies, shops and 
academic institutions shutting down for 24 hours on that same day (Tzogopoulos, 2005: 
10). Over 95% of the population expressed their objection to what was generally viewed 
as an "imperial expedition" and "a war for oil", while Prime Minister Kostas Simitis 
declared that "Greece is not participating in the war and will not get entangled with it" 
(Simitis quoted in Tzogopoulos, 2005: 5). Unlike in the British press, the representations 
amongst the Greek newspapers were uniform; the war in Iraq was unanimously 
represented as a threat to the global order, initiated by a dangerous empire with disregard 
for international laws and norms. Moreover, the E. U. was positioned in an oppositional 
relationship to the U. S. as a force of good, which, united, could "defeat" the U. S. peril. 
This chapter delineates the main representations in the British and Greek press from 
October 2002, when the debates on the legality and the morality of the war began to 
intensify, until April 2003, when what is described as the initial stage of the war ended 
with the 'siege' of Baghdad. 
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British press representations: October 2002-April 2003 
This section is divided in four parts. The first part looks at the two main discourses on 
the war in Iraq, which was seen either as necessary and morally righteous or as dangerous 
and irrelevant to the 'war on terrorism'. After looking at the main discourses on the war, 
I examine the main actors involved, the U. S., the U. K. and the E. U. Thus, the second 
part studies the main representations of the U. S. as a corrupt bully, an aspiring imperialist 
and a force of good. The third part moves on to representations of Blair as a poodle, a 
sincere leader who is nevertheless wrong, a moderator or a corrupt Prime Minister. 
Finally, the fourth part expands on depictions of a future Britain as a great European 
force or as a major U. S. ally and expands on discourses of the French and the "Franco- 
German axis" as bullies and as a threat to the world order. 
A war In Iraq as 
The first of the two discourses on the war in Iraq, the hegemonic discourse in Vie Mirror 
and Yhe Independent, represented the war as irrelevant, dangerous for western security, 
unlawful and unhelpful for the Iraqis themselves. Saddam. and Al Qaeda were 
positioned in a relationship of opposition to each other, and the non-essential character of 
a war in Iraq was also juxtaposed to the necessity of the war on terrorism. Moreover, 
constructions of the war in Iraq as obstructing the war on terrorism rendered the former 
not only irrelevant, but also dangerous. Finally, the positioning of the U. S. in opposition 
to the West as a unilateral actor pursuing an unlawful war, which would neither benefit 
the west nor the Iraqis, rendered the war in Iraq both unnecessary and damaging. 
Inappropriate 
The irrelevance of the war in Iraq was accentuated through the elevation of terrorism as 
the most important threat facing humankind, and the disassociation of the war in Iraq 
from the terrorist threat. Specifically, terrorism was constituted as posing a very serious 
threat to western values and to western societies. Especially after the Bali bombings and 
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the siege of the theatre in Moscow the hegemonic discourse on terrorism was very similar 
to the one described in chapter 4. Terrorists were "small men who want to look big, 
psychopaths ... zealots" (Humphrys, 2002: 19), "evil ... ideological fanatics whose 
hatred for the West is total ... they cannot be reasoned with, bought off or deterred" 
(Gove, 2003e: 20). This is therefore "an enemy with whom it is impossible to negotiate" 
('Answer to Terror', 2002: 18), "whose divine, irreducible aim is the destruction of 
western society" (Shawcross, 2002: 29). The only difference from representations of 
terrorism in the first few months after the September II events was that there were often 
references to Al-Qaeda, rather than merely the faceless terrorist as the enemy to be 
fought. Thus, "this threat from Al-Qaeda reaches across the skies to every western 
airplane, and every western passengee, (Toolis, 2002: 6) and "Al-Qaeda will continue 
bombing and killing because, in the words of Hezbollah: 'We are fighting to eliminate 
you"' (Furbank, 2002: 25). 
As was also pointed out in the previous chapter, negative predicates, such as "evil", 
"psychopaths" and "small men" constituted the terrorists as irrational and fanatical 
individuals. Thus, the terrorists were positioned in opposition to everyone else, as 
inherently and innately evil. As Rai points out, "the personality defect model of terrorism 
holds that terrorists have fundamental and pathological defects in their personality 
structure, usually related to a damaged sense of self. Moreover, these defects result from 
unconscious forces in the terrorists' psyche" (Rai, 2004: 544). The consequence of 
representing terrorists as evil and unreasonable, was the exclusion of complex histories of 
struggle, intervention and non-development which may shed light on the reasons for the 
attacks. Instead, such representations preclude the possibility of any reason other than 
the terrorists' irrational fanaticism. "Once a terror attack occurs, it is held that all such 
historiography should be consigned to the proverbial scrap heap. It now becomes a 
matter of pure evil, with no history or reason" (Bhatia, 2005: 16). In tum, constituting 
the terrorists as ruthless others, without morality or restraints, and their actions as a- 
historical and unjustified, resulted in the need for an immediate and relentless resolution 
of the conflict. Since terrorists "cannot be negotiated witW', attack and destruction is the 
only solution to the problem of terrorism. Thus, by positioning the terrorists as a 
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particular type of subject, certain actions were deemed pointless and even dangerous, 
while others came to be seen as 'natural' and essential. In particular, exploring the 
causes of the attacks was inconceivable, while retaliation for the destruction of the 
terrorist threat and the pre-emption of future attacks was naturalized as the most logical 
and only viable option. 
While terrorism was constituted as a major threat in 77ie Afirror and The Independent 
discourse, and the war against terrorism was legitimized as an immediate necessity, a war 
in Iraq was construed as irrelevant, as a distraction which would divert attention from 
what was, in fact, a greater danger. "Bush and Blair are fighting the wrong war. As long 
as Bin Laden is alive this deadly threat from tourist bars in Bali to tourist aircraft 
anywhere in the world, will grow" (Toolis, 2002: 6). "The greatest effort must be 
reserved for the greatest threat. And that comes from al-Qaeda ... The priority must be to 
prevent Al-Qaeda striking. Not to play to the cameras with a gun-ho military invasion" 
('Al-Qaeda is the real foe', 2002: 6). Due to the imminence of the threat from terrorist 
organizations, a war in Iraq was represented as delaying and distracting the 'War on 
Terror' campaign. "War against Iraq is a perverse priority when it is already the terrorists 
who present much the bigger threat to international security" ffight Terrorism, not Iraq', 
2002: 28). Moreover, Saddam and Al-Qaeda were compared, with Al Qaeda emerging as 
a much bigger threat than the rogue dictator, who was seen as vile, but nevertheless, 
harmless to the West. "Is it Iraq, ruled by a hideous regime, to be sure, but which has 
nothing more than a clapped-out air force, a few rusting old missiles and an army with 
sub-zero morale to throw at us? Or is it Al-Qaeda, a global network that can call on up to 
100,000 militants, dispersed in as many as 50 countries, with a proven track record in 
creating terrorist havoc and a fanatic's iron determination to create more"? (Freedland, 
2003: 4). Therefore, "Anyone who thinks Saddam is about to start World War Three is a 
fool, the President of the United States or botV ('War looms, but peace can be won', 
2003: 6). In sum, "they found no evidence of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. And they 
confirmed that the possibility of Saddam Hussein attacking the West is as likely as Kylie 
Minogue challenging Mike Tyson to a 15-round title fight" (Sheridan, 2003a: 13). 
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According to the above representation, there was a clear demarcation between Al Qaeda 
and Saddam Hussein, a differentiation which wasn't made in Vie Times discourse. 
Saddam and Al Qaeda were constructed as two different subjects, both vile and ruthless, 
yet not equally dangerous. Predicates such as "deadly threat", "greatest effort", "grow", 
"priority", "imminence", "iron determination" represented the terrorists as more 
dangerous than the Saddam regime, which, with "rusting old missiles", "clapped-out air 
force", "sub-zero morale", was represented as less threatening. Not only did this 
comparison result in the construction of Saddam Hussein's regime as non-threatening to 
the west, but it also resulted in the magnification of the Al-Qaeda threat and the 
representation of a 'war against terror' as an absolute necessity which could not be 
delayed. By pointing out that an attack against Saddam would be distracting and would 
delay the 'war on terror', the urgency of this war became apparent. A prompt response 
on the part of the west against the 'deadly terrorists' was deemed essential while a failure 
to respond quickly was seen as both unacceptable and dangerous. Therefore, this 
comparison increased the notion of risk and panic, since the west was seen to be in a state 
of emergency. This state of emergency was enhanced by the use and constant repetition 
of what Edavec calls "lexical cohesive devices" (2004: 98), words such as 'threat' and 
'danger' that constructed risk discourse and therefore rendered certain actions appropriate 
for dealing with the terrorists. 
Dangerous to the Mest 
War in Iraq was also articulated as dangerous for the west, since it was expected to lead 
to terrorist escalation. "Attacking him [Saddam] will not ease the danger-from terrorism. 
In fact, it will make it worse by infuriating and inciting fanatics ... they will find a perfect 
excuse if they can accuse America and the UK of bombing and killing innocent civilians 
in Iraq" ('War on Iraq will make us terror target', 2002: 6). In fact, "the moment our 
forces join with America to bomb and invade Iraq, Al-Qaeda will respond by launching a 
terrorist bombardment here" ('Why we're the target of terrorists', 2003: 6). Thus, 
"instead of increasing security for the West, we will have destroyed if' (Hamilton, 2003: 
16). Muslim resentment would grow, which would, in turn, result in the creation of a 
165 
more favourable environment for the breeding of terrorism. "A war on Iraq will win yet 
more backing for jihadism in the Muslim world. A prolonged U. S. occupation of Iraq 
will be the greatest provocation yet" (Freedland, 2002: 6). As a result, "a pre-emptive 
war against Iraq would have the opposite effect of increasing martyrdom. It is bound to 
heighten the sense among some Muslims that the U. S. and its allies are engaged in a 
crusade against their values. It will make attacks like the bomb in Bali more likely" 
('Unless there is more justice', 2002: 14). Finally, a war was bound to destabilize whole 
regions, which would yet again result in strengthening the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. 
"The U. S. and Britain seek a possible war that threatens to destabilise regions that are 
already terrorist breeding grounds" (Tight Terrorism, not Iraq', 2002: 28). "Me war 
could have an impact on surrounding states ... how do we calculate how many more 
suicidal bombers will be created, and therefore how many terrorist attacks can be directly 
related to this war"? (Mowlam, 2002: 6). 
In this representation, the presupposition that the war in Iraq would lead to terrorist 
escalation constituted the war in Iraq as dangerous and threatening to western security. 
Predicates such as "destroyed", "grow", "increasing", "heighten", "destabilize" served to 
constitute the war as escalating terrorism. This representation did not significantly differ 
from the British press discourses on terrorism shortly after the September II events. It is 
still based on the binary construction of an inside/outside, a "west versus the resf' 
dichotomy, whereby the western inside is threatened by a non-westem, Muslim outside. 
Muslim countries were positioned in a relationship of complementarity and identity to 
each other and to terrorism as breeding grounds for terrorists, and in opposition to the 
West. This orientalist, discourse (see Said, 1995) was based on the. construction and 
normalization of imaginative geographies (Graham, online: 3) that separated the "western 
homeland" from the terrorist "Muslim outside". Thus, the "civilized, western world" was 
constructed as a coherent whole, which must defend itself from "Islamic terrorism". As 
Graham (online: 9) points out, "once again, western nations-and the securitized cities 
now seen once again to sit hierarchically within their dominant territorial patronage - are 
being normatively imagined as bounded, organized spaces with closely controlled, and 
filtered, relationships with the supposed terrors of the outside world". Moreover, the 
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articulation of the western inside as defensive on the one hand, and the Muslim outside as 
aggressive on the other hand, constituted the west as the victim which needs to defend 
itself against aggressive, Islamic terrorism. However, it was also pointed out that the war 
in Iraq would only enhance the "security" problem, rather than provide a solution. 
Breaching internationaljustice 
A representation found primarily in the Independent, although also in the Mirror, 
constructed the war in Iraq as a manifestation of U. S. unilateralist intentions and 
disrespect for the international community. "The most important lesson of the post- II 
September world is that when America decides it has a clear national interest America 
will act - with or without the rest of us" (Keane, 2002a: 18). The UN was seen to have 
been disregarded by the U. S. "The suspicion remains that if the UN does not do what he 
wants it to do - and pass a second resolution with a wording similar to that issued by 
Britain and the US yesterday - then George Bush will ignore if'('Saddarn is Neutralised', 
2003: 18). Similarly, "President Bush does not argue that might is right. He argues that 
America has overwhelming might and that it is always right, because it is America. If the 
UN Security Council is to survive at all, it must survive in the post 9/11 world, as a kind 
of international Supreme Soviet, whose duty is to endorse the American view. Ditto 
Nato" (Lichfield, 2003: 18). It was also pointed out, that President Bush "Wants to 
destroy the UN" (Fisk, 2002: 21). In fact, a decision on the war in Iraq seemed to lie in 
the hands of the U. S alone, since it was not possible for any other actor to express dissent. 
"Nobody dares to say no to Washington ... Weapons inspectors and reports are irrelevant 
Whether Iraq is invaded or not will, in the end, depend entirely on the-US ... the rest 
of us - the UN, Britain, America's allies or the Arab world - have no say in the matter. 
And ifs fantasy for anyone to say otherwise" (Hamilton, 2002: 17). 
This discourse was critical of the U. S., which was positioned in a relationship of power 
over the E. U. and the West, as intent on disregarding international law and imposing its 
views on all others. Specifically, active verbs such as "decides", "acts", "ignores", 
"destroy", "decides" constructed the U. S. as a powerful and active agent, in contrast to 
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the U. N. and all other actors which were articulated as weak, by means of passive and 
receptive verbs, such as "endorse", "survive", and "(nobody) dares". Therefore, in 
contrast to the previous representation, which positioned the West- including the U. S. - as 
a unified entity needing to protect itself from the terrorist threat, the U. S. was "othered" 
in this representation, only differently than the terrorists. Thus, it was not treated as a 
threatening or dangerous other, but as a non-compliant other, unwilling to co-operate and 
intent on protecting its own interests, at the expense of collective interests. 
Unhelpfulfor Iraqis 
In line with the previous representation, the war in Iraq was not only represented as 
unlawful, but it was also constituted as unhelpful for the Iraqis. It was maintained that all 
the rhetoric about liberating the Iraqis and instilling democracy in the country would not 
be realized. "Sadly, a glance at previous U. S. invasions suggests their promise of 
rebuilding might not be entirely believable. Because to take the odd example at random, 
Nicaragua, Chile, Guatemala, Afghanistan, Vietnam, Grenada, Laos, and Somalia all 
seemed to miss out on this glorious regeneration scheme after the American military 
ripped them apart. They promise long-term commitment, have their way, then never 
phone, never write, you're just another notch on the Statue of Liberty" (Steel, 2003: 18). 
The U. S. was represented as creating havoc and making empty promises, which they then 
entirely disregarded. Moreover, it was also seen as intent on colonizing the countries it 
invaded and instilling puppet governments, instead of restoring democracy. "History is 
littered with examples of how American actions have removed a regime to replace it with 
a worse one" (Tet's stop the grim preacher', 2003: 6). Besides, "freedom, United States- 
style, so far means full hospitals, no water, a terrified civilian population and the specter 
of a humanitarian disaster that nobody can estimate ... He [Bush] demands 
democracy in 
the Middle East now, but the US has propped up brutal and corrupt dictatorships in the 
area for years. Not just Saddam's Iraq but Saudi Arabia and a host of smaller autocratic 
Gulf states" (Stott, 2003: 14). The U. S. was thus seen as having double standards, as 
being hypocritical and undemocratic, and thus both unwilling to and incapable of 
effecting a positive change in a post-war Iraq. "As well as giving their country back, 
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we're also going to bring them democracy. Where has America done this in the past, 
then? True, they have sometimes re-shaped a country's democracy. For example in Chile, 
they tried out a new system of picking a leader, where you hold an election and whoever 
gets the most votes, you kill him ... George Bush is sure to want to sort this out, because 
if there's one thing he can't stand, it's someone who uses his own family to undermine the 
democratic process to become ruler of their country" (Steel, 2003: 12). 
This representation of the war as harmful for the Iraqis was reinforced by pictures of 
injured Iraqis, primarily children who had been hit by U. S. bombs. On the twenty-third 
of March, the cover of The Independent on Sunday featured a half-page image of a baby 
whose face was covered in bums, and which was crying in his mother's arms, under the 
headline, "This is the reality of war. We bomb. They suffee, (Appendix C, Figure I). 
Another picture in The Mirror (Appendix C, Figure 2) showed a man holding an 
unconscious, severely wounded girl in his hands, with the headline, "The bombs that 
devastated ordinary homes. Not so smart" I Another very shocking and visually arresting 
picture in ne Mirror on the 13th of March featured two little girls, lying dead in the 
rubble of their home. The headline of the article accompanying the picture, written by 
John Pilger, was: "These sisters were killed by one of our bombers. Look at the pictures 
... and ask yourself what they say about Blair's 'moral case' for this phoney war" (Pilger, 
2003: 6). Moreover, the covers of both newspapers often featured full page images of a 
bombed Iraq, attached to huge headlines such as "Mass Destructi&', "Shocking and 
Awful"', or "Baghdad's night of Terror" (Appendix C, Figures 3-5). These images and 
headlines constituted the Iraqis as the helpless victims of mostly U. S., but also British 
aggressiveness, since it was "our" bombers who cause "awful" "destruction"; it is "we" 
who bomb and it is "they" who suffer. 
Moreover, many photos depicted people marching against the war, often featuring front 
page headlines such as "Not in our Name, Mr. Blaie' (Appendix C, Figure 6), or 'The 
People versus the Wae'. The 15 February Mirror front cover was a full-size picture of a 
sick and skinny child, whose bones could be discerned. The child was facing the camera 
as if saying "Look at me! Save me" and big headlines in the bottom of the picture wrote 
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"For his sake ... March". In small letters on the left side comer of the photo was a 
caption saying, "Suffering: This starving Iraqi child faced death in 1998 -a new war 
could kill a million children" (Appendix C, Figure 7). Another front cover full-page 
photo (Appendix C, Figure 8) showed a baby looking directly at the viewer's eyes. In the 
background one could discern two placards, one with 'peace' written on it, and another 
featuring a previous Mirror cover showing a bleeding soldier, with half the page filled 
with the headline "No War". 
Such images were common in Pie Mirror and 77ie Independent. Both photos featured 
children staring at the camera and both were followed by captions and headlines 
opposing war and encouraging readers to voice their dissent. The frequent choice of 
children is interesting. Children connote innocence and promise; thus, photos of injured 
children or children in protest marches, arouse the emotions and, at least for some, have a 
deeper impact than pictures of adults. This emotive impact is enhanced when children 
are shown facing the camera. As Kress and Van Leeuwen point out, "when represented 
participants look at the viewer, vectors, formed by participants' eyelines, connect the 
participants with the viewer. Contact is established, even if it is only on an imaginary 
level". This visual configuration both creates a visual form of direct address and 
constitutes an 'image act' whereby the participants gaze demands something from the 
viewer, "demands that the viewer enter into some kind of imaginary relation with him or 
her" (1999: 381). 
The newspaper articles were also accompanied by mostly ironic sketches questioning 
U. S. intentions. One depicted the center of a post-war Iraq. The whole area seems to be 
rubble, but some of Iraq's monuments are still standing. In the foreground one can see 
what used to be the famous Saddarn statue. However, Saddam's head (the statue's head) 
lies on the ground and President Bush has taken Saddarn's place. Bush is holding a gun, 
while the statue has the phrase "the glorious leader" inscribed on it. In the background 
one can see the Triumphal Arch, which was built by Saddam to celebrate his victory 
against Iran. However, the shape of the crossed swords have changed, the swords in the 
sketch are bent, forming the logo of McDonalds food chain. Near the 'Triumphal Arch' 
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there is another statue of George Bush pointing towards Iran, replacing what used to be a 
statue of Saddarn pointing towards Iran. Finally, on the left one can see an image of 
Bush as Laurence of Arabia riding his horse and holding an American flag. In the top 
right comer there is what looks like a slip of paper attached to the sketch-photo, which 
reads: "Iraq-Reconstruction Plan [Top Secret]". This sketch ironically manifested the 
newspaper's distrust towards the U. S. government's reconstruction promises; moreover, 
through the substitution of major Iraqi symbols by American ones, the U. S. was 
represented as intent on exploiting rather than liberating Iraq. Since McDonalds connote 
Americanization and American commercial expansion, the substitution of the swords by 
the golden arches connotes commercial colonization. Moreover, the substitution of the 
Saddarn statue by the Bush statue is very important symbolically, because the fall of the 
statue had come to be seen as a metaphor of Iraq's liberation in major 'pro-war' 
discourses. In contrast, this sketch was in line with Vie IndependentlMirror discourse, 
which questioned the discourse of the war as liberation, substituting it by a war as 
occupation discourse. 
The righteousness of a war in Iraq 
The hegemonic discourse in The Times justified the war in Iraq in terms of its morality 
and the threat of the Iraqi regime. Specifically, a war in Iraq was construed as both 
necessary for western security and moral since it would liberate the Iraqis. Moreover, the 
anti-war protesters were articulated as anti-American and threatening to the west. 
Saddam as a danger 
According to this representation, a war in Iraq was both justified and required because of 
the danger that Saddam. posed to the international order. Saddam. was represented as a 
"genocidal butcher" (Kaletsky, 2003c: 20) and a "mass murderer with the means of mass 
murder on a scale never before known" (Gove, 2003b: 20) and his regime as "an evil, 
fascist regime" (Clwyd, 2003: 20) and "a terrorist power with growing access to weapons 
of mass destruction" (Rees-Mogg, 2002: 18). Saddam. was proven unreliable and to have 
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deadly intentions; it was therefore useless to negotiate with him. "There is ample 
evidence of Saddam's intentions; must we wait on his capabilities? " (Bobbitt, 2003: 22). 
Moreover, "If Iraqs arms programmes are not subdued, WMD are likelier to proliferate 
in other states, especially Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Libya ... Saddam would clearly 
be capable of using these non-state actors as unidentifiable agents to attack the US or the 
UK with weapons he would not dare use against us directly" (Bobbitt, 2003: 22). 
Therefore, "it would ... be fatal to any hopes of a meaningful international order to draw 
back from the use of force" (Gove, 2003b: 20), and "there remains only one way to bring 
this about: military interventioW' ('Mother of all bluffs', 2002: 19). As a consequence, 
the regime "... inust come to an end; with or without the help of the Security Council, and 
with or without the backing of the Labour Party in the House of Commons tonight" 
(Clwyd, 2003: 20). 
The main presuppositions grounding this representation are Saddarn Hussein's possession 
of weapons of mass destruction, his intention to use them against the west, and his links 
to terrorism and terrorist organizations. None of these claims have been proven; in fact, 
they have been highly contested by many analysts. What is noteworthy, however, is the 
ways in which these presuppositions and highly contested pieces of information came to 
be the accepted, as indeed the dominant discourse in Yhe Times. 
To begin with, representations of Saddam and his regime were very similar to 
representations of the terrorists. As Hodges also points out in his discussion of Bush's 
War on Terror Narrative, "central to the construction of identities in the BWOTN is the 
justification of war against Iraq vis-&-vis the events of 9/1 P (Hodges, 2004: 2). 
Similarly, in the Times discourse, Saddam was articulated as a "genocidal butchee', a 
4(mass murderee', and his regime as "fascisV' and an "evil, terrorist power". Thus, the 
terrorists and the Iraqi "terrorist power" were positioned in a relationship of similarity 
and complementarity to each other; similarity, in the sense that they were very both 
dangerous and non-negotiable subjects intent on destruction, and complementarity, since 
they needed each other in their deadly plans against the west. Moreover, these two 
subjects were positioned in opposition to "us", the western countries. The west was 
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therefore articulated as the victim of collaboration between a terrorist alliance, and in 
need to defend itself against this "fatal" threat. As a result of the above representations, a 
war in Iraq was constituted as equally important to the war on Terror as hunting down the 
perpetrators of September 11, since "a strike against the one (Saddam) is justified by its 
equivalence to a strike against the other (Al-Qaeda)" (Hodges, 2004: 2). 
Furthermore, the construction of Saddarn as dangerous rendered imperative a swift and 
drastic response, while at the same time rendering risky and "fatal" anything that would 
delay the required military intervention. The U. N. was therefore naturalized as a 
hindrance to the maintenance of international order. "The inspectors are Saddarn's 
mechanism for delay ... the search is a futile distracti&' ('Phoney Peace', 2002: 
21). 
Furthermore, "Saddam would have a UN shield behind which he could continue to 
conceal and develop his weapons" (Powell, 2003: 13). To sum up such representations 
naturalized the importance of a military strike in Iraq by demonizing Saddarn Hussein as 
an enemy, intent on destroying the West, and by constructing links between Iraq and 
terrorism, and between two otherwise quite distinct and separate subjects, with 
potentially divergent motivations. Thus, such constructions created closure and 
discouraged any form of non-military action as dangerous and risky. As Spence (2005: 
284) points out, "dominated by this imperative, practices of evaluation, decision, 
negotiation and compromise, that is of the reasoned assessment of disparate and various 
tractable risk situations, are inconvenient distractions. Instead, the task of eliminating 
perceived challenges to the integrity of the nation-state supplants the relational and 
heterogeneous risk problematic with that of absolute security and its constitutive other, 
teffor". 
The Morality ofwar 
Although Pie Times discourse supported the war in Iraq in terms of the danger posed by 
weapons of mass destruction, an equally if not more dominant representation framed the 
war as a moral enterprise. "Every day in Iraq prisoners are beheaded, electrocuted or 
locked in cells until they are driven to eat the flesh of other prisoners. Military force can 
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surely be justified to remove the man whose major contribution to modem Arab culture 
has been genocide" (Knowles, 2003: 18). Similarly, "Saddam is a genocidal butcher, 
whose removal will almost certainly save far more lives than it destroys" (Kaletsky, 
2003c: 20), and "a modem Moloch engorged with the human blood of his tortured and 
slaughtered innocent child victims ... war is the only way to put an end to the suffering 
caused by Saddam. Ali and other dead and wounded civilians are the terrible and tragic 
price that has to be paid" (Nicholson, 2003: 18). Therefore, the deaths resulting from the 
war in Iraq were constituted as a necessary and unavoidable ill. "War is like 
chemotherapy. The good and innocent cells will be killed along with the bad. Butwhere 
there is cancer that threatens to snuff out life, what is one to do but fight back? (Boteach, 
2002: 20). Not liberating Iraq would thus be unethical and morally inconceivable. "The 
most moral of wars are not even those fought in self-defense, but rather those which are 
fought to defeat tyranny and genocide. If a war of self-defense demonstrates an 
appreciation of our own lives, a war to defend our neighbour's existence manifests an 
appreciation of all life" (Boteach, 2002: 20). Especially after the U. S. troops had entered 
Iraq it was pointed out that the Iraqis themselves were happy about the war, as was 
evident in the Iraqi reactions at the sight of the U. S. military. "By every indication we 
have, the population of Baghdad was making a secret holiday in its heart as those horrible 
palaces went up in smoke, and this holiday will soon be a public holiday, and if we all 
keep our nerve we can join the festivities with a fairly clear conscience" (Hitchens, 2003: 
12,13). Likewise, "for the first time since 1958 Iraq has a chance to dream of something 
other than bloody dictatorship" (Taheri, 2003: 30). 
According to this discourse, force in Iraq was justified on human rights grounds. Saddam 
was-p-os'fitioned in opposition to the Iraqis who were constructed as the victims of a 
tyrannical regime. This representation was accentuated by the articulation of Saddam as 
a "butcher", who "slaughtered" the Iraqis. As Tenorio (online: 54) points out, "the 
lexical item 'to butcher' is a verb that requires an [+animate, +human] agentive subject 
and a [+animate, +animal] affected object". The difference between a butcher and 
articulations of Saddam as a butcher is that Saddam was represented as "slaughtering" 
human beings like animals. Thus, the metaphor of Saddam as a butcher constituted 
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Saddarn as a brutal dictator, who dehumanized the Iraqis by treating them as animals. 
Therefore, this metaphor positioned the Iraqis as "defenseless and innocent victims who 
have no choice but to be sacrificed like animals by a wicked human agenf' (Tenorio, 
online: 54). 
The representations of Saddam Hussein as a purely negative, brutal subject, who 
constituted a major threat to all Iraqis, facilitated representations of an intervention as 
liberation. Since all Iraqis were constructed as potentially suffering inhumanely treated 
under Saddam's rule, an intervention could only be positive for the future of the Iraqi 
people. Therefore, the above representation constituted as truth the highly contested 
presupposition, that the ousting of Saddam equaled the liberation of Iraqis. This was 
further facilitated by means of predicates that construed the invasion as liberation. Thus, 
lexical items such as "save lives", "life", "appreciation", "defend", "justified" and 
"moral", were juxtaposed to predicates such as "death", "tyranny", "blood" and 
"dictatorship" to constitute a "villain-victim-hero" fairytale discourse (Lakoff, 1991), 
whereby "'we" are the heroes, who will rid the Iraqi victims of Saddam, the villain. This 
discourse facilitated the construction of the military intervention as necessary and 
unavoidable. 
Finally, the war as a moral and just enterprise was also justified by means of the nation as 
a person metaphor (Lakoff, 1991 and 2003), whereby the ruler stands for the state. The 
articulation of the war as waged against Saddam minimized the negative consequences of 
the war and elevated it as a moral enterprise. However, this metaphor hides the fact "that 
the 3000 bombs to be dropped in the first two days will not be dropped on that one 
person. They will kill many thousands of the people hidden by the metaphor, people that 
according to the metaphor we are not going to war against" (Lakoff, 2003: online). 
The above discourse, however, can and has been contested. As has already been pointed 
out, the Independent and Mirror discourses constituted the war in Iraq as unhelpful for 
the Iraqis and as pointless, while the Greek press discourse constructed the war as a 
colonizing U. S. expedition and as destructive for the Iraqis. Thus, in a different discourse 
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the war in Iraq could be represented as occupation, rather than liberation and the motives 
of the intervention could be seen as selfish. For example, as Bhatia (2005: 13) observes, 
"the construction of a savage, lawless or unordered subject is a noted prerequisite of 
intervention ... Descriptions of an opponent are used to emphasize the benefit that would 
result from the imposition of an imperial order. Any suffering caused by the newly 
arrived actor is thus dismissed as incomparable to the disorder previously present". 
Diefolly of the protesters 
Not surprisingly, this discourse constructed the anti-war protesters negatively. They were 
articulated as "morally deluded ... malcontents and emoting naffs", "whose activism ... 
is an unlovable eccentricity", and who "march because marching is what they do. They 
are outraged, because outrage is what they do. But they do not march in my name, nor the 
public's" (Millen, 2003: 22). Not only were the protesters constructed as non- 
representative of the general public, but they were also seen as disrupting order. 
"Doubtless many anti-war protesters felt that their actions yesterday, taking to the streets, 
lying down in roads and clogging cities, were in that noble tradition, even though their 
main effect was to inconvenience fellow citizens" ('Democracy and dissent', 2003: 23). 
In the above representations, the protesters were othered as aberrations from the norm, 
and the protests were depoliticized. In his study of the U. K. media's portrayal of youth 
anti-war protesters, Stephen Cushion (2004) concluded, that "instead of promoting the 
intervention of young people in the political sphere, these images imply an immaturity of 
political expression". Similarly, the predication of protesting as an "eccentricity" and of 
the protesters as "morally deluded", whose actions "inconvenience" the rest, resulted in 
the construction of the anti-war protests as unwanted and pointless, since they were 
emptied of any significance and meaning. 
Elsewhere, anti-war protesters were depicted as well intentioned, but nevertheless wrong 
in their judgments. Their protests, it was argued, weakened the West and empowered 
Saddam, thus making war inevitable. "Saddarn Hussein must be thrilled by this support 
offered him by British peace protesters" (Rashid, 2003: 7). Similarly, "this great 
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demonstration -... was not assembled to support the liberation of Iraq, but to oppose it ... 
Subjectively the march was for peace; objectively it helped Saddam Hussein ... they are 
good people. One should not forget that ... unfortunately, the road to hell 
is paved with 
good intentions. I am glad that our Prime Minister is not anti-American or an appeaser" 
(Rees-Mogg, 2003a: 18). 
Finally, some of the protesters, were simply anti-American. "Its opposition to Uncle Sam 
is the glue in the Left coalition, the brew which puts fire into bien-pensant bellies, the 
opium of radical intellectuals ... For Yankee-phobia is, at heart, a dark thing, a prejudice 
with ugly antecedents which creates unholy alliances. And, like all prejudices, it thrives 
on myths which will end up only serving evil ends" (Gove, 2003a: 16). As a result, 
"there was never any doubt which side they would take. When America does just that, 
the reaction is not to thank heavens for a nation that is prepared to stand up for freedom, 
but to spit in its face. That mindset infects the entire political culture" (Pollard, 2003: 
18). Thus, the U. S. was constructed as a victim of anti-American sentiments which 
would never change no matter how righteous U. S. actions were. "And the peace camp 
still has the gall to call Bush and Blair butchers. They are the war criminals even when 
the evidence against the bestiality of Saddam's stinking regime is overwhelming ... Let 
the malcontents bum the Union Jack. Right now I feel like kissing it" (Parsons, 2003b: 
17). 
The above representation was based on two main presuppositions, namely that the U. S. is 
always well-intentioned, righteous and thus entitled to intervene whenever it decides to 
do so; it was also presupposed that the West was threatened by Saddam's regime. As a 
result of those presuppositions, whoever opposes the war is automatically 'anti- 
American', supports Saddarn and harms the West. Tbus, the world was constructed as 
divided in two camps, those who approve of U. S. actions and don't challenge U. S. 
authority and those who express disapproval and thus support terrorist, authoritarian 
regimes and consequently hann the west. 
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The United States as 
A corrupt, imperialist bully 
The U. S. was on the whole represented as a negative force in 7he Mirror and 7he 
Independent. In particular, it was constructed as a corrupt bully intent on imposing a new 
American-ccntered world order. "The New World Order turns out to be The World 
Ordered Around by the USA. The 20th century looks like being the century of 
unrelenting American imperialism. Its slogan: 'Agree with Washington - or you are 
dead. "' (Routledge, 2003b: 9). Moreover, "it [the U. S. ] has created familiarity without 
respect, global recognition without affection, an unstable combination of desire, envy and 
loathing" (Smith, 2003: 23). However, it needs to be pointed out that a differentiation 
was made in this discourse between the U. S. generally, and the Bush administration in 
particular. Thus, for the most part, it was the Bush administration that was represented as 
a threatening subject, and not, for example, previous U. S. administrations. 'The Bush 
Administration is deeply corrupt. It came to power on a voting fiddle. It emerged from a 
plot by the oil barons who want the USA to rule the world for profit" (Routledge, 2003c: 
8-9). Likewise, "a gung-ho American president, surrounded by war -crazed advisers of 
the Reaganite school, are intent upon ruling the world. Their way. The terrible events of 
September II gave them the pretext they were looking for to impose a Pax Americana on 
the globe' (Routledge, 2002a: 6). Thus, the problem was constructed as stemming from 
the Bush government. 
Bush, himself, was often described as mad, aggressive and a worthless leader. He was 
also frequently likened to an ape. "... Even though market research suggests that 87 per 
cent of chimp newspaper readers take the Sun, I'd hate to offend them by suggesting that 
their leader on Earth could be the sneering, sniggering ape we see punching his fist 
gleefully before announcing the start of war, or grinning imbecilically while addressing 
army families in Florida hours after one of his cruise missiles caused carnage in a 
Baghdad market" (Norman, 2003: 37). Similarly, "he is an ape, but that doesift matter - 
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he is an ape with cruise missiles ... Bush's vanity is as dangerous as it is sickening. 
It also 
discredits us" (Routledge, 2003c: 8-9). Therefore Bush was represented as a very 
powerful, yet brainless and thus dangerous president. "There is less cynicism in Krusty 
the Clown. More gravity on the moon. More brains on a Texan plain full of buffalo 
droppings. Bush is not a serious statesman but a puerile punk ... those who 
have 
observed Bush closely say he is the immature buffoon satirists portray him as ... Draw a 
photo fit of the man you would least like to have in charge of our planet's destiny at this 
critical point in history and he would look remarkably like The Yellow Rogue of Texas" 
(Reade, 2003: 17). In her study of Hitler's use of metaphors in Mein Kampf, Felicity 
Rash (2005: 103-105) points out, that Hitler used animal metaphors to dehumanize Jews 
and other groups of people, who were likened to apes, lizards, parasites or donkeys. 
Similarly, in this discourse the articulations of Bush as an ape dehumanized him and 
debased him as a 'lower', less intelligent species. 
Furthermore, the aspirations for an American global empire were narrated as very 
dangerous for world order. "The US is hell bent on constructing a 21st century empire. 
America's weapon of choice is the cruise missile - and the way Bush is behaving, it might 
not be too long before he presses the nuclear button" (Sheridan, 2003b: 17). An 
Independent sketch (Appendix C, Figure 9) showed Bush in his office, somewhere in 
outer space, Earth visible from his windows. On his office there was a 'Fire' button and 
his finger was on top of it, ready to blow up the planet. On the top part of the sketch was 
written, "The Empire strikes bacle'. The war in Iraq itself was described as an important 
step towards these imperial ambitions. "If America installs a colonial regime in 
Baghdad, certainly its dependence on Saudi Arabia will be dramatically eased, and its 
grip on the world's greatest oil market will be tightened This is the hidden agenda of the 
"war on terrorisnP -a term that is no more than a euphemism for the Bush 
administration! s exploitation of the September II attacks and America's accelerating 
imperial ambitions" (Pilger, 2002: 8-9). As a result, "the diplomatic charade is over and 
the slaughter is about to begin ... This is not a war. This is a massacre. A massacre with 
the goal of building a 21st century American empire" (Sheridan, 2003c: 21). A sketch 
(Appendix C, Figure 10) depicted an amended world map, called "The Dubyagraphic- 
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New world order". Texas was the focal point of the map, while all other areas, apart 
from England had been renamed. Europe, for example, was renamed "cheese eating 
surrender monkeys", the Middle East was "Greater Israel", while Canada was "North 
Texas". 
This representation positioned the Bush administration in opposition to the rest of the 
world as a dangerous and threatening other, a corrupt and colonizing power. Therefore, 
in this representation the U. S. ceased to exist as a western ally in the war on terrorism, 
and became an enemy of the west and the world. Thus, this discourse broke the chains of 
equivalence between the terms civilized, humane, western, defensive and U. S., which 
resulted in a unified, hegemonic British press discourse after September II and during 
the war in Afghanistan. 
This representation departed from previous British press discourses, in scrutinizing a 
western power. However, similarly to the hegemonic Greek press discourse, this scrutiny 
was directed at one western power only, the U. S., which was demonized as the only actor 
responsible for imperialism and exploitation. This representation didn't acknowledge, 
firstly, that the U. K. had backed the U. S. in a series of wars or invasions, including the 
Iraq war; secondly, it could be claimed that imperialism and exploitation are not unique 
to the U. S., but are inherent in the western, capitalist system. As Berglez (2004: 257) 
points out, the question of identification transforms "into a matter of identifying or 
disidentifying with 'them' (the U. S. ), instead of navigating the discourse towards the 
fundamental question on whether or not 'we' identify with the hegemonic structures that 
rather include the U. S. as well as ourselves". Therefore, this discourse constructed a 'we' 
whereby, for example, 'the terrorist attacks were attacks on all of us, and not just the 
U. S., but the negative aspects of this 'western world' were only represented by the U. S. 
A force ofgood 
77te Times and, to a lesser extent, the other two newspapers, represented the U. S. as a 
force for good. The U. S. may be a superpower, it was argued, but it is a benign and 
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compassionate empire that sets a good example and spreads democracy to authoritarian 
and totalitarian regimes around the world. "If there is an American empire, it is of a 
more benign variety than the majority of its earthly predecessors. During the past century, 
America has been on balance an immense force for good" (Cornwell, 2002: 13). For 
example, "the Russian people would not have been liberated from Stalinism if the 
Americans had not won the Cold War ... the U. S. model has repeatedly proved to 
be 
uniquely powerful, not just in defence, but in broader economic political and international 
terms. Now democracy is spreading in a remarkable way ... All of this, the spread of 
freedom in Africa, Europe, China and the former Soviet Union, is the result of the 
example of the American model" (Rees-Mogg, 2003d: 16). Moreover, the Bush 
administration itself was commented for its benign character. "While no government is 
perfect, the Bush administration is pre-eminently a force for good" (Anderson, 2003b: 
16). 
The U. S. was also represented as genuinely interested in democratizing nations and 
improving people's lives. "In its pursuit of Iraq, it is obeying one of its oldest instincts, 
that things - in this case the Middle East -- can be changed for the better ... people 
in 
very high places in Washington really do share the Wilsonian belief that Iraq can be 
remade into a progressive state to serve as a model for a blighted region. " (Cornwell, 
2002: 13). Ingratitude towards this benevolent America was due to jealousy deriving 
from feelings of powerlessness and inferiority. "As Britain should know as well as 
anyone, being top nation is a lonelyjob, in which gratitude from others is not among the 
rewards. Someone once wrote about the 'tragic lesson' that any dominant country must 
learn - that it cannot be loved. President Bush, I am sure, has learnt that lessoW' 
(Cornwell, 2002: 13). However, this ingratitude could be damaging since the U. S. was 
the only power capable of enforcing order and was thus very much needed. "Since 1945 
Europe has relied on the United States to defend the West ... The global village 
has only 
one policeman, though Britain has been a loyal special constable ... If there is only one 
policeman in the village, it is no good for the parish council to expect to tell him what to 
do. The policeman sees the maintenance of order as his responsibility. He knows very 
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well that any breakdown of order means that he will be called upon to intervene" (Rees- 
Mogg, 2003c: 18). 
Democracy and freedom are the key terms in the above discourse. Both democracy and 
freedom were represented as conditions with some determinable essence which can 
unproblematically "spread" once authoritarian leaders such as Saddam Hussein were 
ousted. Moreover, the U. S. was constituted as a paradigmatic democracy, on the top of 
the hierarchy, which thus had the right to intervene in order to "restore ordee' and 
"spread" its democratic values. Not only was it presupposed that democracy has a 
specific and universally applicable meaning, but it was also presupposed that the world 
was divided in democratic and non-democratic countries. While democratic states were 
"benign", "progressive" and "better", the non-democratic ones were authoritarian, 
regressive, worse off and were thus inferior to the democratic ones. As Mouffe (2000: 4) 
also points out, "democratic logics always entail a frontier between 'us' and 'them', those 
who belong to the democratic and those who are outside it. This is the condition for the 
very existence of democratic rights". This binary positioning of states as democratic and 
non-democratic not only established the superiority of the democracies, but also enabled 
many, often violent, foreign policies to install democracy in the so-called non-democratic 
states, such as Iraq, which needed to be liberated. Since democracies are inherently 
benign and superior to the non-democracies, any intervention could only be humanitarian 
and well-meant, as well as necessary in order for democracy to prevail; democracies are 
thus entitled to "spread" and export democracy by any means available in order to 
liberate the backward and oppressed nations. 
However, this sharp distinction between democracies/non-democracies is not as 
straightforward as articulated in the above discourse. Moreover, democracy cannot be 
seen as a finite, tangible, complete and uncontested term, which can be universally and 
unproblematically applied. There is constant struggle to naturalize its meaning and it 
only appears familiar through its constant abuse. One means, by which democracy fills 
with meaning, is through its juxtaposition to the non-democratic. By constructing the 
non-democratic as "worse", or "less progressive" or "less liberal", the democratic 
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acquires meaning as embodying all those qualities that the non-democratic lacks, whether 
this is the case or not. 
Besides, "promoting" democracy to the "non-democracies" is in itself a paradox, since it 
manifests intolerance towards plurality, dissent and difference and involves adopting the 
high moral ground. For this reason Derrida refers to democracy as the "democracy to 
come", a democracy that is and should always be undecidable and open. Thus, "a 'true' 
democracy could never be empirically realized, because it would involve the 
incompatible ideals of an infinite respect for the singularity and alterity of the other, as 
well as a quantifiable equality between anonymous singularities. Nevertheless, the 
recognition of this impossibility and incompatibility is essential to any striving for 
justice" (Derrida, 1997: 306). 
Not acknowledging the undecidability of the democratic project and constituting 
democracy as uncontested and fixed facilitates imperative policies to promote democracy 
and freedom in those areas that are represented as non-democratic. The above discourse, 
for example, legitimized the Iraq war, since it was conducted by a democratic country to 
democratize a non-democratic one. Thus, such a discourse can legitimize an otherwise 
non-permissible and potentially damaging foreign policy. As Ake points out (quoted in 
Holbrook-Ellsworth, 2003: 12), "the contemporary world is not a favourable environment 
for democracy because we have trivialized democracy to the extent that it is no longer 
threatening to those in power or demanding to anyone. Democracy spreads because it 
has been rendered meaningless and innocuous without losing its symbolic value. While it 
spreads, our world is more repressive". 
Constructions of Tony Blair 
On the whole, Tony Blair was not criticized very heavily in the British press in the 
months leading to the war in Iraq. Representations of Tony Blair as an unworthy and 
corrupt politician were not as dominant as representations of Blair as a poodle, a 
moderator, and well-intentioned yet wrong. The representation of Blair as a poodle 
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constructed him as a loyal, follower of U. S. policies, while his representation as a 
moderator constituted him as a politician who had, in fact, managed to shape many 
decisions on the "war on Terror". Finally, the representation of Blair as well-intentioned 
yet wrong, construed him as a brave politician, who acted out of his own conviction. 
Thus, even though he was often wrong, his actions were based on high moral and ethical 
standards. These three representations are not mutually exclusive; for example, Blair was 
often constituted as both a poodle and well-intentioned. For this reason, these three 
representations are treated in this section as sub-discourses of an overall discourse, which 
was sympathetic towards Tony Blair. By contrast, the construction of Blair as a corrupt 
politician is incompatible with the previous representations. 
A common representation in ne Mirror, but also to a lesser extent in 7he Independent, 
depicted the Prime Minister as a "poodle" who would follow the U. S. president no matter 
what decisions the latter took. "I suppose it is too much to ask a British Labour prime 
minister to do some thinking of his own and reject the consummate folly of blindly 
following President Bush and his wild men over the brink" (Routledge, 2002a: 6). Blair 
was referred to as a "poodle premier" (Routledge, 2002b: 6), or a "British lapdog" 
(Hardy, 2003: 4), who "barks and bites whenever George Dubya Bush gives the order" 
(Routledge, 2002b: 6), while Bush was seen as a "dog handler" (Routledge, 2002b: 6). 
Blair was thus described as a follower, rather than a leader. "Tony Blair has sold himself 
into unpaid political and military slavery to President George Bush" (Routledge, 2003b: 
9), and "Bush gives his dog a bone" (Wallace, 2003: 4). As a consequence, "if they 
elected a monkey as US president, our leader would ingratiate himself and do its bidding" 
(Alibhai-Brown, 2003: 18). This metaphor of Blair as a poodle was reinforced by 
pictures and cartoons, one of which showed Blair in a collar, walking on four legs with 
his tongue out like a poodle being dragged by President Bush his master, who said: 
"We're gonna bomb eye-rak ... I mean ... we're gonna humanitarianly aid eye-rak ... 
back to the stone age" (Appendix C, Figure 11). The poodle breed's most distinctive 
characteristic is their loyalty to their owner. Thus, articulating Blair as Bush's poodle 
constituted Blair as a blind follower of Bush's policies, not capable of exercising 
independent thought, or at least not capable of counteracting Bush's decisions. Besides 
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the poodle metaphor, predicates such as "gives the order", "blindly following", "slavery" 
and "ingratiate" facilitated the positioning of Blair in a relationship of submission to 
Bush. 
A different representation, mainly in 7be Independent and Mirror, described Blair as a 
well-intentioned and brave politician who sincerely believed that his cause was right and 
who acted out of his own conviction rather than as Bush's lapdog. "Let's give the guy 
some credit here. In recent weeks he's been busting his guts to get a second UN 
resolution, NOT because he's George Bush's poodle (we know Bush spits on UN 
resolutions) but because he believes it's the right thing to do. You've got to respect a man 
who has got the guts to gamble everything he's ever worked for on a cause he believes to 
be right" (Malone, 2003: 33). Similarly, "one thing we can say about Tony Blair is that 
he gives every impression of being sincere about what he thinks, too ... Mr Blair may be 
hideously wrong, but he exudes the air and gaunt appearance of someone who cares" 
('Smirking gun' (The), 2003: 11). Nevertheless, "Tony Blair is sincere, but also 
sincerely wrong" (Seddon, 2003: 20). According to this representation, Blair was wrong 
in his choices, but he was nevertheless praised for this honesty and his determination 
passionately to pursue his beliefs, even defying his own party for what he believed to be 
morally right. "You may not agree with him. You may think he is misguided. Even his 
enemies will have to admit, though, that he has been bold -almost reckless -in pursuit of 
what he believes to be right" (Sieghart, 2003: 2). Moreover, "the nation has been 
refreshed and inspired by its experience of this leader, who is wrong but morally honest 
... For this, he deserves respect" (Orr, 2003: 16). Consequently, on this view, Blair was a 
valiant leader rather than a scared follower, and deserved respect, since his decision-to 
back President Bush in the Iraq war stemmed from a sincere belief that the war was the 
right thing to do. 
At this point it is interesting to compare The Afirror and The Independent's representation 
of Bush's decision to intervene in Iraq on the one hand, and Blair's decision to support 
the war on the other. The articulations of Blair as a poodle, and as well intentioned but 
wrong essentially absolved Blair from any responsibility for the war in Iraq. The poodle 
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metaphor constituted Blair as unable to take his own decisions and as incapable of 
independent thought. Similarly, while it was presupposed that Blair had "honest" 
intentions, it was also presupposed that Bush's same decision to go to war was dishonest 
and selfishly motivated. As a result, Bush and Blair were constituted as very different 
subjects even though they had essentially taken the same decision. In turn, the U. K. and 
the U. S. were also positioned as very different subjects, even though both the U. S. and 
the U. K. had taken the decision to start a war. As was also seen in previous sections, the 
U. S. was represented as the only perpetrator of the war in Iraq in 7he IndependentlAfirror 
discourses, while the U. K. was positioned in similarity to the E. U. and in opposition to 
the U. S. 
The third, mostly Times representation represented Blair as a moderator and mediator 
who privately influenced President Bush's decisions. This representation shared both 
similarities and differences with the previous two. Like the first representation, Blair was 
constituted as loyal to Bush. However, he was not seen as a poodle, because his loyalty 
to Bush was described as measured and aiming at moderating Bush's policies. Moreover, 
similarly to the second representation Blair was constructed as having sincere intentions; 
unlike it, Blair was represented as rightfully going to war in Iraq. "Tony Blair is not a 
poodle or a Rottweiler or any other kind of canine except maybe for some kind of dog 
with a good nose for sniffing out trouble" (Keane, 2002b: 22). Specifically, Blair was 
articulated as a retriever which is loyal, but is nonetheless not a follower. "Tony Blair is 
often depicted as President Bush's poodle. But this is the wrong dog. In canine terms, Mr 
Blair is more like one of David Blunkett's retrievers, publicly loyal but with its own sense 
of direction. The Prime Minister has many concerns which he will express in private" 
ýMiddell, 2003a: 18). Blair was essentially referred to as a realist, who knew that 
influencing the U. S. could only be achieved by staying close to it, and that staying close 
to Washington was in Britain's best interests. "Far from being George Bush's poodle, 
Mr. Blair takes a more detached view of why being publicly close to Washington is in 
Britain's interests. If there are obvious dangers, there are potentially big gains" (Riddell, 
2003b: 20). The Prime Minister may not have confronted Bush openly, but he had 
privately shaped many decisions on the War on Terror and had also taken many 
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initiatives. "The relationship between the British Prime Minister and American President 
is much more subtle, and balanced, than many realize ... Over the past 18 months, the 
British Prime Minister, far from lamely following in President Bush's wake, has been an 
architect of the West's anti-terror strategy" ('Dogged Diplomacy', 2003: 27). This 
representation is very similar to the articulations of Blair as a wise advisor to Bush and 
the U. S. (see chapter 4) after the September II attacks. According to both 
representations, Blair was constructed as a worthy leader in world politics, whose 
relationship to the U. S. was one of similarity rather than submission and inferiority. 
The final, least popular discourse, found predominantly in the Mirror articulated the 
Prime Minister as a "'hypocrite' (Sheridan, 2003a: 13), and "the man with blood on his 
hands ... who took my country to war against Yugoslavia and bombed civilian targets 
hundreds of miles away from Kosovo. He is also the man who approved the carpet 
bombing of Afghanistan, resulting in untold deaths (Routledge, 2003a: 5). Moreover, he 
was 46a tyrant who ignores the wishes of his people and does exactly what he wants, no 
matter how irrational" (Furbank, 2003: 19), as well as "a cuckoo in our nest ... Not 
for 
nothing is his name an anagram of B Liae' (Routledge, 2002c : 8-9). What defined him 
was "weakness masquerading as strength and lies tarted-up to look like truth" (Starling, 
2002: 6). 
A Mirror front cover (Appendix C, Figure 12) showed Tony Blair in the attire of an 
executioner looking at the viewer. The bold headline stated: "Blair's Bleak New Year 
Message - You've never had it so bad". Another Mirror cover (Appendix C, Figure 13) 
showed a full-page image of Blair smiling, under the headline: "Prime Monstee,? 
Finally, a picture in the Mirror (Appendix C, Figure 14) depicted Tony Blair speaking 
from a lectern during one of his briefings. The photo was taken from a low angle, so the 
lectern was the focal point of the photo, while one could only discern half of Blair's face 
above it. The angle created the impression that Blair was hiding behind a tombstone. 
This impression was enhanced by the caption: "Grave concern: Blair appears to be 
peering over a tombstone as he speaks from the lectern at his monthly briefings 
yesterday". Blair's predication as a "monster" and as an "executioner", as well as the 
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image of him speaking behind a grave-looking lectern, positioned him in opposition to 
G'us'v, as warmonger intent on and bound to cause many deaths. 
The future of Britain lies 
The question of where Britain's allegiances should lie, with Europe or with the U. S., 
featured prominently in 71e 7"Imes discourse, which favoured closer ties with the U. S. 
7he Afirror and The Independent didn't engage in a long debate about the role of Britain 
in the international arena, even though Europe was generally favoured and the war in Iraq 
was constituted as marginalizing both the Prime Minister and the U. K. in Europe. This 
section initially analyzes 71e Independent and Mirror pro-E. U. discourse and then moves 
on to an analysis of 77ie Y"imes pro-U. S. discourse. 
in the European Union 
According to this pro-E. U. representation, which was mostly an Independent and Mirror 
representation, the alleged special relationship with the U. S. was nothing more than an 
illusion. "Far from being a partnership of equals, the special relationship has barely been 
a partnership at all. The Americans have been happy to have us with them, but only as 
long as we did their bidding" (Anderson, 2003a: 12). Similarly, "the only 'special' 
aspect of the relationship is its demeaning one-sidedness ... I 
doWt believe any future 
British prime minister, Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat, will again put the US 
before Europe. More than ever, it seems to me, Britain's destiny is with Europe" 
(Whittam Smith, 2003: 19). 
In addition, Britain's position in the EU had been undermined as a result of Blair's stance 
and his uncompromising backing of President Bush. "Me Prime Minister has been 
sulking like a schoolboy nobody wants to play with ever since. From his comer of the 
EU playground, Blair has resorted to the kind of name calling which characterised the 
Thatcher years, when relations with the EU hit rock bottom" (Davidson, 2002: 6). 
Moreover, "our leadership has stamped over our democracy and our relationships with 
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the European Union and the rest of the world" (Alibhai-Brown, 2003: 18). Finally, 
"Britain has squandered the opportunity to be a better European playee, (Overy, 
2003: 26). A detachment from the E. U. not only isolated the U. K., but also 
disempowered it. "Increasingly, the issue of conflict with Iraq is isolating Britain inside 
Europe. It is stifling Britain's voice, diminishing Britain's influence and calling into 
question our countr-Vs European allegiance" ('Symbolic Moment', 2003: 18). It was also 
maintained that Britain should embark on an effort to improve its relations with the 
European Union, since it was in its best interests. "Tony Blair should admit that he 
cannot ride the twin horses of Europe and America. And it makes more sense to unite 
with our EU partners, whose interests are ciosee, ('Stop doing Bush's dirty work, Tony, 
2002: 6). 
In the above representation, the U. S. and the E. U. were positioned in opposition to each 
other as two equally powerful, yet very different subjects. Because of this constructed 
incompatibility between the U. S. and the E. U., the U. K. "partnership" with one of the 
two was seen as destroying the relationship with the other. As a result, the U. K. was 
constituted as in need to choose and align with one of the two powers, namely the E. U. 
Thus, not only was the U. K. positioned in a relationship of similarity to the E. U., but it 
was also positioned in opposition to the U. S. This need to align with the E. U. was 
reinforced by means of predicates, such as "destiny", "partners". "opportunity", closer" 
which were attached to the E. U., in contrast to predicates such as "diminish", 
"squandered", "stamped ovee,, "demeaning one-sidedness", which constructed the U. K. - 
U. S. relationship as detrimental to the more important UK-E. U. partnership. Finally, the 
U. S. was ftirther othered by means of 
, 
shifters s. uch. as '. ýthemý'_and "their", in contrast to 
shifters; such as "our partners", which hailed the readers to identify with the E. U. 
with the United States 
The second representaion, primarily in The Times, constituted the E. U. as an oppressive, 
bureaucratic institution of limited capabilities and increased expectations, which would 
never be capable of achieving significant political unity. "As Europe has become 
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politically more powerful, its institutions ... have shown an increasing tendency to pursue 
their own interests, to turn into Japanese-style bureaucratic tribes. The idea that Europe 
will ever forge a sense of political identity strong enough to overcome these centrifugal 
tribal forces is surely far-fetched" (Kaletsky, 2003a: 24). Moreover, "Under all the make- 
up of symbolic statehood - passports, flags, anthems, numberplates - the E. U. has never 
really been more than a highly sophisticated set of legal duties and reciprocal deals 
between nation states, albeit a unique one" (Tyrie, 2002: 22). Therefore, "It seems to me 
that the power game is already lost. It is very hard to see any set of circumstances where 
Europe collectively will be able to exert much military or even political power in the 
world over the next generation ... the EU as a body is and will remain impotent" 
(McRae, 2003: 16). 
For this reason, it was in Britain's interests to disengage itself from the E. U. "We in 
Britain will not, and need not be sucked into such a state without our consent" (Tyrie, 
2002: 22). "'Ever greater union' is rubbish ... nobody, especially a Briton, can act 
Napoleon to the myriad interests and cultures of Europe" (Jenkins, 2002: 20). With a 
European constitution, "the European nations will have lost their independence; they will, 
in effect, be colonies of a centralised European empire, ruled by the Franco German 
political class ... it is anti-parliamentary, anti-democratic, anti-British, and even 
ultimately anti-European" (Rees-Mogg, 2002: 18). Additionally, "When will the British 
wake up from their pathetic little dreams of being Europeans and realise that we have 
been looking for our future in all the wrong places? Who wants to be European today? " 
(Parsons, 2003a: 17). 
In contrast, a bond with the U. S. was naturalized in this representation. Not only was the 
U. S. constituted as much more powerful than the E. U., but also the relationship between 
Britain and the U. S. was articulated as "naturally" closer and more important. "Britain 
has always been semidetached from Europe because that is its geography. The bond with 
America, so infuriating to the French, is embedded in British consciousness. It is crucial 
to European security. Government autonomy is also what British people want. They 
distrust Brussels as an agency of their domestic rule' (Jenkins, 2002: 20). The U. S. and 
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the E. U. were often compared, and the U. S. always emerged as the natural ally. "But if 
the one-sided scrap with Iraq taught us anything, it's surely that we need to break free 
from the European Union, not mate with it. For all the rampant anti-Americanism in this 
country, there can surely be no argument that we share a bond with the United States that 
no country in Europe can compare to. We are tied to America by language, culture, 
blood, history and instinct ... The war with Iraq proved that this country has no 
bond 
with its continental neighbours" (Parsons, 2003c: 17). Therefore, Britain would have to 
make a choice between the E. U. and the U. S., a self-evident choice according to this 
representation. "The world has changed: he can no longer have Brussels and 
Washington, too. He will have to choose between the new European constitution, which 
weds him to the Franco-German axis, and the alternative that strengthens and enlarges the 
historic special relationship with America, while at the same time solidifying Britain's 
role as the leader of 'New Europe"' (Stelzer, 2003: 18). 
The Times discourse created a dichotomy between the U. S. and 'Europe' by pointing out 
that a bond with the U. S. was natural while a further political alliance with the E. U. was 
enslaving. Moreover, the fact that the E. U. member states were often articulated as 
"impotent", "ungrateful" or "pathetic" constructed Britain as a superior subject which 
belongs to a stronger and more 'principled' alliance, that is the U. S. The U. K. - E. U. 
relationship was to a great extent constructed in relation to the U. S. Since the U. S. and 
the E. U. were positioned in an oppositional relationship to each other, and since the U. K. 
was placed in a complementary relationship with the U. S., the E. U. and the U. K. were 
seen as being incompatible. In other words, the ties with the U. S. distinguished the U. K. 
from other EU members. Therefore, this discourse was essentially an inversion of ne 
Independent and Yhe Mirror discourse, which similarly positioned the E. U. and the U. S. 
in opposition to each other, but also constituted the U. K. as enslaved by the U. S. and as in 
need to ally with the E. U. 
Similar representations have also been constructed in the past. For example, Ichijo points 
out that during the Kosovo crisis as well as during the Euro launch the British public 
discourse constructed the European Union as 'Europe', a super state in the making, which 
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would not be successful and would end up reducing its member states to subordinate 
units. Britain was constructed as different from and superior to other European countries, 
a difference which was often articulated. with reference to history and the special 
relationship with the U. S. Since Britain was incompatible with Europe/EU, it would only 
be natural for Britain to pull out from the Union (Ichijo 2005: 1-6). 
"Old Europe" as a threat to world order 
Rumsfeld's reference to France and Germany as "Old Europe" 192 was adopted in the pro- 
U. S. discourse and was naturalized as true. "Mr Rumsfeld did us all a favour by 
distinguishing the New and Old Europe" (Powell, 2003: 13). By the same token, 
"Donald Rumsfeld's statement last week that France and Germany constitute Old Europe 
may not have been a triumph of diplomacy, but it didn't lack condour" ('Regime 
Change', 2003: 25). Specifically, Old Europe was articulated as "mean spirited" 
(Kaletsky, 2003d: 24), with "sclerotic aspirations for world power, and terribly weak 
leaders, shored up by appeals to crude anti-Americanism (Schroder) or to the fact that 
they are not actually neo-fascist (Chirac)" (Sullivan, 2003: 4). On the other hand, New 
Europe with its "vibrant labour markets, high growth potential and inspiring futures, is 
growing up around the Old Europe, which generally lacks those things" (Brooks, 2003: 
24) 
Specifically regarding the war in Iraq, Old Europe was described as having adopted a 
"juvenile and obstructive stance", which proved "the new weakness of Old Europe" 
(Gove, 2003c: 18), and which essentially isolated it in the international arena. "The 
posturing of Jacques Chirac and the strategic pacifism of Gerhard Schroder have painted 
a wholly misleading picture of European opinion" ('Regime Change', 2003: 25). "Me 
'transatlantic rift' actually involves just a handful of European countries, since Italy, 
Spain and most of Eastern Europe, have already given America the same unstinting 
support as Tony Blair" (Kaletsky, 2003a: 24). France and Germany were also constituted 
192 On the 22d of January, 2003, The secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, rcmarked: "Now, you are 
thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I tWnk that's old Europe" (2003: online) 
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as bullies, with "patronising attitudes" ('Wanted', 2003: 16) towards the candidate states 
which had sensibly opted for backing the U. S. in the war in Iraq. "British support for the 
US-led war -and the support offered by ten smaller current and prospective EU members 
-brought animosity from the 'old' states of France and Germany, and an outrageous 
attempt to intimidate candidate states into silence by the bumptious French President, 
Jacques Chirac" ('Expanding Empire', 2003: 25). 
Furthermore, France's opposition to the war and the fact that it threatened to veto a 
resolution on Iraq were narrated as dangerous for world order. "France's action will leave 
lasting bitterness in America, weaken the United Nations, divide the European Union, 
wreck the transatlantic alliance and signal the possible end of Nato as a useful political 
and military body ... It will encourage dictators around the world, from Pyongyang to 
Harare, to believe that they can defy UN resolutions, oppress their people and get away 
with it, safe in the knowledge that France will take a self-indulgent and unprincipled 
stand, at least as long as M Chirac is in the Elysee ... The threat to use the veto 
mindlessly has already caused damaging turmoil" ffrench disconnection', 2003: 23). 
Therefore, "It is the President of France who is today the most serious obstacle to world 
ordee, (Hames, 2002: 18). Similarly, "Herr Schroder has considerably reduced the 
political and psychological pressure on Iraq, making it more likely that Saddam will 
continue to flout UN obligations and thus invite an American attack" (Berlin Blinkered', 
2003: 21). 
Finally, "Old Europe's" stance was not only seen as harmful, but it was also constructed 
as immoral. "While American neo- conservatives, at least, have a vision of democracy 
for the Arab peoples - through violently overthrowing the Arab dictators who stand in its 
way - the French offer the oppressed Arab people nothing but a pessimistic shrug and a 
few million francs more for the corrupt Yasser Arafat" (Hari, 2003: 18). Therefore, "this 
is fundamentally a division between those who believe that foreign policy should involve 
ethics backed with force and those who doret. It is a divide between Palmerstonians on 
one side and pacifists, parasites or pirates on the other ... French elites treat 
foreign 
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policy like sex, a sphere in which morality is never allowed to intrude" (Gove, 2003d: 
18). 
A dichotomy was thus created in The Times discourse, whereby the E. U. was divided in 
"old" and "new" Europe; while "old Europe" was constructed as "weak", "sclerotic", 
"juvenile", "patronizing", "lacking", "New Europe" was articulated as its opposite, that is 
"vibrant", "inspiring", "growing", with "potential". Moreover, while "Old Europe's" 
stance on the war was "dangerous", "immoral" and "pessimistic", "New Europe's" stance 
was "ethical". A polarization was thus created, whereby the E. U. was divided in two 
opposing camps, one which supported a war in Iraq and was a positive force, and the 
other which objected to the war and embodied negativity. As Rode (2005) also points 
out, this discourse is reminiscent of the Cold war discourse, in which democratic nations 
were labeled"the West", while countries with communist regimes were called "the East". 
However, not only did this discourse dichotomize the E. U. in two opposite poles, but it 
also united otherwise disparate identities against those countries which didn't support the 
Iraq war. 
However, the above discourse can and has been contested. For example, there is a 
reversal of the old/new Europe binary in the Greek section, where "old Europe" connotes 
maturity, experience and morality, whereas "New Europe" connotes immaturity. As 
Rode also points out in his study of German media representations of Rumsfeld's 
"Old/New Europe" binary (2005), the German media constituted "Old Europe" as 
civilized, with a rich cultural and political history; it was also constructed as mature 
"through experience and history of bloody wars"; "Moreover, "Old Europe's" aversion 
towards the Iraq war in the German media discourse emanated from the fact that it had 
"overcome the concept of war as a political strategy" as a result of their history of bloody 
and destructive wars. 
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Greek press representations: October 2002-April 2003 
This section on the Greek press is divided in three parts, the first of which looks at the 
press representations of the U. S. as an empire, intent on colonizing the world. The U. S. 
was represented as a "New Rome" whose deeds were also reminiscent of "Hitler's New 
World Order Vision". The second part analyzes representations of the war in Iraq, which 
was described as a crucial step in the U. S. colonizing vision and was therefore perceived 
as a threat to humanity. A persistent discourse during the war, which I elaborate on in the 
third part, was the construction of Iraqis as heroically resisting U. S. domination and of 
the anti-war movement as a force capable of "defeating" the U. S. The fourth part looks 
at the role of Europe in the war, which was constituted as under threat and in urgent need 
of unification in order to "wipe ouf' the U. S. At the same time that the E. U. was 
glorified, the U. S. was condemned as a corrupt exploiter, while the eight European 
leaders in favour of the war were heavily criticized as "traitors". 
The U. S. subject 
7he Empire strikes back -A threatening New Order 
The Greek press represented the U. S. as a ruthless, greedy and constantly expanding 
empire aspiring to world domination. Such was the association of the U. S. with empire 
that the leading articles in left-wing Eleutherotipia always referred to Bush as "Emperor 
Bush" and to the U. S. as "the Empire". "The American Empire ... is only satisfied when 
all existing regimes are subordinate to its hegemony and obey as well as carry out its 
orders without raising any objections" (Netas, 2003b). 193 Moreover, "with Bush and his 
policies for the National Security of the United States, imperialism becomes an official 
state policy aiming at military domination of the planet, with pre-emptive use of violence 
against any country which doesn't appeal to America. This cannot merely be called a 
change of American foreign policy-, it is the return to ancient Rome, the Colosseum, 
193 "H qLEptKavucj avToKpaToptoL ... 
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where the Americans are the spectators and all the other nations are waiting for the lions 
in the arena" (Vranas, 2003a: N06). 194 
The "sheriff/cowboy" metaphor which was constantly used during the war in Afghanistan 
(see Chapter 4) was still frequently employed but Bush was predominantly depicted as a 
Roman Emperor and the U. S. as a modem Rome. "The anti-war cries of despair don't 
move Caesar ... He is fascinated by the glory of the Roman 
Empire ... The world 
has to 
bow at his sight and not disappoint him. Even more, of course, people should not defy 
his grandiose plans to expand his empire and perpetuate it. The imposition of "Pax 
Americana" in the "broader Middle East" with the establishment of even more obedient 
regimes and the reformation of whole nations, as is scheduled by the professed plans of 
the neoconservatives and religiously obsessed eagles of Washington, is the most 
important aim of the bellicose emperor Bush ... the ambitious plans of 
New Rome" 
(Moronis, 2003a). 195 The main aim of the Empire was expansion, and ultimately the 
colonization of the whole world. Moreover, its immense military power rendered it the 
most dangerous and threatening Empire in the history of humankind. "Who out of the 
former emperors, Caesars, Great Alexanders or Napoleons had as much power (as he 
does)" (Boukalas, 2003a)? 196 'This is an empire worse than the ancient Persian, the 
Roman, the Byzantine and the British" (Papadopoulos, 2003a: N06). 197 
In this dominant representation, the U. S. was positioned in opposition to the world, in a 
relationship of occupier/occupied, by means of predicates, such as "obey", "orders", 
"arrogance", "obedient", "bellicose", "dominatioif' and "subordinate". However, it was 
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mainly the metaphor of the U. S. as Rome that facilitated and reinforced the positioning of 
the U. S. as a very dangerous subject with relentless imperial ambitions. The Roman 
Empire is recognized by historians as one of the most successful empires in history, and 
definitely the longest lasting one. It used military power to expand its territory, and at its 
height stretched "from the moors of Scotland out to the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys 
of Iraq today and from the North Seas of Germany to the sands of the Sahara" ffears', 
2005: online). Thus, articulating the U. S. as the New Roman Empire, constituted the 
U. S. as a mighty superpower, capable of and intent on colonizing vast areas and 
expanding its territory by military means. Any U. S. action was therefore naturalized as 
stemming from its imperial ambitions. Not only was it presupposed that the U. S. was an 
Empire, but it was also presupposed that the notion of Empire was a very negative one. 
Since the U. S. was positioned in a relationship of similarity to all previous Empires, it 
was thus also presupposed that the U. S. Empire was a very negative force in the world. 
Moreover, the representation of the U. S. as the most dangerous and malicious Empire 
ever demonized the U. S. as the 'ultimate other'. 
The Empire metaphor was complemented by an equally dominant representation of the 
U. S. strategic plans as similar to Hitler's 'New Order" vision. "The Bush dogma for pre- 
emptive defence resembles Hitler's dogma for "viable space'. It allows any type of war 
even when there is no cause or reason... " (Papadopoulos, 2003b: N06). 198 The U. S. was 
on its way towards the imposition of a new, menacing world order, characterized by 
ethnic cleansing and ruthlessness. 'The New Order of things is there, it is relentless and 
very threatening" (Giannoulopoulos, 2003a). 199 Moreover, "the promoted new 
international order is nothing other than a Pax Americana" (Ligeros, 2003c). 200 Finally, 
"It is definitely neonazism, but I am not even sure that Germany's Hitler had completely 
disregarded the then League of Nations or if it had treated immigrants in its borders with 
methods as fierce [as the U. S. ]" (Giannaras, 2003) . 
20 1 The U. S. was therefore 
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represented as an amalgam of Roman might and arrogance on the one hand and a more 
modem, fascist, Hitler-style authoritarian rule on the other, thus rendering it extremely 
deadly and murderous, as well as more merciless than Rome or Hitler. 
Sketches in all Greek newspapers depicted the U. S. as a Nazi empire and Bush as Hitler, 
or as a Hitler worshiper. One sketch (Appendix D, Figure 1) depicted the Akropolis 
monument in Athens. In the place of the Greek national flag, which normally stands 
beside the Akropolis, there was the American flag, but it had been replaced by a Nazi 
swastika. The Akropolis is regarded as one of the most defining national symbols, along 
with the flag and the national anthem. Thus, replacing the Greek flag with the American 
one, connoted occupation; the swastika in the place of the American stars connoted 
occupation in the fashion of Nazi Germany. Another sketch (Appendix D, Figure 2) 
which reinforced this image depicted President Bush in his office sitting between two 
American flags. On the wall behind him was a large portrait of Hitler, while sitting near 
him was a female figure asking him: "Do you regard yourself as the new Churchill", with 
President Bush answering, "Javoll". Similarly to the previous sketch, Bush was equated 
with Hitler. Finally, another sketch (Appendix D, Figure 3) showed what looked like two 
Nazi soldiers marking the wall of a house with the Jewish sign, "Juden Raus" [Jews out]. 
The inhabitant of the house complained to the soldiers: "But we are not Iraqis". And one 
of the soldiers replied. "That is what Serbians and Afghans thought! Nowadays, whoever 
isn't American is an Iraqi". The whole world was positioned in opposition to the U. S. in 
this sketch, while the American soldiers were positioned in similarity to the Nazis. Thus, 
as a result of such representations, the world was constituted as under threat by the U. S. 
It is noteworthy that the Hitler metaphor was also used by the Bush administration during 
the Gulf war to refer to Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime (see for example 
Macdonald, 2002; Spellman and Holyoak, 1992). As Macdonald points out (2002: 38- 
39), Bush's and Thatcher's decision to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait so 
promptly with military force was partly due to the "30s analogy", which "ruled out any 
appeasement policies and influenced British and American perceptions of Hussein's 
irrationality, the stakes, policy options, and whether Iraq or the coalition would grow 
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stronger over time. The analogy thus directly influenced policy choices, leading to the 
early decision to respond promptly with military force". Similarly, through articulations 
of Bush as Hitler and of the U. S. as Nazi, the threat emanating from the "U. S. Empire" 
was constituted as immense and immediate. As is seen in the following section, the 
Iraqis, the E. U. and the world in its entirety were constituted in opposition to the U. S., as 
well as in need to fight the U. S. Such representations were naturalized and rendered 
necessary through the articulation of the U. S. as a dangerous, totalitarian actor, in the 
fashion of Hitler's Germany, and as an overtly ambitious and arrogant Empire, in the 
fashion of ancient Rome. 
Despite all the descriptions of the U. S. as a mighty power and a nearly unstoppable force, 
it was also pointed out that the future of the Empire was grim since "descent starts when 
arrogance reaches its peak" (Papadopoulos, 2003: N04) . 
202 By the same token, "we 
203 
should not forget that no empire can last forever" (Diakogiannis, 2003). As a 
consequence, "Persia and Rome in antiquity and Nazist Germany in our times are 
examples which speak for themselves" (Oikonomopoulos, 2003c). 
204 The problem 
nevertheless seemed to be, as was generally acknowledged, that the Empire would cause 
general havoc and destruction before its inevitable demise. "The Evil Empire will fall in 
a few decades. While heading towards decline, however, it will destroy everything with 
its arrogance and will fill the world with ills, blood and tears" (Papadopoulos, 2003b: 
N06). 205 
A disregardfor international law 
International law and international justice were constituted as under attack by the 
unilateralist Emperor. 'The emperor and his ally[Blair], who is nostalgic for the 
grandeur of the British empire, seem to be determined to dispose of the United Nations 
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and violate international law, so as to launch a terrorist war of power demonstrati&' 
('Videogame of Disaster', 2003). 206 Thus, the U. S. was constructed as a belligerent 
actor, intent on and capable of destroying or completely restructuring the international 
system, which would be based on Pax Americana, and would be utterly undemocratic. 
"Post-war international justice is restructured by the empire ... the new model of 
imperial 
justice replaces the United Nations and transfers the "right of intervention" to the most 
powerful force" (Kalfelis, 2003b: N06). 207 The power of the mightiest would 
overshadow any form of cooperation between nations, since every decision would be 
taken by the U. S. itself. "International relations will not be based on international justice, 
but rather on the mood and interests of the empire ... Democracy is raped and threatened 
with even further molesting when one shows contempt towards the will of the majority of 
nations and of peoples" (Netas, 2003d) . 
208 In the end, "'Pre-emptive violence' by one 
country, will have triumphed over collective action, which is meant to be based on the 
laws of intemational justice" (Bourdaras, 2002). 209 
Such constructions were complemented by a number of sketches, one of which showed 
two pictures in chronological sequence. In the first picture, one could discern two hands, 
with the words Bush and UN inscribed on them. The 'UN hand' was seen delivering the 
UN inspectors' verdict to the 'Bush hand'. In the second picture the 'Bush hand' was 
seen throwing the inspectors' verdict, now a paper plane with a bomb attached to it. This 
sketch connoted U. S. unilateralism. and aggressiveness. Not only was Bush shown to 
have completely disregarded the U. N. verdict, by turning it into a paper plane, but 
attaching a bomb to it also signified U. S. belligerence and warlike attitude. A second 
sketch (Appendix D, Figure 4) depicted Bush and Blair dressed as soldiers sitting on a 
bench while Kofi Annan, was shining Blair's and Bush's black boots. Blair asked Bush: 
206 *'0 CL1)Tolýodzopct; KOI 0 appax6ý TOU, VO(ITGLIT6; TOI) ßpETC1V1K0Ü CI'UTOKPCITOPIxoe fflaWolug EP(PavgovTctl 
cziroga(itagbot va czXpTioTLýcouv Tov OHE K(II Va ICCLPUß1600'UV TO 8tCOVt; SiKCLIO, 'XPOIC£tllkVOI) VCt gCL7[()lýCFOI)V tvcLV 
TPOI4OKPCLTIK6 n6)£110 LICI5F. 1411; WXÜOý'. 
207 "n P£TäßCLOI (17r6 TOV lktZCPIC&t(Y)16 MV CLUTOKPCLTOP[Ct PETWXnýUlTiýEI TO IIETCLIZO)£ýIKÖ 8tFOVt; 8iK«10, rO 01tOt0 
icaoopiý6tav CLI[6 (n)pßäcr£K Kat CFUVOAKE;. To vto povTLýo Tou cii)ToKpctTopucoe 8ucaio-o EKTongctrci HV(ügbcTOvll 
KM gTCtOtTFI TO '8tKC(i0)JICC TU5 ClttltßCLCTI; ' MV tWP6TEP11 8ýVCtgTý'. 
208 4. ot ötr »oVr 
j; ox tCra ý1; 8tv ea pueý(ýovrcLt PC ßdtun TO 8t£Ovk; 8ilccLto, UW Tt; EicäaTOTE 81aotattý Kott TCL auggtpovTa 
Tq; CLUTOKpaTopta; ... 
Mg T9V ZEPI9P6V9M1 Tq; poe). I1(Yyl; 95 IcýMOXR(P(CL; UM KpctT6)v KGLI TO)v lad)vl pläýEM, 
8-1P1cpctTla Kat C11tEllEiTc(t 96 lrctp(IlctpcL KCLKOICoillclý'. 
209 "H $irpolilirTu(: A' ßia tou Ev6g, Oa tXtt OpiajißLi5crei es ßäpo; tg; crulloytKA; 8päarN 11 oiroiaunoilOsTat, Oa 1'Ptlc£t 
va MplýeTat cm; ctpXtg Tou Atsevo-ö; Aucajoull. 
200 
"George, what about giving it [the UN] a few more responsibilities", while Bush replied: 
"Even more responsibilities, Tony"? Annan was thus positioned as Bush's subservient 
employee and servant, being reduced to obeying Bush's orders and shining shoes. This, 
in turn signified that the U. N. didn't have a meaningful or powerful presence in the 
international system, and was rendered useless by the U. S. 
US. as a violent and an unworthy culture 
U. S. aggressive foreign policy was associated with the innately violent American nature, 
which was manifest in their domestic policies as well as their daily lives. "Violence 
is 
inscribed in their genes and is the undeniable practice of their daily life" (Tsalidis, 
2003) 
. 
210 "This uncontrolled, blind, insane violence is inscribed in the DNA of their 
civilization7' (Danikas, 2003: N72). 21 1 The government was also described as nurturing 
"hard-line values" and encouraging violence in the everyday practices of its populace. 
"The country whose language is violence; [the country] which deifies its society's violent 
murderers; ... which 
has allowed violence at the expense of black people; which bonours 
violence in legalizing the use of guns by its citizens ... these well-fed cavemen 
in dark 
212 suits" (Kastriotis, 2003). According to this representation, American culture was 
constructed as uniformly uninspiring and unworthy. "This god-fearing, hard-working, 
conservative white America, which regards its privileges as a divine gift, poverty as a just 
divine punishment towards lazybones, taxation as immoral, environmental restraints 
towards businesses as the invention of crazy communists, labour laws as an offence 
towards the rights of the employer, and social benefits as an immoral and atheist money 
transfer from the god fearing and hard-working white employee towards the black, drug 
addicts and the lazy, this same god-fearing America which votes for Bush, listens to hard- 
line right wing radio stations, watches Fox channel, laughs at what they see as a declining 
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French manhood and fears Saddam, as well as protests against homosexuals" (Tsimas, 
2003b: N04). 2 13 
This representation has similar effects to the British press discourses on terrorism, since it 
constructed the U. S. as inherently violent (see also Karim in Riggins 1997 and Shaheen 
1984). While the terrorists were articulated as irrational and evil, the U. S. was 
constituted as "genetically" violent and intrinsically "hard-line". This essentially meant 
that it was impossible to negotiate with the U. S., which would remain violent and 
irrational no matter what. Moreover, this representation magnified the U. S. threat, 
because it couldn't be reasoned with or pacified. 
To sum up, the U. S. was constructed as an overtly dangerous 'other' intent on colonizing 
the world. That the Empire and Nazi metaphors outnumbered the descriptions of the U. S. 
as the Wild West and Bush as a sheriff/cowboy, which were the predominant metaphors 
in the months following September 11, demonstrates the magnification of the U. S. threat, 
which was constituted as spreading around the world; the Wild West metaphor is more 
contained than the Nazi and Rome metaphors, which construct the U. S. as an Empire. 
The American empire, it was argued, would follow the same route that other Empires had 
followed in the past. It would conquer and enslave many places before it eventually lost 
its power and fell. Moreover, the representation of the American culture as inherently 
violent and ignorant increased the danger stemming from the "evil Empire". The above 
representation of the U. S. as the most dangerous and malicious Empire ever demonized 
the U. S. as the 'ultimate other' and constructed it as an entirely negative force. 
Moreover, it positioned the U. S. in opposition to the world, as the most dangerous threat 
facing humanity. As is seen in the following sections, a set of different and separate 
identities were united as a"totality", in opposition to the U. S. Empire. 
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Gcd Sticatd)paw TOD EpyoS6Tq MI Tt; KOtVcovtKt; napoXt; (6ac; a7cIpcivav xta cm; HnA) w, pta aAOtKq Icat &Ocn 
"Ta(POP& XpTjPd*ro)v a7c6 Tov 0coOtpoýlIeVO lCat GXXqpdL EPYCLý6AEVO 7EPO; TOV PCP5pO, TOV 7[p&; &Kla, TOV T&9ldlnR aUT4 
Tj Ococepoi5pEq Apcpucj 71OU "(PV, 91 M7COU;, CLICOUt Tct vx6 aKPOSCttd KuptapXia pa8t6(po)vct, PXtnEt 004 TudVO, 
ýlqTd TO KC(p6lt TOV niTcp ApAT aTo 7R&TO, yOA&t PC aViKSOTCE Tla TOV PEMPNO aviptup6my rauwv nou 
TOfIO15VTCLt TOV I: CWTdp, K(It KCtTEfWVEt CIE CtVTt-8tCt8nXd)OEI; CVaVT(oV Taw I etplIV69"V oPOTUX6(p0aV' - Cn)A 11 
ApEpucý Efvctt pia vfcL X6)pa". 
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The war in Iraq and American imperialism 
While the U. S. was constituted as an Empire intent on colonizing the world, the Iraq war, 
in turn, was constructed as simply a step in this colonization. This section looks at the 
construction of the Iraq war as a U. S. hegemonic and colonizing project. Moreover, the 
Iraqis in this discourse were articulated as heroically resisting this U. S. domination. 
Colonizing Iraq and a threat against humanity 
The Greek press described the war in Iraq as a colonizing enterprise, whose aims were 
the control of the oilfields as well as the control of the wider Middle East region. 
Therefore, the war would result in Iraq becoming dependent on the U. S., rather than 
liberated and autonomous. "Iraq of 22 million people will be the second U. S. state in 
terms of population. And if Texas can't put up with being third, President Bush could 
divide Iraq in North and South (this has happened before anyway)" (Vranas, 2003b: 
N84). 214 Moreover, the Americans would not withdraw their troops after the occupation 
of the country and Saddam's demise, but would stay in Iraq for a long time, making the 
most of the conquerors' privileges. "They will stay in Iraq so as to terrorize the whole 
area and mainly in order to establish their worldwide hegemony" ('An Outrage with a 
215 View to Profit', 2003). The people would merely be slaves, with the U. S. rulers 
turning Iraq upside down. "It is as simple as that: The "liberation" in reality means 
enslavement and "the liberators" will be nothing other than tyrants" (Netas, 2003d). 216 
214 4cTO IP&IC, ge 22 cicawpjApta, Oa A-rav il 86T&pq nO). t-[Cia TEDV IMA cye nXqftcyý6 (icp6q ElVat il Ka. %t(p6pvta). Kat 
av ca)T6 8cv Oa ýLnopokm va To ctv-rk4Et To Tt4a;, nou ftai Oa fpcvE aqv Tp(Tq Otag, o np6c6poq Mnou; Oa linopoLOE 
va StapeXfact To lpdK CFC MPCIO Kat v6no (I)ndpXCt ICCEI CrE CLUT6 npoly6lievo) ... Av To lpdlc ylvet q 5111 woluda Tcov 
HrIA, ot Aýzpucavof Oa caco4vowat cav crro cmiTt Tou; icat Cut icat aqv Atapwý. E)a jinopo& va imyaivouv (Fra 
015vopa PC TO lpdv Icat va "Vdýovv O-rovq apaTOMY, KO'UVd)VTCLq TOI)q TO ýLECTCLIO 86XTUXO: 'E86) cillacrrel ot vtot cra; 
lEiTOVEC, Ot MEY6101 ECtTCtVdSC; l "'. 
15 "19a IIF-IVO'UV CYTO TP&K YICt VCt TP%tOKparý(yow 6Xq TTIV 7EEPIOX4 Kat 7tponavT6; YICL VCL ESPCLI6)00UV TqV qYCýLOVI(l 
Tou; aTov Ocylio". 
. -noxý anm, 11 axC%cu0tp0)cTj, antialvet UnOSOýX(0" KCLt Ot ((alEEXCU0tPG)Ttq) SEV OCL EIVCLI TInOTCE 6A0 71(XP& 
81)vd=ý'. 
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Moreover, there was no faith in the possibility of a relatively painless resolution of the 
conflict. It was generally agreed that the U. S. would remorselessly destroy the country. 
"Nobody doubts that America is intent on turning Baghdad into Guernica" (Vranas, 
217 2003c: N72). Additionally, when the war started it was agreed that "the illegal, the 
terrorist, the barbaric and murderous U. S. invasion turned Iraq into hell" (Murderers', 
2003). 218 Descriptions of the war, which was often referred to as an invasion, featured 
brutal U. S. invaders indiscriminately killing Iraqis and treating them inhumanly. "So 
suddenly on a Wednesday afternoon here comes a conquered, enslaved, humiliated and 
raped Baghdad ... the devastated Iraqi nation, on a land fed with 
blood and cancer 
because of the bombs ... with the children running tattered towards the 
invaders, with 
only one word coming out from their dried lips: "water"... with the captives a bit further 
covered with Ku-Klux-Klan hoods, tied and kneeling as is dictated by the ... Geneva 
Convention, before they are dragged like animals" (Bakomarou, 2003). 2 19 A sketch in Ta 
Nea (Appendix D, Figure 5) featured an American soldier with a gun in his hands having 
just bombed what looks like a wrecked maternity clinic. The soldier uttered: "At least we 
won't need to kill all those who haven't been born". 
The metaphor of slavery which runs through the entire Greek press discourse facilitated 
the construction of the Iraq war as a disaster for the Iraqis. The articulation of the Iraqis 
as slaves and of the U. S. as a tyrant followed from, and reinforced representations of the 
U. S. as a totalitarian Empire. Moreover, this metaphor reinforced the need for liberation 
from the tyrant. Thus, essentially this metaphor constructed moral dichotomies, whereby 
the U. S. was the ruthless occupier intent on enslaving the Iraqis, who were the innocent 
victims on the verge of enslavement and in need of liberation. However, in creating such 
moral dichotomies, this binary construction of the U. S. as tyrant and the Iraqis as 
217 "01 H17A KCLVEI; 89V Ctp(ptp&UEI AM 7ECO; tXOI)V TqV 7tp66EUq VCL pacaptiVow rq B(xySdTtl ac rKCpVtKe. 218 "H ouppopia q; napdvogq;, TTI; TpoRoKpaTtKý;, Tq; 06ppapTl;, rlq 8OXOq*VtKýq CMSPOPý;, 710*0 PETtTPETE GC 
K6Xaaq TO lpdK". 219 "Evat 4a(PVIK6, TO m6ymp Tq; TETdpTilq, VQ TIJV KCLTaKTnptq, TCLUMOP&TI, otaolAq il BaYS&TTI 
0 PaPTUPIK6; tpaKiv6q Wq, 7tdvo) cm Put Tq nonaptvq ILE afPCL Kat PC KapKivo an6 Tt; P611pe; ... ME TQ 7Eatbtd va 
TpfXO*OV paKLVSuTa 7(pOq TOI)q EIGPOXCý, PC pia p6vo X14il crTa 4cpaptva Xc(Xq Tau;: 'watff' ... Me Touq atXPQMTOV; 7110 KEt, CrKE7taaptvov; PS KObK6XC; a Xa Kou KXou4 Kkav, Up&ouq -tTpcpctv Ta Xtpta PC Ta (paywgtva VOXICL CV6; lynpou- yovcxTtcyTobq, 67t(j)q c7rudoom ... il 1:, uYOAKq Tqq rev6q;, 7rptv Tov; 6pouv crav Ta ýd)a &q Ta 7jju(pOpTnYd. MC 
TCL VOGOKOjlda Va g7l X(t)pdve &Uovq icoPgaTtaaPtvouq -To 95%T00V TPCL'UPCLnd)V EiVal YUVaiKEq, Jj%IKI(t)VtvOt KCEI 
Nalstd ... Me Ti; Ravd8c; va To)vd; ouvrp"gv&; za 7catStd Touq ptcFa am epci7ttcL ... Me Ta op(pavd, PlKpd 
K07168ta, 
vct ýijw& Tt; pavdUq TOI)q... Me TOV OpýVO, TOV Tp6PO KCR Tt; KCLT6pE; MOW Ct7enq KXEtUTL; 716PTEý'. 
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enslaved, denied social complexities (see for example Felstiner, 1983), since it merely 
demonized one side and did not take into account relevant issues, such as for example, 
the situation in Saddam-ruled Iraq. 
It needs to be stressed that the U. S. was depicted as an imperial occupier by all 
commentators and at all points. The Iraqi war was thus described as the siege and 
occupation of a country which would have undoubtedly preferred the status quo, that is 
life under Saddam. Hussein. Saddarn himself was non-existent in the press discourse. 
The few times he was mentioned, he was represented as a victim, since, as was argued in 
the press, he was attacked by the U. S. even though he had destroyed his weapons. The 
absence of Saddam. in the press discourse positioned the U. S. as the sole vile subject. 
The above representation is in contrast to The Times discourse, in which Saddam was 
described as the ultimate danger and the war in Iraq was therefore not only justified, but 
also imperative. Failing to describe the pro-war situation in Iraq, rendering Saddam 
invisible or even a victim and presupposing that the Iraqis were all against the war and 
ready to fight against the U. S., meant that the Iraq war was seen as a colonial occupation. 
Following from the above, the Iraq war was seen as a threat towards humanity, since it 
would mark the beginning of an indiscriminate expansive expedition. "Because of 
Bush's war the world will enter a neo-colonialist era with less democracy and freedom 
than what is the case nowadays" (Dretakis, 2003)? 20 Similarly, "What is at stake 
nowadays is the future of humankind itself' (Bitsakis, 2003b: N06). 22 1 According to this 
discourse, the Iraq war should not be taken lightly, because it was of utmost importance 
for the world. "This is not merely slavery for the Iraqis. [This is] slavery for all those 
who don't succumb to the desires and to the mood of the ones in power" (Kairos, 
222 2003). The U. S. was portrayed as the foremost menace in the history of humankind, 
threatening not only Iraqi but also world peace. "This is the largest bellicose machine 
ever known to humankind; in other words this is essentially the greatest threat against 
220 TEVIK6TEPCE, 0 K6opq Oct fXet EtcytIOM CYC 11ta VEO-CL71011CtaKý E7tOXA pe %ty6TEP11 Kai 6Xt 7ceptcyakepil 8nPoKpaTia 
Kai d"Oepta an6 EKEIVq ICOU X)IC&PXEt CýgCpa". 
221 "MT6 cuvcn(bq nou Stakupdnai 174gCpa E(Val TO (StO TO gtWv Tq; avOp(0716TnTOLý'. 
222 "Oxt cKXaPtd Tta To IP&K. EKXaptd yta &ov; 6cyot 6CV 1)7tOT6CFCFOVTat Crrt; EmOupit; Kai on; optýEt; T(ov tow6v". 
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humanity" ('Emperor and the Pope', 2003)223, or "The Nazis were the enemies of all 
nations. The Americans are the enemies of the human race" (Nautilos, 2003). 
224 It was 
maintained that the entire world was Bush's victim. "Saddarn Hussein will not be the 
only victim of the crime that will be committed by Bush the Caesar. It will be a crime 
against humanity" ('What the Hegemon likes', 2003). 225 Metaphors of slavery and the 
presupposition that the Iraq war was the first of many U. S. colonizing enterprises 
constituted the war in Iraq as a "threat against humanity". Thus, the world was 
positioned in similarity to the Iraqis and in opposition to the U. S. invader. 
The Iraq war was therefore depicted as a crucial point in U. S. imperialist history which 
would establish an even fiercer and more belligerent empire intent on attacking 
relentlessly. "This [the war in Iraq] is the continuation of previous ones (Balkans, 
Afghanistan), and is more importantly the link leading to an even more aggressive stance 
on the part of the chariot of American imperialism, the most criminal machine of human 
226 history" (Papavasileiou, 2003). Consequently, the war was particularly critical to U. S. 
strategic plans on the way to realizing their global imperialist vision. "The war against 
Iraqis is a very important stage in the march of the U. S. towards world hegemony. U. S. 
leaders envisage a modem terrorist empire, which will fulfil Fukuyama's prophecies: 
global capitalism under U. S. hegemony, global markets as a means of enrichment of the 
few at the expense of most people, global policeman, global cemetery of ideas and 
values. Global empire" (Bitsakis, 2003a: N06). 227 
According to this discourse, the U. S. was capable of creating a "global capitalist 
Empire". However, such a discourse concentrated solely on the U. S. without asking 
223 "llpkenat lia Tq pqcL%6Tcp7j nolcgwý pylXaA ROU YV6)PIGC Wrt 0 K6alto;, 8ýXaSA oucncLcmKdL yta Til pEyoUTcP1 
CL7160,1 MIT& Tq; avOpconftqTaý' 
224 "Ot Naýf ATav EXOpol Twv Aad)v. Ot Aýtcpucavol Elvat EXOpoi Tou AvOpd)nol)". 225 "To ty0olpa, nou uotjidýEmt va Stanpd4ct o icalaapa; Mnou;, Sev OcL tXct Np Tov I: avT&p Xol)aFtv. Ga EiVal tyKXIJjIa KQTd TQ; avOpwn6qwý' 226 "Ev6; nokipou zou anoukd cruvtXEtcL Tow npoTly6pmov (BctkKdvta, A(pyavicridv) icat, Kuplo);, KP(Ko 710U 
OU 
#PEI CC 7110 ElEtOETId; OtGEt; TO dpga TO'u agEpt0wicou quicptaktop-6, Tqv mo eyKXIýLaTtKA ILqXavA nou yvd)ptac 11 
avOP6)7rtvq IcrTopW'. 227 6ý0g6XEpo; (avan6VClUKT0; K. Xn. ) CVaV-rl0V'r0U XaO6 TOU lpdK dvat ((ctnypA)) Tq; noptigrow HITA 7(po; Tqv 
nay0opta ilycpovfxL 01 717LTEq Twv HrIA ovEye6ovTat pta 6yXpovq allT01CPaTOpla, nOIJ Oct npaypaTORMAGU Tt; 
7[POTTITCiC; TOU 'DoAmoyidpa: 7ECLYK60PIO; KainuLkiop6q ulc6 Tqv ilyEpovia Tow IMA, 7raymcquonoulptq ayopd, 
gloov xXouTt%tob T(ov Xlyow Kai 8umXta; T(Ov no), Mv, nayic6apto; Xo)poybXaicaq, nayic6aVto ve"Tayelo t8F-d)v Kal 
a4td)v. nctyK6crgta aumcpaTOpla". 
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important questions about the international state of affairs. This discourse emphasized 
agency over structure, since the U. S. was constituted as the only actor capable of 
transforming and shaping the international system. However, as Berglez (2004: 258) 
points out, "the U. S. is an independent agent with a great deal of power, strength and 
personal ambitions". At the same time, the U. S. is "an 'aspect' of a structural condition 
(the capitalist system) -a structural condition that could potentially be brought to the fore 
as relevant material for further interpretations and explanations". One cannot refer to 
capitalist structures in a purely theoretical and abstract manner in which the agents 
concerned are excluded from the discourse. Likewise, one cannot simply base all 
judgement on a specific actor leaving aside important structural discourses. The actor, 
which in this case is the U. S. is "discursively more attractive than 'capitalist structures' as 
the U. S. has undoubtedly a distinguishable character and a 'personality'. While discourse 
on the capitalist structures generates apathy and despair, discourse on the U. S. tends to 
create 'passionate energies' in various directions ... the U. S. is a polysemic text with a 
fundamental ability to stir up the minds and the hearts of the surrounding world, 
'doomed' or rather 'blessed' with the ability to suddenly turn otherwise slacking and lazy 
consumers into passionately engaged political citizens and even into anti-imperialist 
revolutionaries" (Berglez, 2004: 259). It is therefore not only the U. S. that one should be 
referring to, but also the capitalist system with encourages some and discourages other 
behaviours. 
7he resisting Iraqis 
The prime action ascribed to the Iraqis was resistance to the U. S. invader. Thus, at the 
same time that the Americans were demonized, the Iraqis were praised for their braveness 
and resolve. "They [the Americans] are ruthless, bloodthirsty and murderous, humanlike 
creatures, vampires, liars, thieves, petty crooks, hypocrites, angels of darkness, soulless 
humanoids, zealots and arrogant bastards who deny civilization, victimizers of souls, 
fascists and Hitler-like. They are dangerous. You see them in battle array and you are 
filled with disgust. They speak and drink the blood of innocent people ... Their presence 
revolts the soul, targets the heart and offends the thought, their arrogance terrorizes and 
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their disdain for panhuman civilization provokes and ridicules the human spirit. Ruthless 
butchers" (Tsalidis, 2003). 228 In contrast, "Iraqi passion and courage, which stems from 
their civilization, is enlightening for all those nations which stand against the savagery 
and the colonizing vision of the Americans. It is enlightening for all those who still 
believe that there is the right to resist the might of the tyrants" (Stainatopoulos, 2003 a). 
221 
Thus, "the power of the machine and of the bombs is eliminated by the decision to 
sacrifice life" ffiasco and Fantasy', 2003). 230 
While the U. S. was constructed in an entirely negative way, as the 'dangerous other', the 
Iraqis were the 'brave others', fighting not only for their liberation but for us' as well, 
for humanity itself. While the British press showed images of Iraqis celebrating the 
demise of Saddam along with pictures of suffering, the Greek press only published 
pictures of injured children and women, with newspaper covers featuring big headlines, 
such as "one foot in the grave for 6.000.000 people under siege! ', "The massacre will last 
for months", "Murderers" and "Serial Killers", followed either by pictures of crying 
babies or injured Iraqis in bombed surroundings (see Appendix D, Figures 6-8). 
Moreover, the Iraqi sacrifice and resistance was constituted as a wake-up call to the 
world. "Whatever happens in Baghdad, the Iraqi nation has already won. It sent the 
message to all the compromised, to all the subordinated, to all the subservient European 
realists that humanity is still there; it hasn't been lost yet. The resisting Iraqis honour 
history itself, they defend thousands years of civilization, they fight against the illiterate 
tyrant, they slap all of us who think they are politically right, they set fire to the 
hibernated conscience of the drowsy consumer ... the Iraqis fight for their 
freedom, their 
own-Ireed0m, as well as our freedom, for dignity, for their dead, for their ancient 
228 "Eivat cyK). npaTieq. Elva% a8faTaxTot, atpocrrayd; Kat ayop6pot, TtpaTa avOpcon6popya, Pc)4Epo6XTj8F;, 
PpuK6XaKE;, IYOTC;, KXtTTFq, TIXOTLVtOt CLnaTE6)VC;, 'UIIOKPtTt;, dtyy&XOt TOU aK6Toi);, dTuxot avOpwnoEth, 
OpilcmAnnot ulaý6vq, apvTITL; Tov 7coXtnCFPOb, NTC; VUX6)V, yacrtmetSý Kai XIT%CpicncoL Elvat EyKXIJIACITI&;. Eivat 
EnUCIvSluvoLTou; p4m; napaTaylitvoi); Kai Tj anSia nEPICFCFdCL M0, oOv Kai eptacrow To a(Va a0d)(ov. KdOe Xt4n 
TOV; Kai fVCt lyttta, K60C (Ppdoll Tol); Kai Illa. CUICL%ý, Tj 71CEPOI)CACt TOV; E4CYCIPCI TqV VVA, nXATI&I TqV Kapbld Kai 
71POCFP&Wt Tq O'KL%VTI, 71 U14OV(d TOU; TPOPOKPaTCI Kai Tj 7EEPUPp6vilaý Tou; 7rpo; Tov navcLvOpd)ntvo no) ITIcY96 
2 
ýýKCLXEI Kat It 6tao-Opm To xvdpa. A68oTot cqayctý'. 2 TO W600; Tow lpaKtvd)v, ItPOT6V ROXITRYPOb, civat To TO); XPO; 0,01); TOU; XaO6; XOV avTtcyTtKovTat cyrn Oilpt(oS[a, 
On; KCLTaKTqTtKI; pXbyFt; Tcov AlicptKCIV4)V". 230 "H Nvap7l Tn; ttlqxctvA; Kai Tou; 7rup6; IL718evVcTat cLn6 Tqv an6yaul Oucria; qq ýOW9. 
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civilization. The Iraqis give the outmost lesson of freedom to humankind" 
(Stamatopoulos, 2003b). 231 
Not only were the Iraqis seen as a role model for the rest of humanity, but they were also 
described as essentially saving humanity by resisting the imperial tyrant and by 
empowering the global movement against U. S. monocracy. "In reality, fighting for their 
country Iraqis also fight for another purpose, that of obstructing the imposition of 
American monocracy ... the longer Iraqi resistance lasts, the more the globalized 
movement will last ... Unfortunately, at this point, Iraqis are the only ones 
left to shed 
blood not only for their country, but for humanity itself' (Ligeros, 2003d). 
232 
The Greek discourse inverted Ae Times discourse, since the U. S. stood for tyranny and 
terrorism and liberation was needed, not from Saddam Hussein, but from U. S. 
occupation. Thus, the same binaries of slavery versus freedom, conquest versus freedom, 
tyranny versus freedom, terrorism and barbarity versus civilization and humanity versus 
inhumanity, demonized the U. S. as the possessor of all the negative qualities in the binary 
and constituted the Iraqis as superior, civilized and brave. Moreover, this discourse was 
based on the otherwise highly contentious presuppositions that the Iraqis were satisfied 
with the status quo and were actually resisting the "U. S. invader". 
231 "On Kat va aqtPEI aq B(xySdq, o tpainv6; %a6q fxci ýSq vucAam E(nEOX io pývup crF 6), Ouq Tou; 
ouppýBaugvoi);, cm 6Xou; Tou; unou)xý, ce 6%o-o; TOU; E0E%6SouXov;, Rupconafouq, pcctkt(TTL;, 6taTQ)n(TTt; Kai 
6XOD; TOA); 8Ol)X6TPOVE; 6n o b0p(oxo; Uv tXrt Xa0d adgil, 6n o AReptKav6; Tou Mnou; Kai TO)v 7[Ept aUT6v 
OUStnOTE OCL EnIPXTIOEI 0); 0 6VOP(OnO; TOU Wcomob xpd), rou at(ova. Ot avnCrTEK6pevot lpaKivol TtpdvF. qv t8la Tnv 
l(nopla, vnepaangowat XtXtd8c; Xp6vta noMnapob, evavnd)vovTat crrov aypdppcLTo TOpawo, ojccLpnjX(ýouv 6Xou; 
Cp&q TOIU; I(OXITIK&; OP0016;, IWPIEO%016V TqV KOItIl(YPtVq OUVEISTIan TOU aXOXaIUVCDVtVO'U KCLTMWTý ... 
ot lpainvoi pdXovTat Tia Tqv E)xuOcp(a Tou;, Tq StKA Tou; EXm0cp(a, aVA Kai Tq StKý pCL;, yta qV a410ffphEia, yla 
TOV; Td(POU; TOI);, Yla TOV IICLKPCL((OVO nOktTtcyp6 Tou;. Ot lpaictvot &(vouvTo Vtymo ýMýRa E%m0cp(a; Mv 
aV0P0)n6TqTa" 
232 '41: Tqv 7cpaypnic6q-ta, no)xVd)vTct; Ita TqvxaTpt8aTou;, ot lpanvol Itoxtildv -t(YTD) KI av BCV TO 
cuvctSqTo7tot6v- ym tvav npýTcpo crKon6: yta va egnoSlaouv Tqv EntpoXý qq ajupwavwý; pOvoKpaTOpta; ... 
000 
7teptooftepo StctpKtcr&t Tj avTicrracrq Tow 1paKtvd)v T6c; o OCE TPOTOSOTE(Tal TO 71ayKO%ltOlEOtlqptVO cLvn7toxcvtr, 6 lcfvTlllct 
... 
&u=Xd);, oTo aqw[o nou fXovpE y0dom, VaXe CFTOU; IPCLKIVO16q VU X6001)V TO cxfýtcx Touj 6Xt l16vo ym qv 7ccLTPiSa 
TOVq, Q), M Kai yta ), OyaplaCTý0 Til; Mporcftqmý'. 
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The need to fight the United States 
The anti-war protesters were constructed as resisting the U. S. "Today's universal 'no to 
war' is a no to slavery, no to submission, no to the authoritarianism of the empire. It is a 
233 
proud no to the terrorism of the superpower" ('No to the terrorism', 2003). The 
protesters were, in fact, elevated to the status of a powerful, rival force, capable of 
defeating the U. S. "Global public opinion, which demonstrated its opposition to 
arrogance, last Saturday, emerged as a rival superpower and actually a more powerful 
one' (Netas, 2003b). 234 Similarly, "in this war the empire is up against global public 
opinion, the superpower which consists of most people on Earth and which is armed with 
peace, justice, humanity and its values. If this superpower doesn't give in ... the empire 
will be defeated, because it is morally unarmed" (Resistance', 2003) . 
235 Thus, protesters 
were constructed as morally superior subjects with "bright faces, innocent and sincere 
eyes" (Kourkoula, 2003: N17)236, who significantly differed from the supporters of war. 
"My god, what a contrast this is! On the one hand the demonstrations of peace: 
Expressive and bright faces, feelings of solidarity and despair, belief in something better 
and the sincerity of anger. In the front of war, on the other hand: arrogant faces, a 
narrow-minded and calculating expression. If they win, you are very unfair my god" 
(Grammatikakis, 2003). 237 In short, "Imperialism cannot win a victory, because human 
consciences have solidarity and sensitivities"238 (Tsoulias, 2003: N16). Finally, it was 
pointed out that failure to join the protesters or publicly express your anti-war conviction 
equalled submission and moral death. "Global protest is worth it! Silence and societal 
233 6wro cqwrý6 xam0p&mvo '6Xt (yTov x0xpl dvat 6Xt mvoxo5o6%waq, 6Xt Mv uno'cWta, 6xt crrov 
au-tapXtco iMq auvoicpaTopEar, Elvat LM XEPýMo 6Xt aqv -rpoRmcpada rlq vnF. PHvaRq(ý". 
234 "avtixaXq vncp86%, apj rat liVAcrra pcycLXO'rCPTj, fXEI avaSctXOd To upaupbo EdpoaTo q naTK6crRta icoiA Tv(bjtj, 
xou 6ta84U= Tqv avrWca4 Tqq Mv ax4ovae. 
233 "r avT6v Tov n6)xlio. n cmroVaTopla dvat avnýtftwm lit Tqv naTx6(ypm icotA Tvd)liij. -nlv -oxcp86v%tlq nou 
uuyKpo-r6v ot xoUoý PC 6xka qv EIPAVTI, To 61KCLIO, Tov av0pom-t%t6 icat -it; a4lq Tov. Av awý Tj uncpWagTI, 8cv 
ICallqOOEI ... q auToicpaTopla 
Oa TlTqOEL Un Eivat qOtKdL donW'. 
236 " ra0apd xp6crwita, T6ao dLSoXa tdna7. 
237 "Tt crvTiOcM ed ILovt An6 Tq pta ot btaBlUerct; qq ttpAvqq. np6oo)ncL ticqpacrrtKdL icat ica0apet, cxtoOýpa-ra 
a)ITIXEyyýnq lCal 086VIlq, lt(Gq Ge Kd'n ICCIM)TEPO KCLI 11 ElXUCPfVEla qq OPYAJ. ZTO EnITOXio ToU noXiýoU, cLn6 TqV 
6XXlq: np6owna aXgovucdL, 16(po; not) cLqXcl pucp6vota icat i)no), oytc; p6. Av il 'viq' civat &Ký -rou;, ad); Elcrat -r6c; o 
ast3cor, ed tml". 
231 'Tilv impla Tq; avOpcon6TqTcx; 6CV TqV yp&q)ct o x6ktlioq Kat Tj pappapknra U)JA Ta KOtVO)VtK& ictvýjiara icat Ot 
XaoL Kalltd vixq 6ev poptl va KcpSlact o ttmEptctXtcrji6;, TtaT(ot auvctSýcrct; T(OV QVOpd)nWV EIVCEI XXaOPLVC; VF 
OA1qXCYT6q Kat EUMUOljaitlý". 
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submission to the interests and the plans of the ones in power equals complete 
surmdcring7 (Oikonomopoulos, 2003b). 239 
The confrontation between public opinion and the U. S. was also elevated to the status of 
a war. "All those sub-humans, fight them; and their servants, the scared bootlickers, wipe 
them outl Wipe them out with a straight 'no' and with the firmness of a civilization 
which refuses to be the prey of the cavcmcn; the prey of their jungle, of barbarity; of 
hypocrisy-. of cowardice; of vileness. Wipe them outl Wipe them out with your 
civilization. Come onl Lct's get serious. We are at war. There is us, who want to sow 
dignity. honesty, friendship, bmveness, compassion and directness, which are the seeds of 
coexistence. Then there is them, who sow calumny, bribery, pimping, the imposition of 
the jungle, stupidity, fear ... the 
bcastsl Wipe them out ... only one 
force has powcr 
against the swastika, we; you; the entire world! We are at war. On the one side it is us, 
humanity. On the other it is them, inhumanity-, cowardice ... not anymore. Fight them. It 
is us the cntire humanity and they are its cancer. Fight the cancer before it kills you" 
(Papadopoulos G, 2003). 240 
The representation of the anti-war protesters was very similar to that of the resisting 
Iraqis, since they wcre both articulated as fighting for humankind's "liberatioW' from the 
64swastika" Empire. Ile Iraqis and the anti-war protesters were positioned in similarity 
and complemcntarity to cach other. Moreover, the binary construction of the U. S. and 
the anti-war protesters, whereby the former stood for "barbarity", "cowardice", 
'%ypocrisy". "inhumanity", "immorality" and the latter for "civilizatioW', "bravery", 
"dignity", "honesty". "humanity" and 'Justice", further othered the U. S. negatively, while 
2" "q xarc60pta biapamia, Uv Da Xö£l zugb-rk 11 olcaA, il cru14b6fflon iii; aAp(bxm; Kotvwv(cL; an; ßou)l; 
Kal tcg altzia lwv bapp(bV. eu msv%M; wt%ot PC clvcv 6pwv xapdsocý-. 
"0 ýOIDIK aiutoüý, ' tou; nolqzýatz toirKat tou; luxWctäicov;. TIv xt" q)älaffl tü)v Kolaogwv, 
toK 7)£igtc;. tov; Voxo%unL; Kai iotw, - goßtcpb-ou;. Eý", a(favimt tou; ... g(L9avicytt Tol); lit to 6pOlo «6xt» Kai lit 
to crtcK04-4 PrWan%ld n9&; 10)A'rWPOÜ ROU uPvtiTcLi am vu tivat ippato tcov mýAim. Eppato in; ýoýý;, ti; 
Pappap6rgta;. Tq; vxoicptala,;. TYS UWa; Til; zotcm6iMtet; E4a9crd(Yrc to%); Nie mv noltnapö cruLrEPP6;. 
Ttplia mytpata. Ezolupt a6Itpo ... 
E4mute epti;. xou OLIcupt va cuýpoupe tnv gtoxptxtta, iMv morlIta, tl 
ff0Ja. tg ymu%6tntcL. ti uu"6%, uL, M c0eilni. ra crgöpo crovexaKIn;. Ki eivat cruTof Nov cmtpvouv in blaßolA, 
rV gtayop& ti Pot9m'& tiv cxffl in; ZoÜyO-a;. in Plairtia. to 96ßo. Kuptco; to 96ßo ... Ta 
roopu£Zagavicnz tou; -. NIMIct L%u; txn 6eN-agil axtvctvn um cßäcrnKm Eptt; Ecrc%. 0 K6apoý 610,; ... 
F, 6xi 
zuL. flo)£iiAau totb; E4iacnr o16r)ilpil il A%epwxötqm Kai rimt o icapicf%v; tyl;. lio)£IIA(ne tov KapK(vo xptv co; 
(MOT6)at17. 
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emphasizing the superiority of the protesters. In fact, the marches were represented as a 
battle and a war, whereby the morally and ethically superior "global public opinion" was 
"armed with peace, justice, humanity and values", against the "morally unarmed" U. S., 
which would therefore "not win the victory". The protesters were encouraged to "fight 
them" and "wipe them out", and "not give in", or "surrender", because "we are at war" 
and "we can win it". This discourse not only positioned the U. S. and the anti-war 
protesters in opposition to each other, but also positioned the U. S. in opposition to 
everyone else, since the anti-war protesters were seen to represent "global public 
opinion" and the "entire humanity"; the protesters and global public opinion were 
positioned in similarity and identity to each other. This was also facilitated by means of 
shifters, such as "us", "we", "you" and "our", which interpellated the reader as belonging 
to "our camp" in this war against the U. S. 
The role of Europe in the international sphere 
Europe under threat and a return to bipolarity 
The dominant discourse depicted the U. S. as a serious threat to the E. U. "The aim of this 
illegal_ war isn't just Iraq, but also the European UnioW' (Aspirations of the Empire', 
2003), 241 since "the United States doesn't want Europe to develop into an influential and 
242 
competitive power, which would question the U. S. world dominance" (Netas, 2002). 
By contrast, "it wants a European Union totally dependent on American hegemony 
without its own voice and opinions, without its own foreign policy and defence" ('Europe 
is their Target, 2003). 243 By acting unilaterally and disregarding European dissent on the 
war "Washington didn't even try to hide its intention to split the European Union and 
destroy it politically" (Kazakos, 2003b). 244 
24) t4 CT6X0; To, ) 71ctpävogol) icoliplo 8£v Eivat P6V0T0 lPft, aU& icc(t 11 Eup(onctiKý Evcoug". 
242 t4AEV entel), joýV Ot HIM V(I EýE), iX0ei 1 Eupd)irl os pta tcXupA cLv-rctycovtcrrticA Hvaktl, nou Oa aktgiaßIToeue illv 
Kuptapxia Tou; (yrov likavAT9, Te CLVT6 KM OGL CLVTI, 8päcrol)V". 
243 "(DO£t lita Eup(oncLiKý Fvü)un cL7c6). loTa F. ýCtpTqkLLn CLIC6 T9V C[IIEPIKUVIKý nytkloVia, X(i)pý 8tA Tj; q)(1)VA Kat 
d7CC)n, yü)pi; 8tKA Tq; g(OTEPIKA 71oItTtKA K(II äktUvä". 
244 i6H TOIJCLGIVKTOV ötV npo(MdelgF CaV VCL KPýYtt TUV ItP6O6M1 Tlý VCL X(t)Pig£t T9V tV(OCITI KCLI V(I tnV KCLTCLGTpt%Vtt 
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Since the U. S. "not only seeks the humiliation of its enemies, but even more of its allies" 
(Vergopoulos, 2003), 245 "Europe should not succumb and should fight for its self- 
reliance, so as to become an antagonistic pole with its own voice ... with the 
help of 
global public opinion and common sense, it will be able to resist absurdity and barbarity" 
('Europe is their target', 2003). 246 Not only was there a need for a force to counteract the 
U. S, but "this force cannot be anything other than a united Europe, which will cooperate 
with powers such as China and Russia. However, a united and militarily powerful 
Europe means that there needs to be strong central governance, common foreign policy 
247 and common defence" (Giannoulopoulos, 2003b). Thus, the only way Europe could 
act as a rival power would be through unity and common purpose. "Despite its divisions 
and disagreements, Europe should and can react. It should react by forming a more 
cohesive and effective foreign policy and political defence" (loakeimidis, 2003c: N06). 248 
To conclude, "A future Europe ... should reflect and practically, rather than merely 
symbolically, express the citizens' will transcending, if necessary, national borders" 
(Euthimiopoulos, 2003: N06), 249 since "there is no other solution if we don't want 
Washington to keep being the only factor determining our fate" (Panagopoulos, 2002). 250 
This representation is in line with the overall Greek press discourse which constituted the 
U. S. as an Empire in opposition to all other actors. In this case, the need for further E. U. 
unification was justified in terms of the need to counteract the "threatening" U. S. 
245 'ýj ApEptKj &EK&W Tqv Tandwooq 6xt p6vov T(ov avTtndWv Tqq, Old aIC6gll REpIGCF6TEPO Tow mpaX(OV Tjý'. 
246 "H cupd)nq aptnet va tulv i)noKO\Vct Kai va, 86)(; Et Tq g&Xq yta Tqv auToSuvapla Tq;, ytmva YiVEI pia awayowtcmicý 
HVU111 jig &Ký Irn; T(OV4. MXOPEL TOI)X6XLCYTov, litua Mv Evo)(Tq va crvyicpoqOc( Tj 8mWpaTucý crupaXta Tcov 
nPONPON Tta T9V EtPAVq- ME Tq UrýPI411 Tq; naYOaPla; ICOIVý; YVd)pj; lCal Tq; KOIA; xoytlcý;, Oa PXOPLGEt Va 
avTtcsTaOFf arov napaXoytcrýO Kat aq pappapftqwý'. 
247 44 nplut va &jPtOUPTqOE( To avTinaXo Sto;. OXt 6nw, cmov 4uXp6 HAEpo, aW pc Tqv tvvota cv6; CVQXXQKTIKOb 
n6kou nou Oa BMOLTEt TqV axapaiTnq omovopucý icat cripanomkA toX6 yta va y(VEI avT(Papo aqv aýCPIKCWIKý 
qYEPOVIa. 0 n6ko; cruT6q bev pnopEl napd va Eivat pa Evcogtq Eupdmj, 7tou Oa auvcpy&; F. Tat pe 8-uv6pci; crav qv 
Kiva A -rq Pcoa[a. AW lita cwoýLlvq icat cripaU(DUKd toVpý Eup(bnq crqgaivct icdnota np&ypaTa: tOppý KEVTPIKý 
1: 401)CY(a, KotVý E4(1)TCPtKI) 7E&ATIKA, IKOtVA 6ý11)Va". 
243 I'H Ejpd)n-q 6p);, xapd Ti; StatpUrEt; Kai Stxoyvcople; r1q, 7rptnet icat pnopef va avnSpdoet. Na avnSp6oct Iterq 
Stap6py(oug pta; 7u: ptocy6Tcpo UUVEKTIKý; Kai anOTOXCrPaTIKý; E4COTCPIKý; ITOXMKý; Kat 710XITIKý; dg'UVC4. 
249 stn Eupd)nil Tolu 6pto ... 7rpt7tEt va tutopcl va avTavaKM Kai Va Eicypdýct pe npaypaTtK6 (icat 6Xt cruppoXtK6) Tp67to 
2 25 
I POýXTjaq TOW lEOXtTd)V I)IICPPCLIVOVTCL;, CEV XPEICECITEL TQ EOVIKdt 6VOpa! '. 
5 "Sev lu7tdpxEt 6). Xoq av BEV OtXOV). lc 11 C)UdCTtYKTOV VQ Elvat Kai GTO ptWV 0 p6voj ncEpdyovTct; KaOoptapo6 Tq; 
T6Xq; Raý'. 
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Europe versus the United States 
The U. S. and the E. U. were compared very often in the press discourse, which ascribed to 
the former negative characteristics while at the same time highlighted the positive values 
that the latter represented. "While Europe seems to be influenced by Kant, the United 
States is attached to Hobbes" (loakeimidis, 2002: N06). 251 Specifically, "Europeans have 
a more complex view of the world [than the Americans] and deal with such problems 
more discreetly and with more consideration. They try to influence others more 
indirectly, they are more patient and generally they are in favour of the peaceful solution 
of problems and prefer negotiation, diplomacy and persuasion rather than sanctions" 
(Hatzigakis, 2002). 252 The U. S. and the E. U. were thus represented as two completely 
different subjects. "There are two worlds - and in each one of them the value of human 
life differs" (Tzamalikos, 2002). 253 Moreover, "we and they truly live in different 
planets" (Giannoulopoulos, 2003 C). 254 Thus, "substantially we have a clash of models, 
which may crack the Western alliance, as Francis Fukuyama also claims" (Moronis, 
2003b) . 
255 No matter what the future held, however, the European values would prevail 
in the end. "Other powers may depend on military power. The Union depends on its 
values and sets the right example to the rest. History teaches that values prevail in the 
end and not the military power which ignores humanistic values" (Ioakeimidis, 2003b: 
N06). 256 
In this discourse, the juxtaposition with the U. S. covered over the differences within the 
E. U. and constructed it as a unified, internally coherent and hannonious body. 
Specifically, the U. S. was articulated as a military power, while the E. U. was constituted 
251 44 cvd) q Eupd)nn ýpalvuat va aKOXODOEI Tov Kaw, ot HrIA cpyavfýowat va napaptvo-ov npocxojXqptvF.; crTov 
Xogx; 7. 
252 "Ot Eup(onalot cm6 Tqv Mil tXouv pia nto 0'6VOCTn ElK6Va yta TOV Oago 'cat avTtttcTwRTOuv Ta npopXýpm avT& 
Its Molbuplj ). E=6TqTa. Ilpocma0o& va ElrqPC4ý01)V TOU; MOU; ý18 MO 6ýLECTO'U; TP67rOv;, tXOUV Pcyax, 6TCplq 
V71OVOA Kai ycvtKd CUV06V TqV CIPIVtk4 CII(XVIn 7[POPXIP&TCDV Kai 7CPOTtpObV rn StanpaypdTcuq, Tq 8tnXwpaT(Ct 
Kai TqV 7EC106) aVT( TOW KUpd)(YE(I)V". 
253 "Ylt6pXOUV 860 K6%tot -Kat GTOV Ka0tVaV CL96 a'UTOf)j 11 Qýia Tq; CEVOpd)ntvll; 4(t)A; 8taylpCt, " 
254 66 EPEI; KI UUTOI 6VTO); ý6g CFE 8WTOPFTIKO16ý 7CXCIVýTCý'. 
255 "OlUCIaCMKd 8qMSA 4OUgE 6YKPOA)an 7(POTft0Vq 71OU <dcyco; pay(CrEt Tq Abq)), KaTd TQ 4y6pcva Kai TOU 
0 dVM; 4)OUKOUytdga! '. 
25f "AIXe; Suvdgtt; giropef va aqpgovTctt Kupko; aq oTpaTtWTIKý taXý. H 7Evcoo-q oTqpi; CTat K-oplo); an; a4ts; Kai 
(yro napd8etyRa. H t(TTopia BiSdont 6n ot a4lCq Kai TO napHetyp TEXtICd cntKpaTo6v Kai 6Xt q crTpancoTtKA Hv%tij 
7rou ayvoct Tt; aVOPC07ltCFTtKt; a4f4'. 
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as a normative power (see also Diez, 2004; Kagan, 2003; Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002; 
Wallace, 2005), which engaged in and favoured the "peaceful solution of problems", 
"diplomacy" and persuasion. In his book Of Paradise and Power, Robert Kagan (2003: 
2) also constructed this dichotomy by pointing out that, "on major strategic and 
international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus". 
Even though he ascribed more positive characteristics to the U. S. than to the E. U., which 
he characterized as weak, the similarity in the two discourses lies in the dichotomization 
that they created. "It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a 
common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all- 
important questions of power-the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the 
desirability of power-the American and European perspectives are diverging" (2003: 3). 
This dichotomy in the Greek press discourse not only constructed the U. S. and the E. U. 
as operating in completely different ways and as following very different rules; it also 
reinforced the image of the U. S. as a threatening and dangerous "other", while at the 
same time establishing the "self'as righteous and benign. The E. U. was thus constructed 
as the standard for the world, an "EU-topia" (Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002: 767), which 
everyone should aspire towards. This "normative power discourse" (Diez, 2004), which 
articulated the "United Europe" as the best available model, also enabled and naturalized 
the construction of those actors that objected to a specific E. U. policy or "sided" with the 
U. S., as "traitors", as is seen in the following section. 
Vie eight traitors 
The eight European govenunentsý 57 that supported U. S. war plans were heavily criticized 
in the Greek press discourse as "traitors of all democratic principles", who "jointly raped 
democracy in a provocative and cynical manner" ('Rape of democracy', 2003). 258 These 
257 A statement released in January 2003 by the leaders of Britain, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Denmark 
and the Czech Republic, expressed support for the U. S., and urged the E. U, to unite with the U. S. to ensure that the 
Iraqi government was disarmed. 
258 "EuvInpa4av (YTo Ptacyg6 Tqq 8Tj[LoKPaT(a; RPOKXTITIK6 )CM KUVIK4 Ot OKTd) cupconalot ilytTe; nou unlypayav Tq 
SýXwaq uuo-rpdrcuaý; Tou; gc Tov TýopT; Micou; (TrO Otila TOV IP6K ... np&cetTat ncpt npo&ord)vro)v 8%1OKPanKd)V 
CLPX(OV, C(Kptp&; SOTIU710(MPiýOW O&EV, avTIOETF; ta EICENC; TOW xad)v Itou TO-0; c4txc4av YM Va To'u; 
cimpocrwiloW. 
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countries were represented as splitting European unity and impeding the political 
empowerment of the E. U. "It is verified that the Union cannot emancipate politically and 
form a plan of autonomous political intervention in the international stage, because some 
of its members refuse to differentiate themselves from Washington, not so much because 
they agree with it, but mostly because they don't want to negatively affect their relations 
with it" (Ligeros, 2003b). 259 Moreover, "these countries expect to eat and drink from the 
European family but take this feast for granted and, in any case, regard it as less 
important than their oath of subordination that they sent to the superpower" (Karelias, 
2003a) . 
260 Thus, the relationship between these European countries and the U. S. was one 
of subservient loyalty. "With their signature the eight European leaders state that 
solidarity towards the United States is more important than the loyalty towards the 
European family. Can there be a common European political system after all these? Can 
there be a powerful Europe" (Tsimas, 2003a: N04)? 261 
Not only were these countries constructed as undermining the E. U., but they were also 
seen as "collaborators and co-defendants", who "won't be forgiven for their sins" 
(Tsalidis, 2003), 262 since they morally supported an illegitimate war and the imposition of 
the new Pax Americana. "Above all, this disastrous letter of the W gave the American 
president a moral legalization for his military choices ... the European advocacy for the 
management of the Iraq issue by the United Nations widely expresses an ideological 
antithesis to the new form of global domination, which the United States is trying to 
impose. This is what the W didn't understand" (Kalfelis, 2003a: NO6). 263 Therefore, 
these "traitors" had done irreparable harm to humanity itself and would be punished for 
their sinful behaviour. "They flatter the emperor and his praetorian guard so as to be in 
259 "Entotpat6ve'rat 6Tt il EvoM BEV p7tOpEt va Xetpaycrq0d ROXITLK& Kat va Stappy6oct Rta mpaqywý avr6voVilq 
noktndý 7raptVpaoTjq aq StcONt aKqA, Bi6n optaVtva VtXil q; apvo, 3vTat va 8tayoponotij06v an6, rqv 
OudcnMov, 6Xt -r6cro TtaTl auVquvo6v V' cru4v, 6(yo YtCLTI BEV EMOUVO16V Va 8taTapd4OVV Tlq CXLCFCI; pýj Tqý'. 
260 64 avT4 Ot Xd)PC; 7EPOC150KOLV va (pdvc icat va mdV CL716 TqV EUP(07[CtYkA OtKOYNCICL, CbUd TCLIVETCEt 6Tt OMPO& CLUT6 
To yayonkt BES%&O Kat, CIE K60C 7EEPIRTW9, I)ROSELCITEPO CM6 TO Oýta 'UnOTDXtCtq nOU tCrTEL%aV MV UnCPHVCtpq". 
261 6'MC rjV W[Oypayý OKT& Ei)p(t), Aai(j)v qyeTd)v nou Bjýhvouv 6n q a%XjXqrfý)j npoq Ti; IMA Eivat ollpCLVTIK6Tcpq 
an6 Tq volitiloypo6vq npoi Tqv cupcoxa" omoltnta. MnopEL icaT6nw ctuwý, va undp4ct icotA cup(onctYKA 
no), ITIKý; Mnopd va uitdpýEt toXupý Eup6)n-q"; 
262 "OlOt E(Val OVVIUndOUVOI Kat ovTKcETqyopoýpcvot icat Ti7TOTC BEV ILROPEI varo-0; 4cnx6vEe'. 
263 &r0p(tl;, ndVCO air6 6Xa iq OXt0PICL EMCFTOXý TOW ((8A E4amp6ltae crov AptptKCLV6 7tp6c8po lita nOIKA VOýUtI0710171(Yq 
yta, nq no), cluid; Tou En"74 ... il cuponraYKA euvilyopia yta Tq 
8taXElptail Tqq 'un60eolj;, rou lpdic an6 Tov OHE 
CK41pg9l EupýTcpa ýtta t8soXojtký CrVTiOECM oTqv Kawdpyta pop(pA nayOaptaq EntICUptapX(aq, 7rou npo=Ooýv va 
F, ntp4kouv ot HITA. AuT6 8Fv ica'rav6lqaav ot'8". 
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good terms with them and they abandon their nations ... for the rest of their lives they 
will be ashamed and their remorse will torture them day and night. Their guilt, like 
predatory birds, will haunt them and they won't be able to get rid of it. It [the guilt] will 
eat away their flesh and souls, as well as the flesh and souls of their children" (Tsalidis, 
264 2003). 
The constitution of the E. U. as a unified, superior subject in opposition to the U. S. 
subject, constructed the E. U. countries which supported the war as "traitors", and in 
opposition to the E. U. Moreover, the metaphor of destruction (see also Kelly-Holmes 
and 0' Regan, 2004: 99) which was prevalent in the discourse through predicates such as 
"destroy", "destructioný' and "disastrous" construed the eight governments' decision as 
impeding E. U. unity and as disrupting the otherwise harmonious E. U. construction. The 
E. U. was thus seen as an efficient mechanism which was under threat by these eight 
countries which decided to back the U. S. president. In other words, the construction of 
the eight countries as "traitors of E. U. democratic values" and E. U. unity presupposed 
that such unity existed and was only undermined because of the eight governments' 
deeds. 
This was further achieved through the representation of the E. U. as a family (see also 
Hulse, 2000: 11; Musolff, 2006; Ringman, 2005: 7) whose members need to obey the 
family rules and agree with all E. U. decisions in order to be accepted as family members. 
Understood as a family the E. U. becomes an institution which demands our loyalty and 
devotion. Hence, the eight countries which didn't oppose the war in Iraq were 
constituted as the black sheep of the family. _Specifically, this representation of the 
E. U. 
fits Lakoff's "strict family model" (1995), in which the father "insists on his moral 
authority, commands obedience, and when he doesn't get it, metes out retribution as fairly 
and justly as he knows how". According to this model, morality is a fundamental aspect 
264 " KaXondvouv Tov crumpeaopa icat Tovq npatuwplavoý;, rou yta Va Ta tpuv ica)A ýtaý( Tov; Kat EyKaTaXelnouv 
GqV T6xq TOU; T01); kaooq ... H vrp=4 Ocrrov; crovokbEt & 6Xq Tq 
ýo)A Tov; icat ot TOyct; Ocrrou; anxD'Adv 
ilglpa Kat OXTa, cK 6pvca nou Uv Oa gnopoýv vCE TCX EKSIgOUV Kat OCE KCLTCL'rpd)yOX)V TJ GdPKa KCL1 T9V VuA TOx); uw 
tBION KCL1 T(OV TLKVCDV To, ); $ nou 
Oa Tptq)OvTat an6 Tt; CF6PKE; KCLt TO CLIýLa UOV OX)gdTO)V TOVý'. 
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of the family unit. Therefore, the family members which stray need to be punished in 
order to "balance the moral books" (Lakoff, 1995). 
The role of Greece 
It was generally agreed that Greece should favour the E. U., even though it was not yet as 
powerful as the U. S. "Greece may need to maintain good relations with the superpower, 
since there are still open fronts, but both its present and its future lies in Europe. Its 
development, its prosperity, its social model are identified with Europe" (Karelias, 
265 2003b). If Greece had to take sides and chose a camp that could be nothing other than 
that of the E. U. "The European Union is the preferential camp for modem Greece that 
we all desire" (Turopean Challenge', 2002) . 
266 "It is a bless that during those critical 
moments our country is part of an extended and quite powerful family of countries, 
which cannot be ignored; and if we really face a clash of civilizations, the European 
civilization ... is not only our past 
but also our future" (Karkagiannis A, 2003). 267 
Even though it was unanimously argued that the U. S. was a bellicose Empire and a threat 
to world peace, and that the E. U. should rise as a real power to confront the U. S., the 
short-term future of Greece worried some of the columnists in the right-wing 
Kathimerini. In particular, it was maintained that Greece should not oppose the U. S. 
even though its "heart" beats for Europe, and even though Greece had immensely 
benefited from its membership in the Union. "Greece's fate lies with the historic attempt 
at European unification because both its geopolitical and financial interests are linked 
with the European Union. However, this doesn't mean that it [Greece] has the luxury to 
turn a blind eye to the defining role*played by the United States" (Ligeros, 2003C). 268 As 
265 "Mnopci iq EWSa, pc avotXrd EOwicd Upa-ra, va tXct avdTKq Tt; icaU; crXUret; pe Tqv uncpS6vapj, o),. ýA To nap6v 
Kat TO VMOV Tqq EiVat aqv Eup(ozq. 11 avdnn4A Tjq, TI M119Fpia Tqq, To Kow(Dvtic6 Tqq powtko pe ainýv civat 
Taimaptvo, civat To anoK6pm Tný'. 
266 'ýj Eupwrdký Ev(ocrq axoTcXclTo 7no npovoptaK6 RCSIO p&xn; yta Tq aOyXpovil EUMa no-o 6%ot En, oDpobge,. 
267 "Elvat CUTýX%La 6Tt TI; KPIOIýLE; allT4 GTIYPL; Tj X(Dpa Ila; aVAKEt (YE pla EUPkEpq Kat CXPKCTd IGXUPA OIKOYLVEta 
X(OP6)V, qV WEAL Kavtvaq 8ev popc( va ayvoAaEt. Kat av npdypan ppiox6pacrre ac cnoA crOTKpouq; VETa4b 
7[o), ITtapd)V, 0 EUP(07[CLYK6; 71OXtTICYp;, nOU Kal CDJT6; 71POtKUIYC cm6 n0kfý101);, EnaVaOT60CI; KCEI cruyKpObCYEI;, 
giveTat 6Tt 8cv dvat p6vo TO 7tapEX06v ttCt;, WM KOLI TO P&IOV 
8 I'H EW; fXEt cmvSfact Tq ttOIPCL Tq; PE TO ICFTOPIK6 EYXE(Pllpa Tq; EUPW7laYk-4q evonoilq;, ytaT( 7rpo; CruTýV TTIV 
KCIT601)Vaq Tqv w0o& Kat Ut IE(07[OXIUK& Kat Ta OIICOVOIIIKdL qq cupytpowa. AluT6 8CV UqPQ(VEt, 6ýuo;, 6Tt IXEI TqV 
nokinoxia va napapktyEt TOV KdoptanK6 p6Xo nou acyKobv ot HrIX'. 
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was argued, Turkey as a neighbour and the geographical position of Greece in the 
Balkans created security problems for Greece. "our country's security mainly depends 
on the U. S. position towards Greece, since Washington only can determine the stance that 
Turkey will adopt and stop the aggressiveness that Turkey shows from time to time 
towards our country ... thus, if Greece is forced to choose 
between the United States and 
Europe, the cost will definitely be painful" ('Clash between the U. S. and Europe', 2003). 
269 Therefore, "it makes sense that our country should keep its composure and avoid a 
prompt involvement in the discord between the 'great powers... (Papadimitriou, 2003). 270 
This discourse was to be found in one newspaper only, the conservative Kathimerini, and 
even within Kathimerini it was not the hegemonic discourse. In fact, this discourse is not 
entirely different from the rest. Europe was elevated as the morally superior actor, and 
the U. S. was merely presented as an unwanted, but nevertheless unavoidable ally due to 
the geopolitical issues that Greece was involved in. 
269 stn ac; gd)xta zn; X(bpa; c4ap'rd-rat apad=); CLn6 IM crrdaq nou qpoýv cLntvctvn aqv EWSa ot HfIA, Woptvou 
6TI q OU&CnYK'rOV aXOTEXEI TOV ýIOVCLSIK6 cXc86v 7ccipdyovza nou p7topet va E7(npEdCFCt KaOopt(TTIK& Tqv Touffla Kat Va 
CtVaXCEtTfaCt TqV KaTdL K(Itp0i)q EK8nX6pCq EInOEnK6rqTCX rqq AyKupaq ... 
Av unoXPF. C)Oei 06 En"TA ToU CV6; ý ToV 
dWij,, ro ic6crroq Oa Eivat olyox)pa EnMuvo". 
270 "Evat Xom6v Xoytic6 yta rq Xd)pa tLa;, va 8taTnPAOCI TqV VUXpatp[CL Tq; Kat VCt =09ýyEt pt(I PtCLCFTt)CA EPAOICA Tq; 
MI; tptSE; nOU tXOUV 4EUndaCt PCrat6 UOV 'PCYdWV &UVdLPFEQ)V"'. 
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Conclusion - The British verstis the Greek press discourse 
In this concluding section, the discourses of the British and Greek press are compared. 
As is evident throughout the chapter, there clearly was a hegemonic Greek press 
discourse, with little divergence amongst the Greek newspapers. As far as the British 
press is concerned, there seemed to be divergence between the newspapers, but less 
divergence within. Moreover, The Independent and Yhe Mirror discourses were similar, 
since the hegemonic representations in both newspapers were generally anti-war and anti- 
U. S., while 7he Times discourse significantly differed, being primarily pro-war and pro- 
U. S. I initially compare representations of the war in Iraq and then move on to a 
comparison of discourses on the U. S. and the E. U. I finally look at the proposed roles of 
the U. K. and Greece in the "Iraq war era" as represented in the British and Greek press, 
in order to determine the similarities and differences both within and amongst the British 
and Greek press. 
Representations of the Iraq war 
The Iraq war and issues relating to the Iraq war and the reasons why it should, be 
supported or opposed received extensive coverage in both the British and Greek press. 
The level of coverage was equally high, even though there were different discourses both 
within the British press and between the British and Greek press. In fact, there were 
more similarities between the Greek press discourse and The Independent and Mirror 
discourses, than between the latter and 7be Times discourse. 
Specifically, in The Times the war was represented as necessary for "western! ' safety. 
Saddam was positioned in similarity and complementarity to the terrorists and was thus 
constituted as a major threat to western security. Moreover, he was represented as a 
"tyranf' and a "butcher" who "slaughtered" his people, thus also rendering the war in 
Iraq a moral enterprise. In contrast, 77ie Independent and The Mirror constructed the war 
as unnecessary. This was achieved through the disassociation of Saddam from the 
terrorists and the articulation of his regime as harmless and weak. In addition, the 
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presupposition that a war in Iraq would incite hatred and trigger more terrorist attacks 
also construed the war as harmful for western security. Finally, the war was also 
constituted as unhelpful and even harmful for the Iraqis through the predication of the 
U. S. as a unilateral, self-serving and self-interested power, unlikely to show any interest 
in Iraqi welfare or the rebuilding of democracy. 
Even though these two discourses are very different from each other, they also have 
common grounds. Thus, whereas the war was seen as dangerous in Ae 
IndependentlMirror discourse and necessary in ne Times discourse, in both cases the 
argument revolved around western security. In both cases, the West was articulated as a 
unified entity, to which "we" belong, and needs to be defended from the terrorists. That 
the terrorists and Saddam were seen as very different subjects in The IndependentlMirror 
discourse rendered the war unnecessary. 
Moving on to the Greek press discourse, the war in Iraq was constructed as a U. S. 
colonizing enterprise which would not only enslave the Iraqis but would in the end 
enslave the entire world. This discourse was essentially an inversion of The Times 
discourse, since the U. S. and not Saddam was construed as the "tyrant" and the war was 
represented as occupation rather than liberation, as was the case in Yhe Times. Similarly, 
the Iraqis were described as resisting the occupation, in contrast to Vie Times which 
represented the Iraqis as rejoicing. It seemed that the Greek press and Pie 
IndependentlMirror discourses had many similarities, since they both constructed the war 
as unhelpful for the Iraqis and as harmful. However, they also substantially differed, 
since the Greek press constituted the danger as directly stemming from U. S. aggression. 
In the Greek press, thus, the world was positioned in opposition to the U. S. which was 
construed as the most threatening and dangerous subject bound to cause irreparable harm 
if not stopped. Moreover, the Iraqis were articulated as victims of U. S. colonization and 
the Iraq war was represented as enslavement. In contrast, the British press represented 
the Iraq war as not improving, rather than worsening the Iraqi situation. 
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Representations of the United States 
The hegemonic representation of the U. S. as a corrupt, imperialist bully in both 77ie 
Independent and The Mirror contrasted Yhe Times discourse of the U. S. as a well- 
intentioned, force of good, intent on instilling democracy and promoting liberal values 
and were more in tune with the hegemonic and sole discourse in the Greek press of the 
U. S. as a malevolent Empire intent on colonizing the world. It is quite interesting to 
compare the two negative discourses of the U. S., since even though they both represent 
the U. S. in a negative light, they still are quite different. Specifically, in the British press 
discourse the U. S. was constructed as a unilateral, self-serving power, intent on imposing 
its views rather than collectively and diplomatically solving problems. Thus, the U. S. 
was described as a non-compliant other, rather than a dangerous or threatening other. In 
the Greek press, the criticisms of the U. S. were much fiercer, since it was constituted as 
the most dangerous other. Not only was the U. S. positioned as an unlawful, terrorist 
nation, but the metaphors of slavery, Empire and Hitler's Nazi Germany positioned the 
U. S. as the world's occupier, in opposition to all other actors. Thus, in this case the U. S. 
was not only self-serving and unilateral, but also expansionary, utterly violent and very 
dangerous. It is also noteworthy, that the U. S. actor received much more extensive 
coverage in the Greek press than in the British press, since most articles were to a lesser 
or greater extent related to the U. S. 
Representations of the European Union 
Moving on to representations of the E. U., the Greek press discourse positioned Greece in 
a relation of identity to the E. U., which was represented as a normative power and the 
beholder of superior values. In contrast, The Times discourse positioned the U. K. in a 
relation of identity to the U. S. and in opposition to the E. U., which was constituted as a 
weak and corrupt force, in contrast to the powerful and morally superior U. S. While the 
E. U. was constituted as a superior actor to the U. S. in The IndependentlMirror discourse, 
the representation differed from the Greek press discourse representation, since the U. K. 
was positioned in similarity, and not identity, to the E. U. Moreover, even though the 
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E. U. was generally positively represented in The IndependentlMirror discourse, there 
were very few positive representations of France, while the 8 govenunents supporting the 
war in Iraq were not constituted as negative subjects, as was the case in the Greek press. 
To sum up, during the period examined, the Greek press discourse and the dominant 
IndependentlMirror discourses had adopted a similar stance to the war in Iraq, while the 
very different Times discourse demonstrated the divergent discourses in the British press. 
However, as has been shown, this divergence was not total, since these two discourses 
also had some similarities. Moreover, despite the similarities between the Greek and 
IndependentlMirror discourses, they were still very different in many aspects. The 
purpose of the following, concluding chapter is to evaluate the continuity and changes in 
the Greek and British press discourses throughout the examined period, from April 2001 
to April 2003. 
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Conclusion 
"Discourses are understood to work to define and to enable, and also to silence and to 
exclude ... they are also unstable grids ... changeable and historically contingent" 
(Milliken, 1999: 229-230). 
Based on this premise and refuting the existence of a true, unchanging and objective 
world, while also drawing from the belief that our reality is socially constructed and 
constantly produced and reproduced, the thesis compared British and Greek press 
representations in order to draw some general conclusions about the operation of 
discourses after September 11, the ways they were constructed, contested and changed, as 
well as the ways in which some were marginalized in the process. One of the main aims 
of the project was to examine the extent to which, and in what ways, the September II 
events, the war in Afghanistan and the subsequent war in Iraq affected existing 
articulations and existing state identity constructions. Moreover, the thesis studied the 
ways in which these discourses may have enabled, necessitated or disabled particular 
responses and courses of action and the ways in which they may have marginalized other 
discourses. In order to address the above issues and determine the way events are 
understood in different cultural contexts the thesis employed a post-structuralist, 
discursive analytic approach mostly drawing from Laclau and Mouffe, Foucault and 
Derrida. 
Specifically, my main aims as outlined in the introductory chapter were to: 
1. Identify the existing articulations in the press of the two countries and 
determine whether there were multiple discourse or a prevailing, hegemonic 
discourse. 
2. Conduct a cross-country analysis in order to identify the similarities and 
differences in the press discourse of each country and between the two 
countries. 
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3. Determine whether there was continuity or sudden changes in the 
representations by means of a temporal analysis and thus understand the ways 
the discourses developed and whether the September II events and the 
ensuing wars affected existing articulations. 
4. Explore the ways identities and subject positions were constructed, 
reconstructed and subverted in the texts, as well as the specific mechanisms 
that rendered certain discourses dominant while marginalizing others. 
5. Finally, I was interested in the consequences of adopting one mode of 
representation over another and in the ways the discourses enabled, 
necessitated or disabled particular responses and courses of action. 
The remainder of this concluding chapter engages in a more detailed discussion and 
theorization of these issues. The first section addresses the above research questions 
through a cross-time comparison and by delineating the main similarities and differences 
between the discourses and the extent to which they were contested or remained 
unchanged. Having answered the above questions and having drawn important 
conclusions on the British and Greek press representations, I then use these conclusions 
to address a further issue in the following section. Thus, in the second section I elaborate 
on the virtues of a comparative analysis of the Greek and British press after September 
11. Finally, the third section makes suggestions for future research. 
British and Greek press representations: June 2001-April 2003 
The previous three chapters analyzed and compared British and Greek press 
representations in the three periods under study. In this section I conduct a temporal 
comparison in order to understand whether there were was continuity in the British and 
Greek press discourses, whether the events of September 11 affected the existing 
discourses and whether any changes were only temporary or had a more lasting effect, 
extending to the Iraq war period. This temporal comparison is also useful because it 
enables one to identify and understand the persistence of certain discourses and their 
hegemonic status or their volatility. 
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British press representations 
To begin with, the September II events had a profound impact on the British press, 
which constructed the 'terrorist threat' as the biggest threat facing humanity. Prior to the 
events, there wasn't a clearly identifiable threat in the British press. Thus, for example, 
climate change was represented as a threat in Ae IndependentlMirror discourse, but 
issues such as the Kyoto Protocol received much less coverage before the September II 
events than terrorism did after 9/11. Moreover, not only was climate change constructed 
as a minor threat compared to terrorism, but it was not even represented as threatening in 
ne 771mes discourse. In contrast, in the months following September 11 there was 
unanimity across the British newspapers, which hegemonically represented terrorism as a 
major threat to national and international security, and terrorists as launching a 
devastating attack on the west. Thus, while there was significant divergence between the 
IndependentlMirror discourse and The 771mes discourse on issues such as the E. U., the 
U. S., the U. K. relationship to the E. U. and the U. S., climate change and the missile 
defence system before the attacks on the Twin Towers, there was convergence on most 
emerging issues after the events, or at least any divergence was concealed by the 
emerging hegemonic discourse on terrorism. Moreover, the threat of terrorism remained 
the dominant discourse in the months leading to the Iraq war, the only difference being 
that the chains of equivalence that had been created in the aftermath of the September II 
and resulted in a "united western fronf' against the "evil terrorists" could not completely 
subvert the relations of difference in the months leading to the Iraq war, and thus the 
frontier vis-a-vis the antagonistic outside was not as clear during the Iraq war period as it 
was after the9/11 events. Thus, while in 77ie 77mes discourse Saddarn Hussein was 
positioned in similarity to the terrorists, this was not the case in the IndependentlMirror 
discourse, which represented Saddarn Hussein as harmless and the Iraq war as immoral 
and dangerous. 
There was also a shift in the representations of the E. U. and the U. S. immediately after 
September 11, although it did not last for long. Thus, in the months prior to the attacks, 
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the Independent/Mirror hegemonic discourse on the E. U. and the U. S. was essentially an 
inversion of the Y"Imes discourse. In The Times the E. U. was represented as an enslaving 
union harmful for U. K. sovereignty, while the U. S. was positioned as a natural ally 
whose partnership was vital for the U. K.; the same metaphors were employed by Ae 
Mirror and ne Independent, only to glorify the E. U. and condemn the U. S. In contrast, 
after the attacks, the British press uniformly represented the entire 'civilized, western 
world' as under attack by the terrorists and in need of collaboratively eradicating the 
enemy. Thus, while before the events the U. K. was either positioned in opposition to the 
E. U. or the U. S. in the dominant discourses of the three newspapers, the E. U., the U. K., 
the U. S. and the whole "civilized, western world" were positioned in identity and 
similarity to each other after September 11. However, such unity was only temporary, 
and in the months leading to the Iraq war there was once more a shift to the pre- 
September II division between the MirrorlIndependent discourse on the one hand, and 
the Times discourse on the other. In other words, the Iraq war broke this chain of 
equivalences and shortly after the Afghanistan war the Times hegemonic discourse 
articulated the U. S. as a moral force embarking on a necessary war, in contrast to the 
MirrorlIndependent discourse, which represented the U. S. as a corrupt power, whereas 
the E. U. was constituted as a rather positive actor, with the exception of France and 
Germany. Finally, throughout the period under study, the British press hegemonically 
positioned the U. K. as a leader in world politics. However, in the pre-September II 
period and in the months leading to the Iraq war, it was the U. S. that would enable the 
U. K. to fulfil the role of the leader in The Times discourse. On the other hand, in the 
Independent/Mirror discourse, the U. K. would best fulfil its leadership role as a leading 
E. U. member, rather than a U. S. ally. 
ne British state identity before and after September II 
In sum, September II affected the existing British press representations and, at least 
temporarily, resulted in a reconstitution of British state identity and its global role, which 
in turn reinscribed the British national interest and resulted in the adoption of some, as 
well as the rejection of other foreign and domestic policies. Specifically, the articulation 
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of the U. K. as part of a broader "western we" in opposition to the terrorists meant that 
"the war on terror" was constructed as a national priority and that national security issues 
extended beyond national borders. Thus, the attacks in New York and Washington., for 
example, came to be seen as an attack on "all of us", rather than merely an attack on 
another country. Even though the positioning of the U. K. in identity with the E. U. and 
the U. S. was only temporary in the MirrorlIndependent discourse, its effects are 
significant, since it facilitated and encouraged the construction of the war in Afghanistan 
as necessary and unavoidable. Had the September 11 events not been constituted as an 
attack on the west and on the U. K., the war in Afghanistan would have been represented 
differently. Had, for example, the war in Afghanistan been seen as merely a U. S. 
enterprise which was in no way imperative for global security, any U. K. involvement in 
the war in Afghanistan would have been represented as unjustified and even harmful, 
However, the hegemonic construction of September II as a terrorist attack on the west 
and of the war in Afghanistan as a necessary step in the war against terror rendered the 
war in Afghanistan imperative. Not only was the U. K. fully involved in the war in 
Afghanistan, but the majority of the British public itself was very supportive of the 
British response to the September II events. According to the MORI poll (2001: online), 
72% of Britons approved of the way Tony Blair was handling the British response to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11 and 71% believed that Britain was right to join America 
in the military strikes. Support was also shown by the then leader of the opposition party, 
Ian Duncan Smith and by the Democrat leader Charles Kennedy. 
Moreover, these representations of terrorism as a very serious threat which needed to be 
dealt with promptly and the positioning of Islam/Muslims in similarity and identity to 
terrorism, resulted in a series of domestic measures which were readily accepted even 
though they were highly contentious. For instance, the field of immigration and asylum 
was brought to the foreground after September II and many new measures were 
introduced which could be seen as infringing civil liberties and going against 
international norms. Thus, part four, section 33 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act suggested new possibilities for detaining foreigners; where expulsion was not 
228 
possible, it was possible to keep a suspected international terrorist in detention 
indefinitely. Even though the 2001 Anti-terrorism act renounced articles of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which is only allowed for by article 15 
ECHR at times of war or public emergency, it was hurried through the national 
legislative processes (Haubrich, 2003: 8), instead of going through lengthier processes of 
negotiation and was enforced very quickly. Furthermore, even though part four of the 
2001 Anti-terrorism act was replaced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 2005, the 
latter has also been seen by many as incompatible with domestic and international human 
rights laws. 
In addition, after September IIa number of measures seem to have diminished or have 
the potential to diminish the citizens' privacy and informational self-determination. 
Indicatively, internet and phone providers need to keep communications data for two 
years, goverranental authorities have the power to disclose any information required by 
the secret services or the police to carry out their investigations, while the policy powers 
have been expanded beyond the actual police force. Not only have such measures met 
little resistance, but they are mostly still in operation five years after the September II 
events, along with a widespread culture of fear, which amongst others results in extreme 
security measures in airports after alleged terrorist threats. Finally, as Ansari (2003: 4) 
points out, death threats against Muslims has increased since the events, while race-hate 
crime in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets was reported to have risen by 27% in 
September 2001 compared with September 2000, and of the 100 reported crimes 17 were 
explicitly related to September 11. A BBC survey taken in the summer of 2004 (online) 
found that employment applicants with Muslim names were far less likely to be called 
for an interview than applicants whose. names did not appear to be Muslim. - Ity-2006, a 
YouGov poll indicated that 53% of those people polled felt threatened by Islam, as 
distinct from fundamentalist Islamists, while 18% believed that "a large proportion of 
British Muslims feel no sense of loyalty to this country and are prepared to condone or 
even carry out acts of terroristif'. 
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From the above, it becomes evident that it is important to study discursive constructions, 
their volatility and stability as a means of understanding the extent to which the 
discourses transformed the two countries' state identities and affected their foreign 
policies after September 11. This temporal comparison is also very useful, because it 
enables a comparison of the fixity and volatility of certain representations and can thus 
provide further insight on existing state identities and their future stability or volatility. It 
is naturally more difficult for a long-standing, hegemonic discourse to change or be 
replaced than it is for a discourse which shows signs of instability and constant 
transformation. Thus, for example, while the representations of the U. K. in opposition to 
either the E. U. (in Ae Times discourse) or the U. S. (in the IndependentlMirror discourse) 
were replaced, at least temporarily, by a uniform discourse of the west in opposition to 
terrorism, the British press representation of the U. K. as a leader in world politics 
remained fixed and constant throughout the period of study, which essentially reveals the 
predominance of the British exceptionality and British leadership discourse and its firm 
foundations. The British state identity is therefore informed to a larger extent by a faith 
in British exceptionality than an allegiance to either the E. U. or the U. S. This also 
explains U. K. attitudes on E. U. membership. The E. U. is generally seen as either 
disempowering U. K. leadership or as a means to maintain or achieve this leadership role. 
Due to the fixity of the above discourse, it is highly unlikely that it will change in the 
near future; therefore, any future U. K. actions as an E. U. member are likely to be 
determined by its positioning as a world leader. Due to this construction of its state 
identity, the U. K. is unlikely to take decisions as an E. U. member that undermine or are 
seen to undermine this role. - 
Greek press representations 
In the Greek press, the September II events affected the hegemonic discourse on the U. S. 
and the E. U., and the role of Greece in the international arena. Specifically, the events 
accentuated the existing representations of the U. S. Whereas in the pre-September II 
period the hegemonic discourse constructed globalization as the biggest ill, and the rich, 
western capitalist countries headed by the U. S. as the main exploiters of the rest of the 
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world, this discourse was replaced by a rather U. S. centered discourse after the attacks, in 
which the U. S. became the perpetrator of most ills and the only major exploiter. The 
U. S. was also positioned in opposition to all other actors in the months leading to the Iraq 
war. However, the representation differed from the Afghanistan war period, since the 
U. S. was not only articulated as a world terrorist, but was also constructed as an evil, 
expanding empire intent on colonizing the world. 
Interestingly, the September II events substantially affected the Greek press 
representations of the E. U. Thus, before the attacks the E. U. was articulated as a 
potentially powerful and vibrant, yet nonetheless currently inactive and powerless body 
due to the domination of a few rich members. Immediately after the September II events 
and during the Afghanistan war, the E. U. did not feature often in the Greek press 
discourse, which focused on the U. S. terrorist state. However, shortly after the 
Afghanistan war, the E. U. was reconstituted as the only body capable of counteracting 
the U. S. empire. The E. U. was constructed as a normative power and a coherent, rather 
than a divided body that could and would save the planet from U. S. imperialism. Finally, 
throughout the period under study Greece itself was articulated as a small, powerless 
country that needed to be cautious and wary of its powerlessness in its relations with 
other countries, including the U. S. It was thus represented as needing to stay neutral, 
rather than taking sides in any emerging conflict. However, this was more evident during 
the Afghanistan war than during the Iraq war. Specifically, in the Iraq war period the 
U. S. was constituted as fiercer and more dangerous than in the previous two periods, 
while the E. U. was constructed as united and powerftil. As a result, Greece was 
positioned in identity and similarity to the E. U. and in need of adhering to the normative 
E. U. principles. 
7h e Greek state identity before and after September II 
In sum then, September II affected the existing Greek press representations. However, 
unlike the MirrorlIndependent discourse, in the Greek press this change was more 
gradual and longer-lasting, particularly in terms of the Greek representations of the U. S. 
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and the E. U. Analyzing the Greek press discourses reveals the stability and perseverance 
of negative representations of the U. S. throughout the entire period of study. The 
stability of the representation of the U. S. as a negative actor is evident in that it not only 
persisted throughout the period, but also gained strength after September 11, despite the 
fact that the attacks were inflicted on, rather than initiated by, the U. S. Constructions of 
the terrorist threat didn't diminish, but in fact enhanced the representations of the U. S. as 
the major global threat. This reveals the firm foundations of the above representation, 
which is unlikely to change. Since September II could not "soft&' the negative Greek 
press representations of the U. S., in most likelihood this representation will persist and 
will also be a determining factor in future productions and reproductions of the Greek 
state identity, which exists in opposition to the U. S. It is also evident that the discourses 
on the E. U. were less fixed and were formed and transformed in relation to the stable 
U. S. discourse. The more dangerous for world order the U. S. became in the Greek press 
discourse, the more benign and united the E. U. became. Because of this oppositional 
positioning of the E. U. and the U. S. in the Greek press discourse, any future discourses 
on the E. U. are also likely to be shaped by reference to this positioning. At the same 
time, the dominant discourse of Greece as a powerless country in a volatile area means 
that any future state identity is bound to be inextricably linked to and associated with a 
wider European identity; any future foreign policy action is also likely to be justified in a 
defensive way, as dictated by an alliance or the need to survive in a dangerous 
international sphere. 
In terms of Greek foreign policy, the representations of the September II events as the 
worthy punishment of a terrorist power and of the Iraq war as an illegal enterprise by an 
imperial superpower precluded the- possibility of -a close alliance with the U. S. In 
addition, the representations of the E. U. as the only solution in the post-September II era 
encouraged closer ties with the E. U. Moreover, the unimpeded U. S. and coalition use of 
Greek airspace and military assets for the war in Afghanistan was only justified by the 
government in terms of the need to survive in a hostile and dangerous environment rather 
than, for example, in terms of a U. S. -Greek friendship. 
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In the months leading to the Iraq war the Greek government refuted the U. S. military 
actions and encouraged a united E. U. front. Greek MPS irrespective of political 
affiliation cast a unanimous vote against the war. Greek policy makers were in 
agreement with the views held by the majority of the Greek public, which strongly 
opposed the war and U. S. actions. According to the ex minister of defence Akis 
Tsohatzopoulos, "bringing democracy was just an excuse for the U. S. to pursue its 
imperialist policies" (Tsakona, 2003: 8), while in an opinion poll conducted in March 
2003,90% of those polled replied that they totally disagreed with the war in Iraq, 
whereas almost 80% of the respondents held an unfavourable view towards the U. S. 
(Tsakona, 2003: 2). As the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis (2003) pointed out, 
I would like to express my regret that - despite persistent and continuous efforts 
... the 
hopes that war might be avoided are now zero. ne Iraq crisis, despite its 
importance for the region and the international community, will not affect the 
course of Europe. Nevertheless, I would like to stress the needfor the European 
countries to finally take the decision to implement a common foreign policy and 
defense policy, so that their intervention on the international scene will be 
effective. 
Indeed, after the September II events Greece has witnessed an increasing 
Europeanization of its decision-making process (Ioakeimidis, 2000; Kouneliotis, 2001; 
Stavridis, 2003). Greece ardently supports the deepening of integration in the areas of 
common defence, economic support and social policies, as well as the adoption of a 
European constitution (Ioakeimidis, 2001), while the Greek political parties display 
significant convergence "not only over the principal direction of institutional reform in 
the E. U. but also on the need to protect the European social model" (Pagoulatos, 2002: 
32). There has actually been a Europeanization of foreign policy, even to policy areas that 
haven't had to adapt to E. U. membership (Kavakas, 2000). Furthermore, the Greek 
public seems to also be very supportive of further integration, since in 2002 it displayed 
the highest percentage of support for enlargement (74% compared to an E. U. average of 
51%) and the highest percentage in wanting enlargement to speed up (Pagoulatos, 2002: 
24). Besides, according to a Eurobarometer questionnaire, Greek public opinion favours 
EU decision-making over national decision making in 23 out of 26 policy areas 
mentioned in the questionnaire. Such positive attitudes towards the E. U, and negative 
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attitudes towards the U. S. are not self-evident, since the U. S. remains the largest foreign 
investor in Greece, three million Americans are of Greek ancestry and the E. U. hasn't 
necessarily been very helpful or effective in assisting Greece in times of crisis (Tsakonas 
and Toumikiotis, 2003: 307) 
The British verstis the Greek press discourse 
The comparison between the British and Greek press representations is very important, 
since it deepens our understanding of the ways in which the 'same' event/s are 
understood in similar, or at least seemingly similar, contexts. This thesis showed 
significant national variation on issues that are often treated as uncontested. Thus, for 
example, terrorism was articulated very differently in the two E. U. member states. Even 
though there has been disagreement amongst E. U. states on how to defeat terrorism, there 
has hardly been discord on the meaning of terrorism, which is usually defined as "non- 
state threats in Europe and North America". As was shown throughout the thesis 
terrorism was understood -very 
differently in the Greek and British discourses. Whereas 
in the dominant British press discourse terrorism was articulated as non-state threats to 
the west, in the Greek discourse terrorism was mainly associated with the U. S. Even 
though the September II terrorists were also seen in a negative light, it was the U. S. 
terrorists who were represented as posing the biggest threat. Another example is the 
representations of the E. U. While in the MirrorlIndependent discourse the E. U. was 
simply seen as a means for the U. K. to act as a leader in world politics, in the Greek press 
discourse the E. U. and the Greek state identity were inextricably linked in a relationship 
of identity. 
Comparing the discourses of two E. U. countries enables one to understand the similarities 
and differences in the discourses themselves, and consequently in the countries' state 
identities. Moreover, this comparison enables us to appreciate the reasons why variation 
occurs and points of convergence and divergence between the state identities and is 
therefore valuable. A non-discursive realist approach would look, for example, at the 
countries' foreign policy relations and would focus on inter-state cooperation and inter- 
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state relations. Even though such an approach is useful, it doesn't account for change in 
the states' identities and merely compares stable and non-changing entities on similarly 
understood and uncontested issues. By showing significant variation in the countries' 
press discourses on issues such as terrorism and the E. U. this thesis has shown the 
importance of a discursive, comparative analysis as a means of understanding 
international relations. Understanding the non-fixity and ambiguity of our "reality" 
through the study of the press discourses of two seemingly similar countries on 
seemingly unambiguous or not very ambiguous issues is a positive step towards 
accepting difference and opening up dialogue as well as achieving both cooperation and 
change. More specifically, understanding that, for example, terrorism and the terrorists 
can be constituted as so different subjects and that specific issues are represented in 
different, often contrasting ways, which are nonetheless constructed as the "truth" can 
lead to the questioning of binary constructions and absolute truisms and the adoption of a 
more flexible and reflective approach, conducive to dialogue and cooperation. That often 
events or actors are represented in a one-dimensional way may seem to be a 
commonsensical and obvious observation, but it is nonetheless a very useful observation; 
Both in the British and Greek press there was a frequent use of the good/evil, 
civil ized/uncivilized binary, only to constitute different subjects. In the Greek 
newspapers the U. S. was the evil and uncivilized parts of the binary, while in the British 
press it was the "Islamic terrorists" who took up that role. Moreover, the west/east or the 
west versus the rest binary was employed in both countries' press; however, in the British 
press the west was represented in a positive light, whereas the opposite was the case in 
the Greek press. We often perceive, consciously or not, of the world in such an absolute 
way, as is evident in the British and Greek press, which in turn has consequences for the 
ways in which we act upon the world. ' 
Especially after the September II events such dichotomous constructions have dominated 
the public sphere. This thesis did not claim to provide solutions to problems such as 
terrorism or war; neither did it engage in a discussion of what is right or wrong. Its main 
aim was to analyze and deconstruct the main discourses that dominated the post- 
September II period in order to not only understand all those different discourses but 
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also expose the ways in which truth regimes were constructed, hoping that this exposition 
can encourage dialogue and change. The discursive analytic approach employed 
throughout the thesis was very useful in its elucidation of all those different discourses in 
the press of two culturally distinct, E. U. countries; it was also useful in showing that there 
were many similarities in the ways that these often opposing discourses were formed and 
transformed, thus rejecting the existence of one ultimate truth and highlighting the 
importance of respect for what is different. 
Future research 
As far is future research is concerned, it would be interesting to compare the press 
representations over a longer period of time, which would more clearly show the ways 
certain discourses, such as the British exceptionality discourse, or the representation of 
the U. S. as a very negative actor developed or whether, for example, the discourse on the 
terrorist threat is comparable to any discourses prior to the September II events. What 
would also be interesting for future work is for these findings to be combined with an 
examination of public officials' discourses during that period. This comparison would 
explore the dynamics between media discourses and official discourses and would ask 
questions like "what are the similarities and differences between the governmental 
discourses and the media discourses", "how did they both develop", "was there 
convergence or divergence and what does this reveal about the relationship between 
media and official discourses and its implication for the construction of national 
identities". It would also be very interesting to extend this study and compare media 
representations in other E. U. countries. This would offer a clearer picture of what are the 
main discourses on the above issues within the E. U. and would thus provide insight on 
points of convergence and divergence within the E. U. and on the E. U. as an institution. 
Moreover, such an exploration can lead to more effective cooperation between member 
states, since it would possibly draw attention to previously unexplored issues and would 
encourage member states to deal with issues from a different perspective. 
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